Announcement

Collapse
No announcement yet.

RE: Cali & the Foreclosure Settlement

Collapse
X
 
  • Filter
  • Time
  • Show
Clear All
new posts

  • RE: Cali & the Foreclosure Settlement

    Bank of America’s desire to escape the legacy of its Countrywide problems also helped secure a combined $12 billion in principal write-downs for the state.


    By Alejandro Lazo, Los Angeles Times — February 11, 2012

    California walked away with the biggest chunk of this week’s landmark foreclosure settlement partly because of the state’s size but also because of Bank of America‘s desire to escape the legacy of its Countrywide problems.The nation’s three largest mortgage servicers — Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase and Wells Fargo & Co. — committed to provide California $12 billion in principal write-downs, including through short sales, over the next three years, the single largest such commitment to come out of the negotiations. About 250,000 Californians are covered under that part of the deal, struck between five big mortgage lenders, states and the federal government.

    The devil is in the details as always. By slipping in the provision to count short sales, banks have created a huge loophole that allows them to look like they are doing something substantive for loan owners when in fact they are not. California passed legislation last year which barred lenders from collecting on bad debt after a short sale. In effect, they made every loan in Califonria non-recourse if the seller goes through the short sale process. As a result, lenders must write down this bad debt when a short sale occurs.

    So if lenders are already having to write off this bad debt, what do loan owners gain when lenders agree to write down the principal in a short sale? Nothing. Lenders had to do this anyway. Lenders are almost certain to lose $12 billion on short sales over the next several years, so they could easily provide $12 billion in principal reduction without doing a thing for loan owners struggling to make payments.

    Its a brilliant move by both the California Attorney General and by the banks. The Attorney General looks like a champion of the little guy and grabs headlines. The banks carry on as before, but they look like they provide debt relief. Everyone involved maintains appearances, and the banks get to insulate themselves from further lawsuits.

    This should be characterized as a complete victory for banks. They get good public relations and insulation from further litigation for taking write downs which were inevitable.

    Taking into account a complex series of credits designed to encourage the banks — which also included Ally Financial and Citibank — to make payments to homeowners, California’s share of the settlement could climb to as much as $18 billion. That aid would go to an estimated 460,000-plus borrowers, many in areas of the state hit hardest by the housing bust, according to the state attorney general’s office.

    It doesn’t look like this aid will go to borrowers at all. Most will go to debt forgiveness of sellers. It doesn’t look like 460,000 loan owners are getting principal reduction and getting to keep their house and future appreciation. I actually find that rather comforting. If the principal write downs concentrate on short sales, moral hazard will not result.

    “This outcome is the result of an insistence that California receive a fair deal commensurate with the harm done here,” Atty. Gen. Kamala D. Harris said Thursday in announcing the settlement.

    California’s large share came even though there have been few complaints among state homeowners about the kind of improper robo-signing practices that launched the talks, which quickly morphed into settlement negotiations about errors that occurred throughout the foreclosure process. More than a year ago, evidence began emerging about robo-signing, in which foreclosure documents were signed without being read or with phony names and titles.

    “The robo-signing was the hook for the investigation, that was the most outrageous thing that got the whole thing started. But the robo-signing does not amount to the worst things that servicers have done. What caused the ball to pick up steam was all of the other abuses,” said Kurt Eggert, a professor at Chapman University’s law school. “The servicers really needed California in this deal.”

    What other abuses? I have been writing about this for five years, and I have yet to see any credible documentation of servicer abuses here in California. I don’t recall any allegations of abuses here in California. What we have is a lot of underwater loan owners who are suffering because they participated in the Great California Housing Ponzi Scheme.

    By signing on, California waived a litany of claims it could have brought against the banks, including unfair or deceptive business practices and general consumer protection statutes that applied to wrongdoing in the loan modification and foreclosure process, according to a person familiar with the talks not authorized to speak publicly. California retained some claims that other states gave up, including fair lending cases.


    How can this be construed as anything other than a victory for banks? This settlement amounts to a smoke-and-mirror payout of losses lenders were going to endure anyway in order to provide protection to lenders from future lawsuits. For lenders, this is a win-win.


    “California gets an extraordinary amount of it,” said Iowa Atty. Gen. Tom Miller, who led the negotiations for the state attorneys general. “That’s one of the things that amazed us as we went through this — how much problem there was in California.



    What he means to say is that people in Iowa are truly shocked at how incredibly stupid loan owners in California really are. The fact that they need a $12B to 18B bailout just to cover a fraction of the losses banks will endure via short sale is truly remarkable.

    The settlement covers only homeowners whose mortgages either are owned by the banks in the deal or are serviced by them on behalf of private investors. The settlement doesn’t include homeowners whose loans are owned by government-controlled mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, a share Harris estimated to be about 60% of the state’s homeowners.

    That leaves a huge open question. What about the GSEs? Isn’t California going to try to extort some money out of the US government by attacking the GSEs? Why wouldn’t the GSEs be part of this settlement? Doesn’t that make it even more obvious this is merely a bank bailout in disguise?

    Think about it, if California really wanted to get debt relief to loan owners outside of the debt relief they are already entitled to under current debt forgiveness laws governing short sales, wouldn’t the Attorney General insist on having the GSEs kick in some cash?

    If there were actual debt forgiveness in this agreement, it would be grossly unfair in its application. Loan owners whose loans are held by banks get relief while loan owners whose debts are held by the GSEs get nothing. Since nobody is really getting anything, it isn’t unfair, just completely deceptive.

    … Bank of America, which has a huge portfolio of Countrywide loans from its 2008 acquisition of the Calabasas lender, was especially insistent on getting California on board. For Bank of America, the deal “made no economic sense” if California wasn’t included, and most of that bank’s commitment is aimed at Countrywide borrowers, according to the person involved with the negotiations.”Because of the Countrywide challenge, we had the most at stake for our customers and shareholders,” Bank of America spokesman Dan Frahm said.“Our approach to the negotiations was rigorous and disciplined with a sense of urgency to provide additional assistance to our customers and get the mortgage crisis behind us.”

    Wells Fargo spokesman Tom Goyada said the settlement “is not a one-issue agreement. It covers a range of issues and we are happy to have those set aside and put behind us.” Chase declined to comment. Ally and Citibank did not respond to requests for comment.

    Of course the banks are happy with the arrangement. They no longer have to worry about being sued as the process the rest of their foreclosures. Look for foreclosure processing to really kick into overdrive with this agreement in place.


    Key to Harris was getting a significant amount of principal reduction for borrowers. Under the terms of the deal, banks can write principal down to the current value of the loan, or so the monthly mortgage payments make up only 31% of a borrower’s income, according to the person familiar with the deal.


    Look at the language in that sentence carefully. What does it mean that banks can write down principal? Of course they can. They always could at their own discretion. Notice the word can is very different than the word must. Banks will keep an accurate tally of the write downs from short sales which will count toward their $12 billion. They may also reduce principal on some deeply underwater loan owners to make them less underwater hoping they don’t strategically default. They are doing that now.

    I will go out on a limb here and state I don’t believe any loan owner anywhere will receive principal write downs to current market value with no strings attached. But that is not what loan owners are going to hear or believe. I foresee more false hope coming from this agreement as loan owners make a few more payments hoping they will hit the principal reduction jackpot which will never materialize.


    If the banks don’t fulfill the $12-billion guarantee, they will have to make cash payments of up to $800 million directly to the state, a provision that is enforceable in California court, instead of federal court in Washington, where the rest of the deal is covered.

    Incentives will direct aid to areas hardest hit by the foreclosure crisis, a “Stockton provision” that Harris sought after a visit this year to that foreclosure-ravaged city, negotiators said. Those areas are to receive relief within the first year.

    alejandro.lazo@latimes.com

    I wouldn’t be surprised if a few lottery winners in Stockton who are 60% underwater get principal reductions that leave them only 30% underwater. Lenders will try to find the debt forgiveness level which will prompt the hopeless into making a few more payments. Anyone in Stockton thinking they will get a principal reduction down to fair market value is dreaming. Think of what would happen if such principal reductions were forthcoming. Think of the outrage among those who didn’t get it. What about the people with GSE loans who don’t see principal reduction?

    Bankers should be giddy over this deal. They get good public relations for taking write offs they were going to take anyway, they get to insulate themselves from future litigation, and they get a few more loan owners to sign up for false hope and make a few more payments. They got everything they wanted from this deal.

    http://ochousingnews.com/news/banks-...ce=patrick.net



  • #2
    Re: Cali & the Foreclosure Settlement

    Dr. Michael Hudson right again.

    The 'system' is to pretend to pay a big amount, or to pay a large amount which is miniscule compared to the actual profits made, and then to lock off all future alternative modes of litigation/redress via a 'settlement' which acknowledges no wrongdoing.

    Comment


    • #3
      Re: Cali & the Foreclosure Settlement

      Originally posted by c1ue View Post
      Dr. Michael Hudson right again.

      The 'system' is to pretend to pay a big amount, or to pay a large amount which is miniscule compared to the actual profits made, and then to lock off all future alternative modes of litigation/redress via a 'settlement' which acknowledges no wrongdoing.
      Let's hold the judgment on the mortgage settlement for now. There has been lots of innuendo about this for months. The document isn't even out yet.

      Sure, the banks will get away without paying full cost of the damage that they caused. If they did pay the full cost, they'd be out of business, and a whole lot of previous bail-outs would have been for naught, leaving the government and taxpayers on the hook even more than they are today.

      It's not perfect, but sucking some money out of the banks is a step in the right direction, particularly where this doesn't leave them immune from criminal or other types of civil prosecution, which it appears it does not. Again, the full document isn't out yet.

      The goose was already cooked when the initial Treasury/FED decision not to let the rest go the way of Lehman happened. My advice is not to get all high-and-mighty and angry about some settlement that actually might help a couple of homeowners and bring bank balance sheets a little back towards reality.

      Comment


      • #4
        Re: Cali & the Foreclosure Settlement

        Originally posted by dcarrigg
        It's not perfect, but sucking some money out of the banks is a step in the right direction, particularly where this doesn't leave them immune from criminal or other types of civil prosecution, which it appears it does not. Again, the full document isn't out yet.
        I'm not sure what the benefit of waiting is - are you disagreeing with what is said by Mr. Lazo? That most of the 'settlement' would have been spent anyway, but now it is getting double usage?

        Comment


        • #5
          Re: Cali & the Foreclosure Settlement

          Originally posted by c1ue View Post
          I'm not sure what the benefit of waiting is - are you disagreeing with what is said by Mr. Lazo? That most of the 'settlement' would have been spent anyway, but now it is getting double usage?
          I'm saying that I don't know exactly what's in the settlement, and neither do Mr. Lazo and his sources, because it's not out yet.

          Look, perhaps some of these were loans that they were going to write down anyways, but how do we know if and when that would happen? At least now a portion of it would be tracked and out in the public. Plus it forces the banks to recognize the write-downs rather than let the pain trickle over time. Perhaps MERS will see some reform out of this after all. And from what I understand (again, it's speculation, the final document isn't out), this does not prevent further civil suits or criminal prosecutions, except for around some narrow areas of robo-signing.

          I don't know what will finally be in there. It's not going to be real punishment for the banks because they agreed to it. But I'm reading a lot of ultra-negative speculation that cannot be confirmed.

          Besides, obviously the document would be out if there weren't a couple of serious sticking points. I think with this one a lot of the devil will be in the details. I want the source document.

          I'm not saying this is a key anit-FIRE victory, or a gem, but I don't see how it hurts at the moment, and I want to wait until the final document is out before making final judgement.
          Last edited by dcarrigg; February 15, 2012, 04:04 PM.

          Comment


          • #6
            Re: Cali & the Foreclosure Settlement

            Originally posted by dcarrigg
            I'm not saying this is a key anit-FIRE victory, or a gem, but I don't see how it hurts at the moment, and I want to wait until the final document is out before making final judgement.
            Fair enough, though the practice of using settlements to avoid both acknowledgement of wrongdoing and to prevent civil or future criminal prosecution is already a well worn playbook.

            Comment


            • #7
              Re: Cali & the Foreclosure Settlement

              Originally posted by c1ue View Post
              Fair enough, though the practice of using settlements to avoid both acknowledgement of wrongdoing and to prevent civil or future criminal prosecution is already a well worn playbook.
              and its also the reason why the tortbar has become so 'influential' in politix, never mind medical care.
              again, we can thank the dems (the party of the tortbar) for this too.

              and to think lots of people seem believe the oil biz is the number one corrupt influence/lobby in the .gov today.

              Comment


              • #8
                Re: Cali & the Foreclosure Settlement

                And on the subject of California real estate foreclosures...

                http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/articl...857R.DTL&tsp=1

                More than 80 percent of the residential mortgage loans that have gone into foreclosure in San Francisco contain one or more clear violations of the law, Assessor-Recorder Phil Ting said Wednesday.

                While the errors, many of them technical paperwork violations, don't necessarily indicate criminal conduct by lenders and others in the mortgage industry, they do show that changes must be made in California's century-old real estate regulations, he added.

                "The whole process ... is absolutely, 100 percent broken and not working for any of us at this time," Ting said. "These rules were made for people who walked or rode their horse to the bank."

                A rash of complaints to Ting's office last fall about missing or inaccurate mortgage documents persuaded him to hire an outside company, Aequitas Compliance Solutions of Newport Beach (Orange County), to review a sample of the city's 2,405 foreclosure sales between January 2009 and October 2011.
                The study of 382 loans found that along with the 84 percent with violations, 99 percent of them showed some apparent irregularities and almost a third had problems in four of the six areas of concern the company checked, which include assignments of loans, notices of default and substitution of trustees.

                Backdated documents


                For example, 59 percent of the loans had documents that were backdated, showing a time difference between the date of the document and the date it was notarized or recorded. Although that can be a potentially serious problem, the report also noted that there can be legitimate reasons for the discrepancy.

                In other cases, the original owner of the loan may not have signed a required document or there was no affidavit showing lenders had called or met with borrowers to explore options to foreclosure 30 days before the notice of default was filed, as the state requires.

                "Given these well-documented and widespread ... issues," the report stated, "it is not implausible that there are homeowners who are alleged to have defaulted on loans to which they never fully agreed to and, further, are being foreclosed upon by lenders that might not even own those loans."

                Both Ting and Lou Pizante, the Aequitas partner who compiled the review, insisted the report was aimed at the system, rather than individual lenders.
                "I'm not here to indict the mortgage industry or say that all the people who lost their homes didn't deserve to lose them," Pizante said.

                Systemic problems


                But the county recorder's job is to provide an accurate public record of property ownership and the chain of title, and when the rules aren't followed, for whatever reason, the system falls apart.

                "How can we expect homeowners to have a fighting chance of saving their homes when they can't even find who currently owns their debt?" Ting said in a statement.

                While the study was limited to San Francisco, there's no reason to believe similar problems wouldn't be found elsewhere in the state, said Ting, who is a Democratic candidate for the Assembly seat now held by the termed-out Fiona Ma.

                Just last week, California and 48 other states signed an agreement with five of the nation's top mortgage lenders that provides $25 billion in relief to distressed borrowers. That agreement may hold those lenders harmless for some of the technical violations the new study found, although not for criminal conduct, Ting said.

                "I see across the board laws that have not been followed," he said. "It's up to the district attorney and attorney general to decide whether that's prosecutable."

                The study probably won't help San Francisco homeowners who have lost their property, but it could help those who are in the middle of the foreclosure process by identifying problems their lenders need to deal with, Ting said.

                Scope of irregularities


                The problems found by the study have wider implications, said Bruce Mirken, a spokesman for Berkeley's Greenlining Institute, a liberal public policy and advocacy group.

                "It's clearly time for a statewide inquiry to see if the patterns seen in San Francisco" are widespread, he said.

                Many of the problems probably stem from both a system where loans are often quickly passed from lender to lender and from the sheer volume of both mortgage activity and foreclosures in recent years.

                Ting said he is working with state legislators on ways to update and improve the state's real estate laws.
                Of course, if the 'settlement' is what I expect, the inquiry called for above will no longer matter.

                Comment


                • #9
                  Re: Cali & the Foreclosure Settlement

                  It's been rumored for some time, that in the heat of MBS delirium, mortgages were replicated at an increasingly feverish pace, making chain of lending ownership compromised. Is this another "can't go there" TBTF question, buried deep in the shadow banking's alternate reality.

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    Re: Cali & the Foreclosure Settlement

                    2nd half Chris Whalen of Tangent Capital . . .

                    Comment


                    • #11
                      Re: Cali & the Foreclosure Settlement

                      from Zero Hedge . . .


                      The Farce-Hole Gets Deeper: Obama's "Robo-Settlement For Votes" Cost To Taxpayers: $40 Billion

                      Submitted by Tyler Durden on 02/16/2012 22:52 -0500



                      Plunging deeper into the farce-hole, the FT reports tonight that Obama's foreclosure settlement with the banks over their improper seizure of tax-paying US citizens' homes will in fact be subsidized by those very same US taxpayers. It is a hidden clause (that has not been made public yet) that allows the banks to count future loan modifications under the $30bn (taxpayer funded) HAMP initiative towards their $35bn agreement to restructure obligations under the new settlement. As the FT goes on to note, BofA will be able to use future mods made under HAMP towards the $7.6bn in borrower assistance it is committed to provide - which means, in a (as TARP inspector general Neil Barofsky describes) 'scandalous' turn of events the bank will receive payments for averting a borrower default and be reimbursed by the taxpayer for the principal write-down. We have much stronger words for how we are feeling about this but Barofsky sums it up calmly "It turns the notion that this is about justice and accountability on its head". Are the Big Five banks truly beyond the law?

                      FT: US Taxpayers to subsidize $40bn housing settlement


                      US taxpayers are expected to subsidize the $40bn settlement owed by five leading banks over allegations that they systematically abused borrowers in pursuit of improper home seizures, the Financial Times has learnt.

                      ...

                      However, a clause in the provisional agreement – which has not been made public – allows the banks to count future loan modifications made under a 2009 foreclosure-prevention initiative towards their restructuring obligations for the new settlement, according to people familiar with the matter. The existing $30bn initiative, the Home Affordable Modification Programme (Hamp), provides taxpayer funds as an incentive to banks, third party investors and troubled borrowers to arrange loan modifications.

                      Neil Barofsky, a Democrat and the former special inspector-general of the troubled asset relief programme, described this clause as “scandalous”.

                      It turns the notion that this is about justice and accountability on its head,” Mr Barofsky said.

                      BofA, for instance, will be able to use future modifications made under Hamp towards the $7.6bn in borrower assistance it is committed to provide under the settlement. Under Hamp, the bank will receive payments for averting borrower default and reimbursement from taxpayers for principal written down.

                      ...

                      Andrea Risotto, Treasury department spokeswoman, said this system “leverages a way to help more people”.

                      But people familiar with the matter told the FT that state officials involved in the talks had had misgivings about allowing the banks to use taxpayer-financed loan restructurings as part of the settlement. State negotiators wanted the banks to modify mortgages using Hamp standards, which are seen as borrower-friendly, but did not want the banks to receive settlement credit when modifying Hamp loans. Federal officials pushed for it anyway, these people said.

                      Alys Cohen, an attorney at the National Consumer Law Center, said that if the arrangement increased help, then it was ”good for homeowners in the long term”.

                      "But in the end the servicers are not really being punished. They’re getting off easy,” Ms Cohen said.

                      As if the banks have not been spoon-fed enough over the past three years? We look forward to the mutually assured destruction spin (what would happen if they had to 'spend' that money themselves?) that will be propagandized should this be questioned openly and perhaps a glance at the level of bank reserves sitting on the Fed balance sheet might bring the citizenry off the couch, away from American Idol, and at minimum write a sternly worded text message to their closest BFF on Facebook.


                      Just to be clear: the guilty party in a fraud against taxpayers has their 'punishment' paid for by the innocent taxpayer who had the crime committed against them? ok, thank you.

                      Comment


                      • #12
                        Re: Cali & the Foreclosure Settlement

                        an opinion on why it matters . . .

                        The Housing Crisis, The Justice System & Capitalism

                        by Bruce Judson on February 20th, 2012

                        Extreme economic inequality is among the most destructive forces in a society. As inequality grows, it undermines the effective functioning of the economy, the basic tenets of capitalism, and the foundations of democracy.

                        Unfortunately, the housing crisis and now the housing settlement increasingly look like an example of how this mechanism works.

                        One of the central characteristics of highly unequal societies is that two sets of laws develop: One set for the rich and powerful and one set for everyone else. The more unequal societies become, the more easily they accept the unacceptable, and with each unrebuked violation, the powerful actors at the top of the society gain an ever greater sense of entitlement and an ever greater sense that the laws that govern everyone else don’t apply to them. As a result, their behavior becomes increasingly egregious.

                        In contrast, sustainable capitalism requires that all participants in a contract or bargain believe their interests will be enforced equally by the courts: Capitalism requires that Lady Justice wear a blindfold. When powerful players are permitted to alter established rules at will, capitalism ultimately collapses. Contracts and the idea of a fair bargain become meaningless as less powerful parties to an agreement know their rights will not be enforced. Over time, citizens lose faith in government and their own ability to thrive in what becomes a corrupt economy. This uncertainty leads the small businesses, which are so often cited as important to our economy, to shy away from new activities that might put them at the risk of unequal treatment.

                        I would suggest that the robo-mortgage scandal is a strong indicator that this type of unequal justice is now becoming ever more commonplace in America. Past bank abuses are typically discussed without a sense of outrage. They have, in effect, become a recognized practice of deception with no consequences. Here are three prominent examples from the past few years:

                        First, the robo-mortgage scandal was discovered. As powerful members of society, the banks effectively decided what laws they wanted to follow and disregarded others. The banks claimed that their violations were technical and harmed no one. Nonetheless, the activities of the banks constituted massive fraud, perjury, and conspiracy. Bank officials have testified in court that they filed as many as10,000 false affidavits a month. These are effectively undeniable admissions of law-breaking on a massive scale.

                        It’s a federal crime, punishable by up of five years of imprisonment, to knowingly file a false affidavit with the court. From the perspective of the law, you are guilty of the same perjury, when you falsely testify in court or when you submit a false affidavit. In most states, filing false affidavits with the court similarly constitutes a felony offense of perjury.

                        If an individual citizen perpetrated this kind of massive perjury, he or she would be prosecuted. For illegal activities to take place on this type of massive scale, other serious crimes, such as conspiracy, are almost certainly committed as well.

                        Last week an audit of San Francisco mortgage practices, the first systematic audit in the nation, revealed that an astounding 82 percent of the cases analyzed involved suspicious activity by the foreclosing institution and concluded that a large portion of these activities probably involved felony violations of California perjury laws.

                        Second, when Martha Coakley, the attorney general of Massachusetts filed a civil suit related to the robo-mortgage scandal against several financial institutions, she was demonized by the financial services industry and appropriately recognized for her bravery by housing advocates seeking to end abusive bank practices.

                        What is noteworthy, however, is that Coakley filed a civil suit. This was a lenient effort as she undoubtedly had the ability to build a compelling criminal case against the banks (as institutions) and the bank officers who knowingly created the robo-mortgage scheme.

                        Third, the national housing settlement, involving the federal and state governments, was announced almost two weeks ago. A central concern associated with the settlement is how it will be enforced. The banks have a long and well-documented history, of agreeing to settlements that will change their behavior and then failing to live up to these binding agreements. Moreover, penalties for failure to comply with these settlements are rarely, if ever, assessed.

                        In her New York Times feature story, The Deal is Done, but Hold the Applause, Gretchen Morgenson wrote about this behavior, and how it relates to the current settlement:

                        “But perhaps the largest question looming over this settlement is how it will be policed. Recent history is littered with agreements that required banks to take specific steps to make amends. All too often, the banks have skated away from their promises.”



                        Morgenson then recounts a series of instances where the banks failed to comply with past settlements, including this quote from a former judge involved in these processes and her conclusion:

                        “‘It’s astounding that in such a huge percentage of cases the lenders are not complying,’; said Philip A. Olsen, a former Nevada Supreme Court settlement conference judge.”The banks have learned that they can thumb their noses at the program and it won’t cost them anything.”

                        So you have to wonder whether banks will thumb their noses at last week’s settlement, too. That makes policing compliance crucial.”

                        The full details of the settlement have not been released, but unfortunately, the most recent disclosures suggest that this enforcement power and large penalties per violation are wishful thinking. An executive summary of the provisions of the settlement can be found here. It states, among other things:

                        “If banks fail to remedy violations, they are subject to civil penalties of up to $5 million from the court.”(emphasis added)

                        While the full details may indicate otherwise, the process as described here seems to be a far cry from substantial penalties of $1 million to $5 million for each failure of compliance that some media reports appeared to suggest.
                        Why does the monitor need to provide the banks with a chance to remedy violations of the settlement? The banks certainly know what they are supposed to be doing. It’s one indication that the banks will be able to pursue the changes required without a sense of urgency.

                        With no set penalty formula the same banks which have argued that over 10,000 knowing violations of the law harmed no one, will undoubtedly argue–perhaps for years–that any violations of the settlement are inevitable consequences of glitches in operating a new system, have no practical impact, don’t merit fines of any kind.

                        In addition, have the banks agreed that they will not contest the monitor’s request of penalties to the court? If not, then, as I have previously noted a court fight over each penalty can—and most probably will—ensue, with the possibility that the entire monitoring process is a charade.

                        I hope that I am wrong, but the above analysis certainly suggests that, in Morgenson’s words, banks will have the opportunity to “thumb their noses at [the] settlement” without incurring serious penalties.

                        If the enforcement provisions of the settlement prove to be meaningless, Americans will rightfully believe they have been misled by public officials to believe the settlement included stiff penalties to ensure violations did not occur.

                        The stakes here are enormous. They extend beyond the housing market to the nature of American society itself. The banks’ blatant malfeasance with regard to the robo-mortgage scandal and other foreclosure-related activities have been a clear example of unequal enforcement of the laws. Now, the settlement may serve as another example that equal justice through equal enforcement of the laws, which is necessary for sustainable capitalism, no longer prevails in America.

                        Yale’s Robert Dahl, one of the preeminent political scientists of our era, wrote in 2006 in On Political Equality (Yale University Press) of the risks of rising economic inequality, which is inevitably accompanied by political power which also concentrates at the top of the society:

                        “The unequal accumulation of political resources points to an ominous possibility: political inequalities may be ratcheted up, so to speak, to a level from which they cannot be ratcheted down. The cumulative advantages in power, influence, and authority of the more privileged strata may become so great that .. a majority of ordinary citizens…are simply unable…to overcome the forces of inequality arrayed against them.”



                        I fervently hope we are not living out the ominous possibility Professor Dahl raises.

                        http://itcouldhappenhere.com/blog/inequality-and-capitalism/


                        Comment


                        • #13
                          Re: Cali & the Foreclosure Settlement

                          Sure is looking more and more like the hope that the settlement would mean something - either punitive for banks or beneficial for homeowners - vs. the fear that the banks were skating off again, has fear ahead on all 3 scorecards:

                          Oh, and Schneiderman caved.

                          http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2012/...pposition.html

                          If you were following the mortgage settlement negotiations, it was very clear than the decision of New York state attorney general Eric Schneiderman to abandon his role as the de facto leader of the opponents of the agreement, join a Federal task force to investigate mortgage abuses, and go silent on where he stood on the negotiations put the dissenters in disarray and enabled the Administration to push the deal over the line.
                          While this blog has repeatedly pointed out that Tom Miller, the Iowa attorney general and leader of attorneys general in the settlement negotiations, is not the most credible source, the flip side is that the description of the release in the Administration’s own propaganda website strongly suggests that the release of bank liability is broad, rather than narrow, as deal cheerleaders claimed.
                          If you take this section of an article at Politico, “HUD boss jumps into mortgage melee,” (hat tip reader Deontos) at face value, you can only draw damning conclusions about New York attorney general Eric Schneiderman’s role:
                          Schneiderman, whose Lower Manhattan office overlooks Zuccotti Park where the Occupy movement began, felt like he was being strong-armed by Donovan and wasn’t shy about sharing his dissatisfaction. In late August, The New York Times reported that Schneiderman had come “under increasing pressure from the Obama administration to drop his opposition to a wide-ranging state settlement with banks over dubious foreclosure practices.”
                          That did it for [HUD Secretary Shuan] Donovan, according to people close to him. Worried that the settlement was in danger of falling apart, he woke up at 5 a.m. the next morning and sketched the outline of what would emerge as the final compromise plan.
                          A bit later he called Schneiderman, who immediately began re-arguing his case for holding banks accountable.
                          Donovan stopped him: “Look, hear me out, I want to get past this,” he said, and proposed creating a special panel to probe wrongdoing by banks, to be co-chaired by Schneiderman. He also promised to limit the scope of any releases granted to the banks and rewrote his draft.
                          Miller, who clashed with Schneiderman over the releases, said Donovan didn’t make many changes but was artful enough to sell it as a compromise to the New York attorney general, who wanted to seal the deal.
                          “Essentially what Shaun did was let Eric take credit for shaping the release,” Miller said, “credit that wasn’t factually correct.”

                          Comment


                          • #14
                            Re: Cali & the Foreclosure Settlement

                            I prefer using short sales to straight principal reductions. It allows the person "stuck" in the house to exit, it allows a new (hopefully qualified) owner to take ownership of the property. A new qualified owner will be more likely to be able to keep the property in repair.

                            It also spreads the suffering more equally between the person who took out a mortgage they couldn't afford and the institution who granted a mortgage they should not have granted.

                            I don't think we are going to see widespread prosecution of fraud. Far too many people don't see cheating as wrong.

                            Comment


                            • #15
                              Re: Cali & the Foreclosure Settlement

                              Originally posted by c1ue View Post
                              Sure is looking more and more like the hope that the settlement would mean something - either punitive for banks or beneficial for homeowners - vs. the fear that the banks were skating off again, has fear ahead on all 3 scorecards:

                              Oh, and Schneiderman caved.

                              http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2012/...pposition.html

                              The rotten economy is wreaking havoc with state budgets, and the governors are in a panic about either raising taxes or cutting services.
                              The lawsuits against the banks are being filed by the attorney's general of these states.

                              The final deal closes the matter for the banks who pay money "intended" to help homeowners, but the deal "allows" each states to pour the money instead into the general fund.
                              The banks get off the hook for their actions and can claim pure motives trying to help homeowners.
                              The governors solve their budget problems for one more cycle and can plead a budget emergency for diverting the funds.

                              The banks bought off the governors at a low price.

                              Comment

                              Working...
                              X