Re: Resist or Become Serfs
Yes there is another crisis that people forget about, that led to the 1972 gold default. And that was the 1964 demonetization of silver by LBJ -- and of course there was the 1873 demonetization of silver. The Crime of 1873
1873
The above led to the Long Depression.
Originally posted by Lukester
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Back to 1971: Nixon's action was more than symbolic. It had real impact. And to conservatives of the day, the anguish caused by the closing of the gold window was dwarfed by the shock of wage and price controls simultaneously imposed by Executive Order. (Some contend that several key Southern Californian Nixon supporters never forgave him for that betrayal, and quietly swung their financial support to Ronald Reagan.)
In 1971, Nixon was preparing for his reelection campaign. He was tidying up potentially troublesome areas. Consumer and wholesale price indices were bubbling up although the increases were miniscule as compared with inflation rates nine years later. Nixon's brain trust believed controls would be politically palatable, and could head off future price increases long enough to ensure his reelection.
The closing of the gold window meant little to most Americans as citizens had been legally barred from holding the precious metal since 1933.
As part of his reelection campaign, Nixon also wanted to punish French president Charles DeGaulle. In compliance to federal direction, the US media caricaturized the elegant, aloof French hero as unappreciative. After all, American conscripts had saved the French from the Hun in two world wars. This comic opera general was greedily using American dollars to plunder our gold reserves. Putting this ingrate in his place would resonate well with US voters.
Where was the dissent? Well, there wasn't much.
The equity markets had little interest in the closing of the gold window, but wage and price controls set the stock market off to record-high percentile increases the day following the announcement. Only a few old-fashioned economists, like Murray Rothbard and Hans Senholz, shook their heads in disbelief. The failed ghost of controls had arisen once more.
And by 1971 most Americans had little first-hand memory of gold. The Depression and WW II were indelibly imprinted on their psyches and if they thought about gold at all, it was as a murky link to the hard times of the 1930s. Silver was a different story. The dimes, quarters, and half dollars minted almost continually from 1796 through 1964 were 90% silver. Most folks simply took it for granted that the coinage was silver.
Not one in a thousand reflected that one dollar's face value in silver coins contained 72 parts of a pure ounce and that at $1.29 an ounce, the price fixed by the Treasury Department, the intrinsic value was precisely one dollar. This magnificent reality went unnoticed.
In 1971, Nixon was preparing for his reelection campaign. He was tidying up potentially troublesome areas. Consumer and wholesale price indices were bubbling up although the increases were miniscule as compared with inflation rates nine years later. Nixon's brain trust believed controls would be politically palatable, and could head off future price increases long enough to ensure his reelection.
The closing of the gold window meant little to most Americans as citizens had been legally barred from holding the precious metal since 1933.
As part of his reelection campaign, Nixon also wanted to punish French president Charles DeGaulle. In compliance to federal direction, the US media caricaturized the elegant, aloof French hero as unappreciative. After all, American conscripts had saved the French from the Hun in two world wars. This comic opera general was greedily using American dollars to plunder our gold reserves. Putting this ingrate in his place would resonate well with US voters.
Where was the dissent? Well, there wasn't much.
The equity markets had little interest in the closing of the gold window, but wage and price controls set the stock market off to record-high percentile increases the day following the announcement. Only a few old-fashioned economists, like Murray Rothbard and Hans Senholz, shook their heads in disbelief. The failed ghost of controls had arisen once more.
And by 1971 most Americans had little first-hand memory of gold. The Depression and WW II were indelibly imprinted on their psyches and if they thought about gold at all, it was as a murky link to the hard times of the 1930s. Silver was a different story. The dimes, quarters, and half dollars minted almost continually from 1796 through 1964 were 90% silver. Most folks simply took it for granted that the coinage was silver.
Not one in a thousand reflected that one dollar's face value in silver coins contained 72 parts of a pure ounce and that at $1.29 an ounce, the price fixed by the Treasury Department, the intrinsic value was precisely one dollar. This magnificent reality went unnoticed.
What is known in Populist rhetoric of the late XIX century as The Crime of 1873 was the demonetization of silver enacted by the Coinage Act of 1873. Alexander Hamilton had set the United States on a bimetallic standard in 1792 and, with the notable exception of the Civil War, the country had not moved from this system. In practice this was a continuous switching from a gold standard to a silver standard. When the legal price of gold in term of silver, that is, how many pounds of silver you get for one pound of gold, which was set by the Coinage Act at 15 for 1, was greater than the market price, then nobody would bring gold to the mint and the country would be on a de facto monometallic silver standard.
The consequences of this technical decision were enormous, and it seems to be clear in the view of recent research that many people suffered from until the end of the century. Go to the next slide to see what were those consequences.
Immediately after the United States went for a gold standard regime in 1873, the market price of gold in term of silver began to rise, starting from about 15 in 1870 to reach a maximum of about 40 in 1900.
The demonetization of silver was accompanied by several circumstances which led to a strong secular deflationary trend of about 1.7 % a year in the general CPI from 1875 to 1896.
The consequences of this technical decision were enormous, and it seems to be clear in the view of recent research that many people suffered from until the end of the century. Go to the next slide to see what were those consequences.
Immediately after the United States went for a gold standard regime in 1873, the market price of gold in term of silver began to rise, starting from about 15 in 1870 to reach a maximum of about 40 in 1900.
The demonetization of silver was accompanied by several circumstances which led to a strong secular deflationary trend of about 1.7 % a year in the general CPI from 1875 to 1896.
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