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Is the financial crisis the result of deregulation, lax lending standards, and too much leveraging or are there more important factors involved? In your new book The Great Financial Crisis, you say that stagnation is unavoidable in mature capitalist economies because "a handful of corporations control most industries" which has ended "price warfare." How has "monopoly capital" paved the way for financialization and the creation of derivatives, structured debt instruments, and other complex investments? Could you clarify what you mean by stagnation and how it led to the present crisis?
John Bellamy Foster: The long-term process of the growth of financial speculation or financialization (the shift in gravity of the economy from production to finance) was a process that had to keep going because once it stopped you would have a financial avalanche. As increased debt is used more and more to leverage financial speculation, the quantity of debt increases while its quality decreases. This means that the level of risk keeps rising. As speculation becomes more extreme various mechanisms are introduced to manage risk. Structured debt instruments like collateralized debt obligations and credit default swaps, and a host of other exotic financial instruments, were introduced supposedly to reduce the risk of the individual investor, but ended up expanding risk system-wide.
Ideologically the increased risk is rationalized in various ways -- for example the presumed high tech basis of the New Economy bubble and the notion that new financial instruments had sliced and diced risk and thereby lessened risk exposure in the subprime bubble. But eventually, the decrease in quality that goes along with the increase in quantity of debt has its effect. In this respect, the giving out of subprime loans was simply part of the normal evolution (though this time on a massive scale) of financial instability basic to speculative finance. This was well explained by economist Hyman Minsky in his various works on the "financial instability hypothesis," largely ignored by mainstream economists.
Regulation of this system was impossible, since the risk had to keep rising and any attempt to place any limits on the system once financialization got to a certain point risked a financial meltdown. The capitalist state therefore had no choice but gradually to dismantle the entire financial regulatory system and to allow risk to grow. Indeed, in every major financial crisis over the last thirty years the response was financial deregulation. The risk-prone structure that emerged was presented as "optimal" in the governing ideology, and the IMF and other institutions worked at imposing the same supposedly advanced, high-risk "financial architecture" on all the countries of the world.
The real underlying problem, as indicated above, was stagnation. Explaining stagnation is a long and complex process. It was analyzed in depth by Paul Baran, Paul Sweezy, and Harry Magdoff. For a fuller understanding, beyond what I am able to give in this short space, I recommend our book The Great Financial Crisis and earlier works by Baran, Sweezy, and Magdoff, especially Baran and Sweezy's Monopoly Capital. There are two factors basically to consider: maturity and monopoly. Maturity stands for the fact that industrialization is an historical process. In the beginning, i.e., the initial industrial revolution phase, there is a building up of industry virtually from scratch as in the United States in the nineteenth century and China today. During this period the demand for new investment seems infinite, and if there are limits to expansion they lie in the shortage of capital to invest. Eventually, however, industry is built up in the core areas, and after that production is geared more and more to mere replacement, which can be financed out of depreciation funds.
In a mature economy, growth is increasingly dependent on finding investment outlets, and capital tends to generate more surplus (or investment-seeking capital) than can be absorbed in existing outlets. New industries arise (such as the computer, digital product industry of today), but normally the scale of such industries relative to the whole economy is too small to constitute a major boost to the entire economic system. Although the capitalist economy is not often discussed in terms of such a historical process of industrialization (which lies outside the governing ideology), it is taken for granted in discussions of the world economy that the more mature economies of the United States, Europe, and Japan are only going to grow nowadays at, say, a 2.5 percent rate, while emerging economies may grow much faster. The maturity argument was influenced by Keynes and developed by Alvin Hansen in the late 1930s and early 1940s in such works as Full Recovery or Stagnation? and Fiscal Policy and Business Cycles. But the most powerful and clearest theoretical discussion of maturity was provided by Paul Sweezy, building on a Marxian frame of analysis, in his Four Lectures on Marxism.
The second factor is monopoly (or oligopoly). Marx was the first to discuss the tendency in capitalist economies toward the concentration and centralization of capital, an emphasis that has distinguished Marxian economics. In Marxian and radical institutionalist economics, this led to the emergence by the last quarter of the nineteenth century (consolidated only in the twentieth century) of a new stage of capitalism that came to be known as the monopoly stage (or monopoly capitalism) displacing the earlier freely competitive stage of capitalism of the nineteenth century. In essence, the economy in the nineteenth century was dominated by small family firms (other than railroad capital). In the twentieth century this turns into an economy of big corporations. Although monopoly capital remained a stage of capitalism, the laws of motion of the system were modified. The biggest change is the effective banning of price competition. Monopolistic (or oligopolistic) firms, as Paul Sweezy, then a young Harvard economist, famously explained in the 1930s in his theory of the kinked-demand curve of oligopolistic pricing, tend to shift prices in only one direction -- up. Price competition among the majors is seen as self-defeating and replaced by a steady upward movement of prices, usually a form of indirect collusion, following the price leader (usually the biggest firm in an industry).
With the effective banning of price competition in mature industries (there is still price competition in rising industries where a shakedown process is occurring), the main assumption of orthodox conceptions of the capitalist economy is violated. Competition continues over low cost position in an industry (i.e. over productivity), and in other areas aimed at market share, such as advertising and branding of products (referred to as "monopolistic competition"). But actual price competition under monopoly capital is usually treated as "price warfare," which is no longer acceptable.
Throughout the nineteenth century in the United States the general price level fell with the exception of the Civil War years. Throughout the twentieth century the general price level rose with the exception of the Great Depression years.
The result of all of this is that, given rising productivity, monopolistic corporations end up grabbing as surplus a larger portion of the gains of productivity growth (and virtually all the gains when real wages are also stagnant), leading to a tendency of the surplus of monopoly capital to rise. There is then a vast and growing investment-seeking surplus, which, however, encounters relatively diminished investment outlets due to a number of factors: industrial maturity, growing inequality which negatively affects consumption (insofar as this is based on paychecks not debt), and persistent unused industrial capacity which discourages the further expansion of capacity. In Marxian terms, we can say that the rate of surplus value (or the rate of exploitation) within production is too high for all of the surplus value potentially generated through production to be realized in final sales.
As Keynes taught, savings/surplus (ex ante) that is not invested simply disappears, so this slows down the economy as a whole. But the problem of surplus capital seeking investment is not thereby alleviated, since monopoly capital tends to adopt measures that continually pump up potential surplus even in a crisis. So the contradiction continues.
Baran and Sweezy summed up their argument by claiming that stagnation was the normal tendency of the monopoly capitalist economy. This was in sharp contradiction to received economic theory which assumed that capitalism by nature tended toward rapid economic growth and full employment. In the mainstream view, rapid growth and full employment were intrinsic to the system, so the emergence of slow growth required a specific explanation. In contrast, Baran, Sweezy, and Magdoff, building on a long line of thinkers before them (Marx, Veblen, Keynes, Hansen, Kalecki, Steindl), argued the opposite, that it was periods of rapid growth under monopoly capitalism, such as the now fabled Golden Age of the 1950s and '60s, that needed to be explained as due to special factors. In their view, it was necessary to point to the specific historical stimuli that propelled extraordinary periods of rapid development (in the Golden Age: enormous consumer liquidity after the war, a second great wave of automobilization, military spending associated with two regional wars in Asia and the Cold War, the expansion of the sales effort, etc.). Stagnation itself was the normal tendency of the system and so could be accounted for simply by the waning of such special factors.
If investment and consumption are inadequate to maintain demand, as is the normal case under monopoly capitalism, the government is called into help. In the United States, this has often taken the form of increased military spending (which is crucial to the imperial goals of the system) and lately through financialization. Both of these means of maintaining demand, however, have reached their limits (the U.S. accounts for as much military spending as the whole rest of the world put together and cannot easily expand this at present), resulting in a deepening economic stagnation.
Baran and Sweezy's Monopoly Capital had pointed to financial sector expansion as a possible countervailing factor to stagnation, but in the 1960s this was merely potential and had not emerged to any large extent.
The evolution of the system from the 1970s on became so dependent on the growth of finance, and the incorporation of the giant corporations into this, that I have termed this later phase "monopoly-finance capital."
John Bellamy Foster: The long-term process of the growth of financial speculation or financialization (the shift in gravity of the economy from production to finance) was a process that had to keep going because once it stopped you would have a financial avalanche. As increased debt is used more and more to leverage financial speculation, the quantity of debt increases while its quality decreases. This means that the level of risk keeps rising. As speculation becomes more extreme various mechanisms are introduced to manage risk. Structured debt instruments like collateralized debt obligations and credit default swaps, and a host of other exotic financial instruments, were introduced supposedly to reduce the risk of the individual investor, but ended up expanding risk system-wide.
Ideologically the increased risk is rationalized in various ways -- for example the presumed high tech basis of the New Economy bubble and the notion that new financial instruments had sliced and diced risk and thereby lessened risk exposure in the subprime bubble. But eventually, the decrease in quality that goes along with the increase in quantity of debt has its effect. In this respect, the giving out of subprime loans was simply part of the normal evolution (though this time on a massive scale) of financial instability basic to speculative finance. This was well explained by economist Hyman Minsky in his various works on the "financial instability hypothesis," largely ignored by mainstream economists.
Regulation of this system was impossible, since the risk had to keep rising and any attempt to place any limits on the system once financialization got to a certain point risked a financial meltdown. The capitalist state therefore had no choice but gradually to dismantle the entire financial regulatory system and to allow risk to grow. Indeed, in every major financial crisis over the last thirty years the response was financial deregulation. The risk-prone structure that emerged was presented as "optimal" in the governing ideology, and the IMF and other institutions worked at imposing the same supposedly advanced, high-risk "financial architecture" on all the countries of the world.
The real underlying problem, as indicated above, was stagnation. Explaining stagnation is a long and complex process. It was analyzed in depth by Paul Baran, Paul Sweezy, and Harry Magdoff. For a fuller understanding, beyond what I am able to give in this short space, I recommend our book The Great Financial Crisis and earlier works by Baran, Sweezy, and Magdoff, especially Baran and Sweezy's Monopoly Capital. There are two factors basically to consider: maturity and monopoly. Maturity stands for the fact that industrialization is an historical process. In the beginning, i.e., the initial industrial revolution phase, there is a building up of industry virtually from scratch as in the United States in the nineteenth century and China today. During this period the demand for new investment seems infinite, and if there are limits to expansion they lie in the shortage of capital to invest. Eventually, however, industry is built up in the core areas, and after that production is geared more and more to mere replacement, which can be financed out of depreciation funds.
In a mature economy, growth is increasingly dependent on finding investment outlets, and capital tends to generate more surplus (or investment-seeking capital) than can be absorbed in existing outlets. New industries arise (such as the computer, digital product industry of today), but normally the scale of such industries relative to the whole economy is too small to constitute a major boost to the entire economic system. Although the capitalist economy is not often discussed in terms of such a historical process of industrialization (which lies outside the governing ideology), it is taken for granted in discussions of the world economy that the more mature economies of the United States, Europe, and Japan are only going to grow nowadays at, say, a 2.5 percent rate, while emerging economies may grow much faster. The maturity argument was influenced by Keynes and developed by Alvin Hansen in the late 1930s and early 1940s in such works as Full Recovery or Stagnation? and Fiscal Policy and Business Cycles. But the most powerful and clearest theoretical discussion of maturity was provided by Paul Sweezy, building on a Marxian frame of analysis, in his Four Lectures on Marxism.
The second factor is monopoly (or oligopoly). Marx was the first to discuss the tendency in capitalist economies toward the concentration and centralization of capital, an emphasis that has distinguished Marxian economics. In Marxian and radical institutionalist economics, this led to the emergence by the last quarter of the nineteenth century (consolidated only in the twentieth century) of a new stage of capitalism that came to be known as the monopoly stage (or monopoly capitalism) displacing the earlier freely competitive stage of capitalism of the nineteenth century. In essence, the economy in the nineteenth century was dominated by small family firms (other than railroad capital). In the twentieth century this turns into an economy of big corporations. Although monopoly capital remained a stage of capitalism, the laws of motion of the system were modified. The biggest change is the effective banning of price competition. Monopolistic (or oligopolistic) firms, as Paul Sweezy, then a young Harvard economist, famously explained in the 1930s in his theory of the kinked-demand curve of oligopolistic pricing, tend to shift prices in only one direction -- up. Price competition among the majors is seen as self-defeating and replaced by a steady upward movement of prices, usually a form of indirect collusion, following the price leader (usually the biggest firm in an industry).
With the effective banning of price competition in mature industries (there is still price competition in rising industries where a shakedown process is occurring), the main assumption of orthodox conceptions of the capitalist economy is violated. Competition continues over low cost position in an industry (i.e. over productivity), and in other areas aimed at market share, such as advertising and branding of products (referred to as "monopolistic competition"). But actual price competition under monopoly capital is usually treated as "price warfare," which is no longer acceptable.
Throughout the nineteenth century in the United States the general price level fell with the exception of the Civil War years. Throughout the twentieth century the general price level rose with the exception of the Great Depression years.
The result of all of this is that, given rising productivity, monopolistic corporations end up grabbing as surplus a larger portion of the gains of productivity growth (and virtually all the gains when real wages are also stagnant), leading to a tendency of the surplus of monopoly capital to rise. There is then a vast and growing investment-seeking surplus, which, however, encounters relatively diminished investment outlets due to a number of factors: industrial maturity, growing inequality which negatively affects consumption (insofar as this is based on paychecks not debt), and persistent unused industrial capacity which discourages the further expansion of capacity. In Marxian terms, we can say that the rate of surplus value (or the rate of exploitation) within production is too high for all of the surplus value potentially generated through production to be realized in final sales.
As Keynes taught, savings/surplus (ex ante) that is not invested simply disappears, so this slows down the economy as a whole. But the problem of surplus capital seeking investment is not thereby alleviated, since monopoly capital tends to adopt measures that continually pump up potential surplus even in a crisis. So the contradiction continues.
Baran and Sweezy summed up their argument by claiming that stagnation was the normal tendency of the monopoly capitalist economy. This was in sharp contradiction to received economic theory which assumed that capitalism by nature tended toward rapid economic growth and full employment. In the mainstream view, rapid growth and full employment were intrinsic to the system, so the emergence of slow growth required a specific explanation. In contrast, Baran, Sweezy, and Magdoff, building on a long line of thinkers before them (Marx, Veblen, Keynes, Hansen, Kalecki, Steindl), argued the opposite, that it was periods of rapid growth under monopoly capitalism, such as the now fabled Golden Age of the 1950s and '60s, that needed to be explained as due to special factors. In their view, it was necessary to point to the specific historical stimuli that propelled extraordinary periods of rapid development (in the Golden Age: enormous consumer liquidity after the war, a second great wave of automobilization, military spending associated with two regional wars in Asia and the Cold War, the expansion of the sales effort, etc.). Stagnation itself was the normal tendency of the system and so could be accounted for simply by the waning of such special factors.
If investment and consumption are inadequate to maintain demand, as is the normal case under monopoly capitalism, the government is called into help. In the United States, this has often taken the form of increased military spending (which is crucial to the imperial goals of the system) and lately through financialization. Both of these means of maintaining demand, however, have reached their limits (the U.S. accounts for as much military spending as the whole rest of the world put together and cannot easily expand this at present), resulting in a deepening economic stagnation.
Baran and Sweezy's Monopoly Capital had pointed to financial sector expansion as a possible countervailing factor to stagnation, but in the 1960s this was merely potential and had not emerged to any large extent.
The evolution of the system from the 1970s on became so dependent on the growth of finance, and the incorporation of the giant corporations into this, that I have termed this later phase "monopoly-finance capital."
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