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The Invisible One Quadrillion Dollar Equation -- Asymmetric Leverage and Systemic Risk

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  • The Invisible One Quadrillion Dollar Equation -- Asymmetric Leverage and Systemic Risk

    I am reposting this to the news thread, even though it is from October -- this piece offers a good analysis of the derivatives problem.

    The Invisible One Quadrillion Dollar Equation -- Asymmetric Leverage and Systemic Risk

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    Let us think about the invisible USD 1.144 quadrillion equation with black swan variables -- ie, 1,144 trillion dollars in terms of outstanding derivatives, global Gross Domestic Product (GDP), real estate, world stock and bond markets coupled with unknown unknowns or "Black Swans". What would be the relative positioning of USD 1.144 quadrillion for outstanding derivatives, ie, what is their scale:

    1. The entire GDP of the US is about USD 14 trillion.

    2. The entire US money supply is also about USD 15 trillion.

    3. The GDP of the entire world is USD 50 trillion. USD 1,144 trillion is 22 times the GDP of the whole world.

    4. The real estate of the entire world is valued at about USD 75 trillion.

    5. The world stock and bond markets are valued at about USD 100 trillion.

    6. The big banks alone own about USD 140 trillion in derivatives.

    7. Bear Stearns had USD 13+ trillion in derivatives and went bankrupt in March. Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, Lehman Brothers and AIG have all 'collapsed' because of complex securities and derivatives exposures in September.

    8. The population of the whole planet is about 6 billion people. So the derivatives market alone represents about USD 190,000 per person on the planet.

    The Impact of Derivatives

    1. Derivatives are securities whose value depends on the underlying value of other basic securities and associated risks. Derivatives have exploded in use over the past two decades. We cannot even properly define many classes of derivatives because they are highly complex instruments and come in many shapes, sizes, colours and flavours and display different characteristics under different market conditions.

    2. Derivatives are unregulated, not traded on any public exchange, without universal standards, dealt with by private agreement, not transparent, have no open bid/ask market, are unguaranteed, have no central clearing house, and are just not really tangible.

    3. Derivatives include such well known instruments as futures and options which are actively traded on numerous exchanges as well as numerous over-the-counter instruments such as interest rate swaps, forward contracts in foreign exchange and interest rates, and various commodity and equity instruments.

    4. Everyone from the large financial institutions, governments, corporations, mutual and pension funds, to hedge funds, and large and small speculators, uses derivatives. However, they have never existed in history with the overarching, exorbitant scale that they now do.

    5. Derivatives are unravelling at a fast rate with the start of the "Great Unwind" of the global credit markets which began in July 2007 and particularly after the collapse of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae in September this year.

    6. When derivatives unravel significantly the entire world economy would be at peril, given the relatively smaller scale of the world economy by comparison.

    7. The derivatives market collapse could make the housing and stock market collapses look incidental.

    Three Historical Examples

    1. The so-called rogue trader Nick Leeson who made a huge derivatives bet on the direction of the Japanese Nikkei index brought on the collapse of Barings Bank in 1995.

    2. The collapse of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM), a hedge fund that had a former derivatives and bond dealer from Salomon Brothers and two Nobel Prize winners in Economics as principals, collapsed because of huge leveraged bets in currencies and bonds in 1998.

    3. Finally, a lot of the problems of Enron in 2000 were brought on by leveraged derivatives and using derivatives to hide problems on the balance sheet.

    The Pitfall

    The single conceptual pitfall at the basis of the disorderly growth of the global derivatives market is the postulate of hedging and netting, which lies at the basis of each model and of the whole regulatory environment hyper structure. Perfect hedges and perfect netting require functioning markets. When one or more markets become dysfunctional, the whole deck of cards could collapse swiftly. To hope, as US Treasury Secretary Mr Henry Paulson does, that an accounting ruse such as transferring liabilities, however priced, from a private to a public agent will restore the functionality of markets implies a drastic jump in logic. Markets function only when:

    1. There is a price level at which demand meets supply; and more importantly when

    2. Both sides believe in each other's capacity to deliver.

    Satisfying criterion 1. without satisfying criterion 2. which is essentially about trust, gets one nowhere in the long term, although in the short term, the markets may demonstrate momentary relief and euphoria.

    Conclusion

    In the context of the USD 700 billion rescue plan -- still being finalised in Washington, DC -- the following is worth considering step by step. Decision makers are rightly concerned about alleviating immediate pressure points in the global financial system, such as, the mortgage crisis, decline in consumer spending and the looming loss of confidence in financial institutions. However, whilst these problems are grave, they are acting as a catalyst to another more massive challenge which may have to be tackled across many nation states simultaneously. As money flows slow down sharply, confidence levels would decline across the globe, and trust would be broken asymmetrically, ie, the time taken to repair it would be much longer. Unless there is government action in concert, this could ignite a chain-reaction which would swiftly purge trillions and trillions of dollars in over-leveraged risky bets. Within the context of over-leverage, the biggest problem of all is to do with "Derivatives", of which CDSs are a minor subset. Warren Buffett has said the derivatives neutron bomb has the potential to destroy the entire world economy, and is a "disaster waiting to happen." He has also referred to derivatives as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Counting one dollar per second, it would take 32 million years to count to one Quadrillion. The numbers we are dealing with are absolutely astronomical and from the realms of super computing we have stepped into global economics. There is a sense of no sustainability and lack of longevity in the "Invisible One Quadrillion Dollar Equation" of the derivatives market especially with attendant Black Swan variables causing multiple implosions amongst financial institutions and counterparties! The only way out, albeit painful, is via discretionary case-by-case government intervention on an unprecedented scale. Securing the savings and assets of ordinary citizens ought to be the number one concern in directing such policy.

  • #2
    Credit Default Swaps – Exercises in Surrealism

    This has to be read in conjunction with Satyajit Das' latest

    Credit Default Swaps – Exercises in Surrealism

    At the quantum level, the laws of classical physics alter in intriguing ways. In financial markets, at the derivative level, the rules of finance also operate differently.

    The derivative industry’s indefatigable advocacy of credit default swaps (“CDS”) centers on the fact that contracts related to recent defaults settled and the overall net settlement amounts were small. Closer scrutiny suggests causes for caution.

    The CDS contract is triggered by a “credit event”; broadly, default by the reference entity. CDS contracts on Freddie and Fannie were ‘technically’ triggered as a result of the conservatorship necessitating settlement of around $500 billion in CDS contracts with losses totaling $25 to $40 billion. Government actions were specifically designed to allow the firms to continue fully honouring their obligations. Triggering of these contracts poses questions on the effectiveness of CDS contracts in transferring risk of default.

    Practical restrictions on settling CDS contracts has forced the use of “protocols” – where counterparties may substitute cash settlement for physical delivery. In cash settlement, the seller makes a payment to the buyer of protection to cover the loss suffered by the protection buyer based on the market price of defaulted bonds established through an “auction” system.

    For the GSEs, the auction prices resulted in the following settlements by sellers of protection: Fannie Mae – around 8.49% for senior debt and 0.01% for subordinated debt. Freddie Mac – around 6.00% for senior debt and 2.00 % for subordinated debt.

    Subordinated debt ranks behind senior debt and is expected to suffer larger losses in bankruptcy. The lower payout on subordinated debt probably resulted from subordinated protection buyers suffering in a short squeeze resulting in their contracts expiring virtually worthless. Differences in the payouts between the two entities are also puzzling given that they are both under identical “conservatorship” arrangements and the ultimate risk in both cases is the US government.

    In other CDS settlements in 2008 and 2009, the payouts required from sellers of protection have been highly variable and large relative to historical default loss statistics. This may reflect poor economic conditions but are more likely driven by technical issues related to the CDS market.

    For example, the Washington Mutual payout (around 43%) may have been affected by capital remaining at the holding company, Washington Mutual Inc. (estimated at $2.8 billion). More recently, the auction settlement of Lyondell (around 80-85%) reflected complication from the role of debtor in possession financing and complex collateral allocation mechanisms.

    Skewed payouts do not assist confidence in CDS contracts as a mechanism for hedging. In addition, the large payouts are placing a material pressure on the price of underlying bonds and loans exacerbating broader credit problems.

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    • #3
      Re: The Invisible One Quadrillion Dollar Equation -- Asymmetric Leverage and Systemic Risk

      I don't really understand all this, but the question in my mind is: why do regulators allow derivatives? Why not close this all down: first, by placing upper limits on the transaction amounts of derivative contracts, and then scaling those limits back, gradually? This common-sense strategy would soft-land us out of this mess.

      Comment


      • #4
        Re: Credit Default Swaps – Exercises in Surrealism

        Rajiv - this is a very good reason why the USD may provide stellar out-performance over the next couple of years. It would seem safe to conclude at very least, that the converging bids on the USD will be massive as this is evidently coming to a head one way or another. iTulip suggests that emerging purchasing power decay for the USD is inevitable without too much more delay (and they certainly are not the only ones) but the above described level of screaming demand for the currency unit to settle even a portion of what Das describes, may forestall that a good while?

        And it raises another question which was discussed briefly in Finster's 4321 Deflation thread. That was, whether the massive bid underpinning the USD should be regarded as a "synthetic" event or as the classic bid upon "money" characteristic of all deflations. Seems to me that due to precisely what Satyajit Das lays out, the bid will ultimately be massively synthetic, if only because there has never been a bid for cash to settle of even remotely a comparable scale (even relative to GDP). Modern financial engineering, via the scale up of the derivatives pile, has created a need for "money" to close out these positions which has morphed into such large notional numbers as to render this monetary unit's continuing "moneyness" something that can legitimately be questioned.

        Or at least to expand "US money" out to meet the coming requirements would suggest it becomes completely unrecognizable when compared to "money" aggregates behavior in any other deflation.

        Finster argued that "they are all the same" and that the bid on the USD as "money" here was not in any core respect different to the bid on "money" in any prior (exceedingly rare) deflations to be found in modern history.

        It's an interesting question. Your cited article points out the gargantuan disparity of SCALE which the notional aggregate amounts in derivatives represent. Of course that number is not the hard core net of liabilities to settle, but the distinction may verge upon immaterial because even fractions of a quadrillion boost the notional "money amounts" out of the realm of real money anyway? At least when we venture into the derivatives, the scale is in a class beyond any debt pyramids at other points in history - so where does that leave us? Does the implicit bid upon the fiat USD from this event represent a bid for synthetic, or real money, and does it suggest the USD is being bid upon in the same sense as "money" as it was in the early 1930's? I did not get a clear sense of what EJ's position on that was, although Fred interjected some comment (I can't recall exactly what).

        Finster chooses to make no distinction between this bid on "money" and any other deflation. Should a distinction be made between this scale of notional "need for money" and the "need for money" that occurred in the early 1930's? Quite evidently one was real money (or as real as money gets, being gold and silver certificates at the time), and the notional amounts being bandied about today to reconcile these derivatives strain any remaining tattered definition of the fiat USD as money to the limit, by virtue of the scale of it's sudden required expansion? Of course the paradox is that during the two or three years of such an unfolding event, the USD may become very "hard" indeed, due to the red-hot bid upon it.

        Originally posted by Rajiv View Post
        This has to be read in conjunction with Satyajit Das' latest

        Credit Default Swaps – Exercises in Surrealism
        Last edited by Contemptuous; March 17, 2009, 12:31 AM.

        Comment


        • #5
          Re: The Invisible One Quadrillion Dollar Equation -- Asymmetric Leverage and Systemic Risk

          The regulators accept this because the system is corrupt. CDS for example are nothing else than bond insurance paper which circumvents the regulation of minimum required collateral.

          Plus most of the people don't really understand that the CDS house of cards is not really as dangerous that it seems.
          For example in the daisy chain architecture: Entity B insures $10 mil of A issued bonds with a CDS bought from entity C.
          C is a hedgefund and needs the the collateral therefore reinsures the $10 mil A bond with a naked CDS written by entity D (hopefully at few bps below what C gets from B). D can pass the dead cat by buying protection for those $10 mil from bank E which gets protection from hedgefund F for the same bond.

          In fact B buys protection for that 10 mil A bond from hedgefund F. If A fails then F pays rougly 10 mil to entity B. A $10 mil loss is passed from B to F through a chain of $40 mil notional derivatives.

          There are actually only 4 major structures of payment interaction, if we make abstraction of multisector CDO's (which can lead to completely surreal structures).

          Plus largest volume of derivatives are not not CDS but in currency and forex swaps ... so not really a big deal. Those who unrerstand the derivatives game make good money with virtually no risk. Those who get into this game without understanding what they are doing end up like AIG, and the mast guys still make good money by fleecing the taxpayer (like AIG's counterparties did).


          Most people actually still do not understand even the CDO's. Very few people know, for example, that in fact the CDO acronym stands for Credit Default Obligation

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          • #6
            Re: The Invisible One Quadrillion Dollar Equation -- Asymmetric Leverage and Systemic Risk

            Currency swaps are one type of credit default swaps. CDS is a ponzi scheme at best and it is a massive problem. Many thought they could circumvent risk by purchasing this crap. Many were bundled with the CDO (completely different) thus giving them AAA ratings and sold to mutual funds, pensions, etc. So of the deadbeat "losers" stopped paying their loans, they thought they could recoup through the CDS, and thus no downside risk... Everyone selling CDO and CDS drank the kool-aid and believed that this crap was benign. HOwever, they just turned the risk of failure of a small firm into a systemic risk. Failure of AIG would have collapsed every financial firm in the nation. Probably should let them all fail because AIG is a rat hole. Can't possibly pay off all the bad bets.

            BTW CDO stands for collaterilized debt obligation. It is not a derivative. It was supposed to be backed by a variety of different loans.

            Comment


            • #7
              Re: The Invisible One Quadrillion Dollar Equation -- Asymmetric Leverage and Systemic Risk

              Originally posted by kartius919 View Post
              CDS is a ponzi scheme at best and it is a massive problem.
              CDS are not a Ponzi scheme. There is no need for a continually increased investment in order to transform it in apparent revenue stream for 'investors'

              Originally posted by kartius919 View Post
              Many thought they could circumvent risk by purchasing this crap.
              Those who knew what they were doing actually made even nice money by buying CDS (Lahde is an example)
              Originally posted by kartius919 View Post
              Everyone selling CDO and CDS drank the kool-aid and believed that this crap was benign.
              Wrong. Not everyone buying or selling CDS drank kool-aid, but many did.
              Originally posted by kartius919 View Post
              HOwever, they just turned the risk of failure of a small firm into a systemic risk.
              Not really. CDS were used as one of the tools to misrepresent or better said distort the perception of risk. But they were not the cause of systemic risk.

              Originally posted by kartius919 View Post
              BTW CDO stands for collaterilized debt obligation. It is not a derivative.
              First, the smiley should have made pretty clear the explanation for the CDO acronim was a joke. I can forgive ignorance ( FYI CDO's are a class of credit derivatives while currency swaps are not CDS), but what I can't forgive is when people are unable to get a joke and I need to explain it in detail .

              (PS the correct spelling is collateralized not collaterilized)

              Comment


              • #8
                Re: The Invisible One Quadrillion Dollar Equation -- Asymmetric Leverage and Systemic Risk

                Originally posted by Starving Steve View Post
                I don't really understand all this, but the question in my mind is: why do regulators allow derivatives? Why not close this all down: first, by placing upper limits on the transaction amounts of derivative contracts, and then scaling those limits back, gradually? This common-sense strategy would soft-land us out of this mess.
                There is no need in regulating derivatives. There is need to regulate the banks as well as to create a sound foundation of the financial system (if not the original gold standard, then, at least something similar to Bretton-Woods agreement).

                First, we removed the gold as the foundation and propagated the insane fractional reserve banking model. Then, this "system" creates waves of wild "money" sloshing around and driving bubbles in various sectors of the economy all over the world. And, god forbid, nobody is allowed to fail. Failure is outlawed and regulation looks more, like intervention.

                Of course, this insane amount of paper "wealth" now requires "regulation" on every step. It would be much simpler to have:
                a. international gold standard,
                b. no fractional reserve,
                c. reasonable trade barriers,
                d. consistent anti-monopoly regulation.

                If no banks are too big to fail, and they do it regularly, the fear of god will return. No derivative regulation will be necessary.
                медведь

                Comment


                • #9
                  Re: The Invisible One Quadrillion Dollar Equation -- Asymmetric Leverage and Systemic Risk

                  The USD's comparison to traditional sovereign currencies creates more noise than light. It is the medium of settlement in a world that will be settling a heckuva lot in the near-term. It is a very different beast altogether, the pick axe salesman at the gold rush to whom all frenzied miners must first report.

                  The guy who sells the pick axes enjoys an entirely unique experience at the gold rush. One might even say he derives an 'unfair' advantage. This may subject classic deflation/inflation scenarios to the ash-heap. After all, he is a human like all other humans. Well, yes and no. Does a holder of USD's care if the currency's strength is 'synthetically' derived? Only inasmuch as this settlement-driven phenomenon is of finite duration and the USD returns to a traditional sovereign status. The near-cessation of international trade and cross-border activity, protectionism etc., would mitigate the need for a reserve currency. The USD is the world's currency. In an odd way it's nexus of origin (the US of A) has a certain 'incidentality'. In the same way, the USA benefits 'unfairly' from its currency's reserve status. But in a long term, post-synthetic era, as the books are settled, the USD would suffer a precipitous fate as world trade collapsed.

                  I'm beginning to sense how devilishly clever this reserve currency thing is. Over the years, everybody has been coaxed into playing this game. There are no oases of calm. Dare I say the USD is the currency of the New World Order? Global collapse will consolidate its power and permanently cement its status. The only countervailance is the barabarous relic. But it's the relic part that troubles me.
                  Last edited by due_indigence; March 17, 2009, 05:55 AM.

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                  • #10
                    Re: The Invisible One Quadrillion Dollar Equation -- Asymmetric Leverage and Systemic Risk

                    Interest swaps are credit derivatives not CDS. My mistake

                    Derivatives are major part ponzi scheme. One purchases 10 billion in swaps. He then offsets them buy selling 10 billion in swaps. His cash flow is from the differences in the premiums along with the fees that are generated. The new purchaser than must sell 10 billion in swaps to net back to near 0. He must achieve a higher premium in order to make a profit.

                    Of course some people have made money. That is the purpose of a ponzi scheme.

                    The other part is pure unregulated gambling casino. Minor part is actual insurance.

                    Derivatives is sufficient to collapse the entire financial markets.
                    Last edited by kartius919; March 17, 2009, 06:19 AM.

                    Comment


                    • #11
                      Re: The Invisible One Quadrillion Dollar Equation -- Asymmetric Leverage and Systemic Risk

                      Originally posted by $#* View Post
                      Plus most of the people don't really understand that the CDS house of cards is not really as dangerous that it seems.
                      For example in the daisy chain architecture: Entity B insures $10 mil of A issued bonds with a CDS bought from entity C.
                      C is a hedgefund and needs the the collateral therefore reinsures the $10 mil A bond with a naked CDS written by entity D (hopefully at few bps below what C gets from B). D can pass the dead cat by buying protection for those $10 mil from bank E which gets protection from hedgefund F for the same bond.

                      In fact B buys protection for that 10 mil A bond from hedgefund F. If A fails then F pays rougly 10 mil to entity B. A $10 mil loss is passed from B to F through a chain of $40 mil notional derivatives.
                      This may ultimately be true, but it is a complex legal problem. And between the time that F defaults and the legal matter is settled, aren't all the intermediaries on the hook, and thus potentially insolvent?

                      The problem here is that passing on the risk in this way does not result in a homogeneous distribution of risk: entire subgroups of the CDS market may be collectively under-capitalized, while other groups make money. (Of course, the bondholder is always first in line to lose.)

                      For those cases where this non-homogeneous structure has not emerged in a favorable way, there is always the option of government intervention to make more favored parties whole -- as is the case with AIG's counterparties.

                      Comment


                      • #12
                        Re: The Invisible One Quadrillion Dollar Equation -- Asymmetric Leverage and Systemic Risk

                        Originally posted by due_indigence
                        I'm beginning to sense how devilishly clever this reserve currency thing is. Over the years, everybody has been coaxed into playing this game. There are no oases of calm. Dare I say the USD is the currency of the New World Order? Global collapse will consolidate its power and permanently cement its status. The only countervailance is the barabarous relic. But it's the relic part that troubles me.
                        Past returns are not indicative of future performance.

                        Especially when the agency of destruction is the issuer: the Fed and US Treasury.

                        To me it is clear that the rest of the world is now starting to truly comprehend the risks associated with allowing a central reserve currency with irresponsible issuing entities. The US dollar is not even the only example; the Euro is also undergoing a similar struggle.

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