US declares war on ISIS - Double FacePalm

[touchring]

Re: Shadow diplomacy

EVERYONE is financing the war in Syria......Saudi, Qatar, Iran, Russia, US, etc.

I would like to add to that NGOs of various countries.

And also precisely the reason why people joined ISIS. ISIS appears to be able to provide stability (even though an extremely brutal one) to the total anarchy in Syria and north Iraq.

The only way to undermine ISIS is to bring stability to Syria.

[Forrest]

Re: US declares war on ISIS - Double FacePalm

It won't. And we won't break our dependency on foreign oil until it becomes unobtanium. This is all just insane.

Ooooh! Nice verbage!

[don]

Re: Tower Of Babel

The Middle East and its armies
By Brian M Downing

Recent events have shown the ineffectiveness of armies in the Middle East, from Libya to Iraq, and extending beyond the region into Afghanistan. Training missions can teach troops to shoot and march and salute, but not to hold up under fire. Several armies have struggled or collapsed in recent conflicts, despite superior armaments, training, and numbers. Only a few have acquitted themselves well in battle.

The Libyan army collapsed in the face of lightly-armed rebels and a measure of NATO air support. The Syrian army has been driven from most of the country by a miscellany of rebel forces and can only maintain a stalemate with the help of Hisbollah and Iranian advisers. The Iraqi army was sent fleeing by a few thousand Islamic State (IS) troops and is only slowly regaining ground with outside help. And of course Saddam Hussein's army was devastated in a matter of a few days by the US and allies in 1991 and 2003.

Today, the prospect of 2,000 IS troops invading Saudi Arabia - a country with an army and national guard of several hundred thousand and a sizable air force - causes shudders in and out of the region.

These failures do not stem from Islam or colonial legacies. Nor are they restricted to the Middle East, as the Ukrainian army's timorous performance in Crimea demonstrated, perhaps especially to Russian President Vladimir Putin. Failures stem from organizational and demographic problems that are unlikely to be redressed in coming years. This has great import for regional security and for future alignments with outside powers.

Problems
Armies are organizations. They are charged with recruiting soldiers, integrating them into national structures regardless of their backgrounds, and training them in an array of weaponry from assault rifles to jet aircraft. Armies must be able to keep abreast of changing military threats and doctrines. They must execute large-scale maneuvers and supply units in the most trying of conditions.

Organizational effectiveness in the region (and elsewhere) has been hindered by a lack of professionalism in the officer corps, from company-grade officers to the general staff. Officers are selected less for mastery of the art of war than for loyalty to rulers. This leads to resentment and mistrust: the rank and file from privates to colonels do not trust their superiors; and unit commanders do not trust those in charge of sister units that may be needed in desperate situations.

Social scientists of the 1960s argued that armies in developing countries would help build new nations. People from conflicting regions and groups would be brought together and would serve in a unifying institution. The experience would reduce regionalism and tribalism and sectarianism and build nationalism. That, however, has not been the case.

Commanders tend to come from one region or tribe or sect: Sunnis in Saddam's Iraq, Shias in today's Iraq, Persians in Iran, Sauds in the Kingdom, Alawis in Syria, Pashtun in Afghanistan. Other groups are resentful and often oppressed. Instead of reducing parochialisms, most militaries perpetuate and strengthen them. (Significantly, the region's most competent army, that of Egypt, has the fewest of these fissures.)

Prospects of reform
A country seeing military shortcomings all about it might be expected to embark on systematic changes in its officer corps and to make its rank and file more inclined to defend their nation. Some European states responded in that manner to the threat of revolutionary French armies, though only halfheartedly and in the end only temporarily. Middle Eastern states are unlikely to take any such steps in response to the threat of revolutionary Islamist forces. Tellingly, Saudi Arabia is responding to the IS danger to the north by building a fence along the Iraqi border.

Favoritism in appointments within army and state is too firmly embedded into the political processes to be significantly reduced, let alone abolished. Tribalism, once thought to be an archaic institution that modernization would sweep away, is an enduring part of army and state.

Sectarian tensions are perhaps higher than they were during Iran's revolution in 1979, making substantive incorporation of the other sect into key positions in army and state unlikely.

Westerners might see the lack of political participation as a principal cause of poor fighting spirit, but inside the region political reform is seen as opening the door to extremism, paralysis, and anarchy, and to further weakening of the army.

Perhaps the greatest obstacles to reform are the knowledge that Western troops are available to provide regional security and the belief that the old networks of sinecures and favoritism can survive the transient crisis that IS poses.

Brian M Downing is a political/military analyst, author of The Military Revolution and Political Change and The Paths of Glory: Social Change in America from the Great War to Vietnam. He is co-author with Danny Rittman of The Samson Heuristic.

[lakedaemonian]

Re: Tower Of Babel

The Middle East and its armies
By Brian M Downing

Hi Don,

I suspect the article author only get's it partly right.

I certainly agree with the sectarian/tribal divide.

But I think the author misses the points raised about organization and professionalism. I think he is looking at it like most from a western lens.

Here's an article that I reckon hits closest to the mark on the consistently poor performance of Arab armies:

http://www.gloria-center.org/wp-cont...ed-au1-PDF.pdf

Key points:

1)Arab armies modeled after Western(British/US) or Soviet org structures and doctrine pretty much all suck. You might be surprised to hear that the much vaunted Israeli military isn't that well respected by western military professionals. The IDF(specifically conventional combined arms Army operation) is looked at by many as simply not nearly as bad as the Arab armies it has fought.

2)Arab armies modeled after Western/Soviet org/doctrine are focused on the influence gained by the external actor, petro-dollar recycling, and/or regime continuity against minor internal security threats rather than effectiveness against peer or near peer threats.

3)Arab cultural clash on class structures. Officers in Western armies eat last(as but one example). Officers in Arab armies eat first. Service in professional western armies is perceived by those who serve as a calling or profession of arms, service in arab armies is perceived as an involuntary chore or income generating activity for enlisted who are treated as indentured servants, and a "franchise" often available for purchase for officers(it is common for officers in Arab armies to purchase command.) Westerns scoff at the lack of Arab professionalism, and Arabs will scoff at Westerners naivety and lack of understanding why it's silly to think a few years of western training/modeling will not erase thousands of years of culture.

This "franchise" or personal power perspective of Arab unit commanders is anathema to effective combined arms military operations. But it is deeply ingrained in cultures where corruption isn't just accepted, but deemed necessary for personal survival.

4)External influence on Arab armies rapidly evaporates once that external actor leaves the scene.

Arab performance in unconventional warfare sub unit operations has had considerable success, which is why we are seeing a small(but well motivated and funded) and agile organization like ISIS achieving such substantial gains because it plays to Arab cultural strengths rather than weaknesses.

ISIS is built around an effective Arab force model. They are well motivated. They are well funded. They are small/flexible/agile.

ISIS isn't unstoppable. Far from it. But they do potentially represent a bigger and broader strategic threat because it is a force built around Arab strengths instead of weaknesses.

A bit like T E Lawrence's Arab's fighting the Turks with great success. Except now the Turks are exchanged for entrenched regimes and T E Lawrence is exchanged for thousands of foreign militant extremist volunteers.

Just my 0.02c

[Polish_Silver]

The Arab armies

Hi Don,

I suspect the article author only get's it partly right.
. ..

But I think the author misses the points raised about organization and professionalism. I think he is looking at it like most from a western lens.

. . . .

Key points:

1)Arab armies modeled after Western(British/US) or Soviet org structures and doctrine pretty much all suck. You might be surprised to hear that the much vaunted Israeli military isn't that well respected by western military professionals. The IDF(specifically conventional combined arms Army operation) is looked at by many as simply not nearly as bad as the Arab armies it has fought.

. . .
3)Arab cultural clash on class structures. Officers in Western armies eat last(as but one example). Officers in Arab armies eat first. Service in professional western armies is perceived by those who serve as a calling or profession of arms, service in arab armies is perceived as an involuntary chore or income generating activity for enlisted who are treated as indentured servants, and a "franchise" often available for purchase for officers(it is common for officers in Arab armies to purchase command.)
. . .
Just my 0.02c

LD, I think that's a great analysis.

I think the difference between "professional soldiers" and "indentured servants" is that the professionals have meaningful choice---they could do other jobs, they just choose a military career.

Where as for the "servants", decent jobs are very scarce in that part of the world, with Turkey being a partial exception. (And isn't the Turkish military considered a cut above the others in the region?)

Regarding Israel, I have often wondered about some of the Axis victories in WW II. For example the Japanese conquest of China and the Pacific. Well, they did not attack Australia or New Zealand, where they would have met motivated and well resourced soldiers. The Pearl Harbor attack was really just a half success, since the island remained in US hands, and many ships survived.

Germany in Europe looks much more impressive, but even there I wonder. What if the Maginot artillery could pivot 360? What if France had attacked Germany in September 1939?

What if the British, in 1939 , had done a "Doolittle" on Berlin?

[lakedaemonian]

Re: Tower Of Babel

Whoops!

Double Post delete

[don]

Re: Tower Of Babel

a good 2c lake. Reminds me of reading about the Mexican army years ago. Not much conventionally but real effective in suppressing dissent, its actual mission, aided and abetted by you know who.

[lakedaemonian]

Re: The Arab armies

LD, I think that's a great analysis.

I think the difference between "professional soldiers" and "indentured servants" is that the professionals have meaningful choice---they could do other jobs, they just choose a military career.

Where as for the "servants", decent jobs are very scarce in that part of the world, with Turkey being a partial exception. (And isn't the Turkish military considered a cut above the others in the region?)

Regarding Israel, I have often wondered about some of the Axis victories in WW II. For example the Japanese conquest of China and the Pacific. Well, they did not attack Australia or New Zealand, where they would have met motivated and well resourced soldiers. The Pearl Harbor attack was really just a half success, since the island remained in US hands, and many ships survived.

Germany in Europe looks much more impressive, but even there I wonder. What if the Maginot artillery could pivot 360? What if France had attacked Germany in September 1939?

What if the British, in 1939 , had done a "Doolittle" on Berlin?

The Turks, in my opinion, are like a "quantity over quality" Muslim version of Israel when arrayed against any Arab state.

Militarily, they are the biggest/best in the Muslim world. Although an Iranian nuclear capability would shatter that in one big respect.

The British did bomb Berlin less than a year later that had some psychological effect on Hitler.

What could have had FAR more of an outsized effect would be if the Polish Underground's two massive IEDs successfully planted in Warsaw during Hitler's October, 1939 visit had been successfully detonated.

The only thing that prevented it was the Gestapo/Nazi security forces moving the "dickers"/lookouts to signal detonation to the IED initiator.

Now THAT would have had a very interesting outcome for folks to discuss over many beers.

Ultimately...I think the problem with attempting to array an international coalition against ISIS is as follows:

Consensus driven conventional diplomats will likely be unable to even conceptualize or recognize the need for unconventional diplomatic infrastructure required to successful counter unconventional diplomatic challenges.

Such unconventional diplomatic infrastructure(a new small agile org custom built for THAT Non State Actor) will be deemed incompatible with existing conventional diplomatic infrastructure.

The same thing has happened with the US Army(conventional) and US Army Special Forces(unconventional). The Army didn't want and many times over it's 60 plus year history has tried to strangle and kill it repeatedly.

Yet it is quite possibly the best positive foreign policy tool the US has in it's possession deploying annually to well over 100 countries. Yep....there's some killing going on.

But in most cases it consists of training trips with sovereign states to build their capacity and to immerse themselves deeply in that particular spot. Like diplomats with a lot of guns.

I'm really surprised there isn't a well funded effort to focus more on the diplomacy and less on the guns using some of those guys as the basis to build an unconventional diplomatic team that can bridge the gap with the growing number of NSAs popping up all over the place.

[lakedaemonian]

Re: The Arab armies

Where as for the "servants", decent jobs are very scarce in that part of the world, with Turkey being a partial exception. (And isn't the Turkish military considered a cut above the others in the region?)

Regarding Turkey, the recovery of dozens of Turkish diplomats and dependents(including children) held by ISIS in Mosul have been recovered.

This will provide Turkey greater freedom of maneuver in responding to ISIS et al, despite Erdogan's policies.

http://www.ibtimes.com/dozens-turkis...leased-1692335

http://www.terminalx.org/2014/09/cov...d-by-isis.html

In a way, it puts Turkey in a bit of a corner, since it no longer has a justifiable excuse to oppose US foreign policy on ISIS.

[don]

Wallerstein Talks Turkey

"Syria: Turkish Ambivalence"
by Immanuel Wallerstein


Amid the many and ever-evolving shifts of policies and geopolitical alliances in the various countries of the Middle East, one used to be at least sure what are the prime objectives of the major actors, both in the region and in the outside world.



This is not true of Syria today. Syrian politics today are formed by a triad: supporters of the Bashar al-Assad regime; supporters of the caliphate that calls itself the Islamic State (IS); and so-called moderate Islamic groups that claim to be fighting both of the other two groups. Triadic struggles are notoriously difficult both to analyze and to predict because triads have an almost fatal way of reducing themselves in the relatively short run to a clearer two-sided struggle. However, in this case many of the main actors in the region and beyond are highly ambivalent about what it is they want. Many of them prefer to maintain the triad if they can, and are afraid of being forced to choose to which dyad they give priority. This ambivalence is particularly true of Turkey, although also of Saudi Arabia and the United States.



Turkey shares a large border with Syria. It has been governed for some time now by the AKP (Justice and Development Party), an Islamic party that seeks to project itself as oriented to Islamic values and practices but nonetheless tolerant of other perspectives and commitments. It started its rule with an announced foreign policy of maintaining its links with the western world as a member of NATO and a country seeking to join the European Union while at the same time attempting to restore Turkey's role as a major power in the Middle East, one that would maintain good relations with all other Middle Eastern countries.



When the civil war began in Syria, Turkey offered its services as a mediator. In the process, at some point, Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan thought that Syria's President Bashar al-Assad had lied to him. Deeply affronted, he turned from being a mediator to being a leading proponent of a change in Syrian regime.



Turkey has a very large Kurdish minority to which the successive governments have always denied recognition, devolution, and linguistic rights. Ever since the establishment of a Turkish republic over ninety years ago, Turkish governments have reacted to Kurdish demands with total suppression, some even denying that there was such a group as the Kurds. Some thirty years ago, a Kurdish militant Marxist-Leninist movement, the PKK (Kurdish Workers' Party), sought to achieve Kurdish objectives with armed revolt. The leader of this movement, Abdullah Ocalan, was captured and sentenced to life imprisonment.



A few years ago, the present Turkish regime changed course and surprised the world by entering into negotiations with the PKK to see if a compromise could be realized. For its part, the PKK indicated that they no longer were a Marxist-Leninist movement and were ready to contemplate devolution as an objective instead of independence for the Kurdish region. These discussions have been difficult but ongoing and seemingly promising.



The Syrian civil war upended the internal situation in Turkey. The caliphate forces (so-called IS) expanded considerably in northern Syria and have been seeking to control the Syrian side of the border with Turkey. This is actually a region peopled largely by Syrian Kurds. Their main movement, the PYD (Party of Unity and Democracy) has been the principal target of IS attack as well as the principal force in the zone that is resisting the advance of the IS. The IS is presently attacking Kobani, the de facto capital of the Syrian Kurdish region.



The movement of Syrian Kurds is also in close relation with Turkey's Kurdish movement, the PKK. When the United States announced its policy of creating a "coalition" of forces to fight the IS forces and using its airplanes to try to stem their advance, Turkey found itself immediately under considerable US pressure to join the struggle. In particular, the Kurds on both sides of the border, and the United States, have called for Turkey's opening its borders in both directions: to permit Syrian Kurds who are under threat in Kobani and elsewhere from the IS forces to enter Turkey for safe haven and to allow Turkish Kurds to enter Syria to assist militarily the Syrian Kurds.



Turkey has been most reluctant to accede to any of these requests. President Erdogan declared that, from Turkey's point of view, both the IS and the Turkish Kurdish movement, the PKK, are equally terrorist movements, and Turkey saw no reason to open its frontier in this way. This is a strange position to take since the Turkish government has been negotiating for some time with the PKK despite the fact that they label it as a terrorist movement. The Kurdish movements, the PKK and the DYP, cannot in any sense be equated with the IS which is pursuing a very aggressive military campaign against all and sundry.



So what is Turkey saying to the world? The government has argued that fighting the IS will strengthen Bashar al-Assad. This is probably true. But therein lies Turkey's choice and its ambivalence. The Turkish government is demanding a promise from the United States that it will not be diverted from pursuing a struggle against the al-Assad regime, and in particular that it establish now a no-fly zone on the frontier. The United States argues this is impossible to do without troops on the ground, which they will not send.



And here is the choice: which dyad? If one gives priority to the struggle against the IS, it does reduce the support given to the ever smaller so-called moderate Islamists in Syria. If one gives priority to fighting al-Assad, it does strengthen the IS and will undoubtedly lead to a widespread massacre of Syrian Kurds by the IS, as the United Nations Syria envoy has just warned.



The other Turkish ambivalence concerns their negotiations with the PKK. If Turkey turns its back on the dilemmas of the Syrian Kurds, it will probably lead to a rupture in the negotiations with the PKK in Turkey. They have been so warned publicly by the PKK. But if the Turkish government turns more actively against the IS, the result could be that the PKK would have a stronger position in the continuing negotiations.



In addition, Turkey has been trying to improve its relations with Iran. The two countries share strong common interests in Afghanistan and Iraq, and even support the same forces in Palestine. But not fighting actively against the IS will interfere with this attempt to increase ties. On the other hand, active opposition to the IS will interfere with Turkey's attempt to present itself as a champion of Sunni Islamists.



One way or the other, Turkey will have to come to a more coherent policy in the very near future. Otherwise, its claim to be a major actor in the region will fall flat. And its internal struggle with the Kurds will probably explode into violence again. Ambivalence is not admired in a zone of such hot struggles.