Galbraith on Greece

[gnk]

Re: greeks want reform?

Oligarchs? What oligarchs? Oh, THOSE oligarchs. The ones who hold all the power and stand athwart history yelling "more!"

Ask those all powerful oligarchs, especially those with government contracts how business is going nowadays. Capital controls and a government that has not paid contractors and government suppliers in months... Ask those Oligarchs' employees what their future looks like.

If they were all powerful, would Greece be in this mess? Would they be bleeding economically? Would SYRIZA have risen to power?

Your favorite oligarch's stock (GNK) has fallen tremendously ($20 a share to $7.19 a share) since last October when Tsipras began vying for new elections.

Then again, maybe these oligarchs are just as incompetent as the government?

[don]

Greece on Galbraith

The scene has been set for possible criminal charges to be brought against the former Greek finance minister, Yanis Varoufakis, following revelations of his secret plan to establish an alternative currency in the event of the country leaving the eurozone.

The country’s most senior state prosecutor, Efterpi Koutzamani, ordered the Greek parliament to examine an array of complaints brought by private citizens against Varoufakis. The supreme court prosecutor, who played a leading role in putting the far right Golden Dawn party on trial, also asked a magistrate to investigate whether criminal charges should be brought against non-political figures who allegedly hacked taxpayers’ accounts to set up the parallel payment system.

“I would not want to be in Varoufakis’ shoes,” the conservative MP and shadow finance minister Anna Asimakopoulou said. “I think that it is highly likely he will end up in a courtroom.”

As a sitting MP, the economist-turned-politician enjoys immunity from prosecution. But the prosecutor’s move paves the way for criminal charges to be brought against him if parliament determines there are grounds to establish a special congressional committee to probe the allegations.

Judicial sources said the charges could range from dereliction of duty to overseeing the formation of a criminal gang. The latter was the central accusation brought against Golden Dawn, whose leaders are on trial.

The five-member team tasked with organising the alternative currency – described by Varoufakis as a form of parallel liquidity –could also face accusations of participating in a criminal organisation. The working group was headed by the well-known US economist, James K Galbraith, who was seconded to help Varoufakis until the politician’s resignation earlier this month.

In five separate suits brought against him, Varoufakis has also been accused him of high treason, although legal experts said the charge would be very hard to prove. His handling of fraught negotiations with the European commission, European Central Bank and International Monetary Fund – the bodies keeping debt-stricken Greece afloat – has been blamed for the tough measures imposed on Athens in exchange for €86bn (£61bn) of emergency loans from international creditors.

By failing to agree on a cash-for-reform programme earlier, the crisis-plagued country was forced to sign up to a deal outlining €12bn of savings rather than €8bn as originally thought. The closure of banks and imposition of capital controls – implemented under Varoufakis’ stewardship – are said to have wrought at least €3bn worth of damage on the economy. A prolonged recession is now predicted for a country that has experienced record levels of unemployment and poverty since the eruption of the debt crisis five years ago.

In recent days even senior members of prime minister Alexis Tsipras’ radical left Syriza party have joined in the criticism, attributing the tough stance of lenders to the outspoken politician’s handling of the talks.

“With his loquaciousness, with his naivety, with his zeal to prove his ideas more than anything else, it seems that he hurt the Greek issue,” the Syriza MP and vice-president of the 300-seat House, Alexis Mitropoulos, told Mega TV.

Varoufakis, who has retreated to his island home, has openly admitted to using “unconventional methods” to come up with a contingency plan that would have paved the way for the return of the drachma if Greece was forced out of the eurozone. But he also argued that it would have been “remiss” of him if his ministry had not also devised a Plan B.

He said in a statement this week: “The working group worked exclusively within the framework of government policy and its recommendations were always aimed at serving the public interest, at respecting the laws of the land, and at keeping the country in the Eurozone.”

On Tuesday, the European commission joined the fray, slamming Varoufakis for suggesting that he was forced to hack his ministry’s computer systems because the nation’s “troika” of creditors had exclusive control of the country’s tax agency. A commission spokeswoman described the claims as “false and unfounded”.

Varoufakis, the self-styled “erratic Marxist” also has friends in high places, with many saying he has been turned into a scapegoat. Writing in the New York Times this week, the Nobel prizewinning US economics professor, Paul Krugman, argued that it would have been highly irresponsible of Varoufakis had he not had a plan.

“The issue now becomes whether Tsipras was right to decide not to invoke this plan in the face of what amounted to extortion from the creditors,” he wrote. “ I think he called it wrong, but God knows it was an awesome responsibility – and we may never know who was right.”

Varoufakis responded on his Twitter feed on Wednesday, dryly referring to reports of treason charges.

[Woodsman]

Re: greeks want reform?

You asserted that the "the oligarch meme is not as relevant as it is being portrayed." The Council on Foreign Relations and Financial Times begs to disagree:

FT: Syriza turns Greek oligarchs from taboo subject to economic priority

They are Greece’s best-known tycoons, admired and loathed in equal measure for their vast wealth and deep political connections. While ordinary Greeks call them “diaplekomenoi” (the entangled ones) or “davatzides” (pimps), economists call them oligarchs because of their grip on the country’s business life.

However they are described, their role in Greek politics and society is under scrutiny ahead of this month’s election.
The far-left Syriza party, which is tipped to win a snap general election on January 25, has declared war on the oligarchs if it comes to power. George Stathakis, the party’s shadow development minister, told the Financial Times last week that Syriza would end the practice of governments handing out television licences for free to their political friends and review contentious privatisation sales. Tackling the oligarchs’ grip on the economy “will be a priority” he said.

Such comments already mark a change from form in Greece, where the oligarchs’ influence has long been felt but seldom discussed — at least publicly.

“The real enemy to market competition in Greece is the oligarchy, but it’s a taboo subject — politicians don’t discuss it and the media don’t write about it,” says Aristides Hatzis, a professor of law and economics at Athens University.

One reason is that Greece’s private television channels along with influential news websites and daily newspapers are in many instances controlled by oligarchs with editorial influence.

A US embassy cable released by WikiLeaks said: “Greece’s private media outlets are owned by a small group of people who have made or inherited fortunes . . . and who are related by blood, marriage or adultery to political and government officials and/or other media and business magnates.”

Taming such figures will not be easy: No member of the close-knit oligarch community has yet been toppled by Greece’s seven-year economic crisis, even though their media outlets are believed by some analysts to have racked up almost €2bn in unserviced loans from local banks as advertising revenues collapsed and handouts from state-controlled companies disappeared.

-------------

“They continue to wield influence but they’re taking a wait-and-see position with regard to future political developments,” Mr Bacouris says. “My understanding is that a number of them have been making contact with Syriza but it’s not yet clear with what outcome.”

Top oligarchs

Vardis Vardinoyannis: the 81-year-old patriarch of a Cretan family that controls MotorOil Hellas, Greece’s second-largest oil refinery, as well as a tanker fleet, a bunkering operation on Crete, an oil and gas exploration company and a five-star Athens hotel. The Vardinoyannis group controls one private television station, Star, and holds a minority stake in another, Mega Channel.

Michalis Sallas: the 64-year-old chairman of Piraeus Bank, which has become the largest Greek lender by taking over the healthy assets of two failed Cypriot banks and a Greek state-controlled bank during the crisis. A founding member of the PanHellenic Socialist Movement (Pasok) and former econometrics professor at Athens Panteios university, he has kept close ties since the 1980s with successive Greek prime ministers.

Spiros Latsis: the 69-year-old son of John Latsis, a London-based shipping billionaire who funded the UK Conservative party. The Latsis group is a partner with the Greek state in Hellenic Petroleum, the country’s biggest oil refiner. Last year Lamda Developments, its property arm, won a concession to develop Hellenikon, the coastal site of the former Athens International Airport. Lamda and its partners, Fosun of China and the Abu Dhabi sovereign wealth fund, made the only binding offer for the €5bn project, which a Syriza-led government may potentially cancel.

George Bobolas: the 86-year-old founder of Ellaktor, Greece’s leading construction company, who was accused by journalists and rivals in the 1980s of being a Soviet “agent of influence”. Mr Bobolas has always denied the allegation. The opposition Syriza party says it will review Ellaktor’s share of income from Attiki Odos, a profitable toll road to Athens airport if it comes to power. The Bobolas group is a minority shareholder in Mega Channel and controls Ethnos, a lossmaking daily newspaper.

Dimitris Copelouzos: aged 64, Gazprom’s representative in Greece since the 1980s and founder of Copelouzos group, an energy and construction specialist. The group recently teamed up with the German airport operator Fraport to make the winning €1.2bn bid for a concession to operate 14 regional Greek airports that would drive the country’s tourist development over the next decade. Syriza has warned parliament may not ratify the deal.

[astonas]

Re: Pilger on Greece

Can unification of distinct culture really work? There hasn't been many cases in history where distinct cultures can be unified through peaceful means or even through war.

Well, certainly it can. The US began as thirteen colonies, and continued incorporating regions with different cultures as it expanded. There are without a doubt stilll geographic cultural differences within the US, but I think it is fair to say that a meaningful "American" culture does exist, with a character distinct from that of other nations.

To me, the more interesting question isn't whether it is possible, but whether prior examples of this process are similar enough to the conditions in Europe to make comparison and extrapolation valid.

Even the all powerful religion can't unify culture as Christians and Muslims from different countries can still have different cultures.

I've been musing about European cultures for a while now (my posts on the subject are scattered throughout various "Europe" threads; the one I'm thinking about at the moment is behind the paywall, and so I can't cite it directly) but I have considered religion quite carefully as one of the driving cultural elements at play.

Over time, though, I have continuously drifted away from treating it as a more dominant causal force. Religion does appear extremely powerful, especially in the short term. But it serves mostly as a filter of what people believe. In that way, it can be a tightly-confining, but still have a surprisingly weak influence over the long term.

I now consider language to be a far more powerful cultural element. Rather than restricting merely what people believe, it subtly modulates what they can express. And in doing so, it limits not only what they DO believe, but what CAN BE believed. (One can't "believe" in a complex idea that one cannot put into words, any more than a person blind since birth can't like the color "red". What would that mean?)

This linguistic boundary encloses a much wider field, of course, and percentage-wise, languages overlap in what they can express vastly more than beliefs or cultures do. But when an idea is literally inconceivable in a person's thoughts, the barrier to communication about that idea is incredibly high. Relatively few divergent concepts thus tend to either reflect, or cause, a far wider-reaching impact than their mere numbers would suggest.

As English-speakers, we tend to encounter dramatic examples of this relatively rarely. When encountering in another language a concept that can't be expressed in English, the language is simply appropriated along with the idea. The needed words simply become English ones. This is why English has by far the largest vocabulary of any western language.

But when this natural process is either thwarted or explicitly rejected, as in for example L'Académie française, one sees that much more than mere words are being held back.

I am now using language trees as a tool to evaluate relative cultural proximity, and finding some interesting stuff, which I think will eventually work its way into an iTulip post.

The drastically shortened version is that cultures seem to remain most distinct when language barriers prevent communication between them. But they only appear "impossible" to reconcile when the languages in which thought is conducted include disjoint (untranslatable) conceptions. (caveats here include European polyglottism, and Lingua Francas)

So yes, I still think that cultural unification is possible, and not just in principle. But in Europe, a few of the key obstacles to it have been given insufficient consideration, and so the process will continue to be much more rocky and extended than many expect. It might be said that it can't even get going until most of the citizens of the nations of Europe can not only speak in a unifying language, but begin to think natively in it as well. Such a process could take many decades more, and that's just to get Europe to the point where the US started.

It is easy to see why Pro-Europe leaders throughout the continent were unwilling to wait for a cultural consensus before beginning political and economic unions! The concept simply wouldn't endure long enough, until a time when it was more naturally achievable. But in starting the process anyway, they have also ensured that the road will certainly not be smooth.

[Thailandnotes]

Re: Pilger on Greece

Long profile of Varoufakis

http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/20...-greek-warrior

Laura Flanders, Rick Wolf, Cornel West

Why Marx make still resonates

http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?...&jumival=14361

“In a matter of months, the tax increases will cease to provide revenues that will meet the fiscal targets that has been stipulated for the Greek state.

“When that happens, automated spending cuts will be mandated, and it will further reduce the incomes of Greece’s citizens, and the result will be the resumption of the downward spiral.” Galbraith

[Chris Coles]

Re: Pilger on Greece

( Thailandnotes)

Long profile of Varoufakis

http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/20...-greek-warrior

Laura Flanders, Rick Wolf, Cornel West

Why Marx make still resonates

http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?...&jumival=14361

“In a matter of months, the tax increases will cease to provide revenues that will meet the fiscal targets that has been stipulated for the Greek state.

“When that happens, automated spending cuts will be mandated, and it will further reduce the incomes of Greece’s citizens, and the result will be the resumption of the downward spiral.” Galbraith

As I see it, the only way forward is to address the lack of a supply of equity capital, on free enterprise terms, to enable any employee to address their concerns via direct competition against any existing company. That the solution lays within the bounds of a fully competitive economy.

Neither of the debates we have here above, has anything to say about that lack of equity capital. They either debate a century old concept that was built upon a recognition of the failure to address the problems of the transition from feudalism to capitalism; when capitalism is simply another form of feudalism; or; they debate how to fix banking by adding a new route to gain access to even more credit.

We have to address the structural failure caused by the lack of equity capital.

[gnk]

Re: Pilger on Greece

Not too long ago, during one of Merkel's press conferences she discussed the status of the negotiations and while speaking German, used the English phrase "grace period."

To me, it was a funny moment, it made me laugh.

But in terms of cultural unification, I don't think it's an impossible goal, as long as we are realistic as to what degree cultural unification is attainable and necessary. Just think where Europe was just decades ago, and where it is now. From my personal experiences visiting Greece over a period of decades, I have also witnessed a change in Greek thinking and identity. We're not there yet, but we have come a very long way.

I have stated my views about why Greeks fear a return to the drachma. But there is another factor at play. Most Greeks believe in the European project. They may disagree about economics, but there is a strong cultural force at play. Even Tsipras states publicly, and often, that Greece lies at the heart of Europe - and now I do believe he means it, and no one argues that point. I believe that Greeks fear a Grexit would make them less European and isolated and I don't think a lot of people outside of Greece, or Europe for that matter, can fully understand that psychology or belief.

Keep in mind that during the period of heated negotiations, various elements of Greek political society bonded with their like-minded counterparts found in different EU countries. Videos of different European speakers, with different views, went viral in Greece.

Technology (internet) is making things move even faster - and changing the languages faster than at any other time in human history. So have many other factors come into play: Euro sports - basketball and soccer, Eurovision - a music competition, it's not uncommon to see high school students travel to nearby EU countries for sports, dance, and music competitions.

There's a lot going on in Europe today that was unthinkable 30-40 years ago, let alone 70 years ago. And Europe, as a separate entity, although seemingly diverse, is still unique and seems more homogeneous when compared to many other regions of the world - Asia, Africa, and even North and South America.

I think cultural integration is happening much faster than we realize. I know many business people, engineers, consultants, etc, that travel the continent, from different countries. To me, they have a Euro-centric cosmopolitan view of the world, regardless of what country they hail from. Yet speak to a Greek farmer in a mountain village, not as much, but at the same time, he too is changing. If that person is under 50, try taking his internet access away from him...

[astonas]

Re: Pilger on Greece

Regarding that 70% - ask a public sector worker what has to be done about private sector tax collections - and you will get a similar response to the Troika's. Ask a small business owner what needs to be done about bureaucracy and public sector unions, etc... and again, a similar response to the EU. Ask any young person about pension reform, and well, you get the picture. Ask all Greeks about their political system, and a near unanimous view will emerge - it is incompetent.

Greeks know that reforms are necessary, yet want only other Greeks to reform. A while back, I mentioned that Greece has a hyper-democracy - in a derogatory manner - meaning all groups get their wishes, and that the oligarch meme is not as relevant as it is being portrayed. I hope now people understand what I was trying to describe. It's not a select few oligarchs or a bankster issue that is the sole central problem. It's democracy without self reform/sacrifice, greater-good, responsibility, balancing of interests - whatever you want to call it.

Yes. But that selfishness is hardly unique to Greece; what you describe is human nature. NIMBY-ism and various other forms of struggle for relative advantage in government are inherent in all democracies. The difference must lie not in that aspect, but in another one, that counteracts it.

I tend to see a different factor, which serves to regulate self-interest, as a more differentiating cultural touchstone. It is what might favorably referred to as resilience, and might less favorably be termed stubbornness, in the face of the laws, or other societal pressures. The other end of that spectrum might charitably be called public-mindedness, or less charitably, blind obedience. (Think level 4 Kohlberg.)

When the ordoliberal mind finishes negotiating a deal, and encapsulates it in law, it is the end of the process. That the rules will now be followed is more or less taken for granted. If circumstances change, then it may be necessary to revisit or adjust a rule - but generally only by near-unanimous consent. This is the sort of discussion that happened, for example, when Germany and France "violated" (but actually adjusted using the full due process) budget targets in Europe. And even that sort of minor adjustment is something that is expected to occur very rarely, say once every decade or so.

But it seems from here that when the mediterranean mind concludes any deal, it is seen as merely the opening act of a long haggling process, not complete until the last action being discussed is finally finished. And at any point prior to final conclusion, the whole negotiation can still collapse. In fact, since the threat of that total collapse is what provides negotiation strength to one party, it must be flirted with constantly to get a fair deal.

The exact same instability that is seen as normative, even desirable, in the south, is taken as evidence of utter failure - anarchic deviation from the rule of law - in the north.

To people who imagine that a negotiation is now over, this continuing flirtation with collapse appears to be total madness. When Varoufakis is described in strongly negative terms, that is often why.

It isn't just that his economic theories are seen as total raving garbage to ordoliberals, but also that he was bringing into question the very concept of the word "deal". That was the currency of trust that Merkel said was "lost". It wasn't that people no longer trusted the current government to do what it said. (And therefore, it wasn't to depose the current government that they acted.) It was that they now felt they COULDN'T reasonably trust ANY government from Greece. To their mind, a dangerous precedent had been set for a rogue state - or at least for Greece - to do whatever it felt like, in violation of any international agreements it had ever made. In their mind, tolerating that would ultimately be fatal to every single institution that Europe had ever built, or ever could build. No wonder they didn't give way!

Varoufakis and his allies, of course, see him as a hero of negotiation, trying to overthrow decades of European precedence, to secure not only a better bailout for Greece in the short term, but a new framework of decision-making in Europe that would have been more favorable to the mediterranean way of negotiation, and way of life in general.

So I see the cultural gap as being far less about any objective weakness to corruption per se (though that is certainly a rampant symptom) but as a difference in negotiating framework, stemming from differences in how concepts like "agreed-upon" and "rule" are perceived.

What are the boundaries of negotiation? Does it end when the words "final offer" are said, and accepted? Or is just beginning, and there never really is any end at all?

And this difference applies equally well - in fact, the cultural difference will only be more prominent - in the implementation phase, which can be stretched out ad nauseam.

I still believe that the current path is possible. Only an outsider can balance these internal interest groups, and I hope the power of the EU purse strings can accomplish this.

Yet, what you write, or conclude, astonas, is indeed in the back of my mind, and it is a very real concern.

Greece is a small country, and as such, many people have contacts that are merely one or two degrees from those in Government. I'll ask a few people in Athens that I know are in the thick of things and report back.

Please do, I look forward to your updates.

May I interject with a personal request, though? I do hope that in the meantime, you have secured and validated a path to safety for yourself and your loved ones, should your optimism encounter more serious testing. I hope that you are right, and that I am wrong. But I think the odds might warrant some preparation, considering the potential risk.

My current view is that although Tsipras can get a Memorandum passed in Parliament, he can't get it fully implemented. But if the EU adheres to the purse strings approach - a piecemeal funding on an evaluation basis, then Tsipras will need an election to clean up his party.

Expecting ordoliberals to understand how to negotiate a system built around this piecemeal mindset -- and do so well enough outwit its very creators -- appears to me extraordinarily optimistic. A significant part of the cultural divide between northeastern Europe and the south is precisely a lack of ability to navigate in each others' modes. That applies as much in the North as in the South. Germans aren't any smarter, or more versatile, than Greeks, so they aren't any more able to bridge the gap, either. They use a different paradigm, but it is certainly not a more flexible one.

Yes, Greece had trouble getting its head around the idea that a settled deal was a settled deal, and that the technical framework for negotiation was an established system, in which all of Europe had been working with since before Greece joined, and that it would be deeply unfair to others to change it now.

But Germany, for its part, also doesn't "get" that the Greek political culture does not appear compatible with this, and that perhaps "law" might be in cases better translated into "guideline" "starting point" or even "suggestion".


I really do wonder if most of this whole conflict can't be chalked up to the divergence between connotative definitions and denotative definitions in various languages. The dictionary or translation engine, of course, will translate exclusively based on denotation. But human communication also includes connotation, and that is often nearly impossible to translate both fully and succinctly. So people sit around a table, pressed for time, and at the end shake hands. But the picture that each has in their heads, concerning what is going to happen next, is still entirely different EVEN WHEN THEY USE THE EXACT SAME WORDS, and even when they all genuinely mean them.

You are saying that the Troika would need to continue to parse out piecemeal funding, viewing each reform under a microscope. But I would be willing to bet that if the magnification had to be increased to provide such resolution, the rest of Europe would view it not as a success -- but as an abject failure -- of reform. And the patience to continue to indulge such failure is in some places entirely gone, and everywhere else fading very fast.

Since 2009, merely 6 years ago, do you know how many Prime Ministers Greece has gone through? Six. Four were elected, two were acting/caretaker PMs. Is that a symptom of a viable country?

Wow. I admit that statistic hadn't quite registered with me yet. For comparison, Germany has had 8 chancellors -- since 1949! I think the reasons for Germany thinking it can patiently outlast Greek governments, and for maintaining that elections can't void previous governments' agreements, are even more clear now. Thanks!

Greeks don't fear the drachma per se, Greeks fear being left alone with their current incompetent political system/ruling elites. They also recognize that all the interest groups are strangling their government. They will rarely admit this. I know a few that do - they even go so far as to say that they would be happy to see foreigners running the various government departments.

But surely they also see that such a dramatic deviation from democracy would render both morally and practically invalid any progress that might derive from them? That no reform conducted under such circumstances could ever last even a single day after the removal of foreign intervention? A veneer of reform might be pulled over Greece, but it would pop like a bubble in the end.

The famous meticulous German bureaucrat can't penetrate a system in which every axiom he relies on to function has been removed from play. He simply wouldn't have any Archimedean ground to stand on, no matter how big a lever he carries, in order to move the world. Building hopes on his ability to do so seems to me a stretch.

And even if this were possible, remember that it is one thing to engage in idle talk about such things in political B.S. sessions (and I don't know the circumstances of your discussions) but it is another to actually become a non-sovereign protectorate. That WOULD violate Kant's rules for perpetuating peace, and revolution against any such attempt would be entirely justified. So far there's a lot of hot air that such a "coup" is what we are seeing, but a closer inspection reveals it as just that - hot air.

You're suggesting the real thing! Even if it could work, it would be unwise for Greece to follow that path. It could only lead to revolution! Golden Dawn may have 80% negatives now, but it certainly wouldn't after that!

Furthermore, even if Greece did want to go this way, there is no way that Europe could go along while still maintaining its original purpose of peaceful coexistence of democratic states. Even if it was nominally "peaceful," it would no longer be democratic. This level of intervention really is a non-starter, and if it is not perceived as such within Greece, then it certainly is in the rest of Europe.

[Chris Coles]

Re: Pilger on Greece

Yes. But that selfishness is hardly unique to Greece; what you describe is human nature. NIMBY-ism and various other forms of struggle for relative advantage in government are inherent in all democracies. The difference must lie not in that aspect, but in another one, that counteracts it.

I tend to see a different factor, which serves to regulate self-interest, as a more differentiating cultural touchstone. It is what might favorably referred to as resilience, and might less favorably be termed stubbornness, in the face of the laws, or other societal pressures. The other end of that spectrum might charitably be called public-mindedness, or less charitably, blind obedience. (Think level 4 Kohlberg.)

When the ordoliberal mind finishes negotiating a deal, and encapsulates it in law, it is the end of the process. That the rules will now be followed is more or less taken for granted. If circumstances change, then it may be necessary to revisit or adjust a rule - but generally only by near-unanimous consent. This is the sort of discussion that happened, for example, when Germany and France "violated" (but actually adjusted using the full due process) budget targets in Europe. And even that sort of minor adjustment is something that is expected to occur very rarely, say once every decade or so.

But it seems from here that when the mediterranean mind concludes any deal, it is seen as merely the opening act of a long haggling process, not complete until the last action being discussed is finally finished. And at any point prior to final conclusion, the whole negotiation can still collapse. In fact, since the threat of that total collapse is what provides negotiation strength to one party, it must be flirted with constantly to get a fair deal.

The exact same instability that is seen as normative, even desirable, in the south, is taken as evidence of utter failure - anarchic deviation from the rule of law - in the north.

To people who imagine that a negotiation is now over, this continuing flirtation with collapse appears to be total madness. When Varoufakis is described in strongly negative terms, that is often why.

It isn't just that his economic theories are seen as total raving garbage to ordoliberals, but also that he was bringing into question the very concept of the word "deal". That was the currency of trust that Merkel said was "lost". It wasn't that people no longer trusted the current government to do what it said. (And therefore, it wasn't to depose the current government that they acted.) It was that they now felt they COULDN'T reasonably trust ANY government from Greece. To their mind, a dangerous precedent had been set for a rogue state - or at least for Greece - to do whatever it felt like, in violation of any international agreements it had ever made. In their mind, tolerating that would ultimately be fatal to every single institution that Europe had ever built, or ever could build. No wonder they didn't give way!

Varoufakis and his allies, of course, see him as a hero of negotiation, trying to overthrow decades of European precedence, to secure not only a better bailout for Greece in the short term, but a new framework of decision-making in Europe that would have been more favorable to the mediterranean way of negotiation, and way of life in general.

So I see the cultural gap as being far less about any objective weakness to corruption per se (though that is certainly a rampant symptom) but as a difference in negotiating framework, stemming from differences in how concepts like "agreed-upon" and "rule" are perceived.

What are the boundaries of negotiation? Does it end when the words "final offer" are said, and accepted? Or is just beginning, and there never really is any end at all?

And this difference applies equally well - in fact, the cultural difference will only be more prominent - in the implementation phase, which can be stretched out ad nauseam.



Please do, I look forward to your updates.

May I interject with a personal request, though? I do hope that in the meantime, you have secured and validated a path to safety for yourself and your loved ones, should your optimism encounter more serious testing. I hope that you are right, and that I am wrong. But I think the odds might warrant some preparation, considering the potential risk.



Expecting ordoliberals to understand how to negotiate a system built around this piecemeal mindset -- and do so well enough outwit its very creators -- appears to me extraordinarily optimistic. A significant part of the cultural divide between northeastern Europe and the south is precisely a lack of ability to navigate in each others' modes. That applies as much in the North as in the South. Germans aren't any smarter, or more versatile, than Greeks, so they aren't any more able to bridge the gap, either. They use a different paradigm, but it is certainly not a more flexible one.

Yes, Greece had trouble getting its head around the idea that a settled deal was a settled deal, and that the technical framework for negotiation was an established system, in which all of Europe had been working with since before Greece joined, and that it would be deeply unfair to others to change it now.

But Germany, for its part, also doesn't "get" that the Greek political culture does not appear compatible with this, and that perhaps "law" might be in cases better translated into "guideline" "starting point" or even "suggestion".


I really do wonder if most of this whole conflict can't be chalked up to the divergence between connotative definitions and denotative definitions in various languages. The dictionary or translation engine, of course, will translate exclusively based on denotation. But human communication also includes connotation, and that is often nearly impossible to translate both fully and succinctly. So people sit around a table, pressed for time, and at the end shake hands. But the picture that each has in their heads, concerning what is going to happen next, is still entirely different EVEN WHEN THEY USE THE EXACT SAME WORDS, and even when they all genuinely mean them.

You are saying that the Troika would need to continue to parse out piecemeal funding, viewing each reform under a microscope. But I would be willing to bet that if the magnification had to be increased to provide such resolution, the rest of Europe would view it not as a success -- but as an abject failure -- of reform. And the patience to continue to indulge such failure is in some places entirely gone, and everywhere else fading very fast.



Wow. I admit that statistic hadn't quite registered with me yet. For comparison, Germany has had 8 chancellors -- since 1949! I think the reasons for Germany thinking it can patiently outlast Greek governments, and for maintaining that elections can't void previous governments' agreements, are even more clear now. Thanks!



But surely they also see that such a dramatic deviation from democracy would render both morally and practically invalid any progress that might derive from them? That no reform conducted under such circumstances could ever last even a single day after the removal of foreign intervention? A veneer of reform might be pulled over Greece, but it would pop like a bubble in the end.

The famous meticulous German bureaucrat can't penetrate a system in which every axiom he relies on to function has been removed from play. He simply wouldn't have any Archimedean ground to stand on, no matter how big a lever he carries, in order to move the world. Building hopes on his ability to do so seems to me a stretch.

And even if this were possible, remember that it is one thing to engage in idle talk about such things in political B.S. sessions (and I don't know the circumstances of your discussions) but it is another to actually become a non-sovereign protectorate. That WOULD violate Kant's rules for perpetuating peace, and revolution against any such attempt would be entirely justified. So far there's a lot of hot air that such a "coup" is what we are seeing, but a closer inspection reveals it as just that - hot air.

You're suggesting the real thing! Even if it could work, it would be unwise for Greece to follow that path. It could only lead to revolution! Golden Dawn may have 80% negatives now, but it certainly wouldn't after that!

Furthermore, even if Greece did want to go this way, there is no way that Europe could go along while still maintaining its original purpose of peaceful coexistence of democratic states. Even if it was nominally "peaceful," it would no longer be democratic. This level of intervention really is a non-starter, and if it is not perceived as such within Greece, then it certainly is in the rest of Europe.

My "Take" from what you are now saying, above is that Northern ordoliberal mindset influences pushing all that debt into the Southern fringes of Europe, particularly Greece, is entirely a "Southern" problem". A classic case of; "nothing to do with me, it fell off the back of a lorry".

Your take on the structure of a deal negotiation is; we came here with terms; if you do not agree with them, then you, (the South), are to be described thus:

But it seems from here that when the mediterranean mind concludes any deal, it is seen as merely the opening act of a long haggling process, not complete until the last action being discussed is finally finished. And at any point prior to final conclusion, the whole negotiation can still collapse. In fact, since the threat of that total collapse is what provides negotiation strength to one party, it must be flirted with constantly to get a fair deal.

The exact same instability that is seen as normative, even desirable, in the south, is taken as evidence of utter failure - anarchic deviation from the rule of law - in the north.

To people who imagine that a negotiation is now over, this continuing flirtation with collapse appears to be total madness. When Varoufakis is described in strongly negative terms, that is often why.

That any such "deal" is in fact concluded with the presentation of "our" terms; and any attempt to negotiate is to be seen AND described as:

It isn't just that his economic theories are seen as total raving garbage to ordoliberals, but also that he was bringing into question the very concept of the word "deal". That was the currency of trust that Merkel said was "lost". It wasn't that people no longer trusted the current government to do what it said. (And therefore, it wasn't to depose the current government that they acted.) It was that they now felt they COULDN'T reasonably trust ANY government from Greece. To their mind, a dangerous precedent had been set for a rogue state - or at least for Greece - to do whatever it felt like, in violation of any international agreements it had ever made. In their mind, tolerating that would ultimately be fatal to every single institution that Europe had ever built, or ever could build. No wonder they didn't give way!

Not a wonder that such conversations end in acrimony on both sides.

Intolerance to another point of view seems to me to be deeply embedded in the Northern ordoliberal mindset and is; returning to my minds view; to be seen as the common problem underpinning many other aspects of what is currently wrong with the way many other aspects of Europe are being presented and acted upon by that "famous meticulous German bureaucrat".

There is no "Deal", of ANY sort; until BOTH sides agree.

However politely, bad mouthing the other side of such a debate is never the way forward; both sides of this debate have to be accommodated; regardless of how difficult it is for the main participants.

To now try and say that all of this is entirely a problem of the mindset of the Greek people; is a travesty. Both sides made big mistakes; both sides have to be brought to the table and to accept their part in this. No-one holds the high ground.

[touchring]

Re: Pilger on Greece

Well, certainly it can. The US began as thirteen colonies, and continued incorporating regions with different cultures as it expanded. There are without a doubt stilll geographic cultural differences within the US, but I think it is fair to say that a meaningful "American" culture does exist, with a character distinct from that of other nations.

To me, the more interesting question isn't whether it is possible, but whether prior examples of this process are similar enough to the conditions in Europe to make comparison and extrapolation valid.

I believe that the culture in migrant colonies is more complex, there are 2 sides to it, almost like a split personality. There is usually a public face and a native side - usually shown only in domestic situations.

Over time, the two sides will merge for the majority but will remain distinct for the minority races.

I'm doubtful that language can really influence culture that much. English is the first and second language for many of the ISIS foreign fighters.

[gnk]

Re: Pilger on Greece

Chris, I think you're taking it the wrong way. astonas and I are trying to understand the difference in cultures - not how they interact with other cultures necessarily in order to play a blame game, but on an internal level. There is definitely a different way of doing things in the Mediterranean, and I believe Greece is an extreme example of that.

That said, here's my theory:

It's no coincidence that civilization had flourished first where today we find the most ungovernable countries. (Am I going to get flak for that comment? Hey, I'm of Greek heritage, so I can say it. lol) These countries, in my view - post ice age, were not too hot or too cold - and I'm talking climate here. In most of Greece, in the dead of winter, we harvest olives. Pastures are green and livestock fatten up. In February, while northern climates experience frozen concrete-like soil, we have wild edible weeds growing everywhere - to this day you see people harvesting free food in the countryside - dandelion type plants, wild asparagus, etc... It's actually the summer that is the dry season. Even fishing is a year round endeavor. My best spearfishing herein Greece is in January and February.

So, in ancient times, living in a Mediterranean or even Middle Eastern or Northern African climate gave you a head start in the race to civilization. Instead of working yourself to death because "winter's coming," you had free time (at least enough people did) to think abstract concepts - Mathematics, Geometry, Biology, Astronomy, etc.... You had free time to engage in theater, and other types of Art.

BUT, those Northern "barbarians" stuck with extreme seasons had gained a future advantage. They were forced to plan ahead, to be future based. Preparing for winter influenced their thinking, their religion, their language - concepts such as delayed gratification, protestant work ethic, self reliance, etc. You set aside food, not as a store for the government Treasury or to pay taxes the way the more progressed parts of the ancient world did - food was only available in abundance less than half the year. There was no welfare. You didn't store food and chop lots of wood, you died.

And so, as technology spread to the Northern "barbarians" and with the advent of fossil fuel use these past couple centuries - the North, armed with a new abundance and excellent forward thinking planning skills, kicked the South's ass.

So to speak.

I think it's really that basic.

[astonas]

Re: Pilger on Greece

Chris, I think you're taking it the wrong way. astonas and I are trying to understand the difference in cultures - not how they interact with other cultures necessarily in order to play a blame game, but on an internal level. There is definitely a different way of doing things in the Mediterranean, and I believe Greece is an extreme example of that.

That said, here's my theory:

It's no coincidence that civilization had flourished first where today we find the most ungovernable countries. (Am I going to get flak for that comment? Hey, I'm of Greek heritage, so I can say it. lol) These countries, in my view - post ice age, were not too hot or too cold - and I'm talking climate here. In most of Greece, in the dead of winter, we harvest olives. Pastures are green and livestock fatten up. In February, while northern climates experience frozen concrete-like soil, we have wild edible weeds growing everywhere - to this day you see people harvesting free food in the countryside - dandelion type plants, wild asparagus, etc... It's actually the summer that is the dry season. Even fishing is a year round endeavor. My best spearfishing herein Greece is in January and February.

So, in ancient times, living in a Mediterranean or even Middle Eastern or Northern African climate gave you a head start in the race to civilization. Instead of working yourself to death because "winter's coming," you had free time (at least enough people did) to think abstract concepts - Mathematics, Geometry, Biology, Astronomy, etc.... You had free time to engage in theater, and other types of Art.

BUT, those Northern "barbarians" stuck with extreme seasons had gained a future advantage. They were forced to plan ahead, to be future based. Preparing for winter influenced their thinking, their religion, their language - concepts such as delayed gratification, protestant work ethic, self reliance, etc. You set aside food, not as a store for the government Treasury or to pay taxes the way the more progressed parts of the ancient world did - food was only available in abundance less than half the year. There was no welfare. You didn't store food and chop lots of wood, you died.

And so, as technology spread to the Northern "barbarians" and with the advent of fossil fuel use these past couple centuries - the North, armed with a new abundance and excellent forward thinking planning skills, kicked the South's ass.

So to speak.

I think it's really that basic.

gnk: This certainly is broadly consistent with the way I am thinking about it. Geography has a strong impact on all culture, including language, but language is that cultural aspect that seems most lossless in transmitting conceptions forward in time, permitting outdated and even irrelevant concepts to affect modern thinking. For this reason we see what I have referred to as "germanic" countries with very similar approaches, including the gleeful embrace of ordoliberal economic philosophy. This appears to closely correlate with linguistic influence as well. We also see former imperial and mercantile nations that take on a more trading-oriented "anglo-saxon" philosophy, though there are certainly differences between the English and French flavors. And you have already mentioned and spoken to the "mediterranean" approach that appears to be enabled in more temperate climates.

But to Chris:
gnk is exactly right, you appear to have entirely misinterpreted the tone of the conversation. We're not trying to assign blame at all, here, but trying to find understanding. The way the north sees the south is distorted by a lens that has evolved over millennia, and the south sees the north through a similarly distorted lens. Neither is "correct" in the sense of seeing things "clearly". But the fact that both distorting lenses exist creates the problems we are seeing today.

The discussion of this thread is by now mostly about whether these are insurmountable obstacles to a union. gnk is close enough to the greek culture to try to articulate what might be going through minds there. I feel I can speak at least partly to the more germanic mindset. So in the quotes you excerpted, I was saying, essentially, "this is what I perceive the view from the north to look like, do you have any opinion, either speaking for yourself, or for greek culture more broadly, on that?" In other words, it was a representation of the distortion, and an attempt to discuss it.

The idea that there is "blame" on both sides, was in one sense assumed before this conversation even began (since it is taken as a given that neither side sees the other clearly) and in another, is essentially irrelevant (since there is no universally "correct" culture in the first place, only cultures that have evolved in different circumstances, and thus have different strengths and weaknesses).

[Aside]: The mistake that economists like Krugman and Varoufakis make is assuming not only that there can be only one right answer, but that it must be theirs. It is worthwhile for each of us to ask ourselves if we might have fallen into that trap too. It is one I find useful to repeatedly check myself against. Have you done so lately? I mean really consider the possibility that you are, from the ground up, entirely wrong on an issue you care about. It is an important intellectual exercise, and not easy, but failing to do so can lead to some spectacular blow-ups. The damage Varoufakis did is just the most recent example. [/Aside]

So yes, in order to describe these distortions, one does at times attempt to place oneself into the mind of the other party, and pretend to view the other. Yes, such a depiction can at best be a caricature. And because of the size of the rift, it will generally be an unflattering one. The north DOES have an unflattering perception of the south, and vice-versa. Both have unflattering views of anglo-saxon perspectives, as well, and vice-versa there too. It does no good to pretend that such sentiments don't exist, when trying to discern whether they can be overcome.

I think there is no doubt that a core cultural difference is very real. And while it is necessarily hard to put into words, it is still worth looking at with whatever tools we have, however crude they might be.

[gnk]

Re: Pilger on Greece

This touches upon one of the factors at play in the EU - but overall, it's interesting as it covers a lot of ground. It affects us all.

[astonas]

Re: Pilger on Greece

This touches upon one of the factors at play in the EU - but overall, it's interesting as it covers a lot of ground. It affects us all.

Good find, and thanks for sharing!

Time is indeed one way that languages can be very different. The German language, for example, blends the near-future and present together. "I am going out" and "I will be going out [later]" both translate to "Ich gehe raus". The present is literally slanted toward the future, in a way that is actually locked into the grammatical structure of the language. It takes additional clarification, or a different future tense, to draw a strong distinction between present and future. And there is even a choice of tenses to distinguish different futures: eg. the future tense vs. the future perfect. (The future perfect exists in English, but it is less frequently used: "I will have completed the reform, by X date.")

This really is the exact opposite of the Sicilian dialect discussed in the video above. I knew language mattered, but I hadn't realized that neither the future, nor the future perfect tense even exist there! There literally is no way to even say that "It will be done by X."

Another aspect of the cultural difference can be found in approaches toward interdependence within a society, compared to individualism (anglo-saxon) or class-centric collectivism (mediterranean?). Going back to your climate argument, it is conceivable that individualism is suppressed over time in societies that must have concerted collective action in order to survive harsher winters. That could for example be one explanation for why German industry is built around co-determination, while both anglo-saxon and mediterranean cultures seem to employ (/require?) adversarial positions between labor and management.

I think that it is no accident both that Marx was German, and that when Marxism is employed in other contexts around the world, it has been less than successful. In Germany, however, its influence has led to fairly stable worker-management cooperation, which seems to be mutually beneficial.

The context, and expression in language, of an idea may be what determines whether that idea will help a society thrive, or strangle it, as it takes root and grows.

Interesting concepts, though of course this line of reasoning hardly bodes well for Europe.

Looking up some information quickly, I see that there are some interesting future tenses in Greek, including the Predictive Future, Imperatival Future, Deliberative Future, and Gnomic Future. Furthermore, the Futuristic Present seems to be emphasized as a way to talk about a state of becoming, rather than a future of "having completed."

Interestingly enough, no actual future perfect exists on the websites I've looked at so far. Here's an example. Is this correct, or am I misunderstanding?

[ProdigyofZen]

Re: Pilger on Greece

For those who argue that the decision was not voluntary, but rather forced, it should be pointed out that there is no external military force that is engaged with Greece. Instead, Greece is being told that if it wants more of other nations' taxpayers' money, it must meet certain conditions. Its elected representatives have full freedom tonot get more money, and retain full sovereignty. (In fact, that is precisely what the ordoliberal north would now prefer that Greece do, in the form of a Grexit.) So Kant would see this, too, as a part of the horse-trading that goes into each state's decision to join a union, on whatever terms its representatives can negotiate. Greece may not be crucial enough to Europe to get good terms, but if it doesn't like what it can get, the option to leave is still there. Not even the slightest threat of military intervention has been made, metaphorical references to exactly that notwithstanding, to make Greece stay in the EMU.

There are two ways to conquer a nation; one by sword and the other by debt. John Adams.

Debt is an ingenious substitute for the whip and chain of the slave driver.

The first word in recorded history for "Freedom" was the Sumerian word Amargi. It did not mean freedom as we conceptualize it today but debt freedom.

By the standard of Amargi, very few countries have "freedom" today and Greece is one of the worst nations for "freedom." This is not to mention the debt burden the majority of Americans have.

They don't need to conquer Greece with the sword or tanks, they already control the political process for the next few generations by wielding the debt sword of Damocles.

Kant understood this well even in 1795.