Do as we say, NOT as we do.

[Raz]

We invade Iraq, then accuse Russia of aggression for taking back their naval base in Crimea to keep it out of NATO’s hands!







House votes for new Cold War with Russia

by Ron Paul

Last week the US House voted overwhelmingly in favor of an anti-Russia resolution so full of war propaganda that it rivals the rhetoric from chilliest era of the Cold War. Ironically, much of the bill condemns Russia for doing exactly what the US government has been doing for years in Syria and Ukraine! For example, one of the reasons to condemn Russia in the resolution is the claim that Russia is imposing economic sanctions on Ukraine. But how many rounds of sanctions has US government imposed on Russia for much of the past year? I guess sanctions are only bad when used by countries Washington doesn't like. The resolution condemns Russia for selling weapons to the Assad government in Syria. But the US has been providing weapons to the rebels in Syria for several years, with many going to terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS that the US is currently bombing! The resolution condemns what it claims is a Russian invasion of Ukraine (for which it offers no proof) and Russian violation of Ukrainian sovereignty. But it was the US, by backing a coup against the democratically elected Yanukovich government in February, that first violated that country's sovereignty. And as far as a military presence in Ukraine, it is the US that has openly sent in special forces and other military advisors to assist the government there. How many times have top US military and CIA officials visited Kiev to offer advice and probably a lot more? The resolution condemns Russia for what it claims are attempts to "illicitly acquire information" about the US government. But we learned from the Snowden revelations that the NSA is spying on most of the world, including our allies! How can the US claim the moral authority to condemn such actions in others? The resolution attacks Russian state-funded media, claiming that they "distort public opinion." At the same time the bill demands that the thousands of US state-funded media outlets step up their programming to that part of the world! It also seeks "appropriate responses" to Russian media influence in the rest of the world. That should be understood to mean that US diplomats would exert pressure on foreign countries to shut down television networks like RT. The resolution condemns what it claims is Russia's provision of weapons to the Russian-speaking eastern part of Ukraine, which seeks closer ties with Russia, while demanding that the US government start providing weapons to its proxies on the other side. As I have said, this is one of the worst pieces of legislation I can remember. And trust me, I have seen some pretty bad bills. It is nothing but war propaganda and it will likely lead to all sorts of unintended consequences. Only ten Members - five from each party - opposed this reckless resolution. Probably most of those who voted in favor did not bother to read the bill. Others who read it and still voted in favor may have calculated that the bill would not come up in the Senate. So they could vote yes and please the hawks in their districts - and more importantly remain in good graces of the hawks who run foreign policy in Washington - without having to worry about the consequences if the bill became law. Whatever the case, we must keep an eye on those Members of Congress who vote to take us closer to war with Russia. We should thank those ten Members who were able to resist the war propaganda. The hawks in Washington believe that last month's election gave them free rein to start more wars.

[dcarrigg]

Re: Do as we say, NOT as we do.

FYI:

Text of House Resolution 758

Roll Call Vote

[don]

Re: Do as we say, NOT as we do.

One of the worst myths official Washington and its establishment media have told itself about the torture debate is that the controversy is limited to three cases of waterboarding at Guantánamo and a handful of bad Republican actors. In fact, a wide array of torture techniques were approved at the highest levels of the U.S. Government and then systematically employed in lawless US prisons around the world - at Bagram (including during the Obama presidency), CIA black sites, even to US citizens on US soil. So systematic was the torture regime that a 2008 Senate report concluded that the criminal abuses at Abu Ghraib were the direct result of the torture mentality imposed by official Washington.

American torture was not confined to a handful of aberrational cases or techniques, nor was it the work of rogue CIA agents. It was an officially sanctioned, worldwide regime of torture that had the acquiescence, if not explicit approval, of the top members of both political parties in Congress. It was motivated by far more than interrogation. The evidence for all of this is conclusive and overwhelming. And the American media bears much of the blame, as they refused for years even to use the word “torture” to describe any of this (even as they called these same techniques “torture” when used by American adversaries), a shameful and cowardly abdication that continues literally to this day in many of the most influential outlets.

The Senate Intelligence Committee today will release part of its “torture report.” The report is the by-product of four years of work (2009-2013) and is 6,000 pages long. Only the Executive Summary, roughly 600 pages, will be released today. Even some of that is redacted: the names of CIA agents participating in the torture, countries which agreed to allow CIA black sites, and other details. For months, top Democrats on the Committee warred with the Obama White House due to the latter’s attempts to redact far more vital information than even stalwart CIA ally Dianne Feinstein thought necessary.

None of this has been in any plausible doubt for years. Recall that Gen. Antonio Taguba, who led an official investigation into prisoner abuse, said in 2008: “There is no longer any doubt as to whether the current administration has committed war crimes. The only question that remains to be answered is whether those who ordered the use of torture will be held to account.” Gen. Barry McCaffrey said : “We tortured people unmercifully. We probably murdered dozens of them during the course of that, both the armed forces and the CIA.” Nobody needs this Senate report to demonstrate that the U.S. government became an official squad of torture (with the American public largely on board).

Still, this will be by far the most comprehensive and official account of the War on Terror’s official torture regime. Given the authors – Committee Democrats along with two Maine Senators: Angus King (I) and Susan Collins (R) – it’s likely to whitewash critical events, including the key, complicit role members of Congress such as Nancy Pelosi played in approving the program (important details of which are still disputed), as well an attempt to insulate the DC political class by stressing how the CIA “misled” elected officials about the program. But the report is certain to lay bare in very stark terms some of the torture methods, including “graphic details about sexual threats” and what Reuters still euphemistically and subserviently calls “other harsh interrogation techniques the CIA meted out to captured militants.”

Important parts of the Obama administration engaged in all sorts of gamesmanship to prevent the report’s release, including a last-minute call from John Kerry to Feinstein in which the Secretary of State warned that release of the report could endanger American lives (a warning affirmed yesterday by the White House) And a vital part of President Obama’s legacy will be his repeated and ultimately successful efforts to shield the torturers from all forms of legal accountability - which, aside from being a brazen breach of America’s treaty obligations, makes deterrence of future American torture almost impossible (Obama did that even in the face of some polls showing pluralities favored criminal investigations of torture).

To see how little accountability there still is for national security state officials, recall that the CIA got caught spying on the Senate Committee and then lying about it, yet John Brennan kept his job as CIA Director (just as James Clapper is still Director of National Intelligence despite getting caught lying about NSA domestic spying). Any decent person, by definition, would react with revulsion to today’s report, but nobody should react with confidence that its release will help prevent future occurrences by a national security state that resides far beyond democratic accountability, let alone the law.

The Intercept will have comprehensive coverage of the report throughout the day. We’ll have full annotations of the report; graphical guides to the key parts; reporting in Washington from Dan Froomkin, who has been covering the report for months, and other reporters; and I’ll be live-blogging key parts of the report and other fallout in this space all day, appearing, in reverse chronological order, underneath these initial observations.


Media torture advocates

Col. Morris Davis, the retired Air Force Colonel who served as the Chief Prosecutor of the Military Commissions at Guantánamo until 2007 when he lost his job for criticizing the tribunal, notes that MSNBC’s Joe Scarborough this morning explicitly defended the torture techniques, arguing: “whatever it takes to keep America safe.” Aside from being the essence of the authoritarian mindset – security über alles - it’s quite striking that major television personalities in the U.S. explicitly justify the use of torture. Is there any other western country where that’s true? After all, The Washington Post hired former Bush speechwriter Marc Theissen as a columnist after he wrote an entire book justifying torture (when used by the U.S.).

The U.S. has led the way in destroying the ostensible western taboo surrounding torture, which is why official torturers go free and torture advocates are featured in almost every major media outlet.

– Glenn Greenwald at 7:11 a.m. ET

[vt]

Re: Do as we say, NOT as we do.

There are no easy answers:

http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2...8IN/story.html

https://people.brandeis.edu/~teuber/torture.html

http://www.economist.com/node/9832909

Perhaps one should ask the interrogation question of the families of the 3,000 killed on 9-11. Is sleep deprivation, diapers, or water boarding (used on only 3 terrorists) torture? Note that CIA operatives are water boarded as part of their training, as are special forces.

If you want to see torture ask victims of the Soviet Union's past methods. There have been real instances of torture in many countries including the United States. But did the CIA cross the line to real torture or what some try to paint as such?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Use_of_torture_since_1948

[jacobdcoates]

Re: Do as we say, NOT as we do.

There are no easy answers:

http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2...8IN/story.html

https://people.brandeis.edu/~teuber/torture.html

http://www.economist.com/node/9832909

Perhaps one should ask the torture question of the families of the 3,000 killed on 9-11.

There is an easy answer- Don't do it, it doesn't work. Period.

As for the 3000 killed on 9/11, using them to justify torture is morally revolting.

[thriftyandboringinohio]

Re: Do as we say, NOT as we do.

There is an easy answer- Don't do it, it doesn't work. Period.

As for the 3000 killed on 9/11, using them to justify torture is morally revolting.

+1
"moral relativism " writ large.

[vt]

Re: Do as we say, NOT as we do.

Torture should never be used. There are interrogation methods that can be used that are not torture, but that some try to paint as torture for political purposes.

Ex-CIA Directors: Interrogations Saved Lives

The Senate Intelligence investigators never spoke to us—the leaders of the agency whose policies they are now assailing for partisan reasons.

Updated Dec. 9, 2014 6:51 p.m. ET307 COMMENTS

The Senate Intelligence Committee has released its majority report on Central Intelligence Agency detention and interrogation in the wake of 9/11. The following response is from former CIA Directors George J. Tenet, Porter J. Goss and Michael V. Hayden (a retired Air Force general), and former CIA Deputy Directors John E. McLaughlin, Albert M. Calland (a retired Navy vice admiral) and Stephen R. Kappes :
The Senate Intelligence Committee’s report on Central Intelligence Agency detention and interrogation of terrorists, prepared only by the Democratic majority staff, is a missed opportunity to deliver a serious and balanced study of an important public policy question. The committee has given us instead a one-sided study marred by errors of fact and interpretation—essentially a poorly done and partisan attack on the agency that has done the most to protect America after the 9/11 attacks.
Examining how the CIA handled these matters is an important subject of continuing relevance to a nation still at war. In no way would we claim that we did everything perfectly, especially in the emergency and often-chaotic circumstances we confronted in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. As in all wars, there were undoubtedly things in our program that should not have happened. When we learned of them, we reported such instances to the CIA inspector general or the Justice Department and sought to take corrective action.
The country and the CIA would have benefited from a more balanced study of these programs and a corresponding set of recommendations. The committee’s report is not that study. It offers not a single recommendation.
Our view on this is shared by the CIA and the Senate Intelligence Committee’s Republican minority, both of which are releasing rebuttals to the majority’s report. Both critiques are clear-eyed, fact-based assessments that challenge the majority’s contentions in a nonpartisan way.
What is wrong with the committee’s report?
ENLARGE
Khalid Sheikh Muhammed, shown in an undated photo from the FBI. ASSOCIATED PRESS


First, its claim that the CIA’s interrogation program was ineffective in producing intelligence that helped us disrupt, capture, or kill terrorists is just not accurate. The program was invaluable in three critical ways:
• It led to the capture of senior al Qaeda operatives, thereby removing them from the battlefield.
• It led to the disruption of terrorist plots and prevented mass casualty attacks, saving American and Allied lives.
• It added enormously to what we knew about al Qaeda as an organization and therefore informed our approaches on how best to attack, thwart and degrade it.
A powerful example of the interrogation program’s importance is the information obtained from Abu Zubaydah, a senior al Qaeda operative, and from Khalid Sheikh Muhammed, known as KSM, the 9/11 mastermind. We are convinced that both would not have talked absent the interrogation program.
Information provided by Zubaydah through the interrogation program led to the capture in 2002 of KSM associate and post-9/11 plotter Ramzi Bin al-Shibh. Information from both Zubaydah and al-Shibh led us to KSM. KSM then led us to Riduan Isamuddin, aka Hambali, East Asia’s chief al Qaeda ally and the perpetrator of the 2002 Bali bombing in Indonesia—in which more than 200 people perished.
The removal of these senior al Qaeda operatives saved thousands of lives because it ended their plotting. KSM, alone, was working on multiple plots when he was captured.
Here’s an example of how the interrogation program actually worked to disrupt terrorist plotting. Without revealing to KSM that Hambali had been captured, we asked him who might take over in the event that Hambali was no longer around. KSM pointed to Hambali’s brother Rusman Gunawan. We then found Gunawan, and information from him resulted in the takedown of a 17-member Southeast Asian cell that Gunawan had recruited for a “second wave,” 9/11-style attack on the U.S. West Coast, in all likelihood using aircraft again to attack buildings. Had that attack occurred, the nightmare of 9/11 would have been repeated.
Once they had become compliant due to the interrogation program, both Abu Zubaydah and KSM turned out to be invaluable sources on the al Qaeda organization. We went back to them multiple times to gain insight into the group. More than one quarter of the nearly 1,700 footnotes in the highly regarded 9/11 Commission Report in 2004 and a significant share of the intelligence in the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on al Qaeda came from detainees in the program, in particular Zubaydah and KSM.
The majority on the Senate Intelligence Committee further claims that the takedown of bin Laden was not facilitated by information from the interrogation program. They are wrong. There is no doubt that information provided by the totality of detainees in CIA custody, those who were subjected to interrogation and those who were not, was essential to bringing bin Laden to justice. The CIA never would have focused on the individual who turned out to be bin Laden’s personal courier without the detention and interrogation program.
Specifically, information developed in the interrogation program piqued the CIA’s interest in the courier, placing him at the top of the list of leads to bin Laden. A detainee subjected to interrogation provided the most specific information on the courier. Additionally, KSM and Abu Faraj al-Libi—both subjected to interrogation—lied about the courier at a time when both were providing honest answers to a large number of other critical questions. Since other detainees had already linked the courier to KSM and Abu Faraj, their dissembling about him had great significance.
So the bottom line is this: The interrogation program formed an essential part of the foundation from which the CIA and the U.S. military mounted the bin Laden operation.
The second significant problem with the Senate Intelligence Committee’s report is its claim that the CIA routinely went beyond the interrogation techniques as authorized by the Justice Department. That claim is wrong.
President Obama ’s attorney general, Eric Holder , directed an experienced prosecutor, John Durham, to investigate the interrogation program in 2009. Mr. Durham examined whether any unauthorized techniques were used by CIA interrogators, and if so, whether such techniques could constitute violations of U.S. criminal statutes. In a press release, the attorney general said that Mr. Durham “examined any possible CIA involvement with the interrogation and detention of 101 detainees who were alleged to have been in U.S. custody” after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. The investigation was concluded in August 2012. It was professional and exhaustive and it determined that no prosecutable offenses were committed.
Third, the report’s argument that the CIA misled the Justice Department, the White House, Congress, and the American people is also flat-out wrong. Much of the report’s reasoning for this claim rests on its argument that the interrogation program should not have been called effective, an argument that does not stand up to the facts.
Fourth, the majority left out something critical to understanding the program: context.
The detention and interrogation program was formulated in the aftermath of the murders of close to 3,000 people on 9/11. This was a time when:
• We had evidence that al Qaeda was planning a second wave of attacks on the U.S.
• We had certain knowledge that bin Laden had met with Pakistani nuclear scientists and wanted nuclear weapons.
• We had reports that nuclear weapons were being smuggled into New York City.
• We had hard evidence that al Qaeda was trying to manufacture anthrax.
It felt like the classic “ticking time bomb” scenario—every single day.
In this atmosphere, time was of the essence and the CIA felt a deep responsibility to ensure that an attack like 9/11 would never happen again. We designed the detention and interrogation programs at a time when “relationship building” was not working with brutal killers who did not hesitate to behead innocents. These detainees had received highly effective counter-interrogation training while in al Qaeda training camps. And yet it was clear they possessed information that could disrupt plots and save American lives.
The Senate committee’s report says that the CIA at that point had little experience or expertise in capture, detention or interrogation of terrorists. We agree. But we were charged by the president with doing these things in emergency circumstances—at a time when there was no respite from threat and no luxury of time to act. Our hope is that no one ever has to face such circumstances again.
The Senate committee’s report ignores this context.
The committee also failed to make clear that the CIA was not acting alone in carrying out the interrogation program. Throughout the process, there was extensive consultation with the national security adviser, deputy national security adviser, White House counsel, and the Justice Department.
The president approved the program. The attorney general deemed it legal.
The CIA went to the attorney general for legal rulings four times—and the agency stopped the program twice to ensure that the Justice Department still saw it as consistent with U.S. policy, law and our treaty obligations. The CIA sought guidance and reaffirmation of the program from senior administration policy makers at least four times.
We relied on their policy and legal judgments. We deceived no one.
The CIA reported any allegations of abuse to the Senate-confirmed inspector general and the Justice Department. CIA senior leadership forwarded nearly 20 cases to the Justice Department, and career Justice officials decided that only one of these cases—unrelated to the formal interrogation program—merited prosecution. That person received a prison term.
The CIA briefed Congress approximately 30 times. Initially, at presidential direction the briefings were restricted to the so-called Gang of Eight of top congressional leaders—a limitation permitted under covert-action laws. The briefings were detailed and graphic and drew reactions that ranged from approval to no objection. The briefings held nothing back.
Congress’s view in those days was very different from today. In a briefing to the Senate Intelligence Committee after the capture of KSM in 2003, committee members made clear that they wanted the CIA to be extremely aggressive in learning what KSM knew about additional plots. One senator leaned forward and forcefully asked: “Do you have all the authorities you need to do what you need to do?”
In September 2006, at the strong urging of the CIA, the administration decided to brief full committee and staff directors on the interrogation program. As part of this, the CIA sought to enter into a serious dialogue with the oversight committees, hoping to build a consensus on a way forward acceptable to the committee majority and minority and to the congressional and executive branches. The committees missed a chance to help shape the program—they couldn’t reach a consensus. The executive branch was left to proceed alone, merely keeping the committees informed.
How did the committee report get these things so wrong? Astonishingly, the staff avoided interviewing any of us who had been involved in establishing or running the program, the first time a supposedly comprehensive Senate Select Committee on Intelligence study has been carried out in this way.
The excuse given by majority senators is that CIA officers were under investigation by the Justice Department and therefore could not be made available. This is nonsense. The investigations referred to were completed in 2011 and 2012 and applied only to certain officers. They never applied to six former CIA directors and deputy directors, all of whom could have added firsthand truth to the study. Yet a press account indicates that the committee staff did see fit to interview at least one attorney for a terrorist at Guantanamo Bay.
We can only conclude that the committee members or staff did not want to risk having to deal with data that did not fit their construct. Which is another reason why the study is so flawed. What went on in preparing the report is clear: The staff picked up the signal at the outset that this study was to have a certain outcome, especially with respect to the question of whether the interrogation program produced intelligence that helped stop terrorists. The staff members then “cherry picked” their way through six million pages of documents, ignoring some data and highlighting others, to construct their argument against the program’s effectiveness.
In the intelligence profession, that is called politicization.
As lamentable as the inaccuracies of the majority document are—and the impact they will have on the public’s understanding of the program—some consequences are alarming:
• Many CIA officers will be concerned that being involved in legally approved sensitive actions can open them to politically driven scrutiny and censure from a future administration.
• Foreign intelligence partners will have even less confidence that Washington, already hemorrhaging with leaks, will be able to protect their cooperation from public scrutiny. They will cooperate less with the United States.
• Terrorists, having acquired now the largest haven (in the Middle East and North Africa) and string of successes they have had in a decade, will have yet another valuable recruitment tool.
All of this means more danger for the American people and for our allies.
Anyone who has led a U.S. intelligence agency supports strong congressional oversight. It is essential as a check on leadership judgment in a profession that deals constantly with uncertainty, crises and the potential for surprise. We have all experienced and benefited from that in our careers, including at times when the judgment of overseers was critical.
When oversight works well, it is balanced, constructively critical and discreet—and offers sound recommendations. The Senate Intelligence Committee’s report is disrespectful of that standard.
It’s fair to ask whether the interrogation program was the right policy, but the committee never takes on this toughest of questions.
On that important issue it is important to know that the dilemma CIA officers struggled with in the aftermath of 9/11 was one that would cause discomfort for those enamored of today’s easy simplicities: Faced with post-9/11 circumstances, CIA officers knew that many would later question their decisions—as we now see—but they also believed that they would be morally culpable for the deaths of fellow citizens if they failed to gain information that could stop the next attacks.
Between 1998 and 2001, the al Qaeda leadership in South Asia attacked two U.S. embassies in East Africa, a U.S. warship in the port of Aden, Yemen, and the American homeland—the most deadly single foreign attack on the U.S. in the country’s history. The al Qaeda leadership has not managed another attack on the homeland in the 13 years since, despite a strong desire to do so. The CIA’s aggressive counterterrorism policies and programs are responsible for that success.
Related documents are available at ciasavedlives.com.

[vt]

Re: Do as we say, NOT as we do.

Sen. Bob Kerrey: Partisan torture report fails America

Bob Kerrey8:51 p.m. EST December 9, 2014

Intelligence agencies need guidance to do better, Senate Democrats failed to provide it.

(Photo: J. Scott Applewhite, AP)

I regret having to write a piece that is critical of the Democratic members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Most of them are former colleagues and friends. I hope they will remain friends after reading this.

For eight years I served on this committee. I know how difficult and important the work of providing tough and fair oversight of our nation's$50 billion top-secret intelligence network.

I will wait until I have fully read and considered Tuesday's report to enter the debate over whether the CIA handled interrogation of detainees in an appropriate manner. Thanks to the 2005 and 2006 efforts of Senator John McCain I do not have to wait to be certain our interrogation policies and procedures are aligned with our core values.

I also do not have to wait to know we are fighting a war that is different than any in our country's past. The enemy does not have an easy to identify and analyze military. In the war against global jihadism, human intelligence and interrogation have become more important, and I worry that the partisan nature of this report could make this kind of collection more difficult.

I do not need to read the report to know that the Democratic staff alone wrote it. The Republicans checked out early when they determined that their counterparts started out with the premise that the CIA was guilty and then worked to prove it.

When Congress created the intelligence committees in the 1970's, the purpose was for people's representatives to stand above the fray and render balanced judgments about this most sensitive aspect of national security. This committee departed from that high road and slipped into the same partisan mode that marks most of what happens on Capitol Hill these days.

I have participated in two extensive investigations into intelligence failures, once whenAldrich Ames was discovered to be spying for Russia after he had done substantial damage to our human intelligence collection capability and another following the 9/11 attacks. In both cases we were very critical of the practices of the intelligence agencies. In both cases we avoided partisan pressure to blame the opposing party. In both cases Congress made statutory changes and the agencies changed their policies. It didn't make things perfect, but it did make them better.

In both of these efforts the committee staff examined documents and interviewed all of the individuals involved. The Senate's Intelligence Committee staff chose to interview no one. Their rationale - that some officers were under investigation and could not be made available – is not persuasive. Most officers were never under investigation and for those who were, the process ended by 2012.

Fairness should dictate that the examination of documents alone do not eliminate the need for interviews conducted by the investigators. Isolated emails, memos and transcripts can look much different when there is no context or perspective provided by those who sent, received or recorded them.

It is important for all of us to remember how unprepared we were for the attacks of September 11, 2001 and how unprepared we were to do the things necessary to keep the country from being attacked again. There was no operating manual to guide the choices and decisions made by the men and women in charge of protecting us. I will continue to read the report to learn of the mistakes we apparently made. I do not need to read the report in full to know this: We have not been attacked since and for that I am very grateful.
It is important for all of us to not let Congress dodge responsibility. Congressional oversight of intelligence is notoriously weak. The 9/11 Commission recommended a number of changes in the authorities of Congressional committees but the proposal – advanced by Senator McCain – did not come close to gathering a majority of votes in either the Senate or the House.

The worse consequence of a partisan report can be seen in this disturbing fact: It contains no recommendations. This is perhaps the most significant missed opportunity, because no one would claim the program was perfect or without its problems. But equally, no one with real experience would claim it was the completely ineffective and superfluous effort this report alleges.

Our intelligence personnel – who are once again on the front lines fighting the Islamic State – need recommended guidance from their board of governors: The U.S. Congress. Remarkably this report contains none. I hope – for the sake of our security and our values – Congress will follow the leadership of Senator McCain and give them this guidance.
Bob Kerrey, former governor of Nebraska and U.S. senator, is now the managing director of Allen and Company.

[Thailandnotes]

Re: Do as we say, NOT as we do.

I remember asking a Thai friend about 5 years ago why you couldn't buy the really good Thai apples anymore. He informed me that a trade deal with China involved a huge payment to the prime minister during campaign season. In return Thailand opened its borders to more Chinese produce including apples and the prime minister promised and followed through on the destruction of Thai orchards....(Every time I read a story like the one below, I winkyleaks.


from the Bangkok Post


Details still secret on Thailand role in CIA torture
'Detention Site Green' - Unknown location, unknown Thaksin government involvement

Published: 10 Dec 2014 at 01.04 | Viewed: 8,819 | Comments: 17
Online news: World
Writer: Online reporters, Associated Press

WASHINGTON – The US Senate report released early Wednesday delivered a damning indictment of CIA practices, accusing the spy agency of inflicting pain and suffering on prisoners beyond legal limits - but offered no new information on the location or Thai government involvement in its first waterboarding facility.

The US report will change no minds about water-boarding and other "enhanced interrogation" of terrorists. It officially confirms that a still-secret safe house in Thailand was the site where two top al-Qaeda suspects were water-boarded. Abu Zubaydah (top) was al-Qaeda's coordinator of external contacts and foreign communications, and took part in planning all major terrorist attacks. Before his capture, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri was the chief of operations for al-Qaeda in the Persian Gulf and masterminded the bombing of the US Navy's USS Cole in October, 2000.

Treatment in secret prisons a decade ago was worse than the government told Congress or the public, said the report from the Senate Intelligence Committee, the first official public accounting after years of debate about the CIA's brutal handling of prisoners.

In Thailand, there was disappointment, as the report blanked out all information about the country's role in waterboarding, housing terrorist suspects from around the world - and the exact involvement of Thaksin Shinawatra government, National Security Agency and Royal Thai Army.

The Bangkok Post learned recently that the US Senate's un-edited report claims the CIA chose Thailand as the site of its safe house because of the close ties between the US agency and Thai intelligence officers. According to this report, then-prime minister Thaksin was not informed until after the safe house was actually operating.

Then-president George W Bush and his vice-president Dick Cheney knew that the site was in Thailand, the report says. But the heavily censored version released Wednesday provides no information about the Thai government, intelligence or military involvement.

Thaksin was prime minister at the time and committed Thailand to helping the US, including sending Thai troops to both Afghanistan and Iraq.

"Thailand offered to help the CIA," said a US source familiar with the contents of the uncensored US Senate report. As the number of detainees in US hands grew, the US refurbished a large compound in Poland that replaced the Thailand safe house, and torture on Thai soil ended when the temporary detention side closed in December, 2002, or January, 2003.

A lengthy section of the redacted report released Wednesday - just 499 pages of the original 6,700, and most of those blotched by blacked-out sections - contains extensive details on the capture in Ayutthaya in August, 2003, of the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist chief Hambali...

[Woodsman]

Re: Do as we say, NOT as we do.

... Bob Kerrey, former governor of Nebraska and U.S. senator, is now the managing director of Allen and Company.

How bipartisan, looking to a war criminal for advise on torture. As an ex-operator who's performed a few enhanced interrogations himself back in the day, Kerry's hands are far from clean. I would take anything he says about this matter with some caution. I think his judgment stinks.

It's not related to the current matter, but upon voting to repeal the Glass–Steagall Act in 1999 Kerry defended his position by stating "The concerns that we will have a meltdown like 1929 are dramatically overblown." I guess after that whopper, a gut buster like "I do not have to wait to be certain our interrogation policies and procedures are aligned with our core values" should not be surprising.

His idea that the GOP failed to uphold its oversight duties because they thought the process was "unfair" is pretty hilarious. And surely it had nothing to do with the fact that discrediting the report as partisan was the only option they had as the architects of the war and the torture policy. It belongs to Bush and the GOP. It's all theirs and they own it. Like the sign says "mission accomplished."

Of course that is "aspirational" as nothing of the sort will happen. Impunity is the name of the game with these guys. And as there's no shortage of folks here and everywhere willing to wring hands and furl brows as the eggs are broken and the omelets made' they'll walk between the raindrops like they always do. The agency in question is untouchable so there's no concern for any meaningful or substantive sanctions.

CIA unlikely to lose power in wake of interrogation report
Washington Post, Wednesday, December 10 2014

The Senate report is a substantial blow to the CIA’s reputation, one that raises fundamental questions about the extent to which the agency can be trusted. And yet, as in those previous instances of political and public outrage, the agency is expected to emerge from the investigatory rubble with its role and power in Washington largely intact.

Indeed, the CIA is in many ways at a position of unmatched power. Its budgets have been swollen by billions of dollars in counterterrorism expenditures. Its workforce has surged. Its overseas presence has expanded. And its arsenal now includes systems, including a fleet of armed drones, that would have made prior generations of CIA leaders gasp.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/...1f7_story.html

This will quickly pass into memory and nothing will come of it.

VT, I don't know why you're not celebrating? Your team is hitting it to the fences at every swing. That's tiger blood, baby; that's winning!

[vt]

Re: Do as we say, NOT as we do.

Woodsman, we never celebrate war.

Thank you for the reference to Kerry, which I was not aware of. I looked at an old article in the Washington Post about this incident. It's sad that Senators such as Kerry with this tragedy, Ted Kennedy with Mary Jo, and Robert Byrd with the KKK ever reached such levels of power.

If LBJ and McNamara had not gotten us further into Vietnam and redrawn instead many more Vietnamese and American soldiers, plus civilians on both sides, would still be alive.

If Clinton had taken out Bin Laden in 2000, maybe the Trade Towers, plus, far more importantly, many more lives in the U.S., Europe, and the middle east would have been spared. Of course a few women and children would have died if Clinton had acted. Now hundreds of times more civilians die because of perversion of religion and power.

No simple answers, difficult decisions. Will actions that cause deaths now (not Kerry's of course) save many more later. Will enhanced interrogation but nor torture gain information to prevent further bloodshed.

Of course this really isn't about Kerry and Vietnam. It's about questioning methods of a few war criminals who are torturers themselves. How can you measure the lives saved? Not only about the potential terror victims. No, the numbers are far larger as we would react to another terrorist attacks with more ourselves and tens of thousand more civilians on both sides would die. The escalations are the real tragedy.

We shouldn't have been in Vietnam or Iraq 2. But Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Egypt and other Arabs, plus Israel asked us to have a presence in the middle east.

What's your solution? There are really no good answers on either side of this issue. Both parties are responsible; that's for sure.

[Woodsman]

Re: Do as we say, NOT as we do.

Woodsman, we never celebrate war...

Sure we don't.

[jk]

Re: Do as we say, NOT as we do.

we never celebrate war.

pResident G. W. "Codpiece" Bush

+ More

P

[Raz]

Re: Do as we say, NOT as we do.

... hundreds of times more civilians die because of perversion of religion and power.

No simple answers, difficult decisions. ...

We shouldn't have been in Vietnam or Iraq 2. But Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Egypt and other Arabs, plus Israel asked us to have a presence in the middle east.

What's your solution? There are really no good answers on either side of this issue. Both parties are responsible; that's for sure.

The Saudis BEGGED George W. Dumbass NOT to invade Iraq. They clearly saw that the greatest threat was Iran.

Terrorism is the price of empire. The Romans endured it, the British endured it, the French endured it and so did others on a lesser scale. It is the warfare of the weak, the conquered, and the subjugated.

Their message is: we aren't strong enough to throw you out, but we'll never let you eat your kill in peace.
Combine this with the dysfunctional nature of Islam and you get what we now have.

We have two choices: either become just like them - merciless, utterly ruthless and savage - only on a larger scale, OR (a novel idea) - give up the friggin' empire! Keep enough naval bases to ensure unhindered travel of the sea lanes, but otherwise withdraw.

We don't have to run the world and we can't afford to. Certainly not while our own economy is being hollowed out from the inside.
The mantra of "American Exceptionalism" and the utopian idea of Pax Americana is bleeding and bankrupting us.

And it takes our eyes off the rigged game of FIRE that's destroying us all.

[don]

Re: Do as we say, NOT as we do.

we aren't strong enough to throw you out, but we'll never let you eat your kill in peace

Well put, Raz. Washington's principle military mission was to remain an army in being. That he did though several times it was a near-run thing.

Was he a terrorist?

Yes, to the Brits.