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  • Has China Pivoted?

    By Brendan O'Reilly

    US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's trip to China highlighted the challenges inherent in the world's most important bilateral relationship. There are now serious areas of contention between China and the United States. As China continues her rapid progress towards replacing the United States as the world's largest economy, the entire dynamic of the global political system is experiencing momentous changes, often to the detriment of American influence.

    Both China and the United States must be careful not to repeat the mistakes of past global powers. The risks intrinsic to open confrontation between two economically integrated, technologically advanced nations are simply too high. It is in the interest of both nations, as well as the entire human race, for Sino-American rivalry to remain on friendly terms. Fortunately, despite tough talk on both sides, the fundamental economic and military realities point to long-term balance and a competitive stability.

    An example of China's increased international assertiveness was on full display during Secretary Clinton's visit. During their joint news conference in Beijing, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi harshly rebutted Clinton's previous assertion that China and Russia are "on the wrong side of history" because of their opposition to United Nations sanctions against the Syrian government:

    "I think history will judge that China's position on the Syria question is a promotion of the appropriate handling of the situation … the interests of the people of Syria and the region and the interests of peace, stability and development in the region and throughout the world." [1]

    Yang reiterating the Chinese disagreement with America over the Syrian issue in the presence of Clinton sends a very strong message. Clinton was quick to respond, saying: "It is no secret that we have been disappointed by Russia and China's actions blocking tougher UN Security Council resolutions and we hope to continue to unite behind a real path forward to end the violence in Syria."

    The Chinese government is no longer shy about directly addressing criticisms and disagreements with American policy - even while hosting the American secretary of state. Of course, the meeting also had the usual diplomatic platitudes, with calls for increased "cooperation" and "convergent interests".

    For those reading between the lines it is important to note that a planned meeting between secretary Clinton and China's leader-in-waiting Xi Jinping was canceled at the last minute for "unexpected scheduling reasons". Chinese appeals to refrain from "unnecessary speculation" over the cancelation only added to the intrigue. In a land where symbolism is at the heart of politics, Xi's snub of Clinton is extremely relevant.

    In order to understand China's defensive attitude towards Secretary Clinton, one needs to understand the context of her trip to Beijing, and the broader currents of contemporary Sino-American relations.

    Secretary Clinton made two significant stops on her way to Beijing. First, Clinton visited the Cook Islands to attend the Pacific Islands Forum. Her comments at this Forum served to emphasize American political attitudes towards a rising China. Answering questions on whether Chinese money was negatively affecting the domestic political systems of Pacific nations, Clinton said: "Here in the Pacific, we want to see China act in a fair and transparent way".

    Clearly, there is growing American concern of China overtaking the US as the world's main practitioner of "dollar diplomacy". This dynamic is on display throughout the world: from Africa to South America, and of course, in the Pacific itself.

    According to the Lowy Institute, Beijing has pledged over $600 million worth in loans to Pacific nations since 2005. Meanwhile, Secretary Clinton offered $32 million worth of new development projects during her recent visit. There is little the American government, with its extensive economic and budgetary woes, can do to counter China's increasing investment in foreign countries - except, of course, to decry the potential negative effects such investments will have on the domestic political system in said countries.

    In a more conciliatory note, Clinton stressed "We think it is important for the Pacific island nations to have good relationships with as many partners as possible and that includes China and the United States," and repeatedly said "The Pacific is big enough for all of us." [2]

    Indeed, the vast Pacific Ocean is large enough to accommodate the ambitions and interest of the world's two most powerful nations. The Chinese, though, may take objection to exactly how much of the Pacific each country is currently occupying. A map of US military bases in the region shows that China is effectively surrounded right off her coast by the American navy. One can imagine the protests by the US if China were to set up a massive naval base in Fiji, much less the apocalyptic rhetoric which would result from China stationing tens of thousands of troops in Cuba. As China's economic might is increasingly invested in military capabilities, the Chinese may seek the means to push the line of effective US naval control in the Pacific away from Chinese shores.

    Secretary Clinton's second stop on her way to China further underlined the Chinese fears of regional encirclement and containment. While meeting with Indonesian leaders in Jakarta, Clinton spoke of Indonesia's role as a guarantor of a united ASEAN front regarding the South China Sea dispute: "That show of unity is very important for us …No party should take any steps that would increase tension." She promised to address the South China Sea issue with Chinese leadership, saying: "I will be discussing this [the South China Sea dispute] in Beijing and hopefully we will make progress before the East Asia Summit."[3]
    While these words by no means appear belligerent on their surface, they are widely interpreted in China as American interference. Any moves by the American government to get involved in the South China Sea territorial row are strongly condemned by Beijing. The Chinese leadership sees American backing of the militaries of the Philippines and Vietnam's, as well as support for Japan in the East China Sea, as part of a concerted effort at strategically encircling China.

    The view from China

    An editorial in the Community Party- controlled Global Times, entitled "Hillary reinforces US-China mistrust", offers a glimpse into the Chinese worldview regarding America's pivot towards Asia:


    The biggest "contribution" that she has brought to US diplomacy is the "pivot" to Asia. But besides greatly raising the mutual mistrust with China, the move hasn't yet brought pragmatic benefits to the US. It seems that the US is trying to realize two goals, namely renewing domestic economic vigor and checking China's rise, so as to maintain its world hegemony, which is its ultimate strategic goal. Checking China's rise is the wrong strategic goal for the US. This leading power, despite all its advantages, has limited strength but quite a few thorny tasks in its diplomacy. Superficially, Clinton's proposal to restrain China with "smart power" diplomacy works on the South China Sea issue. But it appears to be merely a small trick from the perspective of the strategy of a superpower.


    [4] China sees the US government as intent on an unrealistic goal of perpetuating complete American global dominance - including in China's backyard. U.S diplomatic efforts in the South China Sea are condemned as merely a "small trick" to contain a rival.

    Why does the Chinese government bristle so at perceived US interference in longstanding disputes over small, uninhabited islands? The answer lies primarily in the sensitive issue of sovereignty.

    For at least several decades, China has claimed the majority of the South China Sea as an integral part of Chinese territory. For China, US intervention in its disputes with neighboring countries over this territory amounts to a direct attack on China herself. Clearly, this is a red line for Beijing.

    It must be noted that not only Beijing, but also the Taiwan-based Republic of China (ROC), claim Chinese sovereignty over the "nine-dashed line" region in the South China Sea. Chinese nationalists in both Taiwan and Hong Kong have recently protested on behalf of Chinese claims of sovereignty in the region.

    Of course, Beijing could benefit on the international stage by taking a softer line on the ongoing maritime disputes. Chinese territorial quarrels with the Philippines and Vietnam offer an
    opening for the US military to increase its presence in the region. However, a more forceful Chinese stance is imperative for domestic political reasons. Recent spontaneous protests against Japanese claims to the Diaoyu (Senkaku in Japanese) Islands have spiraled out of control, with Japanese products, including police vehicles, targeted by angry mobs. As Beijing prepares for a handoff of political power to a new generation, a tough position on protecting perceived Chinese sovereignty in the maritime regions is essential.

    Meanwhile, strong US involvement in the South China Sea dispute has offered the Chinese leadership a golden propaganda opportunity. It may have been difficult for the Chinese government to play up the Philippines or Vietnam as dire threats to Chinese sovereignty, but as soon as Uncle Sam entered the stage with the "pivot" towards Asia, the psychological dynamic of the standoff changed completely. Further pressure was added by US-ally Japan's ratcheting up of territorial tensions on China's Eastern flank. Now the Chinese government can shift the domestic (and so some degree international) narrative of the South China Sea standoff: instead of pushing around smaller powers, it is China herself who is under threat from a hegemonic bully.

    Of course, despite these political narratives, China is by no means powerless to counter US encroachment into the region.

    A MAD world

    Last month, Chinese station television announced the successful test of China's latest intercontinental missile, the Dongfeng 41. This latest series in the Dongfeng ("Eastern Wind") line has a maximum range of 14,000 kilometers, and is capable of carrying multiple warheads. [5] China's longstanding policy of strategically concealing and underreporting military capabilities implies that the published range specifications could be conservative estimates. Meanwhile, reports have surfaced of Chinese advances in deploying nuclear missile-equipped submarines.

    This upgrading of China's strategic missile capabilities is a potentially stabilizing factor in Sino-American relations. The entirety of the continental US is now well within the reach of China's nuclear weaponry. Furthermore, the ability to deploy multiple warheads on a single missile effectively trumps any modern missile-defense system. China has achieved Mutually-Assured Destruction (MAD) status with the US in the event of a full-scale nuclear war. The stakes are much too high now for either power to seek military conflict.

    Neither the US nor China could guarantee that a small clash in the Asia-Pacific would not escalate into a shooting war, which in turn could escalate into an extinction-level event for the human race. This dangerous dynamic is why the US "pivot" towards Asia, and Chinese fears of the aggressive capabilities of the conventional forces of the US military, are based on an extremely outdated worldview. The US military, for all its might, has been rendered useless by China's strategic nuclear arsenal. The American naval buildup off of China's shores amounts to little more than a "paper tiger".

    What will take place is a much more subtle confrontation, with each country staking out areas of influence, primarily for economic resources. On this level, China has played a much smarter game than the US in the last decade. While Beijing has largely focused on economic ties with other nations, Washington has been busy establishing and maintaining costly military bases around the globe.

    The return on investments for each strategy has been obvious. The US will receive very little strategic leverage against China by positioning conventional military forces in the region. The costly deployment of several hundred marines in Australia, for example, has virtually no effect on the security equation between two powers capable of completely destroying each other's major cities in a matter of a few hours.

    The question naturally arises: why is the US intent on a costly strategic encirclement of China if conventional military forces must never be used? Part of the answer lies in an outdated worldview, but the larger motivating factor is domestic politics.

    Much like that the Chinese position in the South China Sea is largely constrained by China's domestic politics, the US leadership is similarly compelled to take a hard line against Beijing. Neither of the two major American political parties can afford to look weak in front of China. America's economic woes, and China's rapid economic rise, make China an easy scapegoat for America's ongoing unemployment crisis, and the largely self-wrought global decline of American influence.

    Simply put, the American political class is afraid. After dominating the globe for over 60 years, America is likely to get replaced as the world's pre-eminent superpower within two or three decades. The Middle Kingdom already challenges US economic supremacy throughout the world. Even the lynchpins of the US "pivot" towards Asia - Japan, India, South Korea, Indonesia, and Australia - do far more trade with China than they do with the United States.

    Although the Sino-American rivalry will remain a serious matter, the areas of contention will be confined to economic, political, and cultural realms. The military stakes are simply too high. Martial posturing on both sides is meant primarily for domestic consumption.

    There are hopeful signs for the development of a friendly rivalry. Firstly, with the exception of the Korean War (1950-1953), there is no strong history of mutual political animosity between the two powers. Indeed, there is quite a long history of cooperation against external threats, such as the Empire of Japan and the Soviet Union. Secondly, the people on both sides are generally mutually amicable.

    On the more concrete side, both China and the US need each other economically. China's economic miracle would sour overnight without access to American markets. For the foreseeable future, China will need to continue exporting consumer goods and importing crops such as wheat and soybeans. On the other hand, America will remain dependent on Chinese trade and loans to forestall an even deeper economic crisis.

    Finally, and most importantly, both powers have achieved a rough nuclear balance. America may have many more nuclear warheads than China, but China's arsenal is more than sufficient to act as a credible deterrent. Military threats and posturing on both sides are produced primarily for domestic consumption. For the time being, there will remain stability in the Sino-American rivalry. Neither power can directly threaten the other through coercive military or economic means.

    Washington's pivot towards Asia is an overly militarized, regionalized effort at containing China. It is doomed to failure because China's growing influence is not confined to the Asia-Pacific, but rather spans the entire globe. Furthermore, the existence of advanced nuclear weaponry means that the Sino-American struggle for dominance will likely remain confined to the economic, cultural, and political realms. If Washington wants to compete in the 21st century, the American leadership must take off its outdated military blinders. America's pivot towards Asia serves little purpose besides angering an increasingly powerful China and uniting China's people against a perceived outside threat.

    Secretary Clinton's less-than-friendly reception in Beijing serves a notice to the United States. An amicable rivalry is possible only when both powers fear and respect each other. No longer will China listen to American denunciations regarding China's foreign or domestic policies without responding in kind. China now has the economic clout and long-range military capabilities to interact with the United States on a fully equal basis.

    Notes: 1. Clinton's China Visit Produces No Breakthrough, Time, Sep 5, 2012
    2. Clinton says Pacific big enough for China, US, Daily Times, Sep 2, 2012
    3. Clinton Applauds Indonesia's Asean role, The Irrawaddy, Sep 4, 2012
    4. Hillary reinforces US-China mistrust, Global Times, Sep 4, 2012
    5. China tests new generation ICBM capable of carrying 10 nuclear warheads, The Economic Times, Aug 28, 2012


    Brendan P O'Reilly is a China-based writer and educator from Seattle.

    http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Global_.../NI07Dj02.html

  • #2
    Re: Has China Pivoted?

    Why do we always say "China" or "The US" when those are abstractions. Most people in both countries could care less about a few Pacific Islands, or nuke subs, or military and political gamesmanship. Most are far more interested in putting food on the table, spending time with family, and getting to retirement to see their grandkids. It is only the select group of psychopaths who care about all this crap, and unfortunately they work their way into positions of power and influence, thus making the rest of us 'pay' for their games.

    Comment


    • #3
      Re: Has China Pivoted?

      Originally posted by doom&gloom View Post
      Why do we always say "China" or "The US" when those are abstractions. Most people in both countries could care less about a few Pacific Islands, or nuke subs, or military and political gamesmanship. Most are far more interested in putting food on the table, spending time with family, and getting to retirement to see their grandkids. It is only the select group of psychopaths who care about all this crap, and unfortunately they work their way into positions of power and influence, thus making the rest of us 'pay' for their games.

      I'm afraid, you are very wrong. That maybe the case for Americans. But do you actually know people from China? I'm not saying that all will care, but as many as 1 out of 4 Chinese are extremely nationalistic and sensitive over such issues. This maybe due to government propaganda and indoctrination from young.

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      • #4
        Re: Has China Pivoted?

        Originally posted by touchring View Post
        I'm afraid, you are very wrong. That maybe the case for Americans. But do you actually know people from China? I'm not saying that all will care, but as many as 1 out of 4 Chinese are extremely nationalistic and sensitive over such issues. This maybe due to government propaganda and indoctrination from young.
        A couple additional points:

        1.) China has not experienced war in generations. Not since Korea(50-53) have the Chinese people experienced the sacrifice of loss from a major war, and not since Vietnam(79) has China endured a major(but brief) border conflict .

        I'm of the belief that a people can become increasingly jingoistic the further they are in history from the human cost of war.

        2.) The US people do not possess the depth and breadth of the global ethnic Chinese expat diaspora. Citizens of China or not, they are ethnic Chinese and that card can be played when it is to the benefit of the PRC. Through out Asia, the Pacific, and Africa are substantial ethnic Chinese communities and enclaves.

        I have personally seen an ethnic Chinese community that was ransacked and largely burnt to the ground in a country by the other more established indigenous folks. While it's not a very common occurrence in the Pacific region....it has happened before and will likely happen again. In some respects, I reckon ethnic Chinese are viewed a bit like the Jews of the Pacific(ethnic Indians as well in places like Fiji) with all the ugly allegations/ignorance/racism that goes with it.

        China(and Taiwan in funny UN vote buying competition) may have gotten involved politically and economically, but it was the rest of the Pacific that got involved militarily.

        I would suspect that could change significantly in the future as both a genuine need to ensure regional security and stability, but also as an opportunity to extend influence and shape the region to try and break US containment of China.

        Fiji is an interesting "softly, softly" example.

        Post 2006 coup, the regional response was to effectively shun Fiji until such time as Bainimarama relinquished his military dictatorship and ceded authority back to the people of Fiji.

        For a time it seemed like it was inevitable that the declining economy of Fiji would compel a restoration of democracy in order to regain regional support.

        But it hasn't turned out that way since Chinese economic aid to Fiji has exploded(from a low base) about 150X.

        If/when Fiji restores a vote for leadership, it will be interesting to see how transparent elections are and what level of influence China will possess over Fiji.

        The Pacific is going to be a very interesting place in the period ahead.

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