military spending to the rescue

[marvenger]

Re: military spending to the rescue

yeah seems like you sacrifice sovereignty for security. Wonder what security will be like in a multipolar world?

[Ghent12]

Re: military spending to the rescue

yeah seems like you sacrifice sovereignty for security. Wonder what security will be like in a multipolar world?

Probably similar to what it was in previous multipolar eras, but with more wild cards (Pakistan) and nuclear weapons.

I don't necessarily subscribe to the idea that it will be a multipolar world, however. Call me crazy, but I don't see the vacuum being as strong as you guys posit, nor do I see anyone but China willing to fill it.

[rj1]

Re: military spending to the rescue

Probably similar to what it was in previous multipolar eras, but with more wild cards (Pakistan) and nuclear weapons.

I don't necessarily subscribe to the idea that it will be a multipolar world, however. Call me crazy, but I don't see the vacuum being as strong as you guys posit, nor do I see anyone but China willing to fill it.

The thing most on here are missing is that the Far East is half a world away from the U.S. and that's a big detriment toward maintaining a level of control that our pussy politicians and public believe we should have or we should withdraw, as well as the fact if we're going to continue to remain Top Dog in the Far East waters, we need to start building more ships because at the current force levels and where they're going, we cannot overextend ourselves. That part of the world consists of many strong countries capable of strong militaries: Australia, India, China, Japan. And there are plenty of hot spots there that has not had a war in the past 30 years that could flare up at any time where these four countries look at each other in a square: Taiwan, North Korea, Pakistan, Nepal just to name a few.

Here's a site I read and their take on this.

http://informationdissemination.blog...-on-china.html

Australian Defense Will Focus on China

Just as Australia’s strategic outlook has been dominated in past decades by American primacy in Asia, so in future will it be shaped more than anything else by what follows as American primacy fades and China grows. The biggest risk is not that China itself becomes a direct threat to Australia, but that the erosion of American power unleashes strategic competition among Asia’s strongest states, which in turn increases the risk that Australia could face a number of military threats to its interests or even its territorial security.

We can escape that risk if the U.S., China, Japan and eventually India can avoid escalating strategic competition by negotiating a new set of understandings to replace those that have kept Asia so peaceful for the past forty years. The essential basis of any new understanding would be a more equal sharing of power among these key states.

But is America really willing to treat China as an equal? Will China settle for anything less? And can either treat Japan as an equal? And will Japan — still a huge power — settle for less than China gets? Unless these questions can be resolved, it is hard to see how escalating strategic competition can be avoided in the longer term.


A FOCUSED FORCE: Australia’s Defence Priorities in the Asian Century, Lowy Institute Paper 26, April 2009, Hugh White, Executive Summary

Hugh White's report set the stage a few weeks ago for the upcoming release of the Australian Defense White paper, which in case you have not heard, is expected to reach conclusions in stark contrast to the United States. News reports in Australia have not been able to resist discussing the gap between the U.S. and Australia regarding the future strategic environment of the Pacific. First it was reported that Australia's military planners asked the U.S. to reconsider their dove-like assessment of China, and also rejected the broader "Gates View" that unconventional non-state conflicts being the primary strategic threat over the next 20-30 years. The rebuff was mutual, as 2 days later The Australian reported the CIA and Pentagon rejected the hawkish arguments made by Australia's Defense leaders about the threat poised by China.

It is noteworthy that Australia is calling China the "next cold war" and when they came to Washington earlier this month, the Australian military leaders has expectations to recruit the U.S. towards this view. On the contrary, the U.S. rejected this assessment, and agreed with opinions of Australia's Defense Intelligence Organization and the Office of National Assessments, also known as Australia's spy agencies, which suggest China's military build-up is defensive in nature and unlikely to pose a long-term threat to Australia's security.

Following that assessment, the Rudd Government appointed the head of the Lowry Institute, Allan Gyngall, as the new head of ONA. It is noteworthy that another former ONA chief, Geoff Miller, had recently stated the following regarding the strategic threat regarding China as reported on The Australian blog.

CAMERON Stewart and Patrick Walters ("Defence plan rejects US strategy”, 13/4) report that “a group of senior Defence officials and ... army, navy and air force chiefs” have successfully argued, in the context of the coming defence white paper, that “Australia’s future defence force should be structured primarily for involvement in conventional warfare”, with China as “the greatest strategic danger to Australia”. To meet this danger, Australia should have new frigates, destroyers and 12 new generation submarines.

This view of China as a strategic danger seems at odds with our existing national policies towards China, our second largest trading partner and source of thousands of students at our universities. The main points of current difference are over the non-war-like topics of the timing and content of a free trade agreement, and how much and what kinds of investment each should allow from the other.

Setting aside the question of the validity of the reported “China threat” analysis, it is surely the height of hubris to suppose that if China—a nuclear power and a country now frequently mentioned as a member, with the U.S., of a coming global “Group of Two”—decided, against all expectations, to threaten us militarily, we could deter it or defend against it by our own efforts. In such extreme circumstances we would have one recourse, and that is our alliance with the U.S.

We need to question the rationale for this proposed force build-up. Apparently a force including 12 “new generation” submarines is envisaged. How realistic is this when we can only muster crews for half of the six Collins-class submarines we presently have?

I have a serious question. Wouldn't a massive naval and air force buildup in Australia be in best interests of the U.S.? If the United States is going to reorganize towards a balanced force, wouldn't a military buildup by Australia be a good thing right now? We know that absent a major change in global conditions, the Obama administration plan is to maintain static and potentially reduced defense budgets over the next few years. Under these conditions, and with both shipbuilding a mess and the retirement of the F-22 line, the U.S. is making choices that reduce mid-term capabilities in major war in favor of dealing with the current wars the nation is in. Under those conditions, why wouldn't an offset in the Pacific in the form of Australia doing a major upgrade of naval and air force capabilities be a welcome thing for U.S. strategy?

The way I see it, there are plenty of domestic debates that will come out of the defense white paper, most of which will be useful in informing the Australian public about the major military growth taking place in the Pacific. While I think the specifics regarding what kind of equipment is certainly a legitimate debate, particularly in regards to submarines because there have been severe crew shortages with the Collins class, the strategic direction expected in the Defense White Paper that focuses on China as the primary strategic challenge appears to me to be very much aligned with U.S. interests.

It is important to note, the strategic direction of Australia does not necessarily need to match the strategic direction of the U.S., and the way I see it, a strategic direction that expands the capabilities of Australia in the Pacific at the high end is probably better for U.S. strategic interests right now than creating a force optimized for small wars at this time. If Australia, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan become more hardened against the potential threat of China, this reduces the risk to the U.S. as we shift towards a balanced force.

Until the intentions of China are more transparent and better understood, the increase of defense capabilities at the high end in the Pacific decreases the risk for both the U.S. and Europe who can then increase the capabilities of their military at the lower end. In this way, I see the strategic direction of Australia to make China the central strategic threat to Australia to be very much aligned with the current U.S. direction towards a balanced force.

[marvenger]

Re: military spending to the rescue

Power is all about control of resources and Australia is right in the middle of a region increasing its power and we have a lot of resources, so I'm a little worried for sure.

I agree with the paper that building the high end is in line with US interests and that we're doing it to try and stay an ally but Ithink that is only part of it because if China did a full invasion or something which I currently think is very unlikely I don't think its worth the US's while to save our bacon no matter how much they like us.

The focus on the 12 subs is the issue, like the article says we can't even get a crew together for the 6 subs we've already got. But what we do have is Sub building facilities in South Australia and an economy in decline. I think its clearly a military spending and boosting of skills ploy to help offset the global decline. South Australia is trying to transform itself into a bit of a high tech manufacturing hub. Considering they're mostly inbred there and chop up their friends and hide the body parts in barrels they've got their work cut out for them.