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What's the Game: Musical Chairs, 1 Potato-2 Potato, or Concentration?

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  • What's the Game: Musical Chairs, 1 Potato-2 Potato, or Concentration?

    EU Banks Selling ‘Crown Jewels’



    European banks, under pressure from regulators to bolster capital, are selling some of their fastest-growing businesses to competitors from outside the region -- at the expense of future profit and economic growth.

    Spain’s Banco Santander SA (SAN), Belgium’s KBC Groep NV (KBC) and Germany’s Deutsche Bank AG are accelerating plans to exit profitable operations outside their home markets. Santander, which said in October it needs to plug a 5.2 billion-euro ($6.9 billion) capital gap, sold its Colombian unit last week to Chile’s Corpbanca for $1.16 billion. Deutsche Bank is weighing options including a sale of most of its asset-management unit, while KBC may dispose of businesses in Poland.

    Such sales risk hurting long-term profit, just as Europe enters recession, investors say. It’s the unintended consequence of the decision by European regulators to make banks increase core capital to 9 percent by June instead of 2019. Unwilling to raise equity because their share prices are too low, lenders are selling profitable assets because they’re struggling to find buyers willing to pay enough for their troubled loans to avoid a loss that would erode capital. Investors say the sales risk leaving banks focused on a stagnant economy and deprive them of economic growth from outside the region.

    “These are the most profitable parts of their business,” said Azad Zangana, European economist at London-based Schroders Plc, the 200-year-old British asset manager, citing Spanish and Portuguese banks selling assets in Latin America. “They’re being forced by regulators to sell them off. You begin to become a less profitable organization. Your business model stops working if you’re being forced to lend only to an economy that’s going through a very deep recession.”

    Hurting Profitability

    The divestitures are likely to hurt banks’ profitability in coming years, analysts say. Shrinkage will cut their return on net asset value by 1.5 percentage points on average, according to a Dec. 6 report by Huw van Steenis, a Morgan Stanley analyst in London. Return on asset value at Frankfurt-based Deutsche Bank will shrink by almost 1 percentage point and at Santander by about 0.8 percentage point because of deleveraging, he said. The shrinking economy will help cut returns by an additional 2.5 percentage points, he added.

    ‘Cheaper Way’

    For French banks BNP Paribas SA (BNP), Societe Generale (GLE) SA and Credit Agricole SA (ACA), return on equity may fall to between 7 percent and 9 percent in 2013, from 12 percent to 21 percent in 2007, according to Christophe Nijdam, an analyst at AlphaValue in Paris. The ratio may rise to between 10 percent and 12 percent by 2015, assuming the economy recovers by then, he said.

    “There’s nothing wrong in theory about selling the crown jewels,” Nijdam said. “It’s always a question of price. European banks will be less profitable -- but less risky.”

    For banks, selling assets has become a cheaper way to raise capital than selling new stock after their shares tumbled. The Bloomberg Europe Banks and Financial Services Index (BEBANKS) has slumped 33.5 percent this year, leaving bank stocks trading at an average of 63 percent of book value.

    “Many of those banks are trading at 50 percent of their book value, so if you can sell an asset at more than that, it’s a cheaper way to raise capital,” said Symon Drake-Brockman, former chief executive officer of Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc (RBS)’s global banking and markets in the Americas and now managing partner of private-equity firm Pemberton Capital Advisors LLP in London.

    ‘Adverse Selection’

    Banks across Europe have pledged to cut more than 950 billion euros of assets over the next two years, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. About two-thirds of that will come from sales of profitable units and performing loans, said van Steenis. Sales of distressed assets and souring loans will account for just 4 percent, or about 100 billion euros, he said.

    “European banks are likely to sell good, performing assets to foreign banks and investors,” he said in an interview. “The question is: When are you getting to the point of adverse selection? When you’re selling the good assets and you’re keeping the more risky assets. There is a risk we’re moving in that direction.”

    Buyers, for the most part private-equity and hedge funds, are offering too steep discounts for underperforming assets. For banks, a fire sale would trigger losses they can ill afford at a time when they’re required to boost capital.

    “Lenders are selling more liquid assets so they can get a price that avoids additional capital losses,” said Joseph Swanson, co-head of restructuring at Houlihan Lokey in London. “Unfortunately, this strategy can result in lower asset quality and increased earnings volatility.”

    Raising Capital

    Regulators are forcing European banks to raise capital as the region’s sovereign-debt crisis worsens. The European Banking Authority last week ordered the region’s financial firms to raise 114.7 billion euros of additional capital. The EBA, which co-ordinates the work of the region’s 27 national regulators, told lenders to bolster their core Tier 1 capital ratios to more than 9 percent of risk-weighted assets by the middle of 2012.

    Faced with a potential credit crunch, the regulator told banks to raise the money from investors, retained earnings and lower bonuses. Failing that, companies may sell assets, provided the disposals don’t limit overall lending to the European Union’s “real” economy, the EBA said in a Dec. 8 statement.

    ‘Family Jewels’

    “The family jewels are being sold,” Richard Mattione, a portfolio manager at Boston-based Grantham, Mayo, Van Otterloo & Co., wrote in a report this month. “A big chunk of private sector loans can’t be reduced because they involve property that will be inactive for years, perhaps a decade. So, once banks trim their healthiest borrowers, and perhaps reduce their overseas exposures, they quickly run into the need to cut loans to small and medium enterprises, providing another negative impulse to European growth.”

    Santander completed the sale of its Brazilian insurance operations to Zurich Financial Services AG for $1.7 billion and sold a $958 million stake in Banco Santander Chile, the South American country’s biggest bank by assets. The Chilean bank’s net profit grew 45 percent (BSAN) between 2008 and 2010 and may increase by another 15 percent this year to about $970 million, according to analyst estimates compiled by Bloomberg. Santander said it will also sell a stake in its Brazilian banking unit.

    The Spanish lender’s sale of its U.S. consumer-loan business to a group led by private-equity firm KKR & Co. may cut net profit for Santander’s shareholders by 150 million euros, according to an Oct. 28 estimate by Raoul Leonard, an analyst at RBS in London.

    ‘Meaningful Negative’

    “That may only equate to 2 percent of Santander’s group net attributable profit for 2010, but assuming multiple asset sales may be in the pipeline, this could lead to a meaningful negative drag on” earnings, Leonard wrote.

    A spokeswoman for Santander, who asked not to be identified by name in line with company policy, declined to comment.

    KBC, the Belgian bank that received a 7 billion-euro government bailout, said in July it would sell Towarzystwo Ubezpieczen i Reasekuracji Warta SA, Poland’s second-largest insurer, and its 80 percent stake in Polish bank Kredyt Bank SA.

    The sale of Kredyt Bank, whose net income rose 9.5 percent to 60.8 million zloty ($17.6 million) in the third quarter, will reduce KBC’s return on equity to 17.3 percent from 18.9 percent, according to Benoit Petrarque, an analyst at Kepler Capital Markets in Amsterdam.

    ‘Two Sides’

    If the disposal isn’t big enough to help meet the 9 percent capital target, the bank could sell its Czech unit as well, Petrarque said. The sale of the Czech division would boost core capital to 10.5 percent at the cost of reducing return on equity to about 11 percent, he estimated. KBC said in July it would retain full ownership of Czech banking unit CSOB AS, its most profitable business in Eastern Europe.

    “When you sell an asset, there are always two sides of the coin,” Stephane Leunens, a spokesman for KBC, said in a telephone interview. “We focus on de-risking the company while trying to generate sufficient growth in our core markets.”

    Philippe Bodereau, head of European credit research at Pacific Investment Management Co. in London, said in a telephone interview that European banks are becoming “slimmer, less global” and “more utility-like.” They will be “better credit investments than equity investments,” he said.

    Deutsche Bank, which needs to plug a 3.2 billion-euro capital shortfall by the middle of next year, said last month it is reviewing all options, including a sale, for most of its asset-management unit, a business that CEO Josef Ackermann built up over the last decade to help mitigate the bank’s reliance on investment banking.

    Deutsche Bank

    The review focuses on “how recent regulatory changes and associated costs” are affecting the business, Deutsche Bank said in the Nov. 22 statement. The disposal would exclude the DWS mutual fund unit in Germany, Europe and Asia, which the bank said was “a core part” of its offering to consumers. The review will be conducted “thoroughly and carefully” said Deutsche Bank spokesman Klaus Winker, declining further comment.

    Banco Espirito Santo SA, Portugal’s largest publicly traded lender, sold its stake in Brazil’s Banco Bradesco SA (BBDC4) for about $1 billion and part of its stake in Denmark’s Saxo Bank A/S this year. Banco Comercial Portugues SA (BCP), the country’s second-biggest bank by market value, is considering options for Bank Millennium SA, Poland’s seventh-largest lender, including a sale. The Porto-based lender needs to raise 1.7 billion euros to meet regulatory targets.

    Banco Comercial

    The Bradesco sale doesn’t affect the operation’s performance in Brazil and the bank’s loan portfolio in that country is growing, Paulo Padrao, a spokesman for Espirito Santo said. Banco Comercial aims to “extract the maximum value” out of operations in Central and Eastern Europe, Erik Burns, a spokesman for the bank, said.

    ING Groep NV (INGA), the Netherlands’s biggest financial-services firm, agreed in July to sell most of its Latin American insurance unit for about 2.6 billion euros to a group led by Grupo de Inversiones Suramericana SA, a Colombian investment firm.

    “If they raise capital by selling crown jewels, the market will reward them in the short term because they’ll meet the regulator’s timeframe,” said Will James, who runs the 632 million-pound SLI European Equity Income Fund at Edinburgh-based Standard Life Plc. “That begs the longer-term question: How do you grow in an environment where customers are unwilling to borrow. That’s the missing piece from the puzzle. In a low- growth or no-growth environment, banks that have sold good assets will continue to struggle.”

    To contact the reporters on this story: Anne-Sylvaine Chassany in London at achassany@bloomberg.net; Kevin Crowley in London at kcrowley1@bloomberg.net; Charles Penty in Madrid at cpenty@bloomberg.net.

  • #2
    Re: What's the Game: Musical Chairs, 1 Potato-2 Potato, or Concentration?

    Fascinating!

    It looks like the EU wants to make sure that if it does have to bail out the banks, it's only paying for the local business, not the far-flung global business. That is, it only wants to bail/nationalize the portion of the bank that actually serves as a public utility.

    Has anyone seen a news article that indicates how long banks have been given to prep themselves?

    Comment


    • #3
      Re: What's the Game: Musical Chairs, 1 Potato-2 Potato, or Concentration?

      Who are the companies and banks buying and financing these sales? Sadly, when it's the non-performing and worthless debt that needs to be disposed, we can count on the banks to do the opposite.

      Comment


      • #4
        Re: What's the Game: Musical Chairs, 1 Potato-2 Potato, or Concentration?

        Originally posted by ltullos View Post
        Who are the companies and banks buying and financing these sales? Sadly, when it's the non-performing and worthless debt that needs to be disposed, we can count on the banks to do the opposite.
        Pure speculation on this, but I would think that it would be banks in a country that lets them wriggle out from under regulation, who are eager to get their hands on some higher profit-margin assets, and have a lot of liquidity due to heavy government intervention on their behalf.

        Anyone else think this sounds like something that U.S. bankers would go for?

        Comment


        • #5
          Re: What's the Game: Musical Chairs, 1 Potato-2 Potato, or Concentration?

          Officially the banks there have until June 2012 to reach a particular "Tier 1" capital ratio (in this ratio, sovereign debt is still treated as basically risk-free, but that's a point for another day.)

          Essentially, some of the larger western European banks are caught in a horrible (from their perspective) catch-22 where they need to solve simultaneously a capital problem and a funding problem (to varying degrees). Trying to fix one problem exacerbates the other.

          In order to meet these capital targets, the banks have to try to harvest gains on their "good" assets, since their other assets likely couldn't be sold at anywhere near the price at which they bought or originated them, resulting in a loss that would drain their equity.

          The potential buyers know that they have all of the leverage, and so even for businesses outside of Europe, the sellers won't be able to realize the values today that they could have realized even six months ago.

          Relatively few banks or investors would be willing to buy a business in eastern Europe, where many of the properties for sale are located, given the expected spillover of the forthcoming recession in western Europe. There may be a few vulture investors or private equity funds who would be willing to step in, but at the prices where they would bid to earn a 20-25% return, it may not be worth it for the European banks to sell what are still (comparably) well-performing businesses at little or no gain. The worse the situation becomes, the less attractive the "good" assets become, the more leverage the buyers have, and the smaller the capital benefit of a sale becomes.

          The banks could theoretically fix their capital shortfall by raising equity, but at their current valuations, they might not be able to raise enough to fill the shortfall (and would massively dilute their existing shareholders, which might be the end of the road for the current management teams.)

          The governments could try to infuse capital into the banks, but they are also clearly having financing challenges - the only reliable buyers of peripheral sovereign debt are peripheral banks, which can monetize the debt via the ECB. (Of course, Ireland tried this approach, and blew itself up in the process.)

          At the same time, the peripheral banks in particular seem to be experiencing deposit outflows, making it progressively more difficult to finance their remaining assets. Selling the good businesses could generate cash and alleviate their funding pressures temporarily, but at the cost of damaging their future earnings potential. (Generally, splitting a company by selling the "good" bank and keeping the "bad" bank isn't an optimal strategy.)

          The only lever available that addresses the funding and capital challenges simultaneously is to cut lending to a very significant extent and try to shrink the banks, which is exactly what is likely happening.

          Of course, while this strategy theoretically would benefit individual banks, when every bank pursues this strategy, the result is a credit crunch, asset deflation, and a worsening recession.

          Other than that, Europe is totally OK.

          Comment


          • #6
            Re: What's the Game: Musical Chairs, 1 Potato-2 Potato, or Concentration?

            If I were Dilma Rouseff (president of Brazil) and I had the choice of either participating in ESFS or whatever it was called or encouraging Brazil's banks to buy up the low hanging fruit described here I know what I'd do.

            As James Grant always says, a crisis is also a value restoration project.

            If the Europeans want to get back in the game they should get on with it: nationalise the banks, peel off the bad loans and refloat them later when credit conditions improve, ring-fence them from the good assets (as described above) and get on with investing.

            What's described here is a Gresham's dynamic: bad money / credit driving out the good.
            Last edited by oddlots; December 13, 2011, 11:12 PM.

            Comment


            • #7
              Re: What's the Game: Musical Chairs, 1 Potato-2 Potato, or Concentration?

              Well and clearly stated! Thanks for the clean summation.

              I concur that a credit crunch is likely soon, as is an associated recession. I think the plan in Europe at this point is to get both done and over with fast (apparently the first by June 2012) rather than try to avoid them.

              But the strategy is discomforting, isn't it? Run as fast as you can TOWARD the wall, so that you can break right through the drywall. And hope really hard that the studs are well-spaced. And that it's not brick.

              Presumably someone who has seen the numbers inside Europe's books has done some calculations, and concluded it will be OK. Not very reassuring to those of us who haven't, but it looks like it's all we're going to get.

              Comment


              • #8
                Re: What's the Game: Musical Chairs, 1 Potato-2 Potato, or Concentration?

                Originally posted by oddlots View Post
                If the Europeans want to get back in the game they should get on with it: nationalise the banks, peel off the bad loans and refloat them later when credit conditions improve, ring-fence them from the good assets (as described above) and get on with investing.
                Yeah, the "bad bank" approach does seem to be the more reasonable one, doesn't it? The main reason I hesitate on it is that I don't see why, if they were considering it, they hadn't already done it. I keep thinking that there must be some data we're not seeing. Maybe those "high-margin" businesses that are being sold for "fire sale" prices are actually more heavily loaded with junk than the buyers realize, and are not quite the deals that they seem?

                My working hypothesis is that Europe is trying to externalize its losses. So this would fit very nicely if it were true. All the talk of how cheaply they were having to sell the business units for could well be sales hype, and bond-yield manipulation propaganda to boot.

                The "bad bank" model doesn't work so well if the entire banking system winds up inside the "bad" category...

                Comment


                • #9
                  Re: What's the Game: Musical Chairs, 1 Potato-2 Potato, or Concentration?

                  Originally posted by oddlots
                  If the Europeans want to get back in the game they should get on with it: nationalise the banks, peel off the bad loans and refloat them later when credit conditions improve, ring-fence them from the good assets (as described above) and get on with investing.
                  Yes, but who exactly would nationalize what?

                  Should the French and German governments nationalize the French and German banks for their PIIGS bad debts?

                  This is exactly throwing French and German tax dollars toward 'subsidies' of 'those lazy tax dodging Mediterraneans'.

                  The precise substance of the actual issue is that said nationalisers of bad banks want at the same time to also have say over the debtors. Sweden didn't have this problem since the bad debts were by Swedish banks to Swedish people.

                  Consider the same issue in the United States: the bottom 99%, or at least 80%, own most of the bad debt while those who would be paying for the 'nationalisation' would be the top 1%/20%

                  I'm not seeing any traction towards a 'Swedish solution' here either.

                  This type of dynamic is yet another negative result of inequality.

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    Re: What's the Game: Musical Chairs, 1 Potato-2 Potato, or Concentration?

                    Nationalization may be a moot point; at this stage, I'd argue that the banks and sovereigns should basically be viewed as consolidated entities.

                    It might make sense to make a distinction if there were a realistic possibility that the sovereign backstop of the banking systems could be removed (i.e., if there were a credible threat that bank senior bondholders and depositors would be required to take losses). However, given that the peripheral sovereigns need the banks to monetize their debt via the ECB, this would be like holding a gun to their own head.

                    By backstopping its banks, France has de facto nationalized them anyway; French sovereign credit already reflects the expectation that any bank capital shortfalls will be effectively be filled via sovereign debt issuance. The situation is somewhat analogous to Fannie and Freddie here in the US - the government is subsidizing their ongoing operating losses by issuing Treasury debt and purchasing preferred stock of the two agencies. At the end of the day, the same taxing and borrowing authority is backstopping the government and the banks (or GSEs).

                    The ownership of the debt is a complicating factor, but the overall leverage relative to the size of the backstop is the real problem. The only "solution" is to reduce the leverage.

                    Comment


                    • #11
                      Re: What's the Game: Musical Chairs, 1 Potato-2 Potato, or Concentration?

                      Originally posted by c1ue View Post
                      Yes, but who exactly would nationalize what?

                      Should the French and German governments nationalize the French and German banks for their PIIGS bad debts?
                      I would think that each nation would nationalize (either partly or fully) its own banks. It's really not so far-fetched, and as mmr points out, effectively underway already. Even the British did a partial version by demanding equity in exchange for bailouts, and the U.S. did it with GM et. al. As far as paying for it goes, I think that this will be late enough in the game that the Germanic countries will consider fiscal transfers (which they have always said is acceptable, but only as the final step in a unification process).

                      The goal is to make the unification process painful enough for banks that these have to shrink in size, making the eventual transfer manageable, rather than overwhelming, as it currently would be.

                      Originally posted by c1ue View Post
                      This is exactly throwing French and German tax dollars toward 'subsidies' of 'those lazy tax dodging Mediterraneans'.
                      The Calvinist motivation is, while present, subservient to the practical here. Religious morals can act as a proxy for, and a long-term influence on, monetary and fiscal philosophies, but they are not identical to them. The monetary and fiscal philosophies themselves are what is applied to understand a given decision in the short term. In this case, pragmatism is dominant.

                      Originally posted by c1ue View Post
                      The precise substance of the actual issue is that said nationalisers of bad banks want at the same time to also have say over the debtors. Sweden didn't have this problem since the bad debts were by Swedish banks to Swedish people.
                      Yes, this is why the Germanic group is so focused on building impervious European institutions (ECB, Justice, etc.) If they create the structure of the institution, and place all power there, then they don't need to wield power themselves on an ongoing basis at all.

                      I tend to be reminded in this case of Odysseus tying himself to the mast so he can hear the sirens. Use the strength of the ship to restrain the otherwise overwhelming forces of desire (bank greed and national populism). Tie yourself and other decision-makers down to these structures, give orders not to release you on pain of death, and then have the crew stopper their ears.

                      Originally posted by c1ue View Post
                      Consider the same issue in the United States: the bottom 99%, or at least 80%, own most of the bad debt while those who would be paying for the 'nationalisation' would be the top 1%/20%
                      Indeed. But neither wealth nor power are as concentrated or defensible under a parliamentary government.

                      Originally posted by c1ue View Post
                      I'm not seeing any traction towards a 'Swedish solution' here either.

                      This type of dynamic is yet another negative result of inequality.
                      The end result will not be just like Sweden's, but have its own character. I do expect it to look much more like Sweden than like the Anglo-Saxon response.

                      And in terms of traction, the current tide of events will drag Europe there of its own accord. The lack of action in this sphere represents a choice to accept the consequences of inaction, not an inability to act. The ejection of Britain is a prime example.

                      Comment


                      • #12
                        Re: What's the Game: Musical Chairs, 1 Potato-2 Potato, or Concentration?

                        Thanks all, very helpful comments.

                        Comment


                        • #13
                          Re: What's the Game: Musical Chairs, 1 Potato-2 Potato, or Concentration?

                          Originally posted by mmr
                          The Calvinist motivation is, while present, subservient to the practical here. Religious morals can act as a proxy for, and a long-term influence on, monetary and fiscal philosophies, but they are not identical to them. The monetary and fiscal philosophies themselves are what is applied to understand a given decision in the short term. In this case, pragmatism is dominant.
                          This has very little to do with Calvinism, and very much to do with electoral suicide.

                          Do you think the savers in Germany want to see the purchasing power of their savings eroded in order to bail out German banks which made bad loans to the PIIGS?

                          In poll after poll, this notion is crushed in Germany.

                          Therefore which is more pragmatic - a no questions asked bailout which stabilizes the 'bad' French and German banks but which provides 2 decade's worth of ammunition for Merkel and Sarkozy opponents, or a fiscal union which permits Merkozy to say that we've created the reforms in the PIIGS to make sure this never happens again?

                          Comment


                          • #14
                            Re: What's the Game: Musical Chairs, 1 Potato-2 Potato, or Concentration?

                            Originally posted by astonas View Post
                            The "bad bank" model doesn't work so well if the entire banking system winds up inside the "bad" category...
                            Very true. That's effectively what happened in Ireland, where the NAMA bad-bank imposed hair cuts of up to 90% on the loans it on-boarded, and the banks then needed international intervention to get re-capitalized.

                            Curiously enough, while the Irish banks are now well-capitalized their balance sheets are still too large and they remain dependent on ECB funding. Accordingly they are also participating in the Great European Bank Shrink, aiming to get back to a size more in line with Ireland's economy by sometime in 2013.

                            Part of the problem in the Irish case seems to have been a desire by the banks to grow to become "European-sized", after the euro was introduced. Turns out that doesn't work when there is no "European-sized" fiscal back-stop.

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