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Summary
Conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) weapons would allow the United States to strike targets anywhere on Earth in as little as an hour. This capability may bolster U.S. efforts to deter and defeat adversaries by allowing the United States to attack high-value targets or “fleeting targets” at the start of or during a conflict. Congress has generally supported the PGS mission, but it has restricted funding and suggested some changes in funding for specific programs.
CPGS weapons would not substitute for nuclear weapons, but would supplement U.S. conventional capabilities. They would provide a “niche” capability, with a small number of weapons directed against select, critical targets. Some analysts, however, have raised concerns about the possibility that U.S. adversaries might misinterpret the launch of a missile with conventional warheads and conclude that the missiles carry nuclear weapons. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) is considering a number of systems that might provide the United States with long-range strike capabilities.
The Air Force and Navy have both considered deploying conventional warheads on their long- range ballistic missiles. The Navy sought to deploy conventional warheads on a small number of Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles. In FY2008, Congress rejected the requested funding for this program, but the Navy has continued to consider the possibility of deploying intermediate-range technologies for the prompt strike mission. The Air Force and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) are developing a hypersonic glide delivery vehicle that could deploy on a modified Peacekeeper land-based ballistic missile—a system known as the conventional strike missile (CSM). In FY2008, Congress created a single, combined fund to support research and development for the CPGS mission. Congress appropriated $65.4 million for this program in FY2014; the Obama Administration has requested $70.7 million for FY2015.
When Congress reviews the budget requests for CPGS weapons, it may question DOD’s rationale for the mission, reviewing whether the United States might have to attack targets promptly at the start of or during a conflict, when it could not rely on forward-based land or naval forces. It might also review whether this capability would reduce U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons or whether, as some critics have asserted, it might upset stability and possibly increase the risk of a nuclear response to a U.S. attack. This risk derives, in part, from the possibility that nations detecting the launch of a U.S. PGS weapon would not be able to determine whether the weapon carried a nuclear or conventional warhead. Congress has raised concerns about this possibility in the past.
While most analysts expected the Air Force to take the lead in deploying a hypersonic delivery system on a modified ballistic missile—a concept known as the conventional strike missile (CSM)—tests of the hypersonic vehicle known as the HTV-2 have not succeeded. An alternative glider, known as the AHW, may be deployed on missiles based at sea. Congress may review other weapons options for the CPGS mission, including bombers, cruise missiles, and possibly scramjets or other advanced technologies.
Warheads deployed on boost-glide systems would not be affected by the 2010 New START Treaty because these are new types of strategic offensive arms. But those deployed in existing types of reentry vehicles on existing types of ballistic missiles would count against the treaty limits. This report will be updated as needed.
Contents
Introduction...................................... .................................................. .............................................. 1
Background .................................................. .................................................. .................................. 2
The Prompt Global Strike Mission (PGS) .................................................. ............................... 2
Rationale for the PGS Mission........................................... ................................................. 2
PGS and the U.S. Strategic Command .................................................. ..............................4
Potential Targets for the PGS Mission .................................................. .............................. 5
Conventional Ballistic Missiles and the PGS Mission .................................................. ............ 6
Plans and Programs.......................................... .................................................. .............................. 8
Navy Programs .................................................. .................................................. ...................... 9
Reentry Vehicle Research.......................................... .................................................. ........ 9
Conventional Trident Modification .................................................. ................................. 11
Submarine-Launched Intermediate-Range Global Strike ................................................. 12
Air Force Programs .................................................. .................................................. ............. 13
The FALCON Study .................................................. .................................................. ...... 13
Reentry Vehicle Research and Warhead Options .................................................. ............ 15
Missile Options .................................................. .................................................. ............. 15
Defense-Wide Conventional Prompt Global Strike............................................ ..................... 16
The Conventional Strike Missile .................................................. ..................................... 17
Hypersonic Test Vehicle (HTV-2) .................................................. ................................... 18
Army Advanced Hypersonic Weapon .................................................. ............................. 19
ArcLight .................................................. .................................................. ........................ 20
Legislative Activity .................................................. .................................................. ............. 21
FY2003 and FY2004 .................................................. .................................................. ..... 21
FY2005............................................ .................................................. ................................ 22
FY2006 and FY2007 .................................................. .................................................. ..... 22
FY2008............................................ .................................................. ................................ 24
FY2009............................................ .................................................. ................................ 25
FY2010............................................ .................................................. ................................ 26
FY2011............................................ .................................................. ................................ 26
FY2012............................................ .................................................. ................................ 27
FY2013............................................ .................................................. ................................ 28
FY2014............................................ .................................................. ................................ 28
FY2015............................................ .................................................. ................................ 29
Issues for Congress .................................................. .................................................. .................... 30
Assessing the Rationale for CPGS .................................................. ........................................ 30
Reducing Reliance on Nuclear Weapons .................................................. ........................ 30
PGS .................................................. .................................................. ............................... 31
The Potential for Misunderstanding a CPGS Missile Launch............................................ ..... 32
Mitigating the Risks .................................................. .................................................. ...... 33
Remaining Concerns .................................................. .................................................. ..... 34
Reviewing the Alternatives...................................... .................................................. .............. 35
Land-Based Ballistic Missiles .................................................. ......................................... 35
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles .................................................. .......................... 36
Submarine-Launched Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles ........................................... 37
Long-Range Bombers .................................................. .................................................. ... 37
Tomahawk Cruise Missiles .................................................. ............................................. 37
Hypersonic Cruise Missiles.......................................... .................................................. ... 38
Scramjet Technologies .................................................. .................................................. .. 38
Forward-Based Global Strike (FBGS) .................................................. ............................ 39
Arms Control Issues .................................................. .................................................. ............ 39
Weighing the Benefits and Risks............................................. ................................................41
Contacts
Author Contact Information....................................... .................................................. .................. 43
Acknowledgments .................................................. .................................................. ..................... 43
Full Report: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41464.pdf
Weighing the Benefits and Risks
The Bush Administration and the Obama Administration have both supported the deployment ofsystems that employ long-range booster rockets and hypersonic payload delivery systems tofulfill the requirements of the prompt global strike mission. Both Administrations have arguedthat these systems can provide the United States with the ability to attack anywhere in the worldon short notice, in support of regional or national security goals. They have both noted that, bystrengthening the U.S. ability to attack at long ranges with conventional weapons, these systemscould help reduce the number of circumstances when the United States might have to considerusing nuclear weapons to defend its interests.
Critics, however, have argued that these weapons might provide the United States with morecapability than it needs under most circumstances, while, at the same time, raising the possibilitythat their use might be misinterpreted—either as the launch of nuclear weapons or as the use ofconventional weapons against nuclear targets. Moreover, as would be true for any weaponseeking to achieve this mission, the ability to attack targets across the globe on short noticedepends on the U.S. ability to acquire precise information about the locations of potential targetsand to translate that information into useful targeting data. If it takes longer for the United Statesto acquire and use that information than it would take for it to launch and deliver a ballisticmissile, or, as has often been the case, if such precise information is unavailable, then the UnitedStates may not be able to benefit from the unique characteristics of long-range ballistic missiles.Bombers would take longer to reach their targets, but this added time might provide the UnitedStates with the opportunity to acquire the needed intelligence. A 2008 report by the GovernmentAccountability Office (GAO) identified this particular problem, noting that many of the ongoing studies into global strike and prompt global strike have not addressed the need for criticalenabling capabilities along with the weapons systems that would be used in the attacks.
In addition, long-range ballistic missiles using boost-glide technologies would have an advantageover sea-based systems if the United States did not have naval forces near the conflict region, ordid not have time to move these forces to the area, or if the target area were out of range for thesea-based systems. But the U.S. Navy deploys its force around the world and maintainscapabilities near likely areas of conflict. A few targets may be out of range for these weapons, butbombers armed with cruise missiles might be able to reach them. Land-based long-range ballisticmissiles would only be needed in the rare circumstance where the United States had no warning,needed a prompt attack, and had to reach too far inland for sea-based systems. But even in thesecircumstances, the benefits of the use of long-range ballistic missiles might not outweigh the risks.
During the Cold War, most analysts recognized that long-range land-based ballistic missiles couldprove destabilizing in a crisis, when nations might have incomplete information about the natureof an attack and too little time to gather more information and plan an appropriate response.Faced with these circumstances, a nation who was not an intended target, such as Russia, mightchoose to respond quickly, rather than to wait for more information. The same could be true forthe adversaries who are the intended targets of U.S. conventional prompt strike weapons. If theUnited States hoped to destroy a nation’s military forces or weapons of mass destruction at thestart of a conflict, before they could be used to degrade U.S. capabilities or attack U.S. forces, theother nation might choose to use these weapons even more quickly during a crisis, before it lostthem to the U.S. attack.
Some have argued that the possible crisis instabilities associated with long-range ballistic missilesshould not eliminate them from consideration for the conventional prompt strike mission becausethe United States can work with Russia, China, and other nations to reduce the risks; also becauseno other weapons, at least in the short term, provide the United States with the ability to attackpromptly anywhere on the globe at the start of an unexpected conflict. Yet the question of whetherthe United States should accept the risks associated with the potential for misunderstandings andcrisis instabilities can be viewed with a broader perspective. How likely is the United States toface the need to attack quickly at great distances at the start of an unexpected conflict? How muchwould the United States lose if it had to wait a few hours or days to move its forces into theregion (or to await the intelligence reports and precise targeting data needed for an attack)?
If the risks of waiting for bombers or sea-based weapons to arrive in the theater are high, thenlong-range ballistic missiles may be the preferred response, even with the risk that other nationsmight misunderstand U.S. intentions. On the other hand, if the risks of waiting for other forces toarrive in theater are deemed to be manageable, and the risks of potential misunderstandings andcrisis instabilities associated with the launch of long-range ballistic missiles are thought to behigh, then the United States can consider a broader range of alternative weapons systems to meetthe needs of the PGS mission.
Conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) weapons would allow the United States to strike targets anywhere on Earth in as little as an hour. This capability may bolster U.S. efforts to deter and defeat adversaries by allowing the United States to attack high-value targets or “fleeting targets” at the start of or during a conflict. Congress has generally supported the PGS mission, but it has restricted funding and suggested some changes in funding for specific programs.
CPGS weapons would not substitute for nuclear weapons, but would supplement U.S. conventional capabilities. They would provide a “niche” capability, with a small number of weapons directed against select, critical targets. Some analysts, however, have raised concerns about the possibility that U.S. adversaries might misinterpret the launch of a missile with conventional warheads and conclude that the missiles carry nuclear weapons. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) is considering a number of systems that might provide the United States with long-range strike capabilities.
The Air Force and Navy have both considered deploying conventional warheads on their long- range ballistic missiles. The Navy sought to deploy conventional warheads on a small number of Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles. In FY2008, Congress rejected the requested funding for this program, but the Navy has continued to consider the possibility of deploying intermediate-range technologies for the prompt strike mission. The Air Force and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) are developing a hypersonic glide delivery vehicle that could deploy on a modified Peacekeeper land-based ballistic missile—a system known as the conventional strike missile (CSM). In FY2008, Congress created a single, combined fund to support research and development for the CPGS mission. Congress appropriated $65.4 million for this program in FY2014; the Obama Administration has requested $70.7 million for FY2015.
When Congress reviews the budget requests for CPGS weapons, it may question DOD’s rationale for the mission, reviewing whether the United States might have to attack targets promptly at the start of or during a conflict, when it could not rely on forward-based land or naval forces. It might also review whether this capability would reduce U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons or whether, as some critics have asserted, it might upset stability and possibly increase the risk of a nuclear response to a U.S. attack. This risk derives, in part, from the possibility that nations detecting the launch of a U.S. PGS weapon would not be able to determine whether the weapon carried a nuclear or conventional warhead. Congress has raised concerns about this possibility in the past.
While most analysts expected the Air Force to take the lead in deploying a hypersonic delivery system on a modified ballistic missile—a concept known as the conventional strike missile (CSM)—tests of the hypersonic vehicle known as the HTV-2 have not succeeded. An alternative glider, known as the AHW, may be deployed on missiles based at sea. Congress may review other weapons options for the CPGS mission, including bombers, cruise missiles, and possibly scramjets or other advanced technologies.
Warheads deployed on boost-glide systems would not be affected by the 2010 New START Treaty because these are new types of strategic offensive arms. But those deployed in existing types of reentry vehicles on existing types of ballistic missiles would count against the treaty limits. This report will be updated as needed.
Contents
Introduction...................................... .................................................. .............................................. 1
Background .................................................. .................................................. .................................. 2
The Prompt Global Strike Mission (PGS) .................................................. ............................... 2
Rationale for the PGS Mission........................................... ................................................. 2
PGS and the U.S. Strategic Command .................................................. ..............................4
Potential Targets for the PGS Mission .................................................. .............................. 5
Conventional Ballistic Missiles and the PGS Mission .................................................. ............ 6
Plans and Programs.......................................... .................................................. .............................. 8
Navy Programs .................................................. .................................................. ...................... 9
Reentry Vehicle Research.......................................... .................................................. ........ 9
Conventional Trident Modification .................................................. ................................. 11
Submarine-Launched Intermediate-Range Global Strike ................................................. 12
Air Force Programs .................................................. .................................................. ............. 13
The FALCON Study .................................................. .................................................. ...... 13
Reentry Vehicle Research and Warhead Options .................................................. ............ 15
Missile Options .................................................. .................................................. ............. 15
Defense-Wide Conventional Prompt Global Strike............................................ ..................... 16
The Conventional Strike Missile .................................................. ..................................... 17
Hypersonic Test Vehicle (HTV-2) .................................................. ................................... 18
Army Advanced Hypersonic Weapon .................................................. ............................. 19
ArcLight .................................................. .................................................. ........................ 20
Legislative Activity .................................................. .................................................. ............. 21
FY2003 and FY2004 .................................................. .................................................. ..... 21
FY2005............................................ .................................................. ................................ 22
FY2006 and FY2007 .................................................. .................................................. ..... 22
FY2008............................................ .................................................. ................................ 24
FY2009............................................ .................................................. ................................ 25
FY2010............................................ .................................................. ................................ 26
FY2011............................................ .................................................. ................................ 26
FY2012............................................ .................................................. ................................ 27
FY2013............................................ .................................................. ................................ 28
FY2014............................................ .................................................. ................................ 28
FY2015............................................ .................................................. ................................ 29
Issues for Congress .................................................. .................................................. .................... 30
Assessing the Rationale for CPGS .................................................. ........................................ 30
Reducing Reliance on Nuclear Weapons .................................................. ........................ 30
PGS .................................................. .................................................. ............................... 31
The Potential for Misunderstanding a CPGS Missile Launch............................................ ..... 32
Mitigating the Risks .................................................. .................................................. ...... 33
Remaining Concerns .................................................. .................................................. ..... 34
Reviewing the Alternatives...................................... .................................................. .............. 35
Land-Based Ballistic Missiles .................................................. ......................................... 35
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles .................................................. .......................... 36
Submarine-Launched Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles ........................................... 37
Long-Range Bombers .................................................. .................................................. ... 37
Tomahawk Cruise Missiles .................................................. ............................................. 37
Hypersonic Cruise Missiles.......................................... .................................................. ... 38
Scramjet Technologies .................................................. .................................................. .. 38
Forward-Based Global Strike (FBGS) .................................................. ............................ 39
Arms Control Issues .................................................. .................................................. ............ 39
Weighing the Benefits and Risks............................................. ................................................41
Contacts
Author Contact Information....................................... .................................................. .................. 43
Acknowledgments .................................................. .................................................. ..................... 43
Full Report: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41464.pdf
Weighing the Benefits and Risks
The Bush Administration and the Obama Administration have both supported the deployment ofsystems that employ long-range booster rockets and hypersonic payload delivery systems tofulfill the requirements of the prompt global strike mission. Both Administrations have arguedthat these systems can provide the United States with the ability to attack anywhere in the worldon short notice, in support of regional or national security goals. They have both noted that, bystrengthening the U.S. ability to attack at long ranges with conventional weapons, these systemscould help reduce the number of circumstances when the United States might have to considerusing nuclear weapons to defend its interests.
Critics, however, have argued that these weapons might provide the United States with morecapability than it needs under most circumstances, while, at the same time, raising the possibilitythat their use might be misinterpreted—either as the launch of nuclear weapons or as the use ofconventional weapons against nuclear targets. Moreover, as would be true for any weaponseeking to achieve this mission, the ability to attack targets across the globe on short noticedepends on the U.S. ability to acquire precise information about the locations of potential targetsand to translate that information into useful targeting data. If it takes longer for the United Statesto acquire and use that information than it would take for it to launch and deliver a ballisticmissile, or, as has often been the case, if such precise information is unavailable, then the UnitedStates may not be able to benefit from the unique characteristics of long-range ballistic missiles.Bombers would take longer to reach their targets, but this added time might provide the UnitedStates with the opportunity to acquire the needed intelligence. A 2008 report by the GovernmentAccountability Office (GAO) identified this particular problem, noting that many of the ongoing studies into global strike and prompt global strike have not addressed the need for criticalenabling capabilities along with the weapons systems that would be used in the attacks.
In addition, long-range ballistic missiles using boost-glide technologies would have an advantageover sea-based systems if the United States did not have naval forces near the conflict region, ordid not have time to move these forces to the area, or if the target area were out of range for thesea-based systems. But the U.S. Navy deploys its force around the world and maintainscapabilities near likely areas of conflict. A few targets may be out of range for these weapons, butbombers armed with cruise missiles might be able to reach them. Land-based long-range ballisticmissiles would only be needed in the rare circumstance where the United States had no warning,needed a prompt attack, and had to reach too far inland for sea-based systems. But even in thesecircumstances, the benefits of the use of long-range ballistic missiles might not outweigh the risks.
During the Cold War, most analysts recognized that long-range land-based ballistic missiles couldprove destabilizing in a crisis, when nations might have incomplete information about the natureof an attack and too little time to gather more information and plan an appropriate response.Faced with these circumstances, a nation who was not an intended target, such as Russia, mightchoose to respond quickly, rather than to wait for more information. The same could be true forthe adversaries who are the intended targets of U.S. conventional prompt strike weapons. If theUnited States hoped to destroy a nation’s military forces or weapons of mass destruction at thestart of a conflict, before they could be used to degrade U.S. capabilities or attack U.S. forces, theother nation might choose to use these weapons even more quickly during a crisis, before it lostthem to the U.S. attack.
Some have argued that the possible crisis instabilities associated with long-range ballistic missilesshould not eliminate them from consideration for the conventional prompt strike mission becausethe United States can work with Russia, China, and other nations to reduce the risks; also becauseno other weapons, at least in the short term, provide the United States with the ability to attackpromptly anywhere on the globe at the start of an unexpected conflict. Yet the question of whetherthe United States should accept the risks associated with the potential for misunderstandings andcrisis instabilities can be viewed with a broader perspective. How likely is the United States toface the need to attack quickly at great distances at the start of an unexpected conflict? How muchwould the United States lose if it had to wait a few hours or days to move its forces into theregion (or to await the intelligence reports and precise targeting data needed for an attack)?
If the risks of waiting for bombers or sea-based weapons to arrive in the theater are high, thenlong-range ballistic missiles may be the preferred response, even with the risk that other nationsmight misunderstand U.S. intentions. On the other hand, if the risks of waiting for other forces toarrive in theater are deemed to be manageable, and the risks of potential misunderstandings andcrisis instabilities associated with the launch of long-range ballistic missiles are thought to behigh, then the United States can consider a broader range of alternative weapons systems to meetthe needs of the PGS mission.
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