There goes Yemen.....

[Polish_Silver]

Re: Why to visit Turkey

you can't "let begin" something that has long been in progress. pakistan, iirc, got some nuclear tech from n. korea. i don't recall the western powers "allowing" n. korea to build its weapons, unless you want to say that anything short of declaring war on n. korea constituted "allowing." further, israel is widely assumed to ALREADY have a substantial nuclear arsenal. you can't begin what's already done. yes, iran would be further proliferation, as would a saudi bomb. it was in 1945 that the genie was released from the bottle [i think they come in bottles, or perhaps oil lamps, not in boxes to my knowledge.]

The non-proliferation treaty should have been enforced with a vengeance. Unfortunately, the international will to act was just not there. And not every country signed it. I don't know exactly what the treaty terms are, but it should have prohibited isotope enrichment, the key step in producing a nuclear weapon. For reactor fuel, everyone could by from "authorized Vendors" which would be, say, France and Russia.

Ignoring treaties, I think it would be great if the major powers would agree to take what ever steps necessary to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, the consensus is just not there, even thought it is certainly in the long term interest of all powers to prevent proliferation.

[lakedaemonian]

Re: Why to visit Turkey

I defer to GRG55 and his posts regarding Egypt as an under-appreciated and emphasized fulcrum for the Middle East Region.

But it's worth understanding the importance of Yemen to Saudi Arabia.

In terms of unconventional/asymmetric warfare, the loss of Yemen to pro Iranian or Iranian sympathetic forces is a very rough analog to D-Day "break-in" in Normandy.

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/wo...-10140145.html

With approx. half of Saudi military forces possessing Yemeni tribal ties(unsure about Saudi National Guard regime continuity force, which is separate to the Saudi Army, Navy, Air Force), this could be quite problematic for the Saudi regime and provide a platform for infiltration into Saudi proper.

Saudi Arabia possesses a massive arsenal of quite capable(and majority US) weapon systems. While they will be reasonably capable of bombing Yemen into rubble and then into smaller bits of rubble, I do not think Saudi forces(and coalition GCC forces) are capable of effectively nullifying a capable insurgency.

Saudi military performance of several years ago in Yemen was a shocking embarrassment, and while they've been working to avoid a repeat, I'm not convinced.

I expect to see sovereign Pakistani, Jordanian, and Egyptian specialist forces acting as state to state negotiated mercenaries on behalf of Saudi Arabia's royal family in Yemen(more so than they already have been in the case of Pakistan).

What will be interesting is if the Saudi's/GCC return to early Post WWII history.

While the US is disengaging from the region, and the Chinese would appear to be quite reluctant to fill the US military threat/deterrence model, it will be interesting to see if western (mainly US/UK) private military contracting(PMC) companies will be retained by Saudi to directly advise and assist on kinetic operations against threats(real or perceived) against the Saudi regime and it's interests.

When the House of Saud opposed Egypt's military intervention in Yemen, it wasn't Saudi forces that opposed the Egyptians, it was private UK citizens with special operations experience from WWII hired by the Saudis with complicity of the sitting UK government to advise and support Yemeni rebels opposing the Egyptian backed regime.

UAE retained Erik Prince of Blackwater fame/infamy to set up a 2 battalion foreign legion-like force consisting primarily of Columbian foot soldiers with western leadership cadres to provide regime continuity capability and response to asymmetric/unconventional threats.

While I think many stories regarding "mercenaries" in Iraq/Afghanistan conducting kinetic operations in the last decade have quite often been overblown and exaggerated(with bits of truth, surely), I reckon the greater the real/perceived threat to the Saudi regime, the greater the rise of sovereign and private mercenary forces conducting direct kinetic operations on behalf of the Saudi regime, and the greater the risk of genocide(s).

[sunpearl71]

Re: Why to visit Turkey

I've heard from some friends in the region that Saudi(and possibly with a GCC coalition) are hitting Yemen pretty hard with airstrikes.

Not much in news yet...not too many western journalists in Yemen/Saudi.

We should be getting detailed news out of UAE/Oman soon I reckon.

Operation Decisive Storm -- Air Power Over Yemen

After Houthi rebels toppled the Yemeni government causing president Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi to flee to Aden earlier this month, a Saudi-led coalition of Middle Eastern states launched an air campaign to intervene.

Operation Decisive Storm began on March 26 and has resulted in one of the most extraordinary gatherings of air power seen in recent years, with air arms from the Gulf Cooperation Council nations, except Oman, joined by aircraft from Morocco, Egypt and Sudan, as well as Jordan.
The numbers of aircraft involved are quite extraordinary but perhaps illustrate the concern that Saudi Arabia and its neighbors have for the spread of the Houthi insurgency in the south of the Arabia peninsula.
Saudi Arabia is supporting the operation with 100 aircraft that are likely to include fighters and support aircraft. One of the Royal Saudi Air Force’s (RSAF’s) F-15S Strike Eagles crashed into the Gulf of Aden on March 28 after suffering from technical problems. Both aircrew ejected and were rescued by U.S. Navy ships.

http://aviationweek.com/blog/operati...wer-over-yemen

[lakedaemonian]

Re: Why to visit Turkey

Operation Decisive Storm -- Air Power Over Yemen


After Houthi rebels toppled the Yemeni government causing president Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi to flee to Aden earlier this month, a Saudi-led coalition of Middle Eastern states launched an air campaign to intervene.

Operation Decisive Storm began on March 26 and has resulted in one of the most extraordinary gatherings of air power seen in recent years, with air arms from the Gulf Cooperation Council nations, except Oman, joined by aircraft from Morocco, Egypt and Sudan, as well as Jordan.
The numbers of aircraft involved are quite extraordinary but perhaps illustrate the concern that Saudi Arabia and its neighbors have for the spread of the Houthi insurgency in the south of the Arabia peninsula.
Saudi Arabia is supporting the operation with 100 aircraft that are likely to include fighters and support aircraft. One of the Royal Saudi Air Force’s (RSAF’s) F-15S Strike Eagles crashed into the Gulf of Aden on March 28 after suffering from technical problems. Both aircrew ejected and were rescued by U.S. Navy ships.

http://aviationweek.com/blog/operati...wer-over-yemen

The Saudis/GCC will learn that air power alone cannot guarantee victory/dominance.

Ground needs to be seized and governance needs to be gained directly or via proxy.

You can't bomb people into agreeing with you.

And it's worth repeating the average Saudi national(particularly serving regular military) with ties to Yemen(circa 50%).

Saudi princes bombing Yemen unopposed like they're riding on polo ponies is one thing, getting their hands genuinely dirty is entirely another.

I would expect a greatly increased risk of reprisal asymmetric/unconventional attacks within Saudi Arabia directed at the regime or against high profile international Saudi interests.

I think it's worth watching Saudi royal family chatter/noise.

The House of Saud has grown HUGE in recent decades. Fracture into factions I reckon could have some risk as seen with soap opera around former King's daughters' public and embarrassing break with the family over personal freedoms/rights.

I would think most would like to see the money train continue. But the growing size/scale of the family would surely increase the "weakest link in the chain" as the kingdom faces increased external and domestic threats to legitimacy.

[lakedaemonian]

Re: Why to visit Turkey

duplicate post

[vt]

Re: Why to visit Turkey

Can't tell one Syrian rebel from another? Al Qaeda vs. ISIS: Here's your guide! They're different, and they have other groups that oppose the Syrian government, but are unaligned.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...hin-jihad.html

This is just the Sunni side. there are Iran supported groups of many varieties too.

[vt]

Re: Why to visit Turkey

How Iran outfoxes U.S.

http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/21/opinio...ame/index.html

[lakedaemonian]

Re: Why to visit Turkey

The Indian Navy recently evacuated a fair few US citizens( a bit embarrassing).

The Pakistani Navy recently evacuated a fair few Indian citizens(even more embarrassing).

Sounding pretty messy getting civilians and NGOs out.

It also seems pretty strange about the Iranian flotilla making it's way to Yemen bringing weapons.

Yemen is a bit like former Yugoslavia, Syria, and Libya.

It has enough Cold War era weapons stockpiles to last into infinity.

[don]

Graham Fuller

Has Yemen reshaped the Middle East geopolitical map?
21 April 2015

Graham E. Fuller -grahamefuller.com

Does anybody remember the old Cold War geopolitical concept of the “Northern Tier states?” They consisted of three countries—Turkey, Iran and Pakistan (sometimes Afghanistan) that lay along the southern border of the Soviet Union; they were perceived in the West as a potential bulwark against Soviet aggression southwards into the Middle East. Is it just possible that we are witnessing today the possible recrudescence of a “Northern Tier” bloc? But this time it would not be united against Russia at all. On the contrary these three states demonstrate warming geopolitical congeniality with many aspects of Russian, Chinese, and “Eurasian” geopolitical views.

The ongoing crisis in Yemen may have become the midwife to such a development. If so, it is Iran that seems to be pulling the pieces together of a new loose power coalition in the Middle East.

Saudi Arabia’s much publicized creation of a supposed ten-nation Sunni coalition to fight “the Iranian and Shi’ite threat” in Yemen and the Gulf recently took two major body blows: the unexpected defection of both Turkey and Pakistan from the Saudi camp as active partners in the military campaign in Yemen—after having initially indicated they would join in.

Yes, it’s notable that Turkey, Iran and Pakistan are all three non-Arab states in the Middle East. But in speaking of a new “Northern Tier” we’re not really talking about an Arab vs non-Arab bloc. The differences are more ideological and geopolitical; they involve differing visions of the future that may reorder the geopolitical map in the Middle East. The “Northern Tier states” could come to constitute a new informal power bloc that challenges Riyadh’s bold new—and reactionary—ambitions in the region.
Two differing narratives of the Yemeni struggle now compete.

The Saudis boast of forging a bold and sweeping Sunni coalition to block a much-hyped threat of Iranian / Shi’ite imperialism that is supposedly taking over Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, the Gulf and now Yemen. Riyadh worries that Iran will soon emerge out from under US-imposed sanctions to take its place as a legitimate player on the regional stage. Washington is no longer perceived as a reliably anti-Iranian force.

But an alternative narrative suggest a different source of Saudi fear—one that stems not from theological disagreement at all, but from fear of the political goals of the Iranian revolution: revolution, overthrow of entrenched elites, anti-monarchical posture, support for meaningful democratic structures—(yes, Iran’s parliament is more activist and independent than almost any Arab state), direct challenge to the long-standing American political and military domination of the Middle East, strong support for the Palestinian cause, and a feisty nationalism. Much of the “Arab street” has admired Iran for its independence and gutsiness in challenging Washington.

Turkey of course has the best, and most well-established and functioning democracy in the region, notwithstanding sometimes rough domestic politics. And Pakistan, along with its Islamic trappings, has operated within democratic structures for many decades, albeit punctuated by periodic military rule. All three represent “modern” states in terms of institutions, and their strikingly developed and diversified economies and class structures.

These states differ in yet another major respect from the Arab states of the Middle East. Turkey and Iran maintain strong national identities, and Pakistan is striving to build based on a strong regional personality. All three are multi-ethnic states, but the legitimacy of the state concept among them is not basically open to challenge, although work to reconcile some domestic minority dissatisfactions is still needed. The future concept and borders of these states is not in question (although Pakistan has been severely shaken by the destructive fallout from the failing US war in Afghanistan.)

It is much harder to say this about most Arab states today. Only Egypt has a strong regional identity within classic geographic borders—and its potential as a “modern state” has been crippled by bad long-standing bad governance. It no longer has any vision for the region or the Arab world—neither Islamist, nor Arab nationalist, nor democratic, nor socialist. Few other major states in the Arab world are politically functional today either. Iraq had a regional geographic Mesopotamian identity but war has destroyed it for the foreseeable future. The small Gulf states, while often reasonably well run, live off oil, and are archaic and defensive in their political and social structures. Stability, where it exists in the Arab world, is largely imposed by monarchs and presidents-for-life.

What happened to bring about a Turkish turnaround on the Saudi coalition? I was frankly surprised at Ankara’s initial support in March for Riyadh’s campaign in Yemen, and more so at Erdoğan’s harshly outspoken criticisms of Iran’s role in the region at the time. This short-lived Turkish turn to Riyadh stood in direct contradiction to long-standing Turkish policies. In my recent book, “Turkey and the Arab Spring,” I describe Ankara and Riyadh as essentially representing ideological polarities: on sectarianism, democracy, globalization, secularism, multiculturalism, modernity, and the Muslim Brotherhood. They agree only on the need to overthrow the Asad regime.

Perhaps Erdoğan’s early decision was best understood as opportunism—an initial concern not to be left out of what might become a “new Arab force.” Yet during a relatively tense visit to Tehran in early April Erdoğan backed away from further criticism of Iran and from participation in the Saudi campaign against Yemen—a notable slap in the face to Riyadh. Iran is still the most important country to Turkey in the Middle East, in economic, energy and geopolitical terms. And Ankara must be mindful of its own large Alevi (quasi-Shi’ite) minority. How much was Iranian influence behind this sudden change of heart?

No less dramatic was the about-face of Pakistan. Islamabad initially seemed to look positively upon Riyadh’s call for Pakistani troops and military support in the Yemen campaign. But Pakistani Prime Minister Sharif, despite his close personal ties to Saudi Arabia, then decided to refer the issue to Parliament, well aware that public opinion in Pakistan ran against involvement of Pakistani troops in the distant Yemeni conflict. Strikingly, Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif visited Islamabad just at that time to call for joint Islamic action for a peaceful negotiated solution. How much did Iran influence the Pakistani about-face as well?

There may not yet be any “’Northern Tier” bloc as such. Yet there is much logic behind a confluence of views among these states on many issues. Such an informal bloc would represent a significantly more progressive, moderate and forward-looking coalition than the present Saudi-driven “Sunni coalition” that is divisive, ideological, destructive and sectarian. The region cries out for something more progressive than the Saudi/Sunni coalition’s reactionary view of the future. The approbation of both Russia and China for these non-interventionist geopolitical policies of the “Northern Tier” additionally lends these states greater clout. Such a bloc would also represent a clear non-Arab vision for the Middle East at a time when the Arab world itself seems to lack any visionary and constructive leadership representing a genuinely modernist future.

Arabs may not wish to listen to non-Arabs, but they themselves offer little alternative right now in the bleak landscape of the Arab world. Hopefully Washington will not allow itself to become stuck with the “counter-revolutionary” Arab coalition as the basis of future American policy in the area either.

====================
Graham E. Fuller is a former senior CIA official, and author of many books on the Middle East; his latest book is “Breaking Faith: a novel of espionage and an American’s crisis of conscience in Pakistan.”