Meanwhile Back in the Sandbox...

[thriftyandboringinohio]

Re: Meanwhile Back in the Sandbox...

The Harry S Truman is in the area now

[jpatter666]

Re: Meanwhile Back in the Sandbox...

The Harry S Truman is in the area now

Yep. http://www.gonavy.jp/CVLocation.html

[llanlad2]

Re: Meanwhile Back in the Sandbox...

Do you really mean the only Muslim country in the Middle East?

Indonesia a 90% Muslim state also has more than 1 democratic election - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_Indonesia

You're right as of 2014 and it's very shaky.

[seobook]

Re: Meanwhile Back in the Sandbox...

You're right as of 2014 and it's very shaky.

http://www.theguardian.com/world/liv...rolling-report

[Polish_Silver]

Re: Meanwhile Back in the Sandbox...

but surely there are secularized muslims who make that distinction, just as the u.s. is known for its "cafeteria catholics" - i.e. they pick and choose among the policy positions taken by their church.

Until recently, I felt that the major religions were not at all different in this regard. If you go to Silicon Valley, you will see Jews working with Muslims, Turks working for Greeks, Persians working for Turks, homosexuals working for fundamentalists. Millenium long disputes seem less than yesterday's bad dreams.

Under certain conditions, people are quite willing to ignore/violate written or human authority.

However, this Atlantic article made me wonder if Islam is fundamentally contradictory with secular society.

It's hard to find something in the New Testament which prevents Christians from peaceful coexistence with people of different world
views.

Judaism is quite different, there are so many places where God orders the Israelites to kill the "other guys", sometimes including women, children, and cattle.

The Jews spent most of recent history being a persecuted minority, and that worked it's way into the religious sentiment.

Islam has had many "national majorities" since it's founding, and supposedly has many "kill the infidels" passages in it's scriptures.

[astonas]

Re: Meanwhile Back in the Sandbox...

Until recently, I felt that the major religions were not at all different in this regard. If you go to Silicon Valley, you will see Jews working with Muslims, Turks working for Greeks, Persians working for Turks, homosexuals working for fundamentalists. Millenium long disputes seem less than yesterday's bad dreams.

Under certain conditions, people are quite willing to ignore/violate written or human authority.

However, this Atlantic article made me wonder if Islam is fundamentally contradictory with secular society.

It's hard to find something in the New Testament which prevents Christians from peaceful coexistence with people of different world
views.

Judaism is quite different, there are so many places where God orders the Israelites to kill the "other guys", sometimes including women, children, and cattle.

The Jews spent most of recent history being a persecuted minority, and that worked it's way into the religious sentiment.

Islam has had many "national majorities" since it's founding, and supposedly has many "kill the infidels" passages in it's scriptures.

I think the key assumption that creates false appearance of contradiction, as in the passages highlighted above, is the assumption that written canonical scriptures, rather than preachments and interpretations, are the most important factor in creating religious violence. Lots of violent passages might make it marginally easier to incite violence, but really the minimum requirement can be as slight as a single passage, if given enough emphasis.

Take for example:

"Think not that I am come to send peace on earth: I came not to send peace, but a sword. For I am come to set a man at variance against his father, and the daughter against her mother, and the daughter in law against her mother in law. And a man's foes shall be they of his own household. He that loveth father or mother more than me is not worthy of me: and he that loveth son or daughter more than me is not worthy of me."

Matthew 10:34-37

This and similar passages were used to help justify plenty of bloodshed, including in the wars of Reformation, several crusades, and plenty of christian-on-christian oppression. Is that "representative of Christianity" today? No. Is it fair to judge all christians today by it and it alone? Of course not. But were these nevertheless used to justify incredible brutality? Absolutely!

So how did that happen? Ultimately, it is the fact that words are treated as divine in their origin, and categorically perfect, that produces the audience credulity required to misuse such texts to violent ends. That problem is less dependent on the arrangement of words, and more about the idea that they cannot possibly ever be just plain wrong. Because that confidence is what creates the credulity needed to accept the specific interpretation of ANY preacher, peaceful or violent, as having the force of the divine (thereby categorically superseding any earthly law, reason, or judgement).



To me, the reverse assumption is more justified: The firebrand preacher's charisma (and their own personal spin on doctrine) is in practice more influential than any particular words in whichever book he's thumping on, when manipulating a population to violence. We are, after all, discussing the triggering of an emotional, rather than an analytical response in the listener, and the human brain really doesn't do analytical thinking very well in the presence of strong emotions. We're just not wired to handle that situation effectively. The goal of the inciter is to bypass the reasoning process, which is precisely why religion is so effective. It presents pre-thought-out answers, and asks that they be accepted whole, via an appeal to an emotional state.

None of this means that religious specifics don't matter, or that the words preached don't matter. It just means that preachers are in general given sufficient latitude by their faithful audiences to be highly selective in drawing textual support, which in practice makes just about any text sufficient, given enough ill intent. Trust is, after all, essential to faith, and enough sermons turn on only a few quotes to not raise eyebrows when only a few are present.

I do like the Atlantic article you cited (it's possible I even linked it once myself.) And I DO think it is correct in that better understanding of the religious landscape will be essential to the US in navigating a very complex situation on the ground in the Middle East. But I see the key places to look when trying to understand the various religious movements and their motivations as NOT lying in the religious texts themselves, but more crucially in the various competing interpretations of those texts. The Atlantic article does this well.

An analogy is looking at the differences between christian interpretations, rather than the Bible itself, to make statements about the Thirty Years war (or for that matter, the rest of the Reformation). The bible was the exact same text on both sides. IT isn't going to tell us very much about why there was a fight. It was the differences that motivated violence, and those lay exclusively in the different interpretations of that same text. Contradictory words, all undeniably written by men, and yet held to have the force of the divine, by virtue of a (human) claim to explain the original text more accurately. Human, temporal power, given the force of divine authority. That's the danger.

In the case of the Middle East today, a similar battle within Islam is going on. Some interpretations will be fairly pro-western. Others exactly the opposite. And THAT's where we're going to find information that lets us find potential allies, and likely future enemies. Not in the Koran, but rather by studying the many various spins on it, and parsing them for their utility in forging peace. That was the process of the christian reformation, and I expect it to be the process of the islamic one as well.

That exploration of nuance seems far more fruitful than trying to somehow "wipe out" Islam (which is already >23% of the world's population, and growing), or eliminating its ability to have an impact on us. (Such an effort can in the long term only be a fool's errand. The world has already globalized, and there is no viable way to reverse that process.) Treating generic "Islam" as the problem requires one to entertain such overly broad responses. Our response must instead rely on further nuance.

Let's take as an example the great deal of recent violence that has been triggered by the suni/shiite split. This isn't really a difference within the Koran. It is instead a difference of opinion on who the rightful heir of Mohammed was to lead the faithful (after the Koran, the final word of Allah, was completed). So a lack of a clear textual answer caused the split interpretations, and the most bloodshed.

To put it differently, it is claims that are left unaddressed in the text (forcing them into the realm of human interpretation) that matter most in triggering violence today. In spaces like these, any crazy idea might be put forward, and given the force of divine authority, by a given sect.

To whatever extent there is intrinsic danger -- or opportunity -- in religious conflict, that's where I'd look for it first.

Interpretation does seem to be where religious violence springs from most often, both in the past, and still today.

[Polish_Silver]

Making Islam Peaceful

In my opinion, people who found religions should never have wealth or political power.

Sacred scriptures may be subject to interpretation, but the behavior of the founder is much less so.
Whether you study Christ by reading the bible, as a fundamentalist would, or by using "higher criticism" as an atheist would,
you will not find that Christ led armies and conquered territories.

However, if you study the life of Muhammad, the situation is quite different.

To make Islam peaceful, we could try these strategies:


1) Keep Muslims ignorant about Muhammad's life.

2) Convince them that Muhammad is not a good example for behavior.

3) Convince them that the methods appropriate in the 600's are not appropriate now.


The most plausible seems to be (3).
Christians have mostly accepted that miracles are much rarer now than in the first century.
The difference is that you cannot cause a miracle by wanting one to happen, but you can start a fight by wanting one.

PS

[vt]

Re: Meanwhile Back in the Sandbox...

This Week in Geopolitics - Stalking the Black Swan with George Friedman Iran and Nukes: From Fear and Loathing to Loathing and Cooperation Jan 18, 2016 International sanctions on Iran were lifted on Saturday. It was determined that Iran had carried out its obligations under its agreement with the United States, Britain, France, Russia, China, and Germany to stop pursuing the development of an atomic bomb. At Geopolitical Futures, we expected sanctions to be lifted and Iran to agree to halt these activities. However, our forecast was not based on the issue of nuclear weapons. Rather, it was based on our model, which indicated there would be cooperation between the US and Iran as a result of converging strategic interests. Nuclear weapons were at one point the main issue when it came to Iran. But by the time an agreement began to emerge, they had become a minor issue. There were much more important problems that needed to be addressed. These problems included the future of the region, the Islamic State, and the common interests of the United States and Iran on both subjects. Let’s begin with the question of Iran and nuclear weapons. Ever since the 1990s, some had argued that Iran was likely to develop nuclear weapons in the near future. By the mid-2000s, the expectation was that it would have these weapons within two years. As each year passed, the due date for when they would be developed moved by another year. The fact that the predictions were constantly wrong didn’t deter the predictors at all. At a certain point, it became necessary to address this question: If Iran was hard at work on nuclear weapons, and was on the verge of building one, why did an underground test never take place? Building a deliverable nuclear weapon is hard and involves much more than simply enriching uranium. Just consider the stresses a completed nuclear weapon, miniaturized to rest on top of a missile, has to undergo. It has to withstand the massive G-forces and vibration of a launch, enter a vacuum where the temperatures vary by hundreds of degrees each second, then re-enter the atmosphere at thousands of degrees, and then explode. Even building a sufficiently ruggedized and miniaturized atomic bomb that can be delivered by aircraft is difficult. But detonating a nuclear device (it’s not yet a weapon) underground as part of a testing process is much easier. The device can be as fragile and sprawling as you want. It isn’t going anywhere. It was my view that Iran might possibly manage a test explosion, but a weaponized system was beyond its capacity. A nuclear test, however, was a risky move. Having a uranium enrichment program, just secret enough that every intelligence agency in the world knew about it, was extremely useful. It allowed others to obsess over Iran’s nuclear power, and that’s exactly what Iran wanted. It had learned the North Korean gambit. The West, and particularly the United States, is obsessed with the mere possibility of nuclear weapons. If you actually build one, the risk is the US may attack you. If you aren’t building one, you will be ignored. But have a nuclear program, without a nuclear bomb, and you will neither be attacked nor ignored. That’s what Iran wanted and what it got. It gained international leverage and attention far beyond what it would have received without a program. And that attention could be used domestically to demonstrate the power of the regime, and regionally to block any extremely aggressive move against Iran, as had happened in Iraq. Bec oming too aggressive toward Iran risked the unknown, since it might have been further along in developing a nuclear weapon than was thought. Therefore, Iran’s nuclear program was less about building a weapon than building uncertainty. This strategy came with a price. The US and European sanctions hurt the Iranian economy substantially. However, the sanctions did not have an immediate impact on Iran’s public pursuit of the bomb. The sanctions began in 2006 and escalated from there. So clearly, as much as the West would like to think that it was the sanction regime that changed Iranian policy, the lapse of a decade would seem to indicate that this was not what broke them. The freezing of assets mattered of course, and the lack of substantial oil revenue and investments also took a toll. But given that the Iranians were not compelled to agree to a settlement when oil was at $100 a barrel and sanctions on oil sales would have had the biggest impact, they were unlikely to feel compelled at $30 a barrel. Sanctions hurt, but not enough to force a change in policy. That’s because sanctions helped the Iranian government politically. Here were six countries, five of them nuclear powers, obsessed with stopping Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. The sanctions were used to demonstrate both the injustice with which the West treated Iran and the fear they had of Iran. This was a heady brew, and the Iranian government used it as more than a counterweight to sanctions. The ability of the Iranians to absorb economic difficulties was substantial. But the pictures of Iranian officials meeting with global powers as equals and challenging their hypocrisy were political gold. And the nuclear program opened the long-term possibility of reaching an agreement that would benefit Iran. Then the region was transformed, and the putative nuclear program decreased in importance to both the United States, in particular, and Iran. This transformation was caused by the emergence of a powerful Sunni movement that was able to take and hold territory in a large region: the Islamic State. The Iranians had experienced the difficulty of dealing with a Sunni-controlled state in the 1980s, when it fought a war with Iraq under Saddam Hussein that cost them about a million casualties. Iran’s worst-case scenario wasn’t war with the United States, but war with a strong Sunni force to their west. The Islamic State was not yet that powerful, but its existence was sufficient to cause Iranian foreign policy to swerve in a new direction. Put differently, a civil war appeared to be breaking out between Sunnis and Shiites, and it was an overwhelming imperative that the Sunni coalition be broken before it could dominate Iraq, and certainly before it could thr eaten Iran. Iran proved incapable of breaking IS by itself. It needed an anti-IS coalition, and the United States had to play some role in that coalition. By this point, nuclear programs were simply irrelevant to the reality of Iran. The United States also shifted its regional strategy. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States discovered a core lesson. It could defeat any conventional or near-conventional enemy army, but it could not occupy either country without fighting an extended war against insurgents and terrorists who were deeply committed to their cause. This was not a new discovery. The Romans, British, and Germans learned this lesson as well. During World War II, in Germany and Japan, the US did succeed in peaceful occupation, not only by waging a military war, but by smashing the society as well. But at that time, it had 10 million men under arms, an economy entirely devoted to the war effort, and powerful allies like Britain and the Soviet Union. Without these things, the only goal that could be achieved was winning hearts and minds and, as it learned in Vietnam, that was easier in theory than practice. Therefore, the United States developed a new strategy. Since it could not control the region through its military, it had no choice but to allow the region to evolve as it would. It was now up to regional powers, who had far more at stake than the United States—and couldn’t withdraw—to manage the situation. The United States would provide air power, intelligence, weapons, and training, but it would not take the primary responsibility on the ground for shaping the situation—because trying consistently led to failure, and continuing to do the same thing hoping for a different outcome is the definition of insanity, to use an appropriate cliché. There were four regional powers who were compelled to be interested in the development of the Islamic State. They were Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Israel, and Iran. Each was threatened by the rise of IS. Each was utterly different from the others and in most cases shared a degree of hostility with each other. Some were close to the United States, and some were hostile. Iran was hostile, yet it was the most concerned of all about IS. The Turks had shown a tendency to try to manage their relations with IS by tacitly ignoring the group. They reportedly allowed the passage of IS operatives and the sale of IS-controlled oil through Turkey and permitted IS militants to use Turkish banks. Tension with IS had grown substantially, but Turkey had not yet committed major forces to the fight against the group. The Saudis, like the Turks, were Sunnis, and while they were concerned about IS, they were far more worried about what Iran might do in the Persian Gulf. The Israelis were worried about everything, but they also understood that a war of attrition against IS was not something they could afford and that an Israeli intervention would only strengthen IS. In a traditional balance of power strategy, the major power maintains common interests with each of the lesser players, while appreciating tension between these nations. That allows the major power to maintain control by being the only one each nation trusts. As the US moved from its strategy of using direct force as its normal mode of operation to using a balance of power to bring regional force to bear, it had to begin the process of balancing regional relationships. Without this, the US would be merely leading a coalition against one of the players. This shift required a closer relationship with Iran. Neither country liked the other, but they had at least some common interests. More important, the US had close relations with the other three regional powers, and this created the appearance of being an anti-Iranian coalition. Particularly as a Sunni rising coalesced around IS, a working relationship with Iran became essential. The nuclear settlement was designed to at least clear the ground for this relationship. Obviously, this meant drawing away from the Saudis, who feared the Iranians, and also allowing friction to build up in the Americans’ relationship with Israel. However, Israel and Saudi Arabia maintained their relationships with the US regardless, as they had no choice. The wildcard was Turkey, which wanted nothing to do with this coalition of the frightened, but has over time moved into an increasingly hostile position toward IS. But it is Iran that has an overriding interest in breaking IS. More than any other issue—the Assad regime, Israel, or nuclear weapons—Iran has an interest in the future of IS. It cannot defeat IS by itself, and it knows that the modest Russian intervention in Syria won’t accomplish the task either. The only power that can both use significant force against IS and create an anti-IS coalition is the US. Saudi Arabia fears Iran, and that is precisely why it must follow the American lead. Israel may not have a military role, but its intelligence and other capabilities can’t be withheld if the US wants it in the mix. And Turkey, as resistant as it is, cannot face a hostile Russia and an indifferent US. It must be brought in as well. Now all of this is far more complex than I have made it, but the bottom line is that the United States and Iran have common interests that override other considerations. It will be argued that any arrangement with Iran is temporary and that in the end the Iranians may turn on the US—or the US may turn on them. This is absolutely true. No arrangement between nations lasts longer than their interests dictate. The US alliance with the Soviet Union crumbled after World War II, while Germany and Japan became allies. The US is now discussing military cooperation with Vietnam. There is no end to the complexity of the relationships between nations. Iran and the United States are not friends. There is no friendship between nations. There are interests—and both share an interest in breaking IS. Even together, they are unable to achieve this task, so others must be compelled to play their part. And when it’s over, different interests will emerge and different constellations of nations will evolve. And so, the great terror of Iranian nukes has been replaced by the great terror of an IS caliphate. Both terrors are legitimate, but passing. For the moment, the US and Iran are afraid of the same thing. This is the finest basis for a shift in relationships between nations. George Friedman George Friedman Editor, This Week in Geopolitics

[llanlad2]

Re: Meanwhile Back in the Sandbox...

I think the key assumption that creates false appearance of contradiction, as in the passages highlighted above, is the assumption that written canonical scriptures, rather than preachments and interpretations, are the most important factor in creating religious violence. Lots of violent passages might make it marginally easier to incite violence, but really the minimum requirement can be as slight as a single passage, if given enough emphasis.

Take for example:
"Think not that I am come to send peace on earth: I came not to send peace, but a sword. For I am come to set a man at variance against his father, and the daughter against her mother, and the daughter in law against her mother in law. And a man's foes shall be they of his own household. He that loveth father or mother more than me is not worthy of me: and he that loveth son or daughter more than me is not worthy of me."

Matthew 10:34-37


This and similar passages were used to help justify plenty of bloodshed, including in the wars of Reformation, several crusades, and plenty of christian-on-christian oppression. Is that "representative of Christianity" today? No. Is it fair to judge all christians today by it and it alone? Of course not. But were these nevertheless used to justify incredible brutality? Absolutely!

So how did that happen? Ultimately, it is the fact that words are treated as divine in their origin, and categorically perfect, that produces the audience credulity required to misuse such texts to violent ends. That problem is less dependent on the arrangement of words, and more about the idea that they cannot possibly ever be just plain wrong. Because that confidence is what creates the credulity needed to accept the specific interpretation of ANY preacher, peaceful or violent, as having the force of the divine (thereby categorically superseding any earthly law, reason, or judgement).



To me, the reverse assumption is more justified: The firebrand preacher's charisma (and their own personal spin on doctrine) is in practice more influential than any particular words in whichever book he's thumping on, when manipulating a population to violence. We are, after all, discussing the triggering of an emotional, rather than an analytical response in the listener, and the human brain really doesn't do analytical thinking very well in the presence of strong emotions. We're just not wired to handle that situation effectively. The goal of the inciter is to bypass the reasoning process, which is precisely why religion is so effective. It presents pre-thought-out answers, and asks that they be accepted whole, via an appeal to an emotional state.

The above argument still doesn't address the important difference created by the "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's". This phrase allows separation of church and state. Ultimately it allows the power of the state to legitimately usurp the power of religion and religious leaders. A secular government in Islamic society is doomed to illegitimacy which will lead to violent overthrow by non-secularists or "democratic" overthrow whereby the religious party is voted in. As for interpretations, in the Koran there is some quite blunt stuff that is not really open to interpretation so you don't need to be a particularly charismatic preacher to win over the congregation which probably means you'll have a few more violent extremists rallying to your cause.

Having said all that, I still believe that the most overlooked parallel between the 30 years' war and the current Islamic ones is the question of demographics and sudden population growth. War over religious differences are most often a manifestation of a battle for land and resources. It is no coincidence that Luther-ism took off when it did and is also why there is no real end in sight to ME troubles.

[vt]

Re: Meanwhile Back in the Sandbox...

U.S., Russian, European invasion of Libya

http://www.debka.com/article/25183/U...t-up-bridgehea

[lakedaemonian]

Re: Meanwhile Back in the Sandbox...

A month+ old, but highly relevant in my opinion:

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articl...-war-near-home

Iranian backed Yemeni Houthi penetrating into Saudi Arabia.

Yemen is like an unconventional warfare version of the Normandy D-Day invasion of Europe.

But have a look at the estimated cost: $200 million a day.

Assuming it's accurate(it's very, very high; but Saudi is relying very heavily on very expensive precision guided weapons and genuine mercenaries) that's an annual run rate of $70+ billion a year.

That's 1/3-1/4 of annual Saudi budget in a time of collapsed energy prices that make up 90% of Saudi government revenue.

Compounding that is fast rising inflation in Saudi Arabia and the Saudi Asir region that resides directly between Yemen and Mecca has largely missed out from the Saudi oil boom with below average income and home ownership, and topography in Saudi that is most condusive to rural insurgency.

[touchring]

Re: Meanwhile Back in the Sandbox...

A month+ old, but highly relevant in my opinion:

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articl...-war-near-home

Iranian backed Yemeni Houthi penetrating into Saudi Arabia.

Yemen is like an unconventional warfare version of the Normandy D-Day invasion of Europe.

But have a look at the estimated cost: $200 million a day.

Assuming it's accurate(it's very, very high; but Saudi is relying very heavily on very expensive precision guided weapons and genuine mercenaries) that's an annual run rate of $70+ billion a year.

That's 1/3-1/4 of annual Saudi budget in a time of collapsed energy prices that make up 90% of Saudi government revenue.

Compounding that is fast rising inflation in Saudi Arabia and the Saudi Asir region that resides directly between Yemen and Mecca has largely missed out from the Saudi oil boom with below average income and home ownership, and topography in Saudi that is most condusive to rural insurgency.

I wonder why Egypt's Sisi doesn't get involved in Yemen. Without Egypt's army, there's little chance that the Saudis can win in Yemen just by using mercenaries.

[lakedaemonian]

Re: Meanwhile Back in the Sandbox...

I wonder why Egypt's Sisi doesn't get involved in Yemen. Without Egypt's army, there's little chance that the Saudis can win in Yemen just by using mercenaries.

Its worth mentioning the Egyptians under Nasser went VERY heavy into Yemen for pretty much the entire 1960's and suffered tens of thousands of casualties.

And while the Egyptians threw the kitchen sink at it with the full support of the Soviet Union and using chemical weapons they we're still utterly humiliated and left with a wrecked economy.

The opposition to the Egyptian Army was literally just a handful of WWII veteran private UK mercenaries(with a complicit and quietly approving UK government), paid for by the Saudi King(not very wealthy and not a blank cheque budget) leading a fairly small number of Yemenis not unlike those opposing the Saudis today.

Terrain in Yemen and along the Saudi side of the frontier is conducive to irregular warfare providing an environment beneficial to guerilla organisations and non state actors.

I'm sure Saudi is keen for Egyptian support in their ultimately existential war, but I think the Egyptians are smart enough to avoid a repeat.

At MOST it would be possible for low numbers of Egyptian special forces(poorly regarded) to get some operational experience with very clear and limited objectives and provided the cash flow costs for deploymeant were clearly net positive to Egypt.

Exactly how much economic leverage Saudi has with Egypt, how vulnerable Egypt is to it, and what Saudi can actually afford in light of its own growing fiscal cliff will be interesting answers to see as the situation develops.

[GRG55]

Re: Meanwhile Back in the Sandbox...

This looks straight out of the American play book - roll in the equipment, bomb the countryside, declare victory and go home.

Vladimir Putin orders Russian forces to begin withdrawal from Syria

Russian president says soldiers should begin pulling out of country as military intervention has largely achieved its aims

Tuesday 15 March 2016 07.11 GMT

The Russian president, Vladimir Putin, has abruptly declared that he is withdrawing the majority of Russian troops from Syria, saying the six-month military intervention had largely achieved its objective.

The news on Monday, relayed personally to the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad, in a telephone call from Putin, followed a meeting in the Kremlin with the Russian defence and foreign ministers. He said the pullout, scaling back an intervention that began at the end of September, is due to start on Tuesday.

His move was clearly designed to coincide with the start of Syrian peace talks in Geneva and will be seen as a sign that Russia believes it has done enough to protect Assad’s regime from collapse...

[thriftyandboringinohio]

Re: Meanwhile Back in the Sandbox...

This looks straight out of the American play book - roll in the equipment, bomb the countryside, declare victory and go home...

To get the best odds of success, emulate a proven master.
Putin may have overlooked or underestimated the chaotic unintended consequences and expensive blow-back that accompanies "the American Gambit".