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  • #376
    Re: whose piece of sand?

    Originally posted by lakedaemonian View Post
    Please don't get me wrong.

    I'm well aware of the horrible actions Iran, specifically it's theocracy and IRGC/Qods Force, are responsible for....as well as actions "by, with, thru" the likes of Hez and other Iranian proxies over the years.

    What I think is that culturally, there's more synergy between Iranian society and the west, than the GCC and the west......UAE/Dubai notwithstanding.

    I personally know folks on the receiving end of Iranian EFPs deployed by Iranian proxies.

    In 2003 onwards, it was Iran fomenting the chaos.

    But once Iran had gained influence and control in Iraq, and once Syria's regime started to falter, Iran went from being the party bent on starting fires, to being the one trying to put them out(same with the shift in Lebanon from being firestarter to firefighter over the last few decades)....as I mentioned in my other previous posts.....the tables have turned, roles have reversed.
    when you are the insiders, the ones in control, you're putting out fires. when you are the outsiders or rebels, you're starting them. your analysis that it's the gcc starting fires at the moment makes sense. but in a grand, regional civil/religious war the tides will ebb and flow. and the firestarters and the firefighters will exchange roles from time to time, or from sub-region to sub-region. there's plenty of blame to go around.

    Comment

    • #377
      Re: whose piece of sand?

      LD, do you know of anyone who could be a peace-broker between these two antagonists? Is there anyone among the Kurds who would be acceptable to both sides. If there is significant continued damage to oil output a lot of powerful groups will be seeking a quick end to the fighting. "The spice must flow."
      "I love a dog, he does nothing for political reasons." --Will Rogers

      Comment

      • #378
        Re: whose piece of sand?

        Originally posted by photon555 View Post
        LD, do you know of anyone who could be a peace-broker between these two antagonists? Is there anyone among the Kurds who would be acceptable to both sides. If there is significant continued damage to oil output a lot of powerful groups will be seeking a quick end to the fighting. "The spice must flow."
        I'm far more familiar with Afghan politics(met a few of their recent candidates, but still certainly no SME there either) than Iraqi.

        If I was running Kurdistan, I'd be wanting to maintain a haven of security/stability, nurturing a positive relationship with Turkey if possible(if only a temporary alignment of interests), and angling for recognition of sovereignty by the international community(including Turkey).

        I think part of the problem with both Syria and Iraq is so many sides to the story, all with their own agendas.

        I honestly cannot think of anyone(or anything) even close to impartial willing/able to mediate this and bring together all the disparate players with a hand in it.

        Comment

        • #379
          Re: whose piece of sand?

          Originally posted by lakedaemonian View Post
          I'm far more familiar with Afghan politics(met a few of their recent candidates, but still certainly no SME there either) than Iraqi.

          If I was running Kurdistan, I'd be wanting to maintain a haven of security/stability, nurturing a positive relationship with Turkey if possible(if only a temporary alignment of interests), and angling for recognition of sovereignty by the international community(including Turkey).

          I think part of the problem with both Syria and Iraq is so many sides to the story, all with their own agendas.

          I honestly cannot think of anyone(or anything) even close to impartial willing/able to mediate this and bring together all the disparate players with a hand in it.
          Not that long ago "peace negotiations" in the Middle East referred to gathering together the Palestinians and the Israelis (in Paris, Oslo or at Camp David) followed thereafter by talk of which participants would thus secure Nobel Peace Prize nominations (for giving it the ol' college try apparently).

          Now look where we are...

          Comment

          • #380
            Re: whose piece of sand?

            Originally posted by GRG55 View Post
            Not that long ago "peace negotiations" in the Middle East referred to gathering together the Palestinians and the Israelis (in Paris, Oslo or at Camp David) followed thereafter by talk of which participants would thus secure Nobel Peace Prize nominations (for giving it the ol' college try apparently).

            Now look where we are...
            Along those lines, and in a different AO, there was a rather weird collection of players.

            Sri Lanka

            There was the Sri Lankan Government on one side, the LTTE Tamil Tigers on the other side, and Norway somehow got caught in the middle as mediator.

            It was all a sham.

            During the sham peace process and "ceasefire"(early 2000's) both sides were aggressively reconsolidating their base, attacking each other covertly, and preparing for total war.

            Which is how it ended.

            Total war, waged by Sri Lanka(supported by China) on the LTTE resulting in the complete annihilation of the LTTE, up through and including the execution of LTTE commander Prabhakaran's young son to extinguish any chance of the return of the LTTE.

            According to a friend who was there in a related(but oblique) capacity, atrocities were completely off the charts.

            I suspect before this is over, there's a very good chance we will see some pretty horrific and history worthy atrocities.

            ----------

            For the first time(or is that second time, Syria is the 1st I reckon) the Israeli-Palestinian conflict seems quite simple by comparison.

            Comment

            • #381
              Re: whose piece of sand?

              Who Will Win in Iraq?

              ISIS Will Fail in Iraq, and Iran Will Be the Victor

              By STEVEN SIMON


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              WASHINGTON — TO go by much of the commentary about Iraq in recent days, the country is already past the breaking point under the lightning campaign by Sunni insurgents. Reinforced by hardened fighters from Syria and sympathetic communities in northern and western Iraq, the insurgents control much of Mosul, the most important city in northern Iraq, and Tikrit, the home of Saddam Hussein’s clan, and they have laid siege to Samarra, the site of one of Shiism’s most storied shrines. It would be no surprise if the next few weeks brought them to the gates of Baghdad.
              But an assault on Baghdad, or even its capture, would be an illusory victory. It can only end in defeat — and the strengthening of the insurgents’ sworn Shiite enemies in Baghdad and, especially, Tehran.
              First, consider the brute demographic reality. Unlike in Syria, Sunnis are a relatively small part of the Iraqi population, about 25 percent — though they are a majority in some areas of the west and north. And in Baghdad their numbers are minuscule.
              The reason for this lies in an earlier Sunni revolt triggered by the second gulf war. Baghdad was the target then, too, and its Sunni population was about 35 percent. As the Sunnis asserted themselves militarily, Shiites struck back; by 2008, when their fury was largely spent, Sunnis were reduced to as little as 12 percent of the city’s population.
              If the insurgents of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, or ISIS, enter Baghdad’s residual Sunni neighborhoods, they will likely be welcomed, but they won’t have much to work with, nor will they have the strategic depth they will need in the street fighting that ensues.
              Moreover, rather like what happened in Syria, the Sunni offensive is likely to spur a transformation of the Iraqi Army from the sorry mess it is now into a more resilient and operationally effective force.
              In Syria, the army reeled in the face of the rebellion in 2011; desertions were rife and large sections of territory were lost to the insurgency. But as incompetent commanders were killed or relieved and a new leadership emerged, the army was able to bring its vastly greater firepower to bear on an increasingly fractionated adversary. Its combat capability was multiplied by the successful integration of civilian militias and the intelligence and tactical advice supplied by Iran. This trajectory is likely to be replicated in Iraq.
              The character of the Sunni offensive will mobilize more than just the army. Mass execution has been meshed with the use of religious symbolism by the insurgents, who framed their objective as extirpating “the filth” — Shiite teaching and believers — from Najaf and Karbala, the two holiest Shiite cities. In a minority war on a majority population, this is a suicidal tactic. The Shiites will hit back even harder than last time.
              In addition to being hobbled by their paltry numbers, the rebels have chosen to make war on an adversary with powerful friends who have a serious stake in the future of Iraq.
              Continue reading the main story Continue reading the main story
              Continue reading the main story
              Iran has already pledged assistance to the government of Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki and reportedly deployed elite units of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps to Iraq. The United States has sent an aircraft carrier and amphibious assault ship to the Persian Gulf and stepped up intelligence help for the Iraqi government.
              Although Washington is unlikely to use force directly against the rebels — in part because insurgents don’t present the kind of targets that American air power is optimized to destroy, and in part because of reluctance to re-engage militarily in Iraq — the kind of advisory help, material assistance and diplomatic support that is on offer will stiffen Iraq’s spine. Perceptions, real or imagined, of American and Iranian collusion will help, too.
              At the same time, gulf states that tacitly support the rebels as payback against Iran for its perceived takeover of Iraq will do nothing to support the rebels’ military campaign, for fear of creating an uncontrollable situation, even if their nationals privately fund the rebel army.
              And once the fighting is over, the Sunnis will be even more isolated than before. President Obama’s call for a multiethnic governing coalition aside, it is inconceivable that Mr. Maliki will now reverse his policy of excluding Sunnis from governance.
              In short, despite the rapid success of the Sunni campaign, it is a kamikaze attack that will make the Shiite hold on the Iraqi state stronger, not weaker.
              That said, it’s unlikely that Mr. Maliki will have the stomach to retake the Sunni-majority areas of western Iraq anytime soon. The rump Iraq, like the Assad regime in Syria, will be ever more in thrall to Iran, and committed to domestic policies that make the reconstitution of the country via a political process ever more unlikely.
              That’s hardly an optimal outcome for Washington: Among other things, Washington’s support for the Maliki government will put further strain on its ties to the gulf states; it will also complicate any effort to deal aggressively with Iran, with which it will find itself in an odd-couple alliance.
              American policy makers might anticipate that the insurgency will burn itself out before it presents a real threat to American interests. But they can’t relax too much, because to the extent that this sectarian brawl produces something resembling a winner, it won’t be in Washington, Mosul or Baghdad — but in Tehran.
              Steven Simon, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, was the senior director for the Middle East and North Africa at the National Security Council from 2011 to 2012.

              Comment

              • #382
                Re: whose piece of sand?

                Who Will Win in Iraq?

                ISIS Will Fail in Iraq, and Iran Will Be the Victor

                By STEVEN SIMON


                Continue reading the main story


                Continue reading the main story Share This Page
                • email
                • facebook
                • twitter
                • save
                • more

                Continue reading the main story Continue reading the main story This story is included with an NYT Opinion subscription.
                Learn more »



                WASHINGTON — TO go by much of the commentary about Iraq in recent days, the country is already past the breaking point under the lightning campaign by Sunni insurgents. Reinforced by hardened fighters from Syria and sympathetic communities in northern and western Iraq, the insurgents control much of Mosul, the most important city in northern Iraq, and Tikrit, the home of Saddam Hussein’s clan, and they have laid siege to Samarra, the site of one of Shiism’s most storied shrines. It would be no surprise if the next few weeks brought them to the gates of Baghdad.
                But an assault on Baghdad, or even its capture, would be an illusory victory. It can only end in defeat — and the strengthening of the insurgents’ sworn Shiite enemies in Baghdad and, especially, Tehran.
                First, consider the brute demographic reality. Unlike in Syria, Sunnis are a relatively small part of the Iraqi population, about 25 percent — though they are a majority in some areas of the west and north. And in Baghdad their numbers are minuscule.
                The reason for this lies in an earlier Sunni revolt triggered by the second gulf war. Baghdad was the target then, too, and its Sunni population was about 35 percent. As the Sunnis asserted themselves militarily, Shiites struck back; by 2008, when their fury was largely spent, Sunnis were reduced to as little as 12 percent of the city’s population.
                If the insurgents of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, or ISIS, enter Baghdad’s residual Sunni neighborhoods, they will likely be welcomed, but they won’t have much to work with, nor will they have the strategic depth they will need in the street fighting that ensues.
                Moreover, rather like what happened in Syria, the Sunni offensive is likely to spur a transformation of the Iraqi Army from the sorry mess it is now into a more resilient and operationally effective force.
                In Syria, the army reeled in the face of the rebellion in 2011; desertions were rife and large sections of territory were lost to the insurgency. But as incompetent commanders were killed or relieved and a new leadership emerged, the army was able to bring its vastly greater firepower to bear on an increasingly fractionated adversary. Its combat capability was multiplied by the successful integration of civilian militias and the intelligence and tactical advice supplied by Iran. This trajectory is likely to be replicated in Iraq.
                The character of the Sunni offensive will mobilize more than just the army. Mass execution has been meshed with the use of religious symbolism by the insurgents, who framed their objective as extirpating “the filth” — Shiite teaching and believers — from Najaf and Karbala, the two holiest Shiite cities. In a minority war on a majority population, this is a suicidal tactic. The Shiites will hit back even harder than last time.
                In addition to being hobbled by their paltry numbers, the rebels have chosen to make war on an adversary with powerful friends who have a serious stake in the future of Iraq.
                Continue reading the main story Continue reading the main story
                Continue reading the main story
                Iran has already pledged assistance to the government of Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki and reportedly deployed elite units of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps to Iraq. The United States has sent an aircraft carrier and amphibious assault ship to the Persian Gulf and stepped up intelligence help for the Iraqi government.
                Although Washington is unlikely to use force directly against the rebels — in part because insurgents don’t present the kind of targets that American air power is optimized to destroy, and in part because of reluctance to re-engage militarily in Iraq — the kind of advisory help, material assistance and diplomatic support that is on offer will stiffen Iraq’s spine. Perceptions, real or imagined, of American and Iranian collusion will help, too.
                At the same time, gulf states that tacitly support the rebels as payback against Iran for its perceived takeover of Iraq will do nothing to support the rebels’ military campaign, for fear of creating an uncontrollable situation, even if their nationals privately fund the rebel army.
                And once the fighting is over, the Sunnis will be even more isolated than before. President Obama’s call for a multiethnic governing coalition aside, it is inconceivable that Mr. Maliki will now reverse his policy of excluding Sunnis from governance.
                In short, despite the rapid success of the Sunni campaign, it is a kamikaze attack that will make the Shiite hold on the Iraqi state stronger, not weaker.
                That said, it’s unlikely that Mr. Maliki will have the stomach to retake the Sunni-majority areas of western Iraq anytime soon. The rump Iraq, like the Assad regime in Syria, will be ever more in thrall to Iran, and committed to domestic policies that make the reconstitution of the country via a political process ever more unlikely.
                That’s hardly an optimal outcome for Washington: Among other things, Washington’s support for the Maliki government will put further strain on its ties to the gulf states; it will also complicate any effort to deal aggressively with Iran, with which it will find itself in an odd-couple alliance.
                American policy makers might anticipate that the insurgency will burn itself out before it presents a real threat to American interests. But they can’t relax too much, because to the extent that this sectarian brawl produces something resembling a winner, it won’t be in Washington, Mosul or Baghdad — but in Tehran.
                Steven Simon, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, was the senior director for the Middle East and North Africa at the National Security Council from 2011 to 2012.

                Comment

                • #383
                  Re: Meanwhile Back in the Sandbox...

                  Originally posted by GRG55 View Post
                  So how do ya like it so far?


                  Qatar rift is pivotal test for disunited Gulf families

                  RIYADH/KUWAIT Thu Mar 6, 2014 10:11am EST

                  (Reuters) - A breach between Qatar and some of its Gulf Arab neighbors is a pivotal test for a three-decade-old union of monarchies formed to stand united when threatened by common enemies.

                  The six neighbors have struggled for years to transform their alliance from a simple security pact into an integrated economy. But plans for a customs union, integrated power grids and a joint military command remain unfinished or unrealized.

                  Critics of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) blame its inadequacies on petty jealousies, border disputes, or the perceived dominance of its biggest member, Saudi Arabia.

                  If the allies can no longer reach broad agreement on how to navigate the political troubles afflicting the region, then the main point of their partnership is in question, say analysts.

                  Born more out of fear than greed, the GCC, which also includes Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman, has managed to present a united front at times of threat ranging from Iranian revolution to Iraqi invasion.

                  The club was born in 1981 to counter the revolutionaries who had toppled Iran's Shah, a fellow dynast familiar to Gulf Arab leaders, two years earlier. As Iran and Iraq embarked on an eight-year war, survival became the watchword for the GCC.

                  Now, even as most Gulf Arab economies are booming and the GCC touts itself as a rare outpost of stability in a turbulent region, the member countries have never appeared more divided.

                  "Will the GCC kill itself?" ran Thursday's headline in Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Rai.

                  Wednesday's statement by Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain that they were withdrawing ambassadors from Doha and all but accusing Qatar of undermining their internal stability was unprecedented as a public display of divisions...

                  ...Saudi Arabia and the UAE are incensed by Qatar's support for the Muslim Brotherhood, which they regard as a dangerous political enemy. They are also cross about Doha's backing for more radical Islamist groups in Syria...

                  ...Saudi Arabia and Qatar are leading backers of rival Syrian rebel groups, and they and other Gulf states are the principal external forces supporting key players in Egypt and Yemen.

                  Acting together they could effect regional change. Apart, they risk dragging the Gulf into the post-Arab Spring quagmire.

                  A Gulf Arab diplomat said the decision to recall the envoys was taken after a meeting of GCC foreign ministers on Tuesday at which it became clear Qatar would not change its approach...

                  ...There have been plenty of previous rifts among the six dynasties, which sometimes appear to regard each other as rivals rather than partners, but they have never involved such an airing of dirty linen or come at such a dangerous time.

                  Unlike in the past, the Gulf states cannot count on strong Arab allies with large armies to see off external threats.

                  Gulf citizens see their region as the last bastion of security in the Arab world, with Iraq and Syria in conflict, Yemen and Libya in chaos, Egypt destabilized and Lebanon and Jordan undermined by turmoil in neighboring states                  ...

                  ...Critics of the GCC deride its failure to fulfill its promises, such as a currency or border union. Despite big arms purchases, all its members remain dependent for their defense on alliances with Western powers, principally the United States.

                  The Gulf countries refer to each other in official statements as "full brothers", the closest blood relationship in a society traditionally built upon large polygamous families.

                  But they have often nursed sibling rivalries in disputes ranging from border demarcation and foreign policy to occasionally unflattering portrayal of rulers in each other's state media...

                  ...For Saudi Arabia in particular, the disunity is a source of frustration. Riyadh has pushed hard since late 2011 for the GCC to forge a closer union on a shared foreign and security policy.

                  The personal initiative of King Abdullah, the idea emerged as a response to the Arab Spring and fears of Iranian interference and represents an important building block of Saudi efforts to become less dependent on the West.

                  But in December Oman said outright it did not want to be part of such a union, weeks after angering Riyadh by facilitating secret U.S.-Iranian talks that the Saudis fear will reduce international pressure on Tehran.Kuwait stayed above the fray this week, talking of acting as a mediator when its emir returns from a medical trip overseas, but refraining from joining the pressure on Doha.

                  "The Saudis are strongly committed to the unity of the Gulf states, and they want other states to take their share of responsibilities towards the people of the Gulf," said Saud al-Sarhan, director of research at the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies in Riyadh.

                  "Saudi Arabia is taking control of regional and Arab security, and slowly bringing to an end the era of reliance on foreign partners for strategic priorities," he added.
                  The talk continues. Although the headline says "agreement", the Arab League does not have a track record of achieving agreement on anything.



                  The League has been meeting in Sharm el-Sheikh amid a crisis in Yemen and the threat of jihadists who have made major gains in Iraq, Syria and Libya.

                  However, establishing the make-up and remit of the force could take months, analysts say...

                  ...Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi said: "The Arab leaders have decided to agree on the principle of a joint Arab military force."

                  Like everyone else, President Sisi sees plenty to worry about as he looks across the Middle East. He describes the growing threats to the region as "unprecedented"...

                  ...Egyptian officials quoted by Associated Press said the force would comprise some 40,000 elite troops, supported by war planes, naval vessels and light armour.

                  The creation of the joint force has long been floated within the League but has never been realised.

                  There has been no indication such a force would de deployed in the Yemen conflict...




                  Yemen's president calls on rebels to surrender their arms and for their leaders to turn themselves in at Egypt meeting.



                  Yemen's president has called on Houthi fighters to "surrender" at a meeting of the Arab League in the Egyptian resort town of Sharm el-Sheikh, as Saudi-led air raids continued to strike the group's positions for a third day.

                  Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who has fled the country, also called for the continuation of air strikes against Houthi targets on Saturday, as leaders representing 21 nations opened a two-day summit.

                  "I call for the continuation of Operation Decisive Storm until this gang [the Houthis] announces its surrender, exits all occupied territories in the provinces, leaves state institutions and military camps," Hadi said...



                  Staff writer, Al Arabiya News
                  Sunday, 29 March 2015

                  The Arab League on Sunday called for the establishment of a voluntary, unified military force that member states can turn to when facing security challenges.

                  The statement, issued in the Egyptian resort city of Sharm el-Sheikh, calls for establishing a voluntary Arab military force that can intervene to counter challenges that threaten the safety and security of any member, based on a specific request from that state.

                  Iraq, one of the members of the Arab League, voiced reservations to the proposed military force.

                  The statement also urged Houthis to “immediately withdraw from Sanaa, government institutions, and give their weapons to the legitimate authorities,” citing its support for the Saudi-led 'Operation Decisive Storm' in Yemen.

                  On Saturday, the Saudi-led coalition continued for a third day a bombing campaign against the Houthi militias who are marching to the southern city of Aden after seizing the capital Sanaa last year...

                  ...Iraq rejected military intervention in any country and called for dialogue as the best solution. Lebanon stressed that any decision taken should prioritize Arab consensus...

                  ...The statement also stressed support for the Libyan government in order for it to control its borders with neighboring countries, a decision that Qatar voiced reservations...

                  ...Algeria, for its part, considered lifting the weapons embargo and arming the Libyan army as part of the political solution in the country.

                  Comment

                  • #384
                    Re: Meanwhile Back in the Sandbox...

                    Originally posted by jk View Post
                    what makes you think that "regional stability" even enters into the qataris thinking? when the sunnis and shias are killing each other in iraq, are they interested in "regional stability"?
                    Too early to tell if its going to spin completely out of control in some parts of the region, but I've been following the Middle East since the '73 Arab oil embargo and I continue to believe we are in the midst of the most profound remaking of the region since the fall of the Ottomans. Terrorism is a purely political act. What happened last week in North Africa and Kuwait (the latter of notable importance as the violence spreads) was no exception.

                    Updated 11:22 AM ET, Sat June 27, 2015
                    (CNN)ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack on a seaside resort hotel in Tunisia on Friday that killed at least 38 people and wounded at least 36 others, many of them Western tourists...

                    ...And ISIS has claimed responsibility for an apparent bomb blast at the Shiite-affiliated Al-Sadiq mosque in Kuwait's capital during Friday prayers, leaving at least 25 dead and more than 200 injured...

                    ..."... Gone are the days of the al Qaeda large-scale plots where the cell was big, the authorities could disrupt it, arrest (people) and prosecute. Now are are seeing an increase in the volume of terrorism because the plots sometimes actually are on a smaller scale (which makes them) harder to protect, harder to monitor."...

                    Comment

                    • #385
                      Re: Meanwhile Back in the Sandbox...

                      it's hard to imagine that the region is going to get much quieter anytime soon. the catholics and protestants fought in europe in the 30 years' war. [longer in northern ireland, of course.] when do we date the outbreak of the sunni-shia wars? the fall of the shah played a role, but the shia uprising there was not directed at the sunni's per se, but at the great satan. the "arab spring"? [where did THAT go?] the second iraq war, in which the u.s. ultimately boosted the shia cause? i think maybe george w. gets the credit for letting this genie out of the bottle.

                      Comment

                      • #386
                        Re: Meanwhile Back in the Sandbox...

                        Originally posted by jk View Post
                        it's hard to imagine that the region is going to get much quieter anytime soon. the catholics and protestants fought in europe in the 30 years' war. [longer in northern ireland, of course.] when do we date the outbreak of the sunni-shia wars? the fall of the shah played a role, but the shia uprising there was not directed at the sunni's per se, but at the great satan. the "arab spring"? [where did THAT go?] the second iraq war, in which the u.s. ultimately boosted the shia cause? i think maybe george w. gets the credit for letting this genie out of the bottle.
                        The Iran Iraq Shia Sunni war started 35 years ago this September.

                        Lots of folks discussing how the region would look if the US didn't invade Iraq in 2003.

                        I wonder how the region would look if Saddam had not invaded Iran in 1980.

                        There's a good 2 million casualties and 2 trillion in destroyed cash/infrastructure.

                        Comment

                        • #387
                          Re: Meanwhile Back in the Sandbox...

                          Originally posted by jk View Post
                          it's hard to imagine that the region is going to get much quieter anytime soon. the catholics and protestants fought in europe in the 30 years' war. [longer in northern ireland, of course.] when do we date the outbreak of the sunni-shia wars? ...
                          Take your pick:

                          632 C.E. - death of The Prophet, PBUH
                          661 C.E. - the assassination of Ali in Najaf, Iraq
                          680 C.E. - the death of Husayn in the Battle of Karbala, Iraq (commemorated by the Shi'ah Day of Ashura)

                          Comment

                          • #388
                            Re: Meanwhile Back in the Sandbox...

                            We just watched the final scene in the excellent BBC version of Wolf Hall, where Ann Boleyn is beheaded to make room for Jane Seymour, who may (must) provide Henry with a male heir.



                            Claire Foy stars as Anne Boleyn in Wolf Hall

                            Comment

                            • #389
                              Re: Meanwhile Back in the Sandbox...

                              Originally posted by don View Post
                              We just watched the final scene in the excellent BBC version of Wolf Hall, where Ann Boleyn is beheaded to make room for Jane Seymour, who may (must) provide Henry with a male heir.



                              Claire Foy stars as Anne Boleyn in Wolf Hall

                              And truly unfortunate that the remarkable Claire Foy's character has been permanently removed.

                              Comment

                              • #390
                                Re: Meanwhile Back in the Sandbox...

                                Originally posted by GRG55 View Post
                                And truly unfortunate that the remarkable Claire Foy's character has been permanently removed.
                                she lasted until the end of the series when her part was cut . . .

                                Comment

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