Red Napoleon is dead at 102 !

[lakedaemonian]

Re: Red Napoleon is dead at 102 !

Winning and losing battles, primarily. Surviving the ever changing judgement of history with one's reputation intact as a secondary criteria.

My personal opinion of Giap as a general in the modern western sense is relatively poor in the conventional conflict sphere. He(and most importantly his men) got his butt kicked repeatedly(although again he was ultimately victorious, but for other reasons). In the political conflict sphere he was wildly successful at both the tactical and strategic levels stemming all the way back to his grass roots of creating and leading the first Vietnamese Armed Propaganda Team. In the unconventional conflict sphere he was also very capable, but displayed a consistent and extremely expensive(in terms of men and material) pattern of shifting prematurely from unconventional to conventional warfare.

The overly aggressive and premature transition from unconventional to conventional is where he really let his men down, in my opinion. The innovation he displayed in the political and unconventional spheres of conflict were almost completely absent in the conventional conflict sphere.


Somewhere between McClellan and Von Runstead, but to really know we'd have to ask the guys under him, as you said.

Most troopers are ambivalent about their senior leadership. They don't see much of them and when they do it usually means they are in for the sh!t. When I served, being in the presence of anyone above a Captain meant at the very least a bit of pain and suffering was in store for me. And I don't think I ever heard a good word in the barracks about any officer. But that's what soldiers do; they gripe. I wasn't a field marshal like some of the folks here seemed to be (and no I am not referring to you or anyone specifically). I was a simple leg infantry who switched to artillery in order to attend college. So I do have some personal history to provide insight on peacetime soldiering, but mine is of the "rum and strumpet" variety rather than the "Drum and Trumpet" sort.

I'm also coming from an infantry background with exposure and experience in some other areas as well. My command appointments will never go beyond small unit, but I've had some great opportunities to directly work under/network with very senior commanders across a number of militaries(including a number of candidates in the 2014 Afghan presidential elections...but that's another story).

I agree that soldiers gripe....always have and always will.....when they stop is when commanders really need to worry.

But I am of the school of thought that commanders who truly look after their men(and women) AND mission are the commanders to emulate. I don't see Giap making it over that pass mark...not even close. Again, just my opinion.

I also think it more than fair to judge senior commanders harshly. I think it is absolutely necessary, if only to counter the seeming human need to elevate them to "rockstar" status.

Field Marshal Douglas Haig seems obvious. Certainly, I think comparisons might be made between his command and Giap's, particularly in regards to your interest regarding the husbanding of resources. Haig was "the butcher of the Somme," chief executioner of British soldiers, Liddell-Hart thought him to be "not merely immoral but criminal" and Lloyd George hated the old bugger's guts. But he won and the last 100 days campaign sealed his reputation. I have no opinion or much knowledge on Iranian and Iraqi commanders. Do you?

I think time and space offer an opportunity to clinically review what happens in conflicts. And I think over time we have seen a significant shift in "group think" about WWI generalship and command as mostly examples of how NOT to conduct war, particularly in the near total disregard for soldiers' welfare but also lack of innovative thought(including lack of success) in tactics and doctrine.

I think there is a lot in common between WWI and the Iran-Iraq War viewing it through a lens focused on innovation(or the lack of) and regard for men(or lack of).

That's helpful and I accept your assurances without question. But would you agree that even people who never fought (or even were conscious of events) seem to get quite attached to this?

Absolutely. I think for both the right and the wrong reasons. I think some people want to refight it and others want to learn from it. And far too many people discuss it like a football game played last Sunday.

It's a world of difference than book history or documentaries, listening to war veterans. Like night is to day, isn't it? I have a few family members and professional acquaintances who served, but fewer people I can call true friends. The men I know all earned Purple Hearts, but everyone came home mostly in one piece and of sound mind. Their view of the experience is all over the map, with a few (one a retired Air Force lifer) who see their time as mostly positive and others for whom it was decidedly unpleasant during and afterwards. Most are pleased to piss on their military leadership from a great height and are unanimous in their contempt for the political leadership.

From my personal experience and that of conflict veterans of different wars I've met and known I think it may be near universal(contempt for senior leadership both military and political treating those making the ultimate sacrifice as mere pawns on a chessboard), hence my comments on "maybe we should ask the Vietnamese".

Personally, I think it's the exception rather than the rule when it comes to even "rockstar" commanders on how they are perceived by the men who served under them.


Anyway, it's clear that despite my certainty and the support of the record (that incidentally is forever changing and in dispute), I need to back off.

A long-time 'Tuliper exploded on me last night and the reaction seemed so far outside what was expected that it's causing me to rethink my participation. There seems to be a great deal of sensitivity on a number of topics and I'm finding it hard to 1) figure out which topics are sensitive to whom and 2) calibrate my arguments so that it does not ruffle so many feathers.

I hail from a more vigorous and pugilistic culture of debate. What I find mild sometimes seems too provocative here. To be honest, I'm not sure how to handle it. It seems like a great deal of work for very little payback. I can get plenty out of iTulip simply by reading EJ's analysis and the Shadow Fed folks and then lurking like the majority seems to do. In any case, I am guest of EJ and so have to adjust to the established norms in his "house." As I see it, I can do that, go dark, or home.

The forums are fun and informative, but as of yesterday maybe more trouble than its worth to me. That's too bad, but life in my United States of late. Apologies for coming on too strong.

Same on my end as well. If I came across too strong, snarky, or arrogant it was/is certainly not my intention. If I did, my apologies

If I do, please call me on it.

I also enjoy a robust debate, as long as it doesn't turn personal.

I suspect the medium plays a role in how things can more easily go the wrong way where it could quickly be corrected on the fly over beers in person.

There's a recent book I would recommend on the fall of South Vietnam called Black April:

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000...997395318.html

http://www.amazon.com/Black-April-Vi...=UTF8&sr=&qid=

It's my understanding that the author George Veith's next book is likely to dive into Giap's/North Vietnam's political warfare and non kinetic unconventional warfare successes in what was a global conflict for the Vietnamese.

My final comments on this thread will elaborate on my choice of mentioning "rockstar" generals such as MacArthur, Patton, and Eisenhower.

Of the three, MacArthur is probably the most hotly debated. Patton probably in the middle, and Eisenhower almost universally admired and respected.

All three are "rockstar" brands with different traits and qualities.

But how many people know all three were involved in the crushing of the Bonus Army?

One gave the order, one carried it out, and one was complicit.

And another equally flawed general who was awarded 2 Congressional Medals of Honor, Smedley Butler, and who was on the other side of the Bonus Army.....remains largely unknown.

Evaluating them all harshly "good guys" or "bad guys" should be the minimum standard in my opinion.

[Woodsman]

Re: Red Napoleon is dead at 102 !

Your post encapsulates everything I love about iTulip. Thank you.

I understand where you stand now and a bit more as to how you came to it. I don't see any substantive areas contention. It also means a great deal to me to hear you say that command at the small unit level puts such regard toward the well being of their soldiers and that doctrine and culture support it. God knows the troops don't exactly make it easy sometimes. And no one accepts command for all the warmth and affection they'll receive, that's for damn sure!

[Thailandnotes]

Re: Red Napoleon is dead at 102 !

The New York Times

October 9, 2013
For America, Life Was Cheap in Vietnam
By NICK TURSE

OBITUARIES of Vo Nguyen Giap, the Vietnamese general who helped drive the American military from his country, noted, as The New York Times put it, that “his critics said that his victories had been rooted in a profligate disregard for the lives of his soldiers.”

The implication is that the United States lost the war in Vietnam because General Giap thought nothing of sending unconscionable numbers of Vietnamese to their deaths.

Yet America’s defeat was probably ordained, just as much, by the Vietnamese casualties we caused, not just in military cross-fire, but as a direct result of our policy and tactics. While nearly 60,000 American troops died, some two million Vietnamese civilians were killed, and millions more were wounded and displaced, during America’s involvement in Vietnam, researchers and government sources have estimated.

Enraged, disgusted and alienated by the abuse they suffered from troops who claimed to be their allies, even civilians who had no inclination to back our opponents did so.

Now, four decades later, in distant lands like Pakistan and Afghanistan, civilians are again treating the United States as an enemy, because they have become the collateral damage of our “war on terror,” largely unrecognized by the American public.

In more than a decade of analyzing long-classified military criminal investigation files, court-martial transcripts, Congressional studies, contemporaneous journalism and the testimony of United States soldiers and Vietnamese civilians, I found that Gen. William C. Westmoreland, his subordinates, superiors and successors also engaged in a profligate disregard for human life.

A major reason for these huge losses was that American strategy was to kill as many “enemies” as possible, with success measured by body count. Often, those bodies were not enemy soldiers.

To fight its war of attrition, the United States declared wide swaths of the South Vietnamese countryside to be free-fire zones where even innocent civilians could be treated as enemy forces. Artillery shelling, intended to keep the enemy in a state of constant unease, and near unrestrained bombing slaughtered noncombatants and drove hundreds of thousands of civilians into slums and refugee camps.

Soldiers and officers explained how rules of engagement permitted civilians to be shot for running away, which could be considered suspicious behavior, or for standing still when challenged, which could also be considered suspicious. Veterans I’ve interviewed, and soldiers who spoke to investigators, said they had received orders from commanders to “kill anything that moves.”

“The Oriental doesn’t put the same high price on life as does the Westerner,” Westmoreland famously said. “Life is plentiful, life is cheap in the Orient.”

Having spoken to survivors of massacres by United States forces at Phi Phu, Trieu Ai, My Luoc and so many other hamlets, I can say with certainty that Westmoreland’s assessment was false.

Decades after the conflict ended, villagers still mourn loved ones — spouses, parents, children — slain in horrific spasms of violence. They told me, too, about what it was like to live for years under American bombs, artillery shells and helicopter gunships; about what it was like to negotiate every aspect of their lives around the “American war,” as they call it; how the war transformed the most mundane tasks — getting water from a well or relieving oneself or working in the fields or gathering vegetables for a hungry family — into life-or-death decisions; about what it was like to live under United States policies that couldn’t have been more callous or contemptuous toward human life.

Westmoreland was largely successful in keeping much of the evidence of atrocities from the American public while serving as Army Chief of Staff. A task force, known as the Vietnam War Crimes Working Group, operating out of his Pentagon office, secretly assembled many thousands of pages of investigative files about American atrocities, which I discovered in the National Archives.

Despite revelations about the massacre at My Lai, the United States government was able to suppress the true scale of noncombatant casualties and to imply that those deaths that did occur were inadvertent and unavoidable. This left the American public with a counterfeit history of the conflict.

Without a true account of our past military misdeeds, Americans have been unprepared to fully understand what has happened in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen and elsewhere, where attacks on suspected terrorists have killed unknown numbers of innocent people. As in Vietnam, officials have effectively prevented the public from assessing this civilian toll.

We need to abandon our double standards when it comes to human life. It is worth noting the atrocious toll born of an enemy general’s decisions. But, at the very least, equal time ought to be given to the tremendous toll borne by civilians as a result of America’s wars, past and present.

Nick Turse is a historian and journalist and the author of “Kill Anything That Moves: The Real American War in Vietnam.”

[flintlock]

Re: Red Napoleon is dead at 102 !

Old Napoleon did that once before Waterloo:

Very cool graphic there. Napoleon in my mind was still one of the greatest generals but his ego got the best of him in that campaign. The Russians failed to cooperate and stand and fight that massive army he built. He would not be the last to learn the lesson about invading Russia. What Napoleon accomplished in 1814 is less written about but more amazing to me than the glory campaigns of Austerlitz, Jena, etc.

[flintlock]

Re: Red Napoleon is dead at 102 !

I'm sorry, but I'm not getting your point. Is it that Giap is overrated because of the losses he suffered? That was the loser's argument put forth by Westmoreland, wasn't it? It wasn't very convincing then or now.

I always found it disingenuous for the creator of "search and destroy" and "free fire zones" to criticize the man who defeated him because of the number of soldiers he sacrificed in gaining that victory. Same for the old "never lost on the battlefield" trope. The Germans said as much with their "stabbed in the back" mythology following WWI.

You'll recall that then as now, it was the right wing that promulgated the myth of national betrayal. Like Westmoreland, General Erich Ludendorff attempted to weasel out of his military failure by advancing the notion that the German Army did not lose the World War on the battlefield but was instead betrayed by the civilians on the home front. Sound familiar?

Generals use the resources at their command to gain supreme advantage on the battlefield. The French and Americans had technology. The Vietnamese had a seemingly endless supply of troops. The Americans played to their strengths, Giap played to his. But don't imagine that Giap was unaware or unmoved at the losses:



Giap lost more in headcount but replaced them without issue. Those who survived became even more effective soldiers and leaders. American forces in comparison were ill trained, poorly motivated and poorly led. By 1969 the morale and discipline of the U.S. ground forces in Vietnam was in such disarray that it ceased to be a reliable fighting force. I believe this was one of the major causes for the change in strategy that resulted in Vietnamization and eventual withdrawal. Nixon may have called the Vietnam settlement "peace with honor," but his alternative was war without an army.

And while Giap may have "wasted" his troops, it seems very likely that we abandoned ours. Evidence mounts that Nixon and Kissinger left to rot nearly the equivalent number of men that were released in Operation Homecoming.

Only recently yet another POW was found alive in Vietnam. Correction: Looks like this guy is a hoaxer. Bastard got me.

Giap won a decisive victory against the efforts of four West Point educated generals - Harkins, Westmoreland, Abrams and Weyand - despite the overwhelming superiority in firepower and logistics at their disposal. That is the bottom line. His race, the body count, his military education, his ideology, and all other objections raised by the losers are secondary to the reality of his victories.

You are trying to put Westmoreland's words in my mouth. Nice try. The point in question is unique military strategy and tactical ability, not was the Vietnam war winnable. Given the political structure at the time, it was not. Westmoreland if given a free hand could have nuked them into the stone age. Would that make him a military genius? I'm certainly not holding Westmoreland or any of the US brass up as military geniuses. But the fact is you could have put put pretty much any Vietnamese general in the same spot and he would have won because the strategy was to simply hold out, at the expense of a million or more of the lives of his own people. What specific tactical or strategic maneuver do you attribute to Giap that won the war? One that was revolutionary or showed unique insight? Tet? Military disaster. 1972 Invasion?( was he even still in charge?) Same.

If you consider simply winning to be the only determination of genius, then I suppose you are correct. But then that makes a lot of otherwise incompetent generals throughout history geniuses. You may consider the loss of millions of his fellow Vietnamese insignificant in judging him, but I don't. Giap was not incompetent, and probably did as well as he could have been expected, but he hardly did anything other than what was expected. Hyperbole seems to be in vogue today. You are always either an idiot or a genius, but never ordinary.

[flintlock]

Re: Red Napoleon is dead at 102 !

Understood, but it was also Westy's publicly stated position on Giap:



Coming from him sitting safe in his air conditioned suite of offices at Pentagon East, it just doesn't have the same gravitas and sense of meaning. I don't recall reading where Westmoreland was so beloved by his men. Although he did let them have beer in the mess hall and wear sideburns.

Your point is well taken, and I am not a fan of Westmoreland at all, but he probably would not have accepted the kind of losses Giap did, even if his superiors would have let him. You hear the same type of arguments sometimes acclaiming the "victory" by Russian generals over the Nazis, or even over Napoleon. What they leave out is how many millions of their own civilians died at the hands of the aggressors because of their incompetence. If an army's job is to defend its people, then many winners of wars have failed at their job. North Vietnam's callousness towards their losses shows how in the end politicians will sacrifice anyone else's blood for their own gain. The US is no exception.

[Woodsman]

Re: Red Napoleon is dead at 102 !

Can't disagree. "Our blood, his guts" comes to mind.

[Woodsman]

Re: Red Napoleon is dead at 102 !

I try, I try...

We need to look at the Vietnam war in it appropriate context, as you say, and for me strategy/tactics is the least important or interesting. I see the war as the Rosetta Stone of the Cold War and late 20th Century America. I submit that as country, we are not still not prepared to examine that time in any honest way. I think there are still too many folks accountable still walking around, too many careers built on mythology, and too many institutions dependent on maintaining that mythology.

Anyway, here's one ordinary guy lifting a glass to all those extraordinary or otherwise who never made it back home or who left the best parts of themselves there. And to hell with the generals and politicians.

[flintlock]

Re: Red Napoleon is dead at 102 !

Patton is one of my least favorite American commanders. Vastly overrated and a real dick to boot.

[flintlock]

Re: Red Napoleon is dead at 102 !

I try, I try...

We need to look at the Vietnam war in it appropriate context, as you say, and for me strategy/tactics is the least important or interesting. I see the war as the Rosetta Stone of the Cold War and late 20th Century America. I submit that as country, we are not still not prepared to examine that time in any honest way. I think there are still too many folks accountable still walking around, too many careers built on mythology, and too many institutions dependent on maintaining that mythology.

Anyway, here's one ordinary guy lifting a glass to all those extraordinary or otherwise who never made it back home or who left the best parts of themselves there. And to hell with the generals and politicians.

I'll drink to that.

I didn't mean you personally! I mean we tend to oversimplify people in general. The Press especially loves either a hero or a goat in its military leadership. Average men doing an average job in a difficult situation is simply not as newsworthy.

[lakedaemonian]

Re: Red Napoleon is dead at 102 !

I try, I try...

We need to look at the Vietnam war in it appropriate context, as you say, and for me strategy/tactics is the least important or interesting. I see the war as the Rosetta Stone of the Cold War and late 20th Century America. I submit that as country, we are not still not prepared to examine that time in any honest way. I think there are still too many folks accountable still walking around, too many careers built on mythology, and too many institutions dependent on maintaining that mythology.

Anyway, here's one ordinary guy lifting a glass to all those extraordinary or otherwise who never made it back home or who left the best parts of themselves there. And to hell with the generals and politicians.

I would largely agree...although I think it's more on the political/special interest side of the house as any remaining Vietnam veterans would be in the private sector now if not retired/dead.

The Spanish American War(USS Maine) and the Vietnam War(Tonkin Gulf Incident) saw US involvement respectively initiate and increase based on questionable narratives pushed by media/politicians/special interests.

What I'd really like to see is an unbiased and comprehensive full spectrum look at the conflict.

The US having lost and South Vietnam being absorbed like the Borg isn't in question.

I think what still is, is in the HOW it was achieved.

The US won the vast majority of the conventional battles(and a good few of the unconventional ones)....but was comprehensively defeated by communist political/psychological/media warfare operations. It was a slaughter. Soviet and Vietnamese archives detail their very comprehensive and very successful efforts.

Two completely different definitions and doctrines regarding warfighting.

The US and South Vietnam also lost the ultra local battle for governance.

So it's not so much a question of being out-fought(in the conventional sense), but being out governed as well as out sacrificed(willingness).

I recently posted a link to David Kilcullen's new book "Out of the Mountains" which is the best single resource I've found for the uninitiated, with a focus on irregular warfare in the future.

Giap is about as worthy of respect as the average WWI general for throwing his men into the meat grinder, but he receives little acclaim for what he is probably most worth being remembered from a military perspective in developing infrastructure/capability to win the battle for governance at the ultra local level.

And while I think it's quite important to gain a better understanding of the total war being fought by the Communists(particularly political/media/psychological infiltration and influence over open western society) as it can pertain to future conflict(as well as how similar techniques can be used by special interests today and in the recent past), I also think it's relevant to focus on the battle for ultra local governance.

In some respects I think the Vietnam War can be quite confusing and makes it hard to see the governance forest thru the conventional war and counter insurgency trees.

What happened with the suicide attack on the US Embassy during the Tet Offensive can relate to the more recent ISI backed Mumbai Massacre raid or Kenya Mall Attack. Where one sees failure, others see priceless marketing and advertising for their narrative.

What happened with Giap's efforts to asset local shadow governance over South Vietnamese villages can relate to more recent Taliban shadow governance efforts. Where one sees secure schools benefitting legitimate government, others see a way of controlling the school curriculum through shadow governance at the expense of the opposition.

What happened with entertainment media narrative regarding the Vietnam War(Apocalypse Now, Deer Hunter, Platoon, etc) can relate to more recent examples(Zero Dark Thirty). Some see historical events harmlessly shaping perceptions through "non-fiction fiction", others see some slick deception.

I was in contact recently with a US veteran who helped to locate and move the horribly bloated bodies of western european men, women, and children who were captured and summarily executed by VC/NVA in Hue 1968.

He related it to a far more recent encounter where he returned to university study later in life(the last 10 years) where he was attending a history lecture at a large public university where a professor with admitted marxist leanings stated categorically the "alleged" massacres at Hue were western fabrications and/or a CIA plot.

That stuff is as silly as the outlandish recent conspiracies.......but is unfortunately accepted as fact by many.

I get a bit stirred up when I read about such incidents/ignorance.

Ultimately, I think looking at Giap to win a conventional war is a path to absolute ruin.

But looking to Giap(particularly his early days) as a means of controlling a favela in Rio, or the same in Lagos, Karachi, Dhaka, or Kinshasa is where I think it's worth investing for the future.

[Raz]

Re: Red Napoleon is dead at 102 !

...A long-time 'Tuliper exploded on me last night and the reaction seemed so far outside what was expected that it's causing me to rethink my participation. There seems to be a great deal of sensitivity on a number of topics and I'm finding it hard to 1) figure out which topics are sensitive to whom and 2) calibrate my arguments so that it does not ruffle so many feathers.

I hail from a more vigorous and pugilistic culture of debate. What I find mild sometimes seems too provocative here. To be honest, I'm not sure how to handle it. It seems like a great deal of work for very little payback. I can get plenty out of iTulip simply by reading EJ's analysis and the Shadow Fed folks and then lurking like the majority seems to do. In any case, I am guest of EJ and so have to adjust to the established norms in his "house." As I see it, I can do that, go dark, or home. ....

You stated that the primary reason for voter ID laws was "racial animus against black people". You then went on to suggest that people from the South were stupid("not particularlly smart").

I strongly support Voter ID requirements AND closing our borders to anyone and everyone who attempts to enter the United States illegally - and that most certainly includes people of color - black, red, yellow, brown, white, purple or green. I do so because of my desire to maintain the integrity of the ballot, the rule of law, and the social stability of the United States (assimilation rather than Balkinization). So by your inference that makes me a stupid racist.

Can't imagine why playing the race card and then the stupid card would set me off.

[vt]

Re: Red Napoleon is dead at 102 !

Strange. I never heard the racism being mentioned when mentioned when Alberto Gonzales and Clarence Thomas were up for high court positions?

Leftists always use the Alinsky rules when they have no basis for their position.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rules_for_Radicals

The American people are getting tired of the dirty campaigning of both parties, of the lies, smears, and lack of substance of any position they hold. Logic and reason have no place.

One moan or woman, one vote. And you must prove you are that person. There is no discrimination whatsoever. All states have voter ID cards that can be obtained quickly and easily.