Meanwhile Back in the Sandbox...

[touchring]

Re: The Empire Strikes . . . ?

leaving aside the question of whether obama manipulated the current set of conditions into existance or is in fact surprised [something we will never know], is there any difference between what you've just said and what adams says are the facts on the ground?

Perhaps it's the same, but I'm amusing it as well since no one knows what's really going on, just like no one knew why GW Bush hated Saddam so much.

and to whom must the saudis now appeal for an extra measure of protection?

The Saudis are going to be alone. There is speculation that China maybe involved in the Middle East, but I doubt the Chinese will take over the role of the US, at least not in the short to medium term. The Chinese don't really like beaches or play with sand.

To the Chinese, oil is just oil, it doesn't matter whether it comes from Iran, Saudi Arabia or Canada's oil sands. If there's a shortage of oil, just cut back on driving, walk more, take the bus, the subway or buy an electric bicycle.

China or the RMB won't collapse if oil stops flowing from the Middle East. Yes, it will cause an economic problem, but not an existential one.

[don]

Re: The Empire Strikes . . . ?

Syria - Suez with a dash of For Whom the Bell Tolls . . .

May was the flowering month for the Syrian thistle. The pink heads grew from the rubble in a small village south of the city of Tel Tamer, in northern Syria. A local Kurdish militia had liberated the village from the Islamic State, or ISIS, in the night. Coalition airstrikes had set fire to the grass and blackened the earth. Concrete buildings and small mud-brick homes were charred and gutted, riddled with bullet holes. The belongings of residents confettied the ground. At a curve in the road lay the corpse of an ISIS fighter.

I found a 26-year-old American civilian named Clay Lawton standing alone, just outside the village. Square-jawed, with large eyes and bright teeth, he was a volunteer freedom fighter with the local militia. ‘‘I’m from Rhode Island,’’ he said. ‘‘You know it? Most people confuse it with Staten Island or Long Island.’’

While we were talking, the unit he had arrived with drove off. Now he was alone, wondering how he would find a commander and return to the action. ‘‘I guess you could say I’m free-floating,’’ he said.

Lawton first heard about ISIS on ‘‘The Daily Show With Jon Stewart.’’ At the time, he was lounging around Key West, driving tour boats from island to island, going to parties, talking to girls. Three months later, he ran out of things to do and bought a ticket home. He lived with his parents and took a job painting houses, thinking he would start a career as a carpenter. After high school, he spent a couple of years in the Army but never deployed. He always wished he had. When a friend from boot camp sent Lawton an email full of links to videos made by the Islamic State — the execution of James Foley, clips from the day ISIS executed 250 Syrian soldiers in the desert — Lawton looked up ‘‘how to fight ISIS’’ on his lunch break.

A Facebook page called the Lions of Rojava was recruiting foreign volunteers. It was affiliated with the People’s Protection Units, known by the Kurdish abbreviation Y.P.G., the military arm of a faction that since 2012 has controlled a sweep of land between the Islamic State’s territory in northern Syria and Turkey. Rojava, as the Kurds call it, is a place that didn’t exist until a few years ago, when civil war in Syria opened up a front for Kurdish nationalism.

Lawton sent the page a message, and within a day a Y.P.G. representative invited him to join the fight. He had about $800 in savings. In February, he flew to Norway and then to Dubai, and from Dubai to Sulaimaniya, in Iraq. ‘‘From there I was really nervous,’’ he said. As he spoke, Lawton sipped water from his CamelBak. ‘‘I thought everyone was ISIS. I thought I was going to get kidnapped.’’ A fighter picked him up in a fake taxi and took him to a safe house where another American who was scared and lost was still hanging out, because he was so desperate to get to the front. Lawton told him to come with him, and so they went together.

Lawton arrived in Syria, was given an M-16 and in just over two weeks was participating in the offensive at Tel Hamis. ‘‘Fighting ISIS wasn’t high-profile yet,’’ he said. ‘‘Wasn’t a big deal. Easy ride to the front.’’

His nom de guerre was Heval Sharvan, but the freedom fighters called him Captain America. ‘‘I think, after this, I might want to relax and go back to work,’’ he said. ‘‘Maybe New York or maybe Miami. Well, Miami might be too chill.’’

Lawton told me about the day he killed an ISIS militant. A Kurd gave him a sniper rifle to attack an ISIS-controlled village. Lawton took a position on the roof of a building and saw an ISIS fighter with a rocket-propelled-grenade launcher running below. Lawton shot him.

‘‘The guy just exploded,’’ Lawton said. ‘‘He was just gone.’’ Lawton still had the rifle at his side, close to his body like a purse.
‘‘That was my first kill,’’ he said. ‘‘Kinda weird, but I had a nightmare that night.’’

‘‘About the militant?’’ I asked.

‘‘It’s hard to explain,’’ he said. ‘‘You know these guys are animals, but even with that knowledge … ’’ He trailed off. ‘‘You know you have to let the brain figure it out on its own,’’ he said. ‘‘He pointed the R.P.G. at me. He would have taken me and my friend. It was hard for me. Killing people, you know you are here to do it. But then, when it happens, and you see it. It’s different. He just exploded.’’

We walked together up the road toward the village. Barley fields spread for miles all around us. ‘‘A couple days later, I was good,’’ he said. ‘‘Ever since then, it’s been no problem. I just have to remember the videos.’’

He meant the videos of Foley, of the Syrian soldiers. He looked down and softened the earth with his boot. ‘‘See,’’ he said. ‘‘I have a big heart, and I never pictured myself actually doing it. I like to see the good in everybody.’’

The foreigners were sleeping in the villages, standing guard, burning trash, with no schedule and no plans. They were easy to spot. The Irishman with bright red hair and skin pale as the sky. Assorted Europeans who traveled in a pack. The Americans with too much sunscreen and gear. Some were fresh to the fight, and others had been on the ground for months.

At the village where I met Lawton, another American walked alone up a dirt road. The man was almost six feet tall, fair-skinned and balding with a goatee. He was a 48-year-old Ohioan named Avery Harrington, though the Kurds called him Cekdar. He was sweating but in good spirits. He drank noisily from a water bottle. A purple-velvet Crown Royal bag that held empty magazines dangled from his belt.

‘‘I’m 54 days over my visa stay,’’ he confessed.

Harrington was in the Marines during the first gulf war but never made it to the desert. Before arriving, he worked in the Ohio Department of Transportation as a highway technician, plowing snow in the winter. After connecting with the Lions of Rojava, he flew to Iraq in March 2015 with $10,000, body armor with steel plates, two canned hams, turkey bacon, 25 pairs of clean socks and 10 packets of baby wipes. He was able to cite the customs regulation — Section 126.17, Subsection F — that allowed every citizen to take one full set of body armor, including a helmet and gas mask, overseas. He paid more than $500 in baggage fees. The hams never left Iraq.

In April, when Harrington finally arrived in Syria, he was part of such a huge influx of foreign recruits that the Y.P.G. started making special units for Westerners, groups of roughly 12 soldiers. They went through a kind of boot camp called the academy. Harrington was one of seven in his class, including two other Americans, a New Zealander, an Iranian and two Brits, one of whom was an actor named Michael Enright. They trained together for just more than a week, learning to clean and dismantle Kalashnikovs. Those with more experience, like Harrington, were given PKC machine guns. Drills started at 6:15 a.m., and the men sometimes practiced blindfolded to prepare for nighttime attacks.

Why were the foreigners there? Some were escaping life back home. Others were old soldiers, trying to fill a void. A few just had delusions of grandeur. They came for the feeling of solidarity, or adventurism, or they came to fulfill a childhood fantasy, to act out some violent adolescent emotion. The youngest fighter was 19, and the oldest, I was told, was 66, a former English teacher from Canada named Peter Douglas. The veterans hoped to kill ISIS fighters and train the locals as they had been trained in the Marines or the Army. The civilians, among them a surf instructor and a philosophy student from the University of Manchester, wanted to learn what they could. They hoped their stamina was enough.

It started the same way for each of them: watching the war on television, then acting on their feelings of impotence and anger. They bought plane tickets from Philadelphia or Miami or Washington and flew solo across the Atlantic, following the orders of a Kurdish militant on Facebook who barely spoke English. It was exciting; it turned them on. They were there to help.

They crossed borders to join a de facto state run by a socialist militia with small arms, entering a battlefield where soldiers died of preventable wounds and untrained medics made tourniquets from broomsticks and torn blankets. The veterans had more experience with weapons than the Y.P.G., who fought with light infantry and without Kevlar. As one foreigner said, of a Kurdish unit, ‘‘I wouldn’t play paintball in that outfit.’’ These Westerners were genuinely brave, and yet the will to do good was not enough. The mind-set of the Y.P.G., some realized, had little to do with their own beliefs. “This is the Twilight Zone,” one said. “Lovely fairy tale,” said another. Many realized, far too late, that this wasn’t a normal deployment. Ad hoc organization, no advanced weaponry, no Black Hawk to airlift them to safety, few translators. They had abandoned everything — jobs, children, wives.

Some fought in combat, but many did not. What followed were purposeless days, sleepless nights, and I sensed a bit of humiliation among them. Like Marlow on his way up the Congo, these men seemed to experience a disturbance in their Western consciousness. They had vastly overestimated their use. Their service was respected but insignificant. These were men who arrived with a stark idea of good versus evil, who thought of themselves as heroes, and found themselves turning in circles.

‘‘We perpetually give,’’ Harrington said. ‘‘And we are perpetually getting screwed.’’

In the months after the first volunteers arrived in the fall of 2014, the foreign fighters battled ISIS alongside the Y.P.G., but then they started dying. By the summer, at least six foreigners had been killed, including one American. The Kurds started using the foreigners for safer tasks — to secure remote outposts or cover guard shifts in rear areas.

Jordan Matson, a 29-year-old Wisconsin man who ran the Facebook page at first, was among the few who continued to join the most dangerous missions. He said he was the second foreign fighter to arrive. He had been in Syria’s Kurdish territory for almost a year and was the darling of the Western militia movement. He was so popular that one woman, writing on Facebook, threatened to kill herself if he didn’t marry her. Another, he said, tried to travel to Syria with her child to ask for his hand in marriage.

I met Matson while he was taking a break from sniper duty. We were in the basement of an apartment building in Tel Tamer, a ghost town with closed storefronts and dogs with cut-off ears. Matson was over six feet and had a big jaw, a goatee and a childish grin. He wore full fatigues and carried a Kalashnikov. I asked if he had time to talk. Yes, he said — he had nothing to do. ‘‘If I have no one to play chess with, then I’m going to stare at that wall,’’ he said. ‘‘And then I’m going to stare at that wall. And when I’m done staring at that wall, I’m going to stare at that wall.’’ Matson asked if I wanted any doughnuts or soda. He was going to get something from a man down the street who worked at the only operating store in town. ‘‘I have lots of money,’’ he said. He wouldn’t say where the money came from except a ‘‘generous benefactor.’’ Harrington told me the foreigners were given a monthly allowance of about $100 for their services from the Y.P.G., which they used for extra food and toilet paper.

Before the war, Matson had never been outside the United States. He was working the third shift at a meatpacking plant in Wisconsin. He joined the Army and served for a year and a half before being discharged. ‘‘Hey, we think you have PTSD,’’ he said his superiors told him. He added, ‘‘But I don’t.’’ He was going through a divorce at the time; he later decided he had an emptiness in his life because he hadn’t deployed.

In June 2014, after the fall of Mosul, he learned on Facebook about an American named Brian Wilson. Wilson was in Rojava, fighting ISIS. They connected online, and Wilson gave him his contacts and suggested a flight route. That same month, Matson flew to Poland, then Turkey, and then drove to a town on the Turkish border. There, a Y.P.G. fighter picked him up in a fake taxi and drove Matson into Iraq. They stayed in Erbil and moved around safe houses; Matson pretended to be a doctor. They traveled deep into the mountains until they were able to cross the Tigris River at night into Syria.

Things happened quickly for him. There was no training and no induction. Matson joined a sniper unit. The soldiers’ job was to attack a group of ISIS militants who were firing mortars at a Christian police station. It was a six-hour firefight. A Y.P.G. fighter died in a suicide bombing. Matson was hit by a grenade and injured his foot. An ambulance ferried him to the regional hospital in Serekaniye.

It was there, bored during his recovery, that he worked on a page to recruit foreigners to the Y.P.G.: the Lions of Rojava. The banner was an image, altered with Photoshop, of foreign fighters. They were holding guns on a hilltop next to a giant lion; behind them was the smoke of ruined towns. It was news to most everyone that there was a Western-friendly faction in Syria. So many queries came in from veterans and nonveterans that he couldn’t deal with them.

Matson passed on the responsibility for the page a while ago. Kurdish Y.P.G. supporters run it and provide directions to prospective fighters on how to apply: Simply submit a résumé and statement of purpose. So far, Matson says, he has met about a hundred foreign recruits, but no one keeps track of the numbers.

Because of the language barrier, the foreigners couldn’t communicate well with the Kurds who were supposed to manage them. Conflicts between difficult personalities were allowed to fester. There were stories about drifters and lunatics. A British man who petted the dead ISIS bodies. Another who used his psychic abilities to hear ISIS fighters speak. One man requested to go home because of a bad case of attention-deficit disorder. Another said he understood what ISIS wanted and sympathized with their cause. Another was known for looking around and saying, ‘‘Did the C.I.A. send you?’’

I walked with Harrington to a neighboring village, where I would meet a driver who would take me out of Syria. Clay Lawton was there, along with an Estonian, a Dutchman and a Spaniard. I said my goodbyes and left. During the drive, a flat tire stranded us on the bank of a river, and Lawton poked his head over the truck bed. ‘‘Just catching a ride,’’ he said. ‘‘Mind if I go with you guys?’’

We rode in the bucket of a bulldozer across the river and then crawled up a wet bank and entered a field of yellow barley. A thin road cut through the field, and we hiked it.

‘‘See that village over there?’’ Lawton said. He pointed to a pile of concrete. ‘‘That’s where I shot the guy. Yeah, ISIS is right there,’’ he said. ‘‘We should probably not be standing here since we’re within sniper range. They’re probably looking at us right now. There still might be some ISIS guys left.’’

A white cloud rose from the dead fields. ‘‘Oh, yep, that’s an airstrike. That means there are still some guys right there.’’

He dragged his arm up and pointed. Neither of us had slept much, and so we didn’t make the effort to move.

Another driver waited for us at the end of the road. Lawton jumped in the van. ‘‘Where exactly do you want to go?’’ I asked.

‘‘Doesn’t matter,’’ he said. ‘‘Just take me to America, or a combat zone.’’

His plan was to change into civilian clothing and cross the border into Iraq. But when we looked in his duffel, he had only fatigues. We made one more stop, at the same location where he was first abandoned by his unit. After discussing the plans, we decided that the political situation was too tense to bring him across the border.

Lawton started dropping his belongings on the ground: camouflage shirts, a bundle of tank tops in a plastic bag. He would find a way out on his own, he said, and wanted to lighten his load. I headed back to the truck and looked back to see Lawton, alone again on the hill. His clothes made a small trail behind him in the dirt.




Avery Harrington

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/04/ma...ting-isis.html

[vt]

Re: The Empire Strikes . . . ?

Sad news from Turkey:

http://news.yahoo.com/turkey-suspect...091848640.html

[jk]

Re: The Empire Strikes . . . ?

@touchring, #511

china has also been tied [oil for missiles] to iran for years. thus i think it would be hard for the saudis to accept china as their protectors. you may be right that the saudis are going to be alone. they are still important customers for u.s. military hardware, though, so even if u.s. oil imports continue to drop, there will still be an important relationship.

here's a bit of info:Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) together imported $8.6bn of defence equipment in 2014, more than the imports of Western Europe combined.The United States maintained its position as the top exporter, shipping $23.7bn of equipment, ahead of Russia on $10bn.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/201...-arms-importer

[jk]

Re: The Empire Strikes . . . ?

I'm increasingly of the view that the USA no longer sees the Middle East/Persian Gulf as particularly important to it. Slowly, but steadily declining oil product consumption in the USA, declining imports from that region and, perhaps, a growing recognition of the root sources of the terrorism it fears may be some reasons. Perhaps it sees China as now being more dependent on Middle East crude supply. The USA might be quite serious about shifting its focus from the historic Atlantic-Europe-Middle East alignment to the Pacific, as it has stated, and let China figure out how to deal with the "War Against Beheadings"

or instead of the pacific tilt, there's the option of ej's "fortress america"- western hemisphere focus.

[don]

Re: The Empire Strikes . . . ?

[touchring]

Re: The Empire Strikes . . . ?

@touchring, #511


china has also been tied [oil for missiles] to iran for years. thus i think it would be hard for the saudis to accept china as their protectors. you may be right that the saudis are going to be alone. they are still important customers for u.s. military hardware, though, so even if u.s. oil imports continue to drop, there will still be an important relationship.


here's a bit of info:Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) together imported $8.6bn of defence equipment in 2014, more than the imports of Western Europe combined.The United States maintained its position as the top exporter, shipping $23.7bn of equipment, ahead of Russia on $10bn.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/201...-arms-importer

China is not going to protect the Saudis militarily like the US. China is not a military superpower, nor do their generals and soldiers even have real combat experience.

Perhaps the Saudis can get protection from Israel? I don't know Middle East politics well so this may sound like a joke.

Just a thought, if lowering oil prices is really strategy to cripple American oil shale production so that the US will rely more on Middle East oil, why don't the Saudis do it the shock and awe way? Announce a super hike in oil production, slam oil prices down to $20 a barrel or even $10 a barrel, free oil for all - the Chinese will start converting their swimming pools to store all this free oil.

This will bankrupt 90% of North American oil producers within a year.

[jk]

Re: The Empire Strikes . . . ?

China is not going to protect the Saudis militarily like the US. China is not a military superpower, nor do their generals and soldiers even have real combat experience.

Perhaps the Saudis can get protection from Israel? I don't know Middle East politics well so this may sound like a joke.

you're not the only person thinking of that.
http://www.mintpressnews.com/the-all...arabia/209548/
http://qz.com/520483/saudi-arabias-l...e-with-israel/

Just a thought, if lowering oil prices is really strategy to cripple American oil shale production so that the US will rely more on Middle East oil, why don't the Saudis do it the shock and awe way? Announce a super hike in oil production, slam oil prices down to $20 a barrel or even $10 a barrel, free oil for all - the Chinese will start converting their swimming pools to store all this free oil.

This will bankrupt 90% of North American oil producers within a year.

i don't think the saudi's have a great deal more capacity. perhaps someone more knowledgeable than i can comment on this. [grg55, where are you?]

grg55's comments have led me to believe that he thinks the swing production is now in u.s. shale. i know he's said the saudi's can lower prices [how far? going back to your question] but can't raise prices. i took this to mean that he, at least, believes that more u.s. shale would come on line to contain any price increase.

left unanswered is how long this equilibrium can be maintained before peak cheap oil reasserts itself.

[don]

Re: The Empire Strikes . . . ?

you're not the only person thinking of that.
http://www.mintpressnews.com/the-all...arabia/209548/
http://qz.com/520483/saudi-arabias-l...e-with-israel/


i don't think the saudi's have a great deal more capacity. perhaps someone more knowledgeable than i can comment on this. [grg55, where are you?]

grg55's comments have led me to believe that he thinks the swing production is now in u.s. shale. i know he's said the saudi's can lower prices [how far? going back to your question] but can't raise prices. i took this to mean that he, at least, believes that more u.s. shale would come on line to contain any price increase.

left unanswered is how long this equilibrium can be maintained before peak cheap oil reasserts itself.

A side note to that is the recent approval on exporting US oil.

China's force projection outside the South China Sea is nil and their military projections don't indicate a push in that direction. Electronic countermeasures, satellite denial, nimble nuclear deterrent launchers, high performance aircraft, in-theater missile development are prominent in their ongoing military profile. The enormous effort needed for global force projection capability - bases, logistics, very long range naval and air assets, etc. aren't showing in the cards.

[touchring]

Re: The Empire Strikes . . . ?

A crazy thought occurred to me this morning. Could it be possible that Obama and Putin actually discussed and planned the Russian takeover of the Syrian campaign way before it happened?

The speed at which the Russians attacked ISIS installation looks more like a continuation of coalition airstrikes than a new campaign? This was followed quickly by the Obama administration announced the withdrawal of the Syrian train and equip program.

All this appears to have be choreographed.

I just thought that this might be linked to the end of Obama's presidential term in 1 year's time. He may not be confident that Hillary can win so better hand Syria+ISIS over to the Russians than risk a new American ground war in Syria and Iraq should the Neocons take charge.

If this were the case, then the rebels are totally scrwed, have -1% chance of winning and should consider raising the white flag or a truce.

[don]

Re: The Empire Strikes . . . ?

BY M.K. BHADRAKUMARonOCTOBER 12, 2015inASIA TIMES NEWS & FEATURES

Washington’s move Friday to start removing the Patriot batteries from Turkey; the Pentagon announcement Friday regarding the termination of the covert operation to build a rebel Syrian army to overthrow the Assad government; the US decision to shift its own military operations to northeastern regions of Syria (away from the theatre of the Russian air strikes); Obama’s categorical statement ruling out a proxy war in Syria against Russia (even while estimating that Moscow is risking a quagmire in Syria); Obama’s pledge that the only war US intends to fight in Syria is the war against the Islamic State – all these need to be seen in perspective.

Put differently, the visit by the Saudi Deputy Crown Prince to meet Putin underscores that the prospects for a Moscow-led diplomatic track opening on Syria in a foreseeable future might have significantly improved. To be sure, Obama has no reason to view the Russian-Saudi proximity in zero sum terms. (By the way, Putin disclosed in a TV interview Sunday that the “first steps in the establishment of contacts [with the US] have been made already”.)

The meeting Russian President Vladimir Putin took Sunday at Sochi on the sidelines of the Russian Grand Prix with the powerful Defense Minister of Saudi Arabia and Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman al Saud (son of King Salman) signifies a dramatic shift of the templates in the geopolitics of the Syrian question.

The very fact that Mohammed bin Salman travelled to Russia for a second time this year already (ostensibly to watch the Formula 1, but intentionally to meet up with Putin) becomes hugely symbolic against the backdrop of the Russian military operations in Syria.

The bottom line is that Saudi Arabia has far from shifted into a hostile mood vis-à-vis Russia following the latter’s commencement of military operations in Syria.

The scant details available so far make out that Syria figured in Mohammed bin Salman’s talks with Putin, with the visiting Saudi prince maintaining that Riyadh backs a solution to the crisis in Syria, which would result in the formation of a transitional government and the removal of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

Now, is there a vague sign of a softening in the Saudi stance? Possibly so. At least, Mohammed bin Salman did not make Assad’s removal a precondition for the transition itself.
According to the Russian account, Mohammed bin Salman said Saudi Arabia desires improvement of ties with Russia and reportedly discussed cooperation in military technology (Russian code for arms deals.)

The most interesting part could be that Mohammed bin Salman flagged the Saudi interest in increased cooperation with Russia in fighting terrorism. The Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said Moscow sought to assuage Riyadh’s concerns on Syria and both sides shared the objective of preventing a “terrorist caliphate” from taking root in Syria.
Earlier Sunday, Putin also held a meeting in Sochi with the UAE Crown Prince Mohammad bin Zayed al-Nahyan in which, again, Syria figured.

Conceivably, there would have been some degree of back-to-back consultations between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi prior to Monday’s dramatic diplomatic engagements in Sochi.

One key point to be noted is that Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the two key GCC powers, have opened a direct line to the Kremlin within no time after the US President Barack Obama summarily decided that the $500 million program to train a Syrian rebel force is being terminated.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are seriously overstretched in Yemen. The Saudi-Emirati intervention in Yemen was always a high-risk gambit and a classic dilemma faces them today after over six months into the war – wade deeper into the river of blood by taking the war to the Houthi heartland in the north (which would require deployment of much larger forces) or to cut free by accepting some form of Houthi self-rule in the north.

But then, the specter that is haunting Saudi Arabia and the UAE is also of Yemen undergoing a north-south split as two entities (as they used to be in the Cold War era.) However, acquiescing with a break-up of Yemen would mean that Riyadh will be not only presiding over the split of a fellow Arab state on sectarian lines (which would be precedent-setting and highly damaging to the Saudi prestige) but also demands that Saudi Arabia would have to learn to live with a de facto Houthi state on its southern border which is certain to be hostile.

On the other hand, if the Saudis plunge deeper into the Houthi heartland, they would be taking on a battle-hardened and highly capable guerilla army on its native turf, which also happens to be an extremely difficult terrain. (Indeed, the risks for Saudi Arabia’s finances if it plunges deeper into the Yemeni morass are self-evident, too.)

Suffice it so say, Yemen needs to be brought up before the UN Security Council where Russia would have a decisive role to play in helping the Saudis and the Emiratis to make a decent face-saving exit from the war.

[don]

Re: The Empire Strikes . . . ?

Who knew Syria would prove so useful to so many . . . .

Back in February when the passport scandal gained media attention, Peter Lee of Asia Times surmised the possibility of Erdogan using Uyghur manpower as his potential power projection asset in Syria.[9] While it is acknowledged Turkey is hospitable to Uyghur refugees and indulges on its notion as protector of the Turkish-speaking world, China would take issue with Turkey setting up a pipeline to encourage Uyghur emigration for Syrian and eventual Chinese jihad.

Training Uyghur ‘rebels’ for Syrian and Chinese jihad?

This threat is further solidified when in September, MEMRI TV translated a video of how the Chinese militant group TIP is setting up training camps with their families in Idlib, along with a new colony of 3,500 Uyghurs near the camps.[10] TIP itself released photos of its camps in Idlib as well as camps to train jihadists “cubs”.[11]

The video went on to say that “thousands of Chinese turkistanis” fleeing China were resettled in the area especially in the village of Zanbaq that is changing Syrian demography, with 20,000 more being trained by Turkish intelligence MIT in Istanbul as “rebels” to eventually fight Assad in Syria and continue onto China.

In light of these developments, it seems Erdogan may view the increasingly Turkic character of Idlib and Aleppo as another Hatay, with view of “pulling a Crimea” for eventual annexation.

While 20,000 Uyghur turks being trained as rebels is hopefully an exaggerated number, it is true TIP is part of Turkey’s Army of Conquest. With ramped up terrorist attacks in China the past two years, and its evolution similar to ISIS from a terrorist organization to a professional army with Turkey’s training, if Erdogan continues this policy he will likely provoke China to enter the Syrian war to neutralize this threat to Chinese sovereignty.

[11] https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Jiha...-children.html; https://news.siteintelgroup.com/tag/31.html


Dr. Christina Lin is a Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at SAIS-Johns Hopkins University. She is the author of “The New Silk Road: China’s Energy Strategy in the Greater Middle East” (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy), and a former director for China policy at the U.S. Department of Defense.

2015 Asia Times

[jk]

Re: The Empire Strikes . . . ?

Pavel K. Baev | October 9, 2015 10:37am
Russia's Syrian entanglement: Can the West sit back and watch?

• Russia
• Syria
• Middle East and North Africa
• International Affairs
• Putin

For observers who are confined by the boundaries of conventional strategic sense, every day of Russia’s military intervention in Syria brings fresh surprises. Indiscriminate strikes against Turkey-backed and CIA-trained opposition groups (which could not possibly be mistaken for ISIS) were followed by deliberate violations of Turkey’s airspace, and then by the spectacular cruise missile salvo from warships in the Caspian Sea. More astonishing turns are almost certain to come, prompting more reevaluation of the power projection capabilities that Russia brings to bear in this high-risk enterprise.
Good morning, Latakia

The intervention, which President Vladimir Putin preferred not to announce in his address to the U.N. General Assembly on September 26, could become an exemplar of achieving maximum political effect from very limited application of force. The three dozen or so combat planes deployed to the hastily prepared airbase outside Latakia perform 20 to 30 sorties a day. That would not have made much of a difference in the U.S.-led air campaign against ISIS that has been going on for more than a year. What makes a difference is targeting opposition groups of various persuasions that were not anticipating such treatment. This tactical surprise is by definition short-term, and in order to continue making a difference—and for the campaign to really resonate—Russia needs to escalate.

The intervention...could become an exemplar of achieving maximum political effect from very limited application of force.

This will be very hard to accomplish. The composite air regiment on the no-frills airbase includes fighters and helicopters of at least five different types. That creates a logistical nightmare, since all supplies have to be shipped by the several naval transports from Novorossiysk and Sevastopol. Several transport aircraft can add only so much to this stretched supply line, so the intervention has to be aimed at achieving some tangible results as soon as possible. The deployment to Latakia of a squadron of Su-25 light fighter-bombers and a squadron of Mi-24 attack helicopters indicates that the main task of this force is not medium-range strikes on high-value assets (on which Russia has scant intelligence data) but close air support. Such a high-risk mission only makes sense if the government troops and Alawite militias launch an offensive operation, most probably aimed at securing the Latakia province from the attacks from the north, where the Nusra Front has been active.
A key condition for such an offensive is that the government forces—together with Hezbollah troops—can stabilize the front around Damascus, where Russian squadrons dare not to show up. Damascus remains the center of gravity in this mutating civil war, even if Latakia is of particular importance as the home-ground for the Assad Alawi clan. What makes control over Damascus more precarious than ever is the possibility that Russian intervention would compel various opposition forces—who until now have focused on fighting one another as eagerly as they fight the government—to unite against the “infidels”.
Sapogi in the sand?

The burning issue for the coming days is whether the lack of meaningful results from the air strikes would prompt the Russian leadership to deploy ground forces. This would follow the “mission creep” script typical of ill-conceived interventions. Putin’s denials of such plans only increase suspicions that under the guise of “volunteers,” units of special forces and then regular battalions would engage in a ground offensive.
Two obstacles stand in the way of such rapid deployment. Firstly, despite the effective ceasefire in eastern Ukraine, the best troops in the Russian army remain concentrated in or near the Donbass war zone. The approaching autumnal draft cycle will deliver the usual sharp decline in the combat readiness of the ground forces, as the better-trained half of soldiers in every unit goes home and raw recruits fill the ranks. Secondly, transporting and supplying tanks and heavy weapons for even one battalion tactical group of about 1,000 soldiers would be an extremely hard challenge for the already-stretched capabilities for strategic air- and sea-lift. In domestic military exercises such as Tsentr-2015, troops and equipment were moved around primarily by rail. There is obviously no such connection to Syria.

[G]round forces...would follow the “mission creep” script typical of ill-conceived interventions.

Putin also knows that placing Russian military boots (or sapogi) in the Syrian sands would be very unpopular, and no amount of propaganda spin placed on the telegenic air strikes can secure a shift in public opinion. The Russian High Command can certainly try some other means of delivering strikes, for instance by the air-launched cruise missiles from the Tu-160 strategic bombers cruising at a safe distance from the battleground. A nuclear submarine can deliver a salvo of long-range cruise missiles from the Mediterranean, primarily in order to show the versatility of Russian power projection. But the role of ground forces most probably will remain limited to immediate protection of the Latakia base.
Calibrating counter-moves

For the United States, avoiding the temptation to over-react is still the key guideline. It stands to reason that the best response, when your opponent is sinking deeper in a blunder of its own making, is not to interfere. This past summer, the Russian Air Force had a dismal record of crashes caused by poor maintenance, and the high stress of the Syrian air campaign is certain to bring more of those. A series of terrorist attacks may shatter the security of the Latakia base, which makes it a very attractive target indeed. Rebels may also use Katyusha missiles for hitting the over-crowded airstrip.
It makes perfect sense to let such disasters arrive in their due course, but there is one significant exception to this indifferent approach: Turkey. Turkey is deeply upset with Russian direct support to the Assad regime, outraged by the violations of its airspace, and threatened by the air war so close to its borders. Statements of support from NATO headquarters are not enough; at the very minimum, the decision to withdraw the batteries of Patriot surface-to-air missiles must be cancelled. When Estonia and Latvia came under Russian pressure last year, NATO gathered the resources and political will to bolster their security—and Russian air provocations on the Baltic theater have practically ceased. Turkey has every right to expect nothing less.
Finally, the United States and its allies could deliver a series of airstrikes on the Hezbollah bands around Damascus. That would be less confrontational vis-à-vis Russia than hitting Assad’s forces. Hezbollah has already suffered losses in the Syrian war and is not particularly motivated to stand with Assad to the bitter end, away from own home-ground in Lebanon. (Israel would appreciate such punishment, too.)
Moscow will be hard-pressed to find a way out of its Syrian adventure. Order will not be imposed through force by dictators in the Middle East. The awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet shows there is another, and ultimately more effective, way. As order continues to erode in Syria, it wouldn’t be wrong for leaders in Washington to just let the Russians entangle themselves. But the United States has allies to worry about, too.
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order...nts-syria-baev

[jk]

Re: The Empire Strikes . . . ?

Pavel K. Baev | October 9, 2015 10:37am
Russia's Syrian entanglement: Can the West sit back and watch?


For observers who are confined by the boundaries of conventional strategic sense, every day of Russia’s military intervention in Syria brings fresh surprises. Indiscriminate strikes against Turkey-backed and CIA-trained opposition groups (which could not possibly be mistaken for ISIS) were followed by deliberate violations of Turkey’s airspace, and then by the spectacular cruise missile salvo from warships in the Caspian Sea. More astonishing turns are almost certain to come, prompting more reevaluation of the power projection capabilities that Russia brings to bear in this high-risk enterprise.
Good morning, Latakia

The intervention, which President Vladimir Putin preferred not to announce in his address to the U.N. General Assembly on September 26, could become an exemplar of achieving maximum political effect from very limited application of force. The three dozen or so combat planes deployed to the hastily prepared airbase outside Latakia perform 20 to 30 sorties a day. That would not have made much of a difference in the U.S.-led air campaign against ISIS that has been going on for more than a year. What makes a difference is targeting opposition groups of various persuasions that were not anticipating such treatment. This tactical surprise is by definition short-term, and in order to continue making a difference—and for the campaign to really resonate—Russia needs to escalate.

The intervention...could become an exemplar of achieving maximum political effect from very limited application of force.

This will be very hard to accomplish. The composite air regiment on the no-frills airbase includes fighters and helicopters of at least five different types. That creates a logistical nightmare, since all supplies have to be shipped by the several naval transports from Novorossiysk and Sevastopol. Several transport aircraft can add only so much to this stretched supply line, so the intervention has to be aimed at achieving some tangible results as soon as possible. The deployment to Latakia of a squadron of Su-25 light fighter-bombers and a squadron of Mi-24 attack helicopters indicates that the main task of this force is not medium-range strikes on high-value assets (on which Russia has scant intelligence data) but close air support. Such a high-risk mission only makes sense if the government troops and Alawite militias launch an offensive operation, most probably aimed at securing the Latakia province from the attacks from the north, where the Nusra Front has been active.
A key condition for such an offensive is that the government forces—together with Hezbollah troops—can stabilize the front around Damascus, where Russian squadrons dare not to show up. Damascus remains the center of gravity in this mutating civil war, even if Latakia is of particular importance as the home-ground for the Assad Alawi clan. What makes control over Damascus more precarious than ever is the possibility that Russian intervention would compel various opposition forces—who until now have focused on fighting one another as eagerly as they fight the government—to unite against the “infidels”.
Sapogi in the sand?

The burning issue for the coming days is whether the lack of meaningful results from the air strikes would prompt the Russian leadership to deploy ground forces. This would follow the “mission creep” script typical of ill-conceived interventions. Putin’s denials of such plans only increase suspicions that under the guise of “volunteers,” units of special forces and then regular battalions would engage in a ground offensive.
Two obstacles stand in the way of such rapid deployment. Firstly, despite the effective ceasefire in eastern Ukraine, the best troops in the Russian army remain concentrated in or near the Donbass war zone. The approaching autumnal draft cycle will deliver the usual sharp decline in the combat readiness of the ground forces, as the better-trained half of soldiers in every unit goes home and raw recruits fill the ranks. Secondly, transporting and supplying tanks and heavy weapons for even one battalion tactical group of about 1,000 soldiers would be an extremely hard challenge for the already-stretched capabilities for strategic air- and sea-lift. In domestic military exercises such as Tsentr-2015, troops and equipment were moved around primarily by rail. There is obviously no such connection to Syria.

[G]round forces...would follow the “mission creep” script typical of ill-conceived interventions.

Putin also knows that placing Russian military boots (or sapogi) in the Syrian sands would be very unpopular, and no amount of propaganda spin placed on the telegenic air strikes can secure a shift in public opinion. The Russian High Command can certainly try some other means of delivering strikes, for instance by the air-launched cruise missiles from the Tu-160 strategic bombers cruising at a safe distance from the battleground. A nuclear submarine can deliver a salvo of long-range cruise missiles from the Mediterranean, primarily in order to show the versatility of Russian power projection. But the role of ground forces most probably will remain limited to immediate protection of the Latakia base.
Calibrating counter-moves

For the United States, avoiding the temptation to over-react is still the key guideline. It stands to reason that the best response, when your opponent is sinking deeper in a blunder of its own making, is not to interfere. This past summer, the Russian Air Force had a dismal record of crashes caused by poor maintenance, and the high stress of the Syrian air campaign is certain to bring more of those. A series of terrorist attacks may shatter the security of the Latakia base, which makes it a very attractive target indeed. Rebels may also use Katyusha missiles for hitting the over-crowded airstrip.
It makes perfect sense to let such disasters arrive in their due course, but there is one significant exception to this indifferent approach: Turkey. Turkey is deeply upset with Russian direct support to the Assad regime, outraged by the violations of its airspace, and threatened by the air war so close to its borders. Statements of support from NATO headquarters are not enough; at the very minimum, the decision to withdraw the batteries of Patriot surface-to-air missiles must be cancelled. When Estonia and Latvia came under Russian pressure last year, NATO gathered the resources and political will to bolster their security—and Russian air provocations on the Baltic theater have practically ceased. Turkey has every right to expect nothing less.
Finally, the United States and its allies could deliver a series of airstrikes on the Hezbollah bands around Damascus. That would be less confrontational vis-à-vis Russia than hitting Assad’s forces. Hezbollah has already suffered losses in the Syrian war and is not particularly motivated to stand with Assad to the bitter end, away from own home-ground in Lebanon. (Israel would appreciate such punishment, too.)
Moscow will be hard-pressed to find a way out of its Syrian adventure. Order will not be imposed through force by dictators in the Middle East. The awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet shows there is another, and ultimately more effective, way. As order continues to erode in Syria, it wouldn’t be wrong for leaders in Washington to just let the Russians entangle themselves. But the United States has allies to worry about, too.
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order...nts-syria-baev

[Woodsman]

Hotel Kabulfornia

You can check out anytime you'd like but you can never leave...

WASHINGTON (AP) -- President Barack Obama announced plans Thursday to keep nearly 10,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan through most of next year and 5,500 when he leaves office in 2017, casting aside his promise to end the war on his watch and instead ensuring he hands off the conflict to a successor.

Obama called the new war plan a "modest but meaningful" extension of the U.S. military mission in Afghanistan, which he originally planned to end next year. He acknowledged America's weariness of the lengthy conflict but said he was "firmly convinced we should make this extra effort."