UBS debunks: China's real exports as % of GDP are more like 10%!
__________________
AMERICAN PONZI DEBT PROVIDES THE ESSENTIAL MARKET FOR CHINA GROWTH? NOT ACCORDING TO UBS!
IS CHINA'S ECONOMY EXPORT LED - UBS SAYS - VERY LITTLE.pdf
Here's an article from UBS arguing very substantively why China's exports as a percentage of GDP (and consequently it's vulnerability to a US slowdown) are nowhere near the numbers iTulip is using. This UBS article arrives at a true exports percentage of GDP which is in the range of 10% of China's total economy. Could it be that iTulip's FIRE economy derived domino theory where China growth hinges precariously on US overconsumption may need to be at least partially "re-calibrated" in light of this paper from UBS?
This is why we should be wary of conclusions which are presented as so "self evident" that they have entered the realm of the axiomatic - which can be then deployed with impunity to construct entire global scenarios. "The China story which hinges on "Unbalanced Global Growth" has been leaned on heavily to construct future scenarios here - and the scenarios depicted according to this construct have such an aura of global inevitability that no one has even bothered to question them.
But this article invites us to step back from uncritical acceptance of the "FIRE economy derived China growth story" and see how perilous it is to lean on what appear to be axiomatic truths. Once accepted, the axioms lead to construction of entire global theses based upon a potentially seriously flawed premise.
China, BRIC nation growth paradigms, commodities, energy consumption growth, global economic leadership trends - all of the discussions on why this is a precarious PONZI edifice perched upon the American homeowner - if you read this UBS analysis and find it's of substance, it suggests these "self-evident truths" require a re-think from the ground up.
EXTRACT -
<< Does it matter whether we look at exports on a gross or net basis? The short answer is that it matters enormously, and Chart 9 helps show why. China’s rising trade surplus isn’t due to an acceleration in export growth; exports actually slowed over the past five years.
Rather, the real culprit is the sharp decline in import growth since 2004 – which, as we have argued many times before, is due to excess capacity creation in domestic heavy industrial sectors. In other words, net exports may be contributing an unusually strong amount to overall growth, but this has nothing to do with export demand or growing external dependence.
Instead, it’s all about rising domestic supply displacing import suppliers ... i.e., about reducing exposure to the global economy. >>
__________________
AMERICAN PONZI DEBT PROVIDES THE ESSENTIAL MARKET FOR CHINA GROWTH? NOT ACCORDING TO UBS!
IS CHINA'S ECONOMY EXPORT LED - UBS SAYS - VERY LITTLE.pdf
Here's an article from UBS arguing very substantively why China's exports as a percentage of GDP (and consequently it's vulnerability to a US slowdown) are nowhere near the numbers iTulip is using. This UBS article arrives at a true exports percentage of GDP which is in the range of 10% of China's total economy. Could it be that iTulip's FIRE economy derived domino theory where China growth hinges precariously on US overconsumption may need to be at least partially "re-calibrated" in light of this paper from UBS?
This is why we should be wary of conclusions which are presented as so "self evident" that they have entered the realm of the axiomatic - which can be then deployed with impunity to construct entire global scenarios. "The China story which hinges on "Unbalanced Global Growth" has been leaned on heavily to construct future scenarios here - and the scenarios depicted according to this construct have such an aura of global inevitability that no one has even bothered to question them.
But this article invites us to step back from uncritical acceptance of the "FIRE economy derived China growth story" and see how perilous it is to lean on what appear to be axiomatic truths. Once accepted, the axioms lead to construction of entire global theses based upon a potentially seriously flawed premise.
China, BRIC nation growth paradigms, commodities, energy consumption growth, global economic leadership trends - all of the discussions on why this is a precarious PONZI edifice perched upon the American homeowner - if you read this UBS analysis and find it's of substance, it suggests these "self-evident truths" require a re-think from the ground up.
EXTRACT -
<< Does it matter whether we look at exports on a gross or net basis? The short answer is that it matters enormously, and Chart 9 helps show why. China’s rising trade surplus isn’t due to an acceleration in export growth; exports actually slowed over the past five years.
Rather, the real culprit is the sharp decline in import growth since 2004 – which, as we have argued many times before, is due to excess capacity creation in domestic heavy industrial sectors. In other words, net exports may be contributing an unusually strong amount to overall growth, but this has nothing to do with export demand or growing external dependence.
Instead, it’s all about rising domestic supply displacing import suppliers ... i.e., about reducing exposure to the global economy. >>
EXTRACT -
A simple example should help illustrate the point; imagine a company that makes furniture for export. The company has 100 workers, produces US$500,000 worth of output using only domestic inputs, and generates US$200,000 of wages and profits per year. Using our framework above, we have a 100% domestic content ratio and a 40% domestic value-added ratio, and the company is contributing US$200,000 to domestic GDP.
Now imagine that the company changes its business model; instead of making furniture, it now decides to make DVD players using the same 100 workers. The company now imports US$4,500,000 worth of imported inputs from abroad, processes these inputs with a minimum of additional domestic sourcing and generates US$5,000,000 of export revenue. At the end of the day, the company finds that wages and profits have risen to US$250,000.
What has this done to our calculation? We now have a 10% domestic content ratio, a 50% domestic valueadded ratio, and the company is now contributing US$250,000 to domestic GDP. Three quick points here: First, the actual export contribution to GDP has clearly gone up, by exactly 50% (from US$200,000 to US$250,000). Second, despite the fact that the domestic content ratio of exports has fallen, the company has still clearly moved up the “value-added chain”, as value added per worker has risen from US$2,000 to US$2,500.
And third, the headline export/GDP ratio has gone up by a factor of ten, i.e., the headline ratio wildly overstates the actual change in underlying exposure to external demand and thus the role of exports in the economy. Why? Because the business model has changed from one of producing goods with high domestic content to “churning” goods with a very low domestic content. And this, we hope, should cure investors once and for all from looking at simple export/GDP ratios as an indicator of ... well, anything.
Original PDF here: http://www.allroadsleadtochina.com/reports/prc_270907.pdf
Comment