What do you think of John Hussman's plan for assisting homeowners? Is this plan being considered by anybody in power?
Source: http://hussmanfunds.com/wmc/wmc090223.htm
There are essentially only two ways to restructure mortgages. First, if it were possible to collect all of the pieces of various securitized mortgage issuances at large discounts to face value (say 60 cents on the dollar), then the government could write down the mortgage principal by the same amount of that discount, with absolutely no cost to taxpayers. Essentially, the losses already taken by lenders and the owners of those mortgage securities would be “passed on” to the underlying homeowners in the form of mortgage principal reductions.
Aside from that, the most useful feature of government in resolving the foreclosure crisis is not its ability to squander taxpayer money, but its ability to provide coordinated action. I still believe that the best approach to foreclosure abatement would be for the Treasury to set up a special “conduit” fund to administer “property appreciation rights” or what I've called PARs.
Suppose a $300,000 mortgage is in foreclosure (or the homeowner and lender can agree to the following arrangement outside of foreclosure court). A reasonable mortgage restructuring might be to cut the principal of the mortgage to $200,000, and to create a $100,000 PAR. The homeowner would agree to pay off the PAR to the Treasury (and administered through the IRS) out of future price appreciation on the existing home or subsequent property. The homeowner would be excluded from taking on any home equity loans or executing any “cash out” refinancings until the PAR was satisfied. The maximum PAR obligation accepted by the Treasury would be based on the value of the home and the income of the homeowner.
The lender would receive not a direct claim on that homeowner, but a participation in the Treasury's “PAR fund” which would pay out proportionately out of all PAR proceeds received by the Treasury (technically, new shares in the PAR fund would be assigned based on a ratio reflecting the extent to which existing shareholders have already been paid off, so earlier shareholders don't receive more than they have coming to them).
Importantly, the Treasury would not guarantee repayment, but would simply serve as a conduit. There would be no “free lunch” at taxpayer expense. If the homeowner was to eventually sell the home and not purchase another, the obligation would become a low-interest loan obligation and would eventually be a claim on the estate of the homeowner, but with an initial exclusion at low income and a progressive recovery rate based on the size of the estate. The PARs would be tradeable, since they would be based on a single pool of cash flows, though they would almost certainly trade at a discount to face value. Assuming that the PAR obligations are fixed and don't increase at some rate of interest, then even if home prices were expected to take about 15 years to recover, the PARs would still trade at more than 50% of face. Given that recovery rates in foreclosure are running at only about 50% of the entire loan, it is clear that this sort of approach would be preferable to foreclosure in most cases. If it were available, lenders might agree to outright principal reductions as well in preference a costly foreclosure process.
This sort of approach would reduce foreclosures without relying on free money from the government, or violating contract law. The PARs would provide a legally enforceable, diversified stream of cash flows at far lower cost than individual lenders would have to spend to collect from individual homeowners. Since home sales are taxable events, the IRS would be in an ideal position to enforce these obligations.
Aside from that, the most useful feature of government in resolving the foreclosure crisis is not its ability to squander taxpayer money, but its ability to provide coordinated action. I still believe that the best approach to foreclosure abatement would be for the Treasury to set up a special “conduit” fund to administer “property appreciation rights” or what I've called PARs.
Suppose a $300,000 mortgage is in foreclosure (or the homeowner and lender can agree to the following arrangement outside of foreclosure court). A reasonable mortgage restructuring might be to cut the principal of the mortgage to $200,000, and to create a $100,000 PAR. The homeowner would agree to pay off the PAR to the Treasury (and administered through the IRS) out of future price appreciation on the existing home or subsequent property. The homeowner would be excluded from taking on any home equity loans or executing any “cash out” refinancings until the PAR was satisfied. The maximum PAR obligation accepted by the Treasury would be based on the value of the home and the income of the homeowner.
The lender would receive not a direct claim on that homeowner, but a participation in the Treasury's “PAR fund” which would pay out proportionately out of all PAR proceeds received by the Treasury (technically, new shares in the PAR fund would be assigned based on a ratio reflecting the extent to which existing shareholders have already been paid off, so earlier shareholders don't receive more than they have coming to them).
Importantly, the Treasury would not guarantee repayment, but would simply serve as a conduit. There would be no “free lunch” at taxpayer expense. If the homeowner was to eventually sell the home and not purchase another, the obligation would become a low-interest loan obligation and would eventually be a claim on the estate of the homeowner, but with an initial exclusion at low income and a progressive recovery rate based on the size of the estate. The PARs would be tradeable, since they would be based on a single pool of cash flows, though they would almost certainly trade at a discount to face value. Assuming that the PAR obligations are fixed and don't increase at some rate of interest, then even if home prices were expected to take about 15 years to recover, the PARs would still trade at more than 50% of face. Given that recovery rates in foreclosure are running at only about 50% of the entire loan, it is clear that this sort of approach would be preferable to foreclosure in most cases. If it were available, lenders might agree to outright principal reductions as well in preference a costly foreclosure process.
This sort of approach would reduce foreclosures without relying on free money from the government, or violating contract law. The PARs would provide a legally enforceable, diversified stream of cash flows at far lower cost than individual lenders would have to spend to collect from individual homeowners. Since home sales are taxable events, the IRS would be in an ideal position to enforce these obligations.
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