Was a Covert Attempt to Bomb Iran with Nuclear Weapons foiled by a Military Leak?

[Guest]

Re: Was a Covert Attempt to Bomb Iran with Nuclear Weapons foiled by a Military Leak?

Rajiv -

I understand your outrage, and that of these exemplary Air Force officers. I too would be horrified were the US to use a nuke for any reason other than in retaliation after being hit with one by a directly attributable nation state entity.

But one cannot indulge mere moral outrage without addressing the rationality of such a movement from one base to another as a quite public preamble for actual international deployment of these bombs - i.e. their "use".. You merely reiterate that it was allowed to occur and that this is very bad. The clumsiness, and highly public method of transport via regular air force personnel, suggests your conclusion about the intent to actually deploy these nukes is open to question, at very least.

This is a far more significant thing to ascertain than the mere fact of their movement from one base to another, would you not agree?

[c1ue]

Re: Was a Covert Attempt to Bomb Iran with Nuclear Weapons foiled by a Military Leak?

Rajiv,

I agree that it is ridiculous to be moving nuclear weapons around in the way that these were, but I have my doubts as to whether there was a nefarious reason.

You are also assuming there are not nuclear weapons already available offshore.

Do you really think there are no nukes available already on aircraft carriers, guided missile cruisers, and submarines outside of US borders?

It seems like way too much trouble to move some nukes from inside the US when there are any number of missiles, artillery shells, and bombs which could serve.

Of course, it may be that some old versions of bombs are needed to simulate an incident, but again I would think buying a rogue bomb would still be easier - what's $20M to a big US budget?

For that matter - it is well known that Israel has nukes. I'm sure Israel wouldn't mind Iran having a nuclear 'accident' and would be happy to contribute one.

Stranger things have happened, but I cleave towards to simpler explanation of a screwup in this case.

[Guest]

Re: Was a Covert Attempt to Bomb Iran with Nuclear Weapons foiled by a Military Leak?

CONSPIRACY THEORIZING AND NUCLEAR WAR ALARMISM - Under the microscope.


Politicians, even the less intelligent ones, tend to understand (by attrition if nothing else) that leaving a casual trail of lies behind themselves is a dangerous way to try making durable career progress. Trails of lies require you to carefully remember the lies already told and be agile enough to add further lies to keep it all hanging together and not wind up with ones career abruptly terminated.

As this process is laborious and risky, they probably learn to use the lies sparingly so as not to have to work at it so hard. It's a lot of work for the poor Politico to take on! If you see it this way, you tend to believe that most conspiracy theories actually have lower probability than the non-conspiracy theories, because really tightly sealed conspiracies take a lot of work and skill to carry out successfully. Even mere cunning (as opposed to wisdom) understands that it can travel within the truth most of the way to it's destination.

Those seeking to put into play genuine conspiracy, when they are in positions of political power (by definition a Politician must have a certain native cunning), probably understand that you employ the use of crude lies as little as possible, because while useful, they are also hazardous to your political health if accumulated too recklessly. This is most particularly so if you are a politician who is anything less than a despot - as anything less than a complete dictator must negotiate submit periodically to the public scrutiny.

An even moderately sophisticated Politician, as any average elected President or Prime Minister must soon learn in office, must recognise that in the modern global village where a good number of other nations have nuclear weapons, the use of such "tools of state" as nuclear weapons is dependent not on the stealth with which they can be deployed, but the ability to create the diplomatic cover so you can conceivably use them at all.

That is the real component of stealth in the 21st Century village - the creation of adequate diplomatic cover to use a nuke for the first time since WWII. And that is a lot of diplomatic cover to try to get. In terms of diplomatic capital, it's a fortune which probably no nation has to spend.

Without an adequate and clearly demonstrable diplomatic cover (e.g. a gradual escalation of events into a hot war with conventional weapons as a preamble) any nation adventuring into the use of Nukes runs a very high probability of destroying it's own influence over any global allies in the process. This is probably by no means lost on the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the US. If we think they are too stupid to grasp that, we commit the risky hubris of considering others less intelligent than ourselves.

Modern nations, other than total madhouses like North Korea (and even they must hesitate) cannot simply deploy a nuke in a fit of anger against another state. Doing so presents very, very large political costs to the continuation of their laboriously constructed network of international alliances and continuing power. Even a rogue President can be deterred by his advisors pointing out these very dangerous real costs, as the costs will sharply affect his ability to manoeuver afterwards.

The cruise missiles in the news clip carried on this thread were not configured as "bunker buster" nukes with application to breaking open fortified underground facilities. They were open blast bombs, the kind that are designed to level maybe 50 square miles right out in the open, for global news satellites to plaster the news photos over every newspaper and TV channel on Earth.

The real tell-tale preamble to the use of such nuclear weapons in the 21st Century global village, rather than employing elaborate (and apparently ineffective) stealth maneouvers to shift hot cruise missiles from one AFB to another, would be clear evidence of attempts to manufacture a diplomatic cover for the deployment of that nuclear detonation.

That diplomatic cover against Iran does not exist in any form today, nor is there any scrap of evidence of an adequate attempt by the USA to manufacture cover for the use of a nuke today. The US may be crude in it's diplomacy compared to a former power such as Great Britain, but it is most certainly not among the 'really crude' employers of power, such as a North Korea, who may still think that merely delivering a nuclear bomb to an adversary and detonating it is all that's needed to gain a tactical advantage in the 21st Century.

Where is even the inkling of a political cover for the pre-emptive use of an open-blast nuclear bomb against Iran today? Anyone here believing this is "as easy said as done" may be arriving at too-hasty conclusions about the very real checks and balances restraining nuclear powers today. It is an overcrowded global village that imposes far more stringent checks on the first use of nukes than was the case forty years ago. The nuclear club is also a lot bigger, and more unpredictable.

Whatever one may think of the US government, one should probably not assume that it lies with reckless abandon at every last paltry turn of political events, even in the present state of serious global tensions. Political leaders are not necessarily scrupulous, but they are probably fairly economical in their employment of lies, for the simple reasons described above, that lies accumulated too rapidly represent accumulating hazards to elected office.

It may be also too easy, or obvious, to believe that there is some imminent preparation by the US to drop a couple of nukes on Iran with no diplomatic cover whatever. This view assumes that every last one of the joint chiefs is not only a felon, but an extraordinarily stupid felon too - that they are collectively stupid enough to all jointly sign off on blowing 60 years of American alliances with many dozens of nations all over the world, by dumping a couple of open-blast nukes on a country we have not even declared war with, and then negotiating away in the UN, by means of "public relations" a thousand mile plume of radioactive fallout on neighboring countries.

No-one is calling the Joint Chiefs of Staff saints, let alone geniuses, but if anyone here can imagine that a four or five star general such as Colin Powell has enough scruples to strenuously oppose detonating a nuke in Iran, then we might also try to imagine that one or two other of the Joint Chiefs have a few grains of elementary common sense as well. They did climb through the ranks for 30+ years, so presumably at least some colleagues found a functioning scrap of intelligence in them.

I have read here no analysis estimating how the US could gain advantage, in any but the crudest way, by exploding open-blast nukes in Iran, or anywhere. Blow up some infrastructure and vaporize fifty thousand civilians, and thereby galvanize a gigantic international intifada, as though the intifada that already exists is not considered vigorous enough - this cannot be described as a thoughtful, or even functional strategy producing any advantage for the US. Any cadet at Annapolis that wrote this up as strategy on a graduation thesis might not get an "A".

Thinking along these lines in any direction seems to construct highly irrational outcomes. This is assuming one does not subscribe to the paranoid fringe, which believes that once deprived of the opportunity to set a fireball in Iran, this US administration has backup contingency plans to secretly detonate a device over the US in order to stage a Putsch and persuade Congress, the Senate and the Supreme court to disband and go home without a murmur. I understand the author of this article is putting that up for our further consideration? Well, those theories are just not my cup of tea.

I have not read any rational analysis as to why a G8 nation (the US) with a 120 year history of at least modestly collaborative interest in building international alliances, would in stealth, without even the most meagre Congressional rubber stamp consent, proceed to trash every last credit the State Department has left with all it's global allies of long standing, by detonating one or two nuclear devices in Iran - all done prior to even being in a declared state of war.

What are we trying to convince ourselves of here - that the US wisely stages it's own Pearl Harbor to win the world's public relations contest in the new clash of civilisations?

[jacobdcoates]

Re: Was a Covert Attempt to Bomb Iran with Nuclear Weapons foiled by a Military Leak?

I don't think it was a screwup, nor do I think cheney is planning a coup or and secret attack on Iran. Secret attack are meant to be just that secret, even after the fact. So using nuke shoots the pooch on that idea.

I do know that you don't just whip 5 nukes out of lockup and load them on the B-52 bomb and fly across the country. Without a couple of platoons of marines from the bunker to the plane and 5 and half billion forms signed in triplicate(please press hard when signing). and god knows how many officers signing off that the transfer is legal and proper.

No, convention weapons and nukes are not stored ANYWHERE near each other for obvious reasons. OK, maybe not so obvious let me explain. Most nuclear weapons in the active arsenal are implosion type weapons. Which mean that there is a ball(aka "pit") of U-235 or PU-238(about 16lb worth, varies depending on the specific type of weapon and it's intended use and yield). Surrounding the ball of U-235 or PU-238 is a shell of brick hard explosives. Those explosives surrounding are all detonated at the same time , compressing the "pit" symmetrically from all sides. As the density increases more neutrons strike the uranium or plutonium atoms in the pit, producing more neutrons and so and so forth. Once the density reaches a certain level the mass of uranium or plutonium goes supercritical(setting up a uncontrolled chain reaction) and a millisecond later, A very big bang. Surround that explosives with lithium deuteride and you get a fusion bomb(much bigger bang). But it all starts with a little bit of convention explosives. Sorry for the short explanation of how nukes work. but as you can see why nukes and conventional explosive weapons are not stored together, never mind even if it doesn't go off you managed to atomize 16lbs of some of the most toxic and radioactive substances on the planet and pump it into the atmosphere.

Mishandling any weapon in the the military is grounds for an instantaneous court martial. Screwup with a nuke, let alone 5, would end you up in Fort Leavenworth for 20 years making big rock in to small rocks, turning them into concrete and making it into small rocks again, the next day!!!!!! Military justice is fast(the bigger the embarrassment to the military, the faster the justice),. Which is one thing I miss about the military, that and stupidity for all intensive purposes being is a crime.

The military is a bureaucracy,when something is important or dangerous to do, it means it gets exponentially hard to accomplish in direct relation to the level of importance or danger it entails. Screwing up one thing in the approved process means you have to start all over again.

I say it wasn't an accident(just an opinion at this point), and for some reason that fact that the US "mishandle" 5 nuclear weapons made the "News" for less than a day, doesn't that strike anybody as terribly odd??? No outrage, no congressman(or woman) driving down the base and climbing waist deep in someone rearend. I've seen congressmen(and women) smoke officers careers for a lot less, in a lot less time, than it's taken so far. Hell our allies haven't said squat about it. It wasn't even on cnn international last night.

I love reason and logic and definitely laugh at almost 100% of conspiracy theories. Some I stop laughing just long enough to try and figure out what (if possible) logical additions would need to be made in order to make them even plausible. I know a fruitless endeavor, but why not take a crack at the impossible every once in awhile. But I hate coincidences also, and it would take many, many, coincidences to make this "screwup" happen.

Lukester- you would not need to declare war, the nukes would do it for you just as officially as the piece of paper. I agree with you about the "professor". I believe he is is quite possibly clinically paranoid and/or delusional. I also agree that an attempted coup by cheney wouldn't get very far. But the silliness of the "professors" theory does not preclude explanations to the point of the nukes being an accident as the only likely or rational explanation.

[Guest]

Re: Was a Covert Attempt to Bomb Iran with Nuclear Weapons foiled by a Military Leak?

Jacobdcoates -

Thanks for your input. I fully agree, the "accidental movement of six hot nukes loaded on a bomber" hypothesis seems a bit incredible too.

One plausible alternative might be as a staged message to Iran? STRATFOR has in previous commentary discussed the deliberate use of "acting like a mad dog" strategy by Iran, i.e. acting very deliberately slightly "out of control" as in the British sailor hostage crisis, as a very deliberate technique to shape the power struggle with the US and Britain and send them a clear message on Iran's ability to disrupt British peacebuilding efforts among Shia in southern Iraq.

It arguably was quite effective in shaping British desire to extricate itself from Southern Iraq - therefore STRATFOR made a quite savvy and rational guess about an action by Iran which appeared quite puzzling at the time (British hostages seemed a huge escalation for no clear purpose).

This was in fact precisely STRATFOR's analysis of the UK sailor hostage crisis - they posted an article suggesting it was devised deliberately as a tool to shape and soften US / UK options back towards Iran's favor, by reminding the US / UK starkly of Iran's "unconventional" options to inflame Shia sentiment in southern Iraq further..

If Stratfor specifically legitimized as plausible that IRAN faked being slightly "out of control" to put the US / UK off balance, as a deliberate move to shape the silent struggle for control of southern Iraq's Shatt Al Arab, then the experimentation of such a tactic by the US, creating a small "anomaly" in the transport of cruise misslies in-country and taking care to leak it, certainly would qualify at least as one explanation - this would at least be an alternative thesis to either "mere accident" or "nuclear war unleashed".

Even here though we then have to wonder if the air force personnel who "leaked" it would then have to be plants to make sure the story got out, or if the entire stratagem relied on someone leaking it spontaneously. Whenever we have to start getting tangled up in sub-plot speculations, my personal bias is to throw the entire idea in the trash as yet another clunky conspiracy theory.

____________


What I'd like to observe further is a question to Rajiv -

You posted this news find with a question mark in the subject line, so it was posted as a question to the community inviting comment?

You seem to have been displeased by arguments submitted against this article's conclusions, as your last reply to me here then refers to a "proverbial horse's ass" in some capacity rhetorically? Consequently I'll take an "educated guess" that it may be you've abandoned this thread in displeasure. But I'm wondering, if you find a posted disagreement on this topic objectionable, why then post the original news clip in the form of a question?

I would think posting significant news stories like this (loose nukes) and collecting widely divergent answers, even those that disagree flatly, should provide a lively general reading interest? I'm concluding we probably have very different temperaments. If I'd posted the original news clip I'd thorougly enjoy reading as many others disagreeing with the original post as possible. The more disagreement the better!

What happened? Why the displeasure?

[goprisko]

Re: Was a Covert Attempt to Bomb Iran with Nuclear Weapons foiled by a Military Leak?

Common guys..................

The whole thing stinks.......... big time.............

I agree with JacobD......... no way the missiles were loaded without
someone signing for them....

Orders were cut............

Someone felt those orders were bogus...............

Hence the leaks.....................

Lack of followup........... lack of investigation. ..... says it all............

Something was up......... and the people in the USAF didn't like it...........

SO...............

It made the news...............

BUT............

How about...... a black op....... similar to 9/11......... for similar purposes......... ???????

INDY

[c1ue]

Re: Was a Covert Attempt to Bomb Iran with Nuclear Weapons foiled by a Military Leak?

No, convention weapons and nukes are not stored ANYWHERE near each other for obvious reasons.

Jacob,

Thanks for the refresher. As a couple of non-technical Japanese laborers demonstrated in Mito a couple of years ago, a nuclear chain reaction occurs when a sufficient mass of reactive material occurs - whether it is U235 or Plutonium.

http://www.iop.org/EJ/abstract/0952-4746/19/4/603

Your explanation notes that there is a shell of explosives - is this mass of explosives so much smaller or less dangerous in effect as compared to a 2000 lb bunker buster?

I don't think it is just 10 pounds of explosives; we're talking about propelling at least 10 kg of nuclear material, and likely more and with high velocity in a 'shaped charge' type explosion. Perhaps 100 pounds is enough, or not.

For weapons used for strategic military purposes (as opposed to a backpack nuke or even an artillery shell), I'd think the mass involved is considerable thus the explosive amount would be pretty large as well.

Thus my question as to whether there is that much difference between a nuclear weapon (mass of explosives which is somewhat radioactive) vs. a 2000 lb mass of explosives with a hard metal shell.

[jacobdcoates]

Re: Was a Covert Attempt to Bomb Iran with Nuclear Weapons foiled by a Military Leak?

Sorry C1ue, for the miss understanding of how nukes work.

The U235 or PU-238 is only about 16 lbs(~8kg) of material(very roughly). The explosives are much more but less than 100lb supposedly. The exact figure is kept secret. It is not a shaped charge explosives, the chain reaction requires that the mass be compressed symmetrically for implosion weapons.
Here is a link http://science.howstuffworks.com/nuclear-bomb.htm
it explains the basics.

Compared to a 2000lb bomb the convention explosive in a nuke are firecrackers, then again most things compared to a 2000lb bomb are firecrackers.

Backpack and artillery nukes are thought to be "gun-type" weapons. Officially, we do not have any nuke artillery shells anymore and never had backpack nukes. The gun-type weapon has two subcritical mass components. It works pretty much like it sounds. There is a target, a barrel, and a charge(explosives). Detonating the explosives sends 1 of the subcritical masses down the barrel at high velocity where it smashes in to the other subcritical mass fusing together causing the new fused mass to go supercritical and start a uncontrolled chain reaction, and a very big bang.

There is very much a weight differential between the two. The 2000lb bomb being a lot larger and heavier than a nuke. Modern nukes can be compactly designed to fit in the space of a 55 gallon drum. Figure that the the tomahawk cruise missile is about 2ft across and they have fitted nukes on those. While a 2000lb bomb is 8ft(~2.5m) long and about 2ft across. The aclm(air launched cruise missile) used by the Air Force are about the same size as a tomahawk. The warhead capacity of a tomahawk according to Janes Defense is 700lb so the nuke would have to come in under that or there would be range penalties.

All thermonuclear weapons are implosion type weapons, basically anything with a yield over 20kt is a thermonuclear, for cost reason. It is theoretically possible to build a strait A-Bomb with a yield of 50kt. but it's very inefficient.


Lukester- It would be nice to throw the whole convoluted tangled mess out in the trash, But, this was 5 nuclear weapons its not something that the American people or for that matter any sane and rational person should go "Oops" and move on. The Stratfor sounds plausible, but there are political prices to be paid for doing such things. Doubt begin to arise about the safety and security of America's nuclear arsenal. Other countries could press this to their advantage, such as requiring foreign arm's inspector to verify the security and safety of American nukes. A huge political embarrassment for the US. Also those foreign inspector get a nice peek at the prize of American military power and there are a lot of countries that would like a peek. Remember as there is no free lunch in economics, there is none in politics either.


I don't want to speculate too much, as there is a surprising lack of evidence of the exact events surround the fiasco, and we definitely need more info. But as goprisko said " The whole thing stinks.......... big time............." and I tend to agree, as for it being some black ops I do not know and would not speculate. But someone had to give orders for those nukes to be moved and it couldn't have been a lowly captain running the flight detail.

[Guest]

Re: Was a Covert Attempt to Bomb Iran with Nuclear Weapons foiled by a Military Leak?

Appreciate all your input, Jacobdcoates.

[jacobdcoates]

Re: Was a Covert Attempt to Bomb Iran with Nuclear Weapons foiled by a Military Leak?

Appreciate all your input, Jacobdcoates.

not quite sure, if your being condescending? But I guess I'll give you the benefit of the doubt.

[Guest]

Re: Was a Covert Attempt to Bomb Iran with Nuclear Weapons foiled by a Military Leak?

Jacobdcoates -

Absolutely not intending to sound condescending. Very much regret you have that impression. Would you have had a better impression of me if I'd simply wandered off without addressing another word to you on this thread, like all the other posters here have actually done? They certainly did not mean it as a snub. Please note rather, I'm the only one who checked back in to express my appreciation, precisely because you agreed with me on all the main points.

A lot of dialogues on these pages get hung in mid-conversation - people wander off - it happens to me constantly, and it's easy to get the wrong idea. After a while you just get used to having a lot of disjointed conversations here.

Sorry you've misunderstood it. I thought very highly of your posts, as you can see clearly we agreed on practically all the main points.

[Guest]

Re: Was a Covert Attempt to Bomb Iran with Nuclear Weapons foiled by a Military Leak?

What we need to post here is Metalman's animated icon of a dead horse being flogged.

At the risk of beating a dead horse then, here's one more very detailed analysis of the "stray nukes story", with a lot of fascinating data on prior "stray nukes".

The summary of this article sounds highly convincing, due to the authoritative description of the background. However it contains one fatal flaw to the author's pet thesis, at least to my mind. The very rationally presented but ultimately loopy thesis is that one nuke went missing from this delivery, and that nuke has been "tasked" as part of a plan to detonate a nuclear explosion within the US - all this is to give the US a pretext to point a finger at Iran (or Al Quaeda, or who knows who else) and then "retaliate" with nukes at Iran. (!!!)

Somebody correct me if I'm wrong, but all nuclear devices carry a unique chemical signature within their own fallout, which permits not only localization to a manufacturing source, but high precision to localize that uranium or plutonium right down to a specific production batch at any specific US or international lab! A detonated nuclear explosion carries a highly specific signature, just like a fingerprint.

Hence this author's elaborate and genuinely authoritative preamble overlooks the point that any nuke used in a decoy explosion over the US would dump a massive chemical signature evidencing it was US manufactured nuclear material, and even identify it to any cursory inspection as being the same nuclear batch of material as this famous shipment of five or six nuclear armed missiles in 2007.

OK, I'm well aware that rehashing all this sensationalist conjecture reeks of the National Enquirer, and other breathless juvenile enthusiasms. However this article deserves posting for the wealth of detail it prvides on history and procedure in transport and the extremely shoddy history in the securing of the US's nuclear arsenal. That history is an eye-opener.

There is definitely something here justifying components of all previous poster's views.

Not least, it puts into focus Rajiv's legitimate concerns that this story is indeed ripe with the overwhelming suggestion of subterfuge. My own thesis that the "leak" of this story was intended entirely as a broad geopolitical hint to Iran is also mentioned, but the author delegates it to a false "damage control" story cleverly put out by the Pentagon. As his own "domestic US detonation plot" thesis is apparently invalidated by the blatant attributability of all chemical signatures inherent in all nukes, perhaps this theory is rehabilitated?

I just find the conclusion that the bottom line is a stolen nuke intended for detonation over the US to be a hallucinatory conclusion (which says a lot about the author's natural inclination to paranoia), because as noted above, the chemical signature would immediately identify it to any subsequent inquiry as being the same chemical signature as the batch of Nuclear tipped cruise missiles in this story!

After a very widely publicized "leak" of this unauthorized transport has already occurred in 2007, to use one of these nukes over the US as a "subterfuge" begins to take on the characteristics of a "keystone cops" narrative.

The most bumbling detective work after a domestic US nuclear blast would uncover such a direct chemical signature link, no? We are left wondering why this author did not think of that after constructing this otherwise quite well researched thesis. This may be a personality trait of paranoia (or it may not!!), that elaborate and finely woven fact can contribute to a thoroughly sound and well researched thesis, which then fatally overlooks a simple bit of data debunking the entire construct as mere fantasy?

Certainly however, the below listed chronology of "stray nukes" in US history would appear to be a real eye-opener collection of data. For that data alone, this should be posted to this thread.

________________



Barksdale Missile Number Six: The Stolen Nuclear Weapon

Chuck Simpson

"Someone, operating under a special chain of command within the United States Air Force, just stole a nuclear weapon."

Some History

Barksdale Missile Number Six deserves far more public attention than it's received to date. Missile Number Six is potentially the major story of at least this year.

Until 1968 under the Airborne Alert Program, informally called Operation Chrome Dome, the Air Force routinely kept about a dozen strategic bombers with nuclear weapons flying at all times.

One predictable result was crashes and incidents. In 1968 the Department of Defense published a list of 13 serious nuclear weapons accidents that occurred between 1950 and 1968. In 1980 the list was revised to include 32 incidents through that year.

Notably, the Pentagon has not acknowledged any accidents since 1980. This alone highlights the importance the Pentagon is placing on the recent transportation of nuclear weapons from North Dakota to Louisiana.

Through 1968, several reported incidents involved plane crashes or malfunctions, beginning with the crash of a B-29 near Fairfield, California in August 1950. The resulting blast was felt 30 miles away.

_______________

In July 1950 a B-50 crashed near Lebanon, Ohio. The high-explosive trigger for the nuclear weapon detonated on impact. The blast was felt over 25 miles away.

In May 1957 a nuclear weapon fell from the bomb bay of a B-36 near Albuquerque, New Mexico. Parachutes malfunctioned and the weapon was destroyed on impact.

In October 1957 near Homestead, Florida a B-47 crashed. The nuclear weapon was burned.

In March 1958 a B-47 accidentally dropped a nuclear weapon near Florence, South Carolina. The high-explosive trigger detonated on impact.

In November 1958 a B-47 crashed near Abilene, Texas. The trigger of the nuclear weapon exploded upon impact.

In July 1959 a C-124 crashed near Bossier City, Louisiana. Both plane and nuclear weapon were destroyed.

In October 1959 a B-52 with two nuclear weapons was involved in a mid-air collision near Hardinsburg, Kentucky. One weapon partially burned.

In January 1961 a B-52 broke apart in mid-air near Goldsboro, North Carolina. Two nuclear weapons were released. The parachute on one weapon malfunctioned, and contamination was spread over a wide area. The uranium core was never recovered. Daniel Ellsberg reported that detonation was a very real risk because five of six safety devices failed.

In that month near Monticello, Idaho a B-52 carrying nuclear weapons exploded in mid-air. No information was made available as to the weapons.

In March 1961 a B-52 with two nuclear weapons crashed near Yuba City, California.

In January 1964 a B-52 carrying two nuclear weapons crashed near Cumberland, Maryland.

In January 1966 a B-52 carrying four hydrogen bombs crashed after a mid-air collision near Palomares, Spain. Two weapons exploded on impact, with resulting plutonium contamination. A months-long program was undertaken to locate and extract the other two weapons from the ocean. Major policy changes were taken under consideration.

In January 1968 a B-52 carrying four hydrogen weapons crashed and burned near Thule AFB in Greenland. Explosives in one bomb detonated, spreading plutonium contamination. Apparently, the other three weapons have never been accounted for. Following large public protests Denmark, which owns Greenland and prohibits nuclear weapons on or over its territory, filed a strong protest.

A few days later the Secretary of Defense ordered the removal of nuclear weapons from planes. After that order was issued, all aircraft armed with nuclear weapons were grounded but kept in a constant state of alert.


_______________



In 1991 by Presidential order, nuclear weapons were removed from all aircraft. Bomber nuclear ground alerts, during which nuclear weapons are loaded onto bombers during test and training exercises, were halted. After that time, all nuclear weapons to be delivered by plane were permanently maintained in secure storage facilities.


August 30, 2007

All of which makes the transport of nuclear weapons in combat position on a combat plane so newsworthy.

On August 30, for the first time since 1968, nuclear warheads in combat position were carried by an American bomber. Numerous international treaty provisions were violated in the process.

That Thursday, a B-52H Stratofortress flew from Minot AFB in North Dakota to Barksdale AFB in Louisiana while carrying twelve cruise missiles. Either five or six of those missiles were armed with nuclear warheads.


Cruise Missiles

The missiles on the B-52 were AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missile units, specifically designed to be launched from wing pods of B-52H planes.

A total of 460 units were manufactured by Raytheon. A total of 394 units are currently maintained by the Air Force. Apparently, 38 are to be modernized and upgraded in Fiscal Year 2008 and the other 356 are to be decommissioned pursuant to the 2002 Moscow treaty.

Raytheon has publicly announced the AGM-129 missiles are to be modified to accomplish a "classified cruise missile mission". This has widely been interpreted to mean conversion to bunker-busters, most likely for use in Iran. This widely accepted explanation is being used to explain why armed cruise missiles are being flown in American airspace.


Nuclear Warheads

The AGM-129 was specifically designed to deliver a W-80 nuclear warhead. The W-80 weapon has a variable yield capability, of 5 to 150 kilotons. For comparison purposes, the bomb used on Hiroshima was 13 to 15 kilotons, or equivalent to 13,000 to 15,000 tons of TNT explosive.


News Stories and Flawed Explanations

The story of the B-52 flight was first reported by Army Times, owned by Gannett, on Wednesday September 5. Gannett relied on information provided by "anonymous officers". The story was picked up by Yahoo Wednesday morning, published by USA Today and The Washington Pos, and then quickly spread.

In response, the Pentagon quickly spread an official explanation. - The Air Force admitted to an inadvertent error: The intent was to transport ACMs without weapons. According to military officers, the nuclear warheads should have been removed before the missiles were mounted on the pylons under the wings of the bomber.


In the words of the Pentagon:

"There was an error which occurred during a regularly scheduled transfer of weapons between two bases. The weapons were safe and remained in Air Force control and custody at all times."

For almost the first time in the history of the nation, the military has publicly and promptly admitted it "made a mistake". This in itself is truly astounding.

To reinforce the military's claim that a mistake was made, a system-wide stand-down was ordered for September 14.

That official explanation was quickly explained away. The mistake was made intentionally, so a "deliberate leak" of a secret operation could occur.

The CIA and the Office of Counter-Terrorism in the State Department explained that Barksdale AFB is a "jumping off point" for re-supply of the Middle East.

The "deliberate leak" was intended to serve as a veiled warning to Iran. This deliberately misleading explanation is evidently intended to lead the public or Iran or both to logically conclude the missiles are bound for Iran.

Bluntly, State and the CIA converted a whistleblower leak by true American patriots into a deliberate leak by official Washington, to scare Iran.

By this means Washington has led the public to forget or overlook the real issue.

To begin, the multiple official explanations reek to high heaven. They collectively read suspiciously like flimsy cover stories concocted in hasty desperation. And no amount of pretty lipstick will be able to make the official explanations pretty.


Transportation Violations

More conflicting explanations followed. These missiles are part of a group scheduled to be decommissioned. This would explain why they were shipped out of North Dakota.

But the missiles were not transported on their way to decommissioning. Missiles are normally decommissioned at Davis-Monthan AFB at Tucson. Nuclear weapons are decommissioned at the Department of Energy's Pantex facility near Amarillo, Texas, accessed through Kirkland AFB in New Mexico.

And military policy requires minimization of the number of flights made with nuclear weapons aboard. So the weapons should not have been mounted on the missiles, flown to Louisiana, un-mounted and flown to New Mexico.

The mode of transportation is also a major issue not defused by official explanations. Per standard operating procedures, or SOPs, both missiles and nuclear warheads are transported primarily by air, in specially modified C-130s or C-17s. Under no peacetime circumstances do military SOPs allow transport of nuclear weapons mounted in cruise missiles mounted in combat positions on combat planes.

Department of Defense Directive Number 4540.5, issued on February 4, 1998, regulates logistic transportation of nuclear weapons.

By delegation of Commanders of Combatant Commands, movement of nuclear weapons must be approved by commanders of major service commands.

Commanders of Combat Commands or service component commanders must evaluate, authorize and approve transport modes and movement routes for nuclear weapons in their custody.

The Air Force is required to maintain a Prime Nuclear Airlift Force capability to conduct the logistic transport of nuclear weapons.

Under SOPs, combat planes with combat-ready nuclear weapons can only be flown on the authority of the Commander in Chief, the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the National Military Command Authority.

All of these transportation regulations were flagrantly violated on August 30.


Handling Violations

Violations of regulations concerning handling of the nuclear weapons in North Dakota are worse.

A sophisticated computerized tracking system is used for nuclear weapons. Multiple sign-offs are required to remove the weapons from their storage bunkers.

The AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missile was designed to carry nuclear weapons. No non-nuclear warhead is available for this missile. So the only possible error could have been loading nuclear warheads on the missiles instead of practice dummies.

The practice warheads have standard blue and yellow signs declaring "Inert, non-nuclear". The nuclear warheads have at least three distinctive red warning signs. This error is therefore highly improbable, absent tampering with signage.

Nuclear weapons are transported from the storage bunker to the aircraft in a caravan that routinely includes vehicles with machine guns front and rear and guards with M-16s. All steps in the process are done under the watchful eyes of armed military police.

Rules require that at least two people jointly control every step of the process. If one person loses sight of the other, both are forced to the ground face-down and temporarily "placed under arrest" by observant security forces. All progress stops until inspections are made to assure the weapons weren't tampered with.

All nuclear weapons are connected to sophisticated alarm systems to prevent removal or tampering. They could only be removed from the storage bunker by turning the alarm off. And the squad commander clearly would not have authority to turn off the alarm.


The Impossible Mistake

Bluntly, the mistake of loading nuclear weapons on a combat aircraft in combat-ready position is simply not possible to make. Safeguards are far too stringent and far too many people would be involved. Particularly given that the mounting was in violation of policy that's been in place without exception for almost 40 years.

No discipline is expected to be meted out. The New York Times tried to imply the commanding general had been fired. Actually, the squad commander in charge of munitions crews at Minot was "relieved of duty pending an investigation". He has not been removed from his position or disciplined. The crews involved have been "temporarily decertified pending corrective actions or additional training" but have not been disciplined. No mention has been made of the wing commander.

Note carefully: These actions amount to nothing at all. The wing and squad commanders are still in place and the crews can easily be re-certified.


Successful Confusion

Washington's efforts to confuse the public have been successful. Attention has shifted from the crucial issue.

This news has already become non-news. The August 14 stand-down will momentarily become news, followed by announcements of more stringent restrictions, improved safeguards and additional training. The public always has been and always will be safe.


One of the major issues will be avoided:

Someone in an irregular chain of Air Force command authorized loading and transport of nuclear weapons. And that would never have been done without a reason. Given the magnitude of regulatory violations involved, the reason must be extremely important.

The paramount issue will be avoided, if necessary with repetition of the reassurance that the Air Force was in control at all times. The weapons were only missing during the 3.5-hour flight.

At Barksdale, the missiles were considered to be unarmed items headed for modernization or the scrap heap, and of no particular importance. They were left unguarded for almost ten hours.

According to one report, almost ten hours were required for airmen at Minot AFB to convince superiors that the nuclear weapons had disappeared. According to information provided to Congress, this time lapsed before airmen at Barksdale "noticed" the weapons were present. News reports will continue to overlook this fact also.

Even here the focus is on time. The number of missiles and warheads issue was overlooked.

Early news reports spoke of five nuclear warheads loaded onto the bomber. Apparently, this information was provided from Barksdale.

That number was later updated to six weapons missing from Minot, apparently based on anonymous tips provided to Military Times by people at Minot. This information has also been forgotten.


Conclusion

Six nuclear weapons disappeared from Minot AFB in North Dakota. -- Five nuclear weapons were discovered at Barksdale AFB in Louisiana.

Which leads to my chilling conclusion:

Someone, operating under a special chain of command within the United States Air Force, just stole a nuclear weapon.



What next?

The answer has been provided several times, most recently by CIA Director and General Michael Hayden. On September 7, dressed in full military uniform, Hayden told assembled members of the Council of Foreign Relations:

"Our analysts assess with high confidence that al-Qaida's central leadership is planning high-impact plots against the U. S. homeland."

"We assess with high confidence that al-Qaida is focusing on targets that would produce mass casualties, dramatic destruction and significant aftershocks."

An eye for an eye. Use of nukes will justify use of nukes. A perfect excuse to wage nuclear war against Iran. I suspect Hayden is absolutely correct, except for his mistaken identification of the "central leadership" that is planning detonation of a nuclear weapon on American soil.

_______________


Chuck Simpson is a retired licensed civil / structural engineer, former attorney.

[jacobdcoates]

Re: Was a Covert Attempt to Bomb Iran with Nuclear Weapons foiled by a Military Leak?

Thank you Lukester, I do appreciate it. As I have only been "lurking" for a short while, I have not noticed till recently, that yes indeed people do wonder off in the middle of a conversations. Which seems to me quite odd. What can you do though, I guess I will have to get use to that happening, I don't normally post a lot on the the forums I visit, I prefer to gather information about things I want to know about, how to do, or just suit my fancy. Which means I don't tend to notice the social aspects of them or things in general for that matter.

Yes, it always is quite disturbing to hear about accidents involving nuclear weapons. When flying planes, it is bound to happen. Planes crash and will do so in the future as they have in the past. all the weapons involved were either destroyed or irrecoverably lost. The Air Force new exactly where they were up in till the accidents. There is one somewhere between 3 and 5 miles off the coast of Savannah, GA. If i remember correctly it was a 1.5MT gravity bomb. It was intentionally ditched in '53 or so when the b-47 it was on, had a mid-air collision and had to make an emergency landing. Back then nukes were the size of a bus, 3-5 tons apiece.

Agree with you Lukester that author is a bit paranoid. He does all right until the last 2 paragraphs.

Yes, he did miss the "chemical fingerprint". Actually, it is radioisotope ratio tracing, plutonium is made in a breeder reactor(custom build). All nuke reactor are really custom build as a matter of fact, especially breeder reactors(govt only). But the effect is that each batch of plutonium from each reactor has a specific mix of radioisotopes, X% of plutonium, .y% of thorium, .Z% of polonium, so and so forth. The ratio is specific not only to the reactor, but particular fuel rods with in the reactor. But, we would only have a fingerprint, if the material was manufactured in a US, UK, or FR reactor. It would not tell us if it was made in China, Israel, or Russia, because none of them release that data to the International Atomic Energy Commission.


I don't know if I should hope if it was an accident or worry that some idiots in the pentagon are playing bully at recess with nukes. Neither is an appealing option.

[Guest]

Re: Was a Covert Attempt to Bomb Iran with Nuclear Weapons foiled by a Military Leak?

Jacobdcoates -

Thank you for your forthright comments. I admire that quality.

[jacobdcoates]

Re: Was a Covert Attempt to Bomb Iran with Nuclear Weapons foiled by a Military Leak?

Your welcome Lukester, and thank you.

I think that this thread has run it course without new information though. Did a Google search for new info newest article is over a week and half ago. No more news about loose nukes, guess it's bad publicity. Who would have though that.