ME: the Diplomatic Game

[don]

Re: ME: the Diplomatic Game

In sheeple-ese, Orange is the new Black

[don]

Re: ME: the Labels Game

Why Washington's war on terror failed By Patrick Cockburn This essay is excerpted from the first chapter of Patrick Cockburn's new book, The Jihadis Return: ISIS and the New Sunni Uprising, with special thanks to his publisher, OR Books. The first section is a new introduction written for TomDispatch. There are extraordinary elements in the present US policy in Iraq and Syria that are attracting surprisingly little attention. In Iraq, the US is carrying out air strikes and sending in advisers and trainers to help beat back the advance of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (better known as ISIS) on the Kurdish capital, Erbil. The US would presumably do the same if ISIS surrounds or attacks Baghdad. But in Syria, Washington's policy is the exact opposite: there the main opponent of ISIS is the Syrian government and the Syrian Kurds in their northern enclaves. Both are under attack from ISIS, which has taken about a third of the country, including most of its oil and gas production facilities. But US, Western European, Saudi, and Arab Gulf policy is to overthrow President Bashar al-Assad, which happens to be the policy of ISIS and other jihadis in Syria. If Assad goes, then ISIS will be the beneficiary, since it is either defeating or absorbing the rest of the Syrian armed opposition. There is a pretense in Washington and elsewhere that there exists a "moderate" Syrian opposition being helped by the US, Qatar, Turkey, and the Saudis. It is, however, weak and getting more so by the day. Soon the new caliphate may stretch from the Iranian border to the Mediterranean and the only force that can possibly stop this from happening is the Syrian army. The reality of US policy is to support the government of Iraq, but not Syria, against ISIS. But one reason that group has been able to grow so strong in Iraq is that it can draw on its resources and fighters in Syria. Not everything that went wrong in Iraq was the fault of [now former] prime minister Nouri al-Maliki, as has now become the political and media consensus in the West. Iraqi politicians have been telling me for the last two years that foreign backing for the Sunni revolt in Syria would inevitably destabilize their country as well. This has now happened. By continuing these contradictory policies in two countries, the US has ensured that ISIS can reinforce its fighters in Iraq from Syria and vice versa. So far, Washington has been successful in escaping blame for the rise of ISIS by putting all the blame on the Iraqi government. In fact, it has created a situation in which ISIS can survive and may well flourish. Using the al-Qa'ida label The sharp increase in the strength and reach of jihadist organizations in Syria and Iraq has generally been unacknowledged until recently by politicians and media in the West. A primary reason for this is that Western governments and their security forces narrowly define the jihadist threat as those forces directly controlled by al-Qa‘ida central or "core" al-Qa‘ida. This enables them to present a much more cheerful picture of their successes in the so-called war on terror than the situation on the ground warrants. In fact, the idea that the only jihadis to be worried about are those with the official blessing of al-Qa‘ida is naive and self-deceiving. It ignores the fact, for instance, that ISIS has been criticized by the al-Qa‘ida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri for its excessive violence and sectarianism. After talking to a range of Syrian jihadi rebels not directly affiliated with al-Qa‘ida in southeast Turkey earlier this year, a source told me that "without exception they all expressed enthusiasm for the 9/11 attacks and hoped the same thing would happen in Europe as well as the US". Jihadi groups ideologically close to al-Qa‘ida have been relabeled as moderate if their actions are deemed supportive of US policy aims. In Syria, the Americans backed a plan by Saudi Arabia to build up a "Southern Front" based in Jordan that would be hostile to the Assad government in Damascus, and simultaneously hostile to al-Qa‘ida-type rebels in the north and east. The powerful but supposedly moderate Yarmouk Brigade, reportedly the planned recipient of anti-aircraft missiles from Saudi Arabia, was intended to be the leading element in this new formation. But numerous videos show that the Yarmouk Brigade has frequently fought in collaboration with JAN, the official al-Qa‘ida affiliate. Since it was likely that, in the midst of battle, these two groups would share their munitions, Washington was effectively allowing advanced weaponry to be handed over to its deadliest enemy. Iraqi officials confirm that they have captured sophisticated arms from ISIS fighters in Iraq that were originally supplied by outside powers to forces considered to be anti-al-Qa‘ida in Syria. The name al-Qa‘ida has always been applied flexibly when identifying an enemy. In 2003 and 2004 in Iraq, as armed Iraqi opposition to the American and British-led occupation mounted, US officials attributed most attacks to al-Qa‘ida, though many were carried out by nationalist and Baathist groups. Propaganda like this helped to persuade nearly 60% of US voters prior to the Iraq invasion that there was a connection between Saddam Hussein and those responsible for 9/11, despite the absence of any evidence for this. In Iraq itself, indeed throughout the entire Muslim world, these accusations have benefited al-Qa‘ida by exaggerating its role in the resistance to the US and British occupation. Precisely the opposite PR tactics were employed by Western governments in 2011 in Libya, where any similarity between al-Qa‘ida and the NATO-backed rebels fighting to overthrow the Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi, was played down. Only those jihadis who had a direct operational link to the al-Qa‘ida "core" of Osama bin Laden were deemed to be dangerous. The falsity of the pretense that the anti-Gaddafi jihadis in Libya were less threatening than those in direct contact with al-Qa‘ida was forcefully, if tragically, exposed when US ambassador Chris Stevens was killed by jihadi fighters in Benghazi in September 2012. These were the same fighters lauded by Western governments and media for their role in the anti-Gaddafi uprising. Imagining al-Qa'ida as the Mafia Al-Qa‘ida is an idea rather than an organization, and this has long been the case. For a five-year period after 1996, it did have cadres, resources, and camps in Afghanistan, but these were eliminated after the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001. Subsequently, al-Qa‘ida's name became primarily a rallying cry, a set of Islamic beliefs, centering on the creation of an Islamic state, the imposition of sharia, a return to Islamic customs, the subjugation of women, and the waging of holy war against other Muslims, notably the Shia, who are considered heretics worthy of death. At the center of this doctrine for making war is an emphasis on self-sacrifice and martyrdom as a symbol of religious faith and commitment. This has resulted in using untrained but fanatical believers as suicide bombers, to devastating effect. It has always been in the interest of the US and other governments that al-Qa‘ida be viewed as having a command-and-control structure like a mini-Pentagon, or like the mafia in America. This is a comforting image for the public because organized groups, however demonic, can be tracked down and eliminated through imprisonment or death. More alarming is the reality of a movement whose adherents are self-recruited and can spring up anywhere. Osama bin Laden's gathering of militants, which he did not call al-Qa‘ida until after 9/11, was just one of many jihadi groups 12 years ago. But today its ideas and methods are predominant among jihadis because of the prestige and publicity it gained through the destruction of the Twin Towers, the war in Iraq, and its demonization by Washington as the source of all anti-American evil. These days, there is a narrowing of differences in the beliefs of jihadis, regardless of whether or not they are formally linked to al-Qa‘ida central. Unsurprisingly, governments prefer the fantasy picture of al-Qa‘ida because it enables them to claim victories when it succeeds in killing its better known members and allies. Often, those eliminated are given quasi-military ranks, such as "head of operations," to enhance the significance of their demise. The culmination of this heavily publicized but largely irrelevant aspect of the "war on terror" was the killing of bin Laden in Abbottabad in Pakistan in 2011. This enabled President Obama to grandstand before the American public as the man who had presided over the hunting down of al-Qa‘ida's leader. In practical terms, however, his death had little impact on al-Qa‘ida-type jihadi groups, whose greatest expansion has occurred subsequently. Ignoring the roles of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan The key decisions that enabled al-Qa‘ida to survive, and later to expand, were made in the hours immediately after 9/11. Almost every significant element in the project to crash planes into the Twin Towers and other iconic American buildings led back to Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden was a member of the Saudi elite, and his father had been a close associate of the Saudi monarch. Citing a CIA report from 2002, the official 9/11 report says that al-Qa‘ida relied for its financing on "a variety of donors and fundraisers, primarily in the Gulf countries and particularly in Saudi Arabia". The report's investigators repeatedly found their access limited or denied when seeking information in Saudi Arabia. Yet president George W Bush apparently never even considered holding the Saudis responsible for what happened. An exit of senior Saudis, including bin Laden relatives, from the US was facilitated by the US government in the days after 9/11. Most significant, 28 pages of the 9/11 Commission Report about the relationship between the attackers and Saudi Arabia were cut and never published, despite a promise by President Obama to do so, on the grounds of national security. In 2009, eight years after 9/11, a cable from the US secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, revealed by WikiLeaks, complained that donors in Saudi Arabia constituted the most significant source of funding to Sunni terrorist groups worldwide. But despite this private admission, the US and Western Europeans continued to remain indifferent to Saudi preachers whose message, spread to millions by satellite TV, YouTube, and Twitter, called for the killing of the Shia as heretics. These calls came as al-Qa‘ida bombs were slaughtering people in Shia neighborhoods in Iraq. A sub-headline in another State Department cable in the same year reads: "Saudi Arabia: Anti-Shi'ism as Foreign Policy?" Now, five years later, Saudi-supported groups have a record of extreme sectarianism against non-Sunni Muslims. Pakistan, or rather Pakistani military intelligence in the shape of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), was the other parent of al-Qa‘ida, the Taliban, and jihadi movements in general. When the Taliban was disintegrating under the weight of US bombing in 2001, its forces in northern Afghanistan were trapped by anti-Taliban forces. Before they surrendered, hundreds of ISI members, military trainers, and advisers were hastily evacuated by air. Despite the clearest evidence of ISI's sponsorship of the Taliban and jihadis in general, Washington refused to confront Pakistan, and thereby opened the way for the resurgence of the Taliban after 2003, which neither the US nor NATO has been able to reverse. The "war on terror" has failed because it did not target the jihadi movement as a whole and, above all, was not aimed at Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, the two countries that fostered jihadism as a creed and a movement. The US did not do so because these countries were important American allies whom it did not want to offend. Saudi Arabia is an enormous market for American arms, and the Saudis have cultivated, and on occasion purchased, influential members of the American political establishment. Pakistan is a nuclear power with a population of 180 million and a military with close links to the Pentagon. The spectacular resurgence of al-Qa‘ida and its offshoots has happened despite the huge expansion of American and British intelligence services and their budgets after 9/11. Since then, the US, closely followed by Britain, has fought wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and adopted procedures normally associated with police states, such as imprisonment without trial, rendition, torture, and domestic espionage. Governments wage the "war on terror" claiming that the rights of individual citizens must be sacrificed to secure the safety of all. In the face of these controversial security measures, the movements against which they are aimed have not been defeated but rather have grown stronger. At the time of 9/11, al-Qa‘ida was a small, generally ineffectual organization; by 2014 al-Qa‘ida-type groups were numerous and powerful. In other words, the "war on terror", the waging of which has shaped the political landscape for so much of the world since 2001, has demonstrably failed. Until the fall of Mosul, nobody paid much attention. Patrick Cockburn is Middle East correspondent for the Independent and worked previously for the Financial Times. He has written three books on Iraq's recent history as well as a memoir, The Broken Boy, and, with his son, a book on schizophrenia, Henry's Demons. He won the Martha Gellhorn Prize in 2005, the James Cameron Prize in 2006, and the Orwell Prize for Journalism in 2009. His forthcoming book, The Jihadis Return: ISIS and the New Sunni Uprising, is now available exclusively from OR Books.

[Shakespear]

Re: ME: the Labels Game

A good documentary made by PBS in 2005. Knowing it was made in the US requires careful attention to what is said and HOW. Lots of good information.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-1cHa03QSY

I like how after King Faisal cut off oil supplies and deprived the west from oil in October 1973 he suddenly gets assassinated shortly later. On 25 March 1975, King Faisal was shot point-blank and killed by his half-brother's son, Faisal bin Musaid, who had just come back from the United States. Winki Winki

[vt]

Re: ME: the Diplomatic Game

http://www.breitbart.com/Breitbart-L...mber-10-Aug-23

[Shakespear]

Re: ME: the Diplomatic Game

Very interesting
http://www.zerocred.com/news/2014-08...t-against-isis
and this comment really gave me a laugh. What the FU^$ is going on ????
http://www.zerocred.com/news/2014-08...omment-5137317

[don]

Re: ME: the Diplomatic Game

Zerohedge links are verboten on the 'tulip.

[Shakespear]

Re: ME: the Diplomatic Game

Zerohedge links are verboten on the 'tulip.

Sorry, didn't know it.
But there sure is a lot of sharp heads over there

[Shakespear]

Re: ME: the Diplomatic Game

We can not allow this thread to die

I will NOT

[vt]

Re: ME: the Diplomatic Game

President Sisi’s Gift
September 9, 2014 by Caroline Glick

Caroline Glick is the Director of the David Horowitz Freedom Center's Israel Security Project and the Senior Contributing Editor of The Jerusalem Post. For more information on Ms. Glick's work, visit carolineglick.com.



Something extraordinary has happened.

On August 31, PLO chief and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas told an audience of Fatah members that Egypt had offered to give the PA some 1,600 kilometers of land in Sinai adjacent to Gaza, thus quintupling the size of the Gaza Strip. Egypt even offered to allow all the so-called “Palestinian refugees” to settle in the expanded Gaza Strip.

Then Abbas told his Fatah followers that he rejected the Egyptian offer.

On Monday Army Radio substantiated Abbas’s claim.

According to Army Radio, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi proposed that the Palestinians establish their state in the expanded Gaza Strip and accept limited autonomy over parts of Judea and Samaria.

In exchange for this state, the Palestinians would give up their demand that Israel shrink into the indefensible 1949 armistice lines, surrendering Jerusalem, Judea and Samaria. Sisi argued that the land Egypt is offering in Sinai would more than compensate for the territory that Abbas would concede.

In his speech to Fatah members, Abbas said, “They [the Egyptians] are prepared to receive all the refugees, [and are saying] ‘Let’s end the refugee story.’” “But,” he insisted, “It’s illogical for the problem to be solved at Egypt’s expense. We won’t have it.”

In other words, Sisi offered Abbas a way to end the Palestinians’ suffering and grant them political independence. And Abbas said, “No, forget statehood. Let them suffer.”

Generations of Israeli leaders and strategists have insisted that Israel does not have the ability to satisfy the Palestinian demands by itself without signing its own death warrant. To satisfy the Palestinian demand for statehood, Israel’s neighbors in Egypt and Jordan would have to get involved.

Until Sisi made his proposal, no Arab leader ever seriously considered actually doing what must be done. Indeed, the rejection of this self-evident Israeli claim has been so overwhelming that in recent years, every Israeli suggestion to this effect was met with raised eyebrows and dismissal by Israelis and foreigners alike.

So what is driving Sisi? How do we account for this dramatic shift? In offering the Palestinians a large swathe of the Sinai, Sisi is not acting out of altruism. He is acting out of necessity. From his perspective, and from the perspective of his non-jihadist Sunni allies in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the Palestinian campaign against Israel is dangerous.

Facing the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran, and the rise of jihadist forces from al-Qaida to the Islamic State to the Muslim Brotherhood, the non-jihadist Sunnis no longer believe that the prolongation of the Palestinian jihad against Israel is in their interest.

Egypt and Jordan have already experienced the spillover of the Palestinian jihad. Hamas has carried out attacks in Egypt. The Palestinian jihad nearly destroyed Lebanon and Jordan. Egypt and Saudi Arabia now view Israel as a vital ally in their war against the Sunni jihadists and their struggle against Iran and its hegemonic ambitions. They recognize that Israeli action against Sunni and Shi’ite jihadists in Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran serves the interests of non-jihadi Sunnis. And, especially after the recent conflict in Gaza, they realize that the incessant Palestinian campaign against Israel ultimately strengthens the jihadist enemies of Egypt and Saudi Arabia like Hamas.

Apparently, Sisi’s offer to Abbas is an attempt to help the Palestinian people and take the Palestinian issue out of the hands of Palestinian jihadists.

Unfortunately for Sisi and his fellow non-jihadist Sunnis, Abbas is having none of this.

In rejecting Sisi’s offer Abbas stood true to his own record, to the legacies of every Palestinian leader since Nazi agent Haj Amin el-Husseini, and to the declared strategic goal of his own Fatah party and his coalition partners in Hamas. Since Husseini invented the Palestinians in the late 1920s, their leaders’ primary goals have never been the establishment of a Palestinian state or improving the lives of Palestinians. Their singular goal has always been the destruction of the Jewish state, (or state-in-themaking before 1948).

Sisi offered to end Palestinian suffering and provide the Palestinians with the land they require to establish a demilitarized state. Abbas rejected it because he is only interested hurting Israel. If Israel is not weakened by their good fortune, then the Palestinians should continue to suffer.

For Israel, Sisi’s proposal is a windfall.

First of all, it indicates that the Egyptian-Saudi- UAE decision to back Israel against Hamas in Operation Protective Edge was not a fluke. It was part of an epic shift in their strategic assessments.

And if their regimes survive, their assessments are unlikely to change so long as Iran and the Sunni jihadists continue to threaten them.

This means that for the first time since Israel allied with Britain and France against Egypt in 1956, Israel can make strategic plans as part of a coalition.

Second, Sisi’s plan is good for Israel on its merits.

The only way to stabilize the situation in Gaza and comprehensively defeat Hamas and the rest of the terrorist armies there is by expanding Gaza.

If, as Sisi offered, the Palestinians of Judea and Samaria accept limited autonomy, Israel will no longer be demographically challenged. As a consequence Israel could apply its laws to Area C, ensuring its long-term security requirements and safeguarding the civil rights of all of its citizens.

Sisi’s plan is a boon for Israel as well because it calls Abbas’s bluff.

Abbas is genuflected to by the US and the EU who insist that he is a moderate. The Israeli Left insists that he is the only thing that stands between Israel and destruction.

Yet here we see him openly acknowledging that from a strategic perspective, he is no different from the last of the jihadists. He prefers to see his people wallow in misery and poverty, without a state to call their own, than to see Israel benefit in any way.

Abbas’s rejection of Sisi’s offer demonstrates yet again that he and his Fatah comrades are the problem, not the solution. Continued faith in the PLO as a partner in peace and moderation is foolish and dangerous. He would rather see Hamas and Iran flourish than share a peaceful future with Israel.

The only reason that Abbas is able to continuously reject all offers of statehood and an end to Palestinian suffering, while expanding his diplomatic war against Israel and supporting his coalition partner’s terror war, is because the US and Europe continue to blindly support him.

The final way that Sisi’s offer helps Israel is by showing the futility of the West’s strategy of supporting Abbas.

According to Army Radio’s report, both Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and the Obama administration have been briefed on the Egyptian plan. The Americans reportedly support it.

Netanyahu’s position on the Egyptian proposal was not reported. But his recent statements indicate that he views the Egyptian proposal as a sea change that may facilitate a diplomatic breakthrough.

During his press conference following the conclusion of the cease-fire in Gaza a week and a half ago, Netanyahu was asked about the prospect of renewing the peace process with Abbas.

Netanyahu responded vaguely that prospects of the peace process are better now, in light of regional shifts. With the Egyptian proposal now out in the open, and assuming that this is what Netanyahu was referring to, his remarks were accurate.

Sisi’s offer, even with Abbas’s rejection of it is a gift to Israel. And Israel’s challenge in the weeks and months ahead is to make the most of it.

If the Americans force Abbas to accept Sisi’s offer, Israel and the Palestinian people will benefit.

And if Abbas successfully scuttles it, Sisi’s offer will show that Israel is correct that it cannot satisfy Palestinian demands on its own, and indeed, it demonstrates how unreasonable those demands are.

Sisi’s offer demonstrates that for non-jihadist Sunnis, not only is Israel not the problem in the Middle East, a strong Israel is a prerequisite for solving the region’s troubles. Here is a major Arab leader willing to stand with Israel even if it means discrediting the PLO .

As a consequence, Sisi’s offer is a challenge to the US and Europe.

Sisi’s offer shows Washington and Brussels that to solve the Palestinian conflict with Israel, they need to stand with Israel, even if this means abandoning Abbas.

If they do so, they can take credit for achieving their beloved two-state solution. If they fail to do so, they will signal that their primary goal is not peace, but something far less constructive.

[Southernguy]

Re: ME: the Diplomatic Game

Hmmm: "According to Army Radio, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi proposed that the Palestinians establish their state in the expanded Gaza Strip and accept limited autonomy over parts of Judea and Samaria." So the source of the information is Army Radio....Israel's, of course. Does anyone has another source for this rather curious piece of information?

[Woodsman]

Re: ME: the Diplomatic Game

Hmmm: "According to Army Radio, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi proposed that the Palestinians establish their state in the expanded Gaza Strip and accept limited autonomy over parts of Judea and Samaria." So the source of the information is Army Radio....Israel's, of course. Does anyone has another source for this rather curious piece of information?

If David Horowitz is associated with it, run away and as fast as your legs will take you. The man is radioactive, in my opinion. I'd call him the political equivalent of 42nd Street peepshow barker, but that's a noble profession compared to what Horowitz does for a living.

[debu]

Re: ME: the Diplomatic Game

Caroline Glick is not much better...

[don]

Re: ME: the Diplomatic Game

a different take on Gaza than that of our MSM . . .

Netanyahu loses plot to new Gaza reality
By Ramzy Baroud

Aside from being a major military setback, Israel's war on Gaza has also disoriented the policies of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu like never before. Since the announcement of a ceasefire on 26 August, his statements appear erratic and particularly uncertain, an expected outcome of the Gaza war.

Since his first term as a prime minister (1996-99), Netanyahu has showed particular savvy at fashioning political and military events to neatly suit his declared policies. He fabricated imminent threats that were neither imminent nor threats, for example, Iraq's non-existent weapons of mass destruction. Later, he took on Iran.

He created too many conditions and laid numerous obstacles for peace settlements to ever be realized. The late Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat, labored for years to meet Israel's conditions, and failed. Abbas has taken the same futile road. But Netanyahu's conditions are specifically designed to be unattainable.

For example, Netanyahu insists that the Palestinian leadership must accept Israel's right to exist as a Jewish state, despite the fact that millions of Palestinian Muslims and Christians share that land, which has for centuries constituted the land of historic Palestine. Signing off the rights of non-Jews is not only undemocratic, but also tantamount to clearing the way for another campaign of ethnic cleansing of Palestinians.

But in actuality, none of this truly matters to Netanyahu. For him, protracted "peace talks" are a smokescreen for his illegal settlement construction project, which remains as ravenous as ever. He is confiscating occupied Palestinian land with impunity, while insisting that Israel's intentions have always been, and remain peaceful.

Political survival

For nearly two decades, Netanyahu negotiated his political survival based on that very strategy, skillfully, although underhandedly playing on existing fears and engineering security threats. For him, Hamas, Hezbollah, the Islamic State (IS), al-Qaeda, the Muslim Brotherhood, Iran, Syria and so on, are essentially one and the same. Of course, they are not, and he knows it well.

If one skims through his speeches and media interviews throughout the years, one can easily spot the oddly fashioned discourse. No threat, however, was as consistently exaggerated and misleadingly presented as that of Hamas. Whenever the Iran discourse grew too redundant and unconvincing, and when Hezbollah (especially in the last three years) grew irrelevant, he infused Hamas. Many in the media willingly or out of sheer ignorance, played into Netanyahu's hand, presenting the Palestinian political movement with a military wing as a menace that has "sworn" to destroy Israel.

That demonization of Palestinians was an essential component in Israel's military strategies throughout the years, starting with the fidayeen, then the socialists, the PLO and so on. It made the political price for war relatively easy. And, for Israel, war is a primary pillar of their policies in the region, where land is confiscated, Israel's enemies are reminded of their place, and "taught a lesson" whenever such a lesson is needed.

War for Israel is also important as a tool to distract from political trouble at home, an under-performing economy or whatever else. Netanyahu's and Israel's wars on Gaza in recent years often served as that distraction from one failed policy or another. Bombing Gaza was quite a convenient and rarely costly strategy to boost the credential of Israeli politicians. Ariel Sharon mastered that art, as others did before him, including Ehud Barak, Ehud Olmert, Tzipi Livni, and of course, Netanyahu himself.

One could argue that Israel's recent war on Gaza, code-named Operation Protective Edge, which began this year on July 7, would have taken place even if Israel's prime minister was someone other than Netanyahu. All signs were in place that made the Israeli military move impending. Rival Palestinian factions, Hamas and Fatah, reached a unity agreement, despite strong Israeli rejection. Alone, that would have been a compelling reason for Israel to feel the need to squash Hamas and end the need for unity in the first place. But more importantly, the mood in the West Bank was begging for change. Protests and rallies were reported throughout the West Bank in June, despite Israeli attempts to crush them, with the help of the goons of the US-funded and trained PA security.

Indeed, that was more important than the unity deal itself. Palestinians were being mobilized outside the fractured political landscape that has for years existed between Hamas and Fatah. Taking the focus back to Gaza, where Netanyahu was leading a supposed war to fight terrorism, extremism and Israel's arch enemies who are "sworn to the destruction of the Jewish state" seemed, from Israel's Machiavellian logic, like a good idea.

In fact, Netanyahu succeeded, at least temporarily, to distract from the looming confrontation in the West Bank. But what he expected was a relatively easy battle. Hamas and other resistance groups were arguably weakened due to the advent of the so-called Arab Spring. They were partly disowned by Iran and entirely disowned by Syria, which is busy fighting its own civil war. Moreover, the removal of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt left Hamas politically frail and exposed. In fact, it was such vulnerability that pushed Hamas to a unity deal with Mahmoud Abbas, who, according to the deal, maintained a degree of dominance over all Palestinian factions, including Hamas itself. Just before the war, a June public opinion poll conducted by the Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) showed that PA President Mahmoud Abbas was winning the trust of 53% of Palestinians, while Hamas' Gaza leader Ismail Haniyeh received the support of 41%.

Disastrous war

Netanyahu's war was the Israeli leadership's attempt at capitalizing on Hamas's purported decline. But the war was a disaster and it failed miserably. It killed more than 2,150 Palestinians and wounded over 11,000 more. The Israeli army was held back by a unified Palestinian resistance front. It lost 64 soldiers and hundreds more were injured. It cost the Israeli economy millions. The war to end Hamas gave birth to the strongest Palestinian resistance front ever.

When the war ended on August 26, Netanyahu, the keen politician who insisted on defining the political discourse of any war or major political event, simply disappeared. Two days later, he held a press conference in which he declared that Israel had "won". But both Israelis and Palestinians disagreed. According to a poll conducted shortly after the ceasefire announcement and reported in the Israeli Jerusalem Post, 54% of Israelis believe they lost the war.

On the other hand, numbers among Palestinians have dramatically shifted as well. According to PCPSR, 61% of Palestinians would now vote for Haniyeh, a huge climb from few weeks earlier; 94% were satisfied with the resistance military performance; and, more astoundingly, 79% said that Palestinian resistance had "won" the conflict.

Netanyahu's war-turned-genocide backfired beyond anyone's expectations. He helped resurrect the very movement he tried to crush. And now he is desperately back attempting to reconstruct the lost political discourse, associating Hamas with vile terrorists, and absurdly presenting Israel as a victim, just as Palestinians finished burying thousands of their dead. This time, however, few seem to believe him.

Asia Times

[don]

Re: ME: the Diplomatic Game

meanwhile, back in caliphate-land . . . .

the long war in Iraq
By Brian M Downing

The four armed groups warring in Iraq - Islamic State (IS), the Kurdish peshmerga, the Iraqi army, and Sunni tribal levies - have strengths and weaknesses. They also have varying levels of foreign support and capacities for cooperation. IS troops have a marked qualitative edge but are badly outnumbered and have no reliable allies inside Iraq.

IS stands little chance of holding on to the swathes of Iraq it has recently conquered, and in coming months it will be forced to retreat from northern Iraq, if not from much of the country. The Kurds, Sunnis, and Shi'ites are capable of effectively countering IS's offensive but political bargaining with the new Baghdad government will come first. The negotiations and fighting will determine Iraq's future as a unified state, a federation, or a fragmented state.

The armies

IS forces have the best discipline and tactical expertise of any force in the country. Its rank and file trust their commanders, have more combat experience than rivals, and have demonstrated remarkable cohesion, tactical knowledge, and audacity. However, they are few in number - no more than 18,000 at most in Syria and Iraq. Since sweeping into northern Iraq last June they've become greatly overextended and must now fight on a winding 800-mile front along which they enjoy little support from local populations. Indeed, IS has alienated almost all those under its rule and is vulnerable to insurgency. The jihadi band has no defense against US airpower.

The Iraqi army has 90,000 combat troops organized into 180 battalions, each of differing competence. They cannot all be judged by the poor showing around Mosul last June. Those units comprised many Kurdish and Sunni Arab soldiers who were not inclined to fight for the Shi'ite government in Baghdad and in fact were pleased to see the Shi'ites abandon Sunni regions. Nonetheless, the national army's officer corps is plagued by corruption and inexperience. Having regrouped in more Shi'ite regions, the army enjoys considerable local support and is being augmented by Shi'ite militias, adding to numerical strength though not to organizational ability and combat effectiveness.

Kurdish units boast some 200,000 troops, but training and equipment vary. Organization is poor and experience is low, but on the rise. Concerned foreign states are delivering arms to the beleaguered people and Kurds from Turkey and Iran are streaming to the aid of their cousins in both Syria and Iraq. The Kurds have recovered from earlier losses to IS and retaken many villages and strategic sites. Owing to limited training and political caution, peshmerga operations are not likely to extend too far from Kurdistan and parts of northern Iraq they recently seized.

Sunni tribal militias are of uncertain numbers; they are essentially levies that elders raise from a large pool of young men. Some fought in the insurgency against the US and in the Sunni Awakening against al Qaeda. Others are inexperienced youths in tribal patronage networks. They enjoy support from the population and know the terrain in both urban and rural settings. Tribal militias are likely to benefit from American arms and money, as they did in the Sunni Awakening. They have not exhibited great discipline or tactical mastery, neither in large or small units. US troops likened them to well armed street gangs. But they can harass IS troops across central and western Iraq and force the jihadis to reduce the number of troops deployed against the Iraqi army and Kurds.

IS's discipline and experience gives it a considerable qualitative edge over the other armies in Iraq. However, the same could be said of the Third Reich's military in the Second World War. The Reich, of course, was ground down and destroyed by numerically superior enemies. IS is incurring constant losses in skirmishes and from US airpower. It can no longer mass troops, hold fixed positions, deploy armor, or convoy men and equipment as tactical situations require.

With even moderately vigorous attacks from the three Iraqi enemies, IS will be badly attritted, with little chance that fresh recruits will compensate for constant losses of experienced fighters. The jihadi cult will either adhere to its warrior creed and fight on, which will lead to exhaustion and disintegration, or it will soberly accept the disadvantage and retreat to urban redoubts and the wastelands of western Iraq from which it can only wage a bombing campaign. In either case, it will no longer be the danger it is presently seen as.

The politics

Numerical advantages will not lead to an immediate IS defeat. The timing, vigor, and coordination of the counteroffensive depend on negotiations among the three groups. Unfortunately, there is considerable mistrust between the three and a coordinated campaign against IS will prove difficult. After all, one group is the former oppressor, the others the oppressed.

Wars have often brought unity, however sometimes they bring opportunity for aggrieved peoples to negotiate their rights and even their independence. Indian troops fought for the British Empire in Italy and Burma (now called Myanmar), but only with the understanding that cooperation would bring independence. The same can be said for African troops and the French Empire. The Kurds and Sunnis are thinking along the same lines and will ask for or declare autonomy. The Shi'ites want to keep both groups under the present unitary state and are seeking to control the flow of arms and money to the two groups.

The Kurds already have their own army, constitution, flag, and oil pipeline. They would like to declare independence. However, they face difficulties selling their oil overseas as Baghdad's legal claims over it are widely respected. Kurdistan has only found buyers in Israel, Hungary, and an undetermined Southeast Asian country. (A tanker filled with Kurdish crude is sitting in international waters off Texas until the dispute is resolved.) The Kurds will seek to get Baghdad to relent on its claims, or convince foreign countries to recognize their legal claims in light of their contribution in fighting and defeating IS.

The Sunnis long dominated the Iraqi army and state until Saddam was driven from power in 2003. Irritated by Shi'ite preeminence, and recognizing their own small percentage of the population (about 16%), the Sunnis are the only Iraqi group that IS can find support from. IS's bombing campaign against Shi'ite targets was at least tacitly supported by some Sunnis, especially remnants of Saddam's army and state. IS's recent offensive has been helped by those same remnants. They were instrumental in convincing parts of the Iraqi army to abandon Mosul, and IS rewarded them with positions in new local governments.

However, Sunni ambitions for autonomy are irreconcilable with IS's dream of a new caliphate. The Sunnis, especially the tribes, are amenable to fighting IS. The most powerful sheikh, Ali Hatem al-Suleiman, has announced his willingness to fight IS. There will be a price and it seems to include direct US support, without Baghdad's mediation - a step toward a fuller break from the old Iraq.

Neither Kurdish nor Shi'ite troops will be welcome in Sunni regions, hence the Sunni tribes will be decisive in ousting IS. The jihadis occupy large parts of Sunni territory, hence the Sunni tribes will be subject to pitiless reprisals. The Sunnis are unlikely to find minority status and a few portfolios preferable to the regional autonomy the Kurds already have. The Sunnis, armed by the West and victorious over the jihadis, will not again submit to the Shi'ite majority.

It is unclear if the Kurds, Sunnis, and Shi'ites can agree upon Iraq's future then attack IS in a concerted manner. While from a military perspective coordination would be preferable, it isn't necessary to begin wearing IS down and forcing significant retreats. Each of the three forces has an incentive to stake out territory from the other two and demonstrate effectiveness to foreign powers in order to win support for its particular vision of Iraq's future.

Brian M Downing is a political-military analyst, author of The Military Revolution and Political Change, The Paths of Glory: Social Change in America from the Great War to Vietnam, and co-author with Danny Rittman of The Samson Heuristic. He can be reached at brianmdowning@gmail.com.

[shiny!]

Re: ME: the Diplomatic Game

a different take on Gaza than that of our MSM . . .

Netanyahu loses plot to new Gaza reality
By Ramzy Baroud

Aside from being a major military setback, Israel's war on Gaza has also disoriented the policies of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu like never before. Since the announcement of a ceasefire on 26 August, his statements appear erratic and particularly uncertain, an expected outcome of the Gaza war.

Since his first term as a prime minister (1996-99), Netanyahu has showed particular savvy at fashioning political and military events to neatly suit his declared policies. He fabricated imminent threats that were neither imminent nor threats, for example, Iraq's non-existent weapons of mass destruction. Later, he took on Iran.

He created too many conditions and laid numerous obstacles for peace settlements to ever be realized. The late Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat, labored for years to meet Israel's conditions, and failed. Abbas has taken the same futile road. But Netanyahu's conditions are specifically designed to be unattainable. ...

IMO this has to be one of the most blatantly biased, inconvenient-facts-be-damned, pot calling kettle black propoganda pieces I've ever read. Simply stunning.