Finally proof that Russia is invading Ukraine!

[touchring]

Re: Signing agreements with Russia?

I'd say signing an agreement with Russia is worthless.
Did Ukraine think the US would help them fight off Russia? What part of the treaty says that?

But what exactly should the US/Nato be doing?
Supplying arms? Sending in Soldiers?

I don't exactly see how Ukraine is a threat to US security, and I don't think we should ask our soldiers to fight for anything else.

Of course, US influence and credibility in Europe is at stake.

The question is:

Should you help your neighbor across 2 streets when your own backyard is burning?

[don]

Re: Signing agreements with Russia?

The real deal this September is not NATO. It's the SCO's summit. Expect the proverbial tectonic shifts of geopolitical plaques in the upcoming meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization - a shift as far-reaching as when the Ottoman empire failed at the gates of Vienna in 1683. On the initiative of Russia and China, at the SCO summit, India, Pakistan, Iran and Mongolia will be invited to become permanent members. Once again, the battle lines are drawn. NATO vs SCO. NATO vs BRICS. NATO vs Global South.

[Polish_Silver]

Getting Lost in Russia?

Sounds like quite the invasion force.

The "Getting lost" was more believable before GPS.

[Polish_Silver]

Re: Finally proof that Russia is invading Ukraine!

The current problem of multi-polar global power imbalance can be traced to the defeat of the Soviet empire by the west in the early 1990s, after which an unstable U.S. dominated uni-polar arrangement arose out of a more balanced bi-polar system. As a logical development of unchecked power in a uni-polar world, in the early 2000s the U.S. over-stepped its role with a unilateral ill-fated invasion of Iraq. Subsequently the U.S. retrenched and a highly unstable multi-polar global power regime developed in the power void that retrenchment created. A multi-polar world will spawn more men like Putin and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi who will seize on a lack of political will, and economic and military power, among fractured world powers to check their ambitions. Global power will logically devolve in the direction of multi-polar conflict and disorder, finally rationalized by a stalemate between alliance blocks backed by either the U.S. or China as a new bi-polar regime emerges after a period of ferocious proxy wars.

I agree with this to some extent. The cold war was like a strong magnet, polarizing almost every nation one way or the other. Global chess moves were for the most part calculated carefully by both sides. But that did not prevent bloody wars like Vietnam, Korea, and Afghanistan. There was also the risk of falling over the brink, as we nearly did in the Cuban missile crisis. Nor did the Cold War prevent wars which were "off the books" of the super-power ledger such as Iran-Iraq, genocides in Africa, India vs Pakistan. (These two almost went to nuclear war in 2001, when the US was pre-occupied with 9-11)

I don't buy that the world is more dangerous now. Maybe more complex, more unpredictable. But I don't see any quantitative argument that there is more war now than during the cold war.

The US cold war policy was very costly in terms of human rights, economic resources, etc.

[gwynedd1]

Re: Signing agreements with Russia?

Of course, US influence and credibility in Europe is at stake.

The question is:

Should you help your neighbor across 2 streets when your own backyard is burning?

An even better analogy is helping your neighbor set their own backyard on fire. 15 years ago I would have not questioned the basic paradigm that the Soviet ways were oppressive and the West free. Russia with its open borders and more civil liberties is less ostensibly oppressive. And since my discovery of the West's more blatant theft of other nation's national resources ,it appears the West is far less a the liberator it was apparently before. I don't think Russia was doing Ukraine a whole lot of good. The problem is I don't see much of an economic future for Ukraine either way. Show me the plan and proof to revive the PIIGS and I would be a little more convinced that there is a lesser evil. And even worse for Ukraine is it would just become a NATO military outpost.

[touchring]

Re: Signing agreements with Russia?

I don't think Russia was doing Ukraine a whole lot of good. The problem is I don't see much of an economic future for Ukraine either way. Show me the plan and proof to revive the PIIGS and I would be a little more convinced that there is a lesser evil. And even worse for Ukraine is it would just become a NATO military outpost.

In the short run, assuming that Ukraine doesn't become another Libya or Syria, I see a better future for Ukrainians if Ukraine joins the EU simply because Ukraine is starting from a lower base, but in the longer run, 20-30 years, it is subjective because the current mega trend is a Europe in long term decline - this should be evident by now.

The issue at hand is not whether Russia or Europe is better for Ukraine but whether violent coups in a country that already has a democratic system (even if sub-functional) can introduce real change. We've seen this happen many times in Thailand for decades and Thailand is a relatively homogeneous country that speaks the same language and has a uniform culture.

[lakedaemonian]

Re: Finally proof that Russia is invading Ukraine!

I don't buy that the world is more dangerous now. Maybe more complex, more unpredictable. But I don't see any quantitative argument that there is more war now than during the cold war.

I would posit the world IS more dangerous now, for a few reasons:

1)We are closer to that ugly point where energy demand from growing 1st/2nd/3rd/4th world countries exceeds available supply. And while I'm confident we will discover "what comes next", I have zero confidence "what comes next" will not occur before we see significant economic/political/social disruption and associated conflict risk in that awkward transition period.

So potentially we have the biggest pending energy price volatility/unpredictability looming on the horizon.

2)We no longer have a bipolar world where the vast majority of conflicts had a superpower on either side(sometimes swapping sides like Somalia/Ethiopia in the 70's) with the ability to influence/control proxy forces to a certain degree.

Nowadays, proxy forces are being run by so many players it's almost impossible to keep track. For example, the majority of folks in the 1st world don't understand the factional conflict between Sunni and Shia that often underpins geopolitics in the Middle East. And the comical part is that even those who've figured that simple but important aspect of regional conflict are now scratching their heads when it comes to why there is growing factional split within the Sunni factions of Egypt/UAE bombing Libya and Turkey/Qatar backing ISIS, and Saudi and Iran reportedly having a chat over what to do......lions and lambs lying down together....all quite biblical

In short......predictability of conflict(especially predictability of proxy sponsors) would appear to be far more nebulous and splintered than in the past.

3)I don't think we can accurately predict Superpower behavior as accurately as we could before.

Stability equates to predictability doesn't it?

Doesn't an increasingly unstable economic foundation of the US, Russian capital flight, and Chinese banking sector pollution risk unpredictable/volatile behavior by major powers to distract citizenry away from it?

4)Lack of "time and space" between India/Pakistan as well as North Korea/South Korea.

The aforementioned Cuban Missile Crisis of the Cold War led to dedicated resources/control measures to make the most of that time/space and mitigate accident risk, particularly in terms of direct communications and nuclear weapons control.

Pakistan/India/North Korea do NOT possess the same level of direct communications and nuclear weapons controls as possessed by the US/USSR. It is my understanding the US has played(and paid) a role in improving this situation since 2001, but the one thing that will NEVER change is the lack of time/space due to the tyranny of distance(or the lack of it between likely combatants).

The OODA Loop(Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) is so incredibly short and nuclear arsenals are so small as to increase risk of a possible first strike success in destroying the opponent's entire nuclear counterstrike capability, that I would rate the use of a nuclear weapon in our lifetimes far more likely than during the US/USSR Cold War.

Magnifying that problem is the very real possibility that US and/or other major power's desire and capability to intervene may be reduced in the future due to falling capability(politically, militarily, economically) to successfully intervene as well as the possibility of a falling desire to intervene if such a sparking conflict could be perceived as having greater domestic distraction value than domestic economic harm.

In closing, I reckon the world is more volatile and less predictable, therefore potentially more dangerous.

The US cold war policy was very costly in terms of human rights, economic resources, etc.

I would agree US foreign policy has come at a high cost post WWII.

But it needs to be said, the US was not operating in a unipolar vacuum. I'm not excusing certain actions and behaviors, but there was an opposition. An extremely active opposition that often goes unmentioned, placing complete blame on the US.

The other side of the chess board slaughtering pawns doesn't excuse the US slaughtering pawns, but it puts it into a more fair context.

[Woodsman]

Re: Finally proof that Russia is invading Ukraine!

...But it needs to be said, the US was not operating in a unipolar vacuum. I'm not excusing certain actions and behaviors, but there was an opposition. An extremely active opposition that often goes unmentioned, placing complete blame on the US.

The other side of the chess board slaughtering pawns doesn't excuse the US slaughtering pawns, but it puts it into a more fair context.

I agree that context is important here. To that end, can you talk about your perspective of the situation immediately following the Second World War? What was the major European security concern of the allies (which included the USSR) in the months prior to and following the surrender of Japan?

It would be helpful to review the plans and outcomes of the Yalta conference as it was there the allies established an an agenda for governing post-war Europe. The Wiki article is necessarily brief but gives a decent enough introduction. In seeking an answer, we can really go as far back as the Moscow conference in 1944, with Stalin and Churchill dividing Europe into spheres of influence on the back of a napkin.



In 1945, who did the allies see as their next potential competitor? Who gave them the most worry?

[gwynedd1]

Re: Signing agreements with Russia?

In the short run, assuming that Ukraine doesn't become another Libya or Syria, I see a better future for Ukrainians if Ukraine joins the EU simply because Ukraine is starting from a lower base, but in the longer run, 20-30 years, it is subjective because the current mega trend is a Europe in long term decline - this should be evident by now.

The issue at hand is not whether Russia or Europe is better for Ukraine but whether violent coups in a country that already has a democratic system (even if sub-functional) can introduce real change. We've seen this happen many times in Thailand for decades and Thailand is a relatively homogeneous country that speaks the same language and has a uniform culture.

Thailand raises an interesting question. To be honest I know little about it, but the combination of apparent homogeneity but political instability has inspired me to look more into it.

[lakedaemonian]

Re: Finally proof that Russia is invading Ukraine!

I agree that context is important here. To that end, can you talk about your perspective of the situation immediately following the Second World War? What was the major European security concern of the allies (which included the USSR) in the months prior to and following the surrender of Japan?

It would be helpful to review the plans and outcomes of the Yalta conference as it was there the allies established an an agenda for governing post-war Europe. The Wiki article is necessarily brief but gives a decent enough introduction. In seeking an answer, we can really go as far back as the Moscow conference in 1944, with Stalin and Churchill dividing Europe into spheres of influence on the back of a napkin.



In 1945, who did the allies see as their next potential competitor? Who gave them the most worry?

It's funny that you ask, because I've been trying to get a better understanding of the immediate Post WWII security and stability environment as I think it provides some potentially useful context for things going on now around the world and likely to in the future.

To me, I think the most serious popular perception about the immediate post WWII environment that needs to be corrected is that warfighting didn't end in Europe in May 1945, nor did it end in Asia-Pacific in August 1945.

There was a LOT of bas stuff/conflict that simply never stopped. The Cold War was actually quite Warm by proxy from May, 1945.

Most folks have heard of the Marshall Plan which provided economic aid to a devastated Europe and acted as a shock absorber to defend against Communist encroachment.

Greece received some of the first Marshall Plan capital injections, which is not surprising considering the fact that WWII didn't end in May 1945, it continued in an irregular/unconventional form for a number of years. Fighting was quite intense and involved a considerable amount of external support from both sides.

Ukraine(which spurred my interest in) had an insurgency(competing non-communist guerillas/partisans fighting the Germans) that lasted nearly 9 years before final remnants were mopped up by the Soviets, but tens of thousands of casualties and mass deportations involving hundreds of thousands occurred mostly before 1950.

Czech Communist coup of 1948 provided decisive Communist victory after bitter partisan infighting.

Italy survived under the western sphere of influence with quite heavy handed support by the US/UK despite considerable effort by the Soviet block.

The list goes on.....

Most of these issues possess a single common denominator, whereby resistance/partisan/guerilla groups supported by one or both sides of the Allies US/UK and Soviet Union during german occupation also possessed aggressive right or left political leanings on top of their irregular/unconventional wartime roles.

Often times these various politically aligned resistance/partisan/guerilla groups were jockeying for post war positioning WHILE still under German Occupation.

They often focused on Post War long-game, instead of kicking the Germans out. Considerable effort was needed to deconflict these politically opposed groups during the war, so it's no surprise it led to considerable instability in the Post War period jockeying for influence and control.

The Yalta Conference, in retrospect, seems like a poorly respected agreement, considering the level of effort on both sides to undermine each other via covert/clandestine means.

In Asia Pacific, by far the most tragic lost opportunity is that of the US OSS(predecessor to CIA and US Army Special Forces) where OSS Unit 101 literally saved the lives of Ho Chi Minh and his general Giap. Roosevelt was supposedly crystal clear on not allowing recolonialization of Southeast Asia post WWII, but Truman thought otherwise in light of the desperate need for Western Europe to find the necessary capital to rebuild(by again strip mining colonial properties).

An OSS officer Archimedes Patti worked closely with Ho Chi Minh and heard his proclamation of independence for Vietnam which is more than coincidentally similar to the US model. Terrible tragedy of failed realpolitik.

[lakedaemonian]

Re: Signing agreements with Russia?

Thailand raises an interesting question. To be honest I know little about it, but the combination of apparent homogeneity but political instability has inspired me to look more into it.

Michael Yon is an American(US Army veteran from the 90's) who was independently reporting on Iraq/Afghanistan over the last decade from a centrist perspective(my opinion).

With the wind-down he shifted a while ago to reside in Thailand and report on Thailand(although he seems to be reporting more on ISIS recently)....so it's more easily palatable coming from a US/Western perspective. I suspect he "gets" Thailand to a certain extent...or as much as a Westerner can for an immersed expat.

Mostly gritty(er) stream of consciousness type atmospherics stuff.

I was in Thailand a few months ago and heard first hand from Thai military what their personal perspectives are on things. I reckon Michael Yon is worth reading as one of several Thai news sources.

https://www.michaelyon-online.com/Mi...-s-Dispatches/

https://www.facebook.com/MichaelYonFanPage

https://twitter.com/Michael_Yon

[Thailandnotes]

Re: Signing agreements with Russia?

Michael Yon certainly doesn't "get" Thailand. He grossly simplifies Thai politics. His loose application of the word "terrorist" is appalling.

[lakedaemonian]

Re: Signing agreements with Russia?

Michael Yon certainly doesn't "get" Thailand. He grossly simplifies Thai politics. His loose application of the word "terrorist" is appalling.

Hence my post:

"With the wind-down he shifted a while ago to reside in Thailand and report on Thailand(although he seems to be reporting more on ISIS recently)....so it's more easily palatable coming from a US/Western perspective. I suspect he "gets" Thailand to a certain extent...or as much as a Westerner can for an immersed expat."

-----

Yon is the first person to come to mind from an independently funded/employed media and politically centrist perspective.

For all of his shortcomings(and they are many), he would still rate favourably compared to the nearly non existent coverage on the topic from Yon's home/customer market by traditional mass media.

His target audience wouldn't be Thai folks or hard core/long term Farang.

Personally, I've tried to digest Thai Politics and the Thai Great Game but I haven't had enough time on the ground after even a bunch of visits to get it. I rely on the word/opinions of trusted locals who also have a good grasp of western politics/culture/business.

I'm not a big fan of Yon, I posted because he's the first westerner who sits front of mind for folks who like coal face perspective, and at the moment his Bedouin lifestyle has him sitting in Thailand for fair bit of time.

If you reckon his use of "terrorist" marks him as a cloned pro intervention everywhere neo-con, he has been a big critic of the current and last Administration's interventions, policies towards host nation citizens, and relentless in pursuing egregious leadership violations by key military personnel.

The guy appears to be trying to be a blog version of Ernest Hemmingway. And even Hemmingway was FAR from perfect.

[touchring]

Re: Signing agreements with Russia?

The adrenaline rush is wearing off. A sign of what is to come..

http://www.businessinsider.com/ukrai...s-2014-9?IR=T&

After the steady rise of enthusiasm for war in Ukraine voter polls through the summer, Ukrainian politicians in favour of the military campaign against Donetsk, Lugansk, and Russia, have suffered a dramatic loss of support across the country.


This was reported in Kiev on September 3. In the first countrywide poll taken since the Ukrainian Army took heavy casualties and retreated from the Donbass at the end of August, voters who had supported the pro-war Radical Party, led by Oleg Lyashko, have dropped from 22.2% to 13.1%. Prime Minister Arseny Yatseniuk’s bloc, Patriots of Ukraine, which includes the police and national guard minister, Arsen Avakov, has collapsed from more than 9% to 3.7%. Yulia Timoshenko’s Fatherland party has fallen below her former proteges to 3.5%. The Svoboda (“Freedom”) party of Oleg Tyagnibok, the candidate of the US Embassy in Kiev and the State Department, and Pravy Sektor (“Right Sector”), the party behind the national guard formations fighting in the east, have lost virtually all their support outside the far western regions of the country; across the Ukraine they are now polling just 2.5% and 1%.


The parliamentary election scheduled for October 26, according to US and Ukrainian sociologists in Kiev “can now be predicted by the misery index – rising war casualties, rampant inflation and unemployment – plus fear of winter.”


The shift in Ukraine voter sentiment has been identified by the Kyiv International Institute for Sociology (KIIS), headed by Vladimir Paniotto. Its polling has been funded independently of the US and Canadian governments, the European Commission, and Ukrainian oligarchs who have sponsored polling by Gallup and by the Razumkov centre in Kiev. For the results of earlier KIIS voter surveys, click here.

[lakedaemonian]

Re: Signing agreements with Russia?

President Obama visits NATO member state Estonia to give a big speech and Russian forces snatch a senior Estonian officer to make a bit of a statement.

http://www.vox.com/2014/9/5/6110037/...icer-kidnapped