Meanwhile Back in the Sandbox...

[lakedaemonian]

Re: Meanwhile Back in the Sandbox...

The personal initiative of King Abdullah, the idea emerged as a response to the Arab Spring and fears of Iranian interference and represents an important building block of Saudi efforts to become less dependent on the West.

upon reflection, I got hung up on this quote above(while waiting for friends at a restaurant near the Burj Khalifa.)

is it the GCC trying to disintermediate the west, but not westerners?

because there is a clear difference from my viewpoint.

while the GCC may be trying hard to become less reliant on the WEST, how is the GCC going at trying to become less reliant on WESTerners?

from my viewpoint, poorly on the latter.

[jk]

Re: Meanwhile Back in the Sandbox...

upon reflection, I got hung up on this quote above(while waiting for friends at a restaurant near the Burj Khalifa.)

is it the GCC trying to disintermediate the west, but not westerners?

because there is a clear difference from my viewpoint.

while the GCC may be trying hard to become less reliant on the WEST, how is the GCC going at trying to become less reliant on WESTerners?

from my viewpoint, poorly on the latter.

"the west" helps formulate and implement policies.
"westerners" execute policy decisions.
seems like an important distinction to me.

[lakedaemonian]

Re: Meanwhile Back in the Sandbox...

"the west" helps formulate and implement policies.
"westerners" execute policy decisions.
seems like an important distinction to me.

I completely agree with the distinction.

To me it seems like a shift for western states from some direct control to more indirect influence.

as those working directly for the GCC states will in many/most cases maintain networking and communications contacts with peers from their former western state employed lives.

In some ways it must be both frustrating and frightening for GCC ruling families to be able to throw off some of the shackles on western control, but at the cost of increasing reliance on individual and private/corporate tribes of westerners(and the like of beholden Pakistanis) as threat levels increased. While there is a big distinction between the west and westerners, surely there's a grey area in between due to former employer networks?

To me it seems like the petrodollar recycling merry go round where westerners pretend to train and GCC security forces pretend to be trained, has changed significantly in tone(at least on one
level) as the threat level to some GCC states has accelerated, forcing direct reliance on regime continuity to a certain extent from western states to private western "tribes".

The use of the tern non-state actors over the last decade has largely been applied to insurgent/opposition networks. But I think the other side of the coin has even more activity.

I've just spent some time learning about the very little known Egyptian participation in the Yemen civil war of the 60's.

Their plans of an eventual pan-Arab megastate were smashed by an even lesser known and largely private small British Israeli mashup.

I'm also trying to learn more about the final years of the Shah. Particularly the strong Israeli connection and attempts to warn/shape the Shah's policies away from collapse and went instantly septic with the rise of the Ayatollah.

Im guessing the fall of the Shah is as relevant and critically important to the GCC ruling families as the fall of the Soviet Union is to the PRC leadership in a China.

But it doesn't look like the GCC ruling parties are learning as many lessons as the Chinese.

Maybe privatised western tribes working directly for the GCC and indirectly reporting to the West via peer networks is a way for the west to maintain regional influence at arms length without the direct blowback if the GCC disappears increasingly larger numbers of dissidents?

From what I recall, American SUV driving part time environmentalists went quiet quickly as pump prices exploded in the months following the BP Gulf spill.

How will the SUV driving part time human rights activists respond when GCC crackdowns increase and increasingly reach the public domain via global inter connectivity?

I'm guessing the higher the pump price the greater the chance of As Long As It's Not In My Back Yard (ALAI)NIMBY.

It will be quite interesting to see consumer/voter reaction after a decade plus of war and national treasure spent when things get interesting in the GCC.

[Forrest]

Re: Meanwhile Back in the Sandbox...

Maybe privatised western tribes working directly for the GCC and indirectly reporting to the West via peer networks is a way for the west to maintain regional influence at arms length without the direct blowback if the GCC disappears increasingly larger numbers of dissidents?

From what I recall, American SUV driving part time environmentalists went quiet quickly as pump prices exploded in the months following the BP Gulf spill.

How will the SUV driving part time human rights activists respond when GCC crackdowns increase and increasingly reach the public domain via global inter connectivity?

I'm guessing the higher the pump price the greater the chance of As Long As It's Not In My Back Yard (ALAI)NIMBY.

It will be quite interesting to see consumer/voter reaction after a decade plus of war and national treasure spent when things get interesting in the GCC.

With the lack of real news being reported about the middle east, will the consumer/voter reaction even exist?

[EJ]

Re: Meanwhile Back in the Sandbox...

Iran Deploys Forces to Fight al Qaeda-Inspired Militants in Iraq

Iranian Revolutionary Guard Forces Helped Iraqi Troops Win Back Control of Most of Tikrit, the Sources Said

In addition, Iran was considering the transfer to Iraq of Iranian troops fighting for the regime in Syria if the initial deployments fail to turn the tide of battle in favor of Mr. Maliki's government.

The Iraqi government has signaled to the U.S. it would allow airstrikes against insurgents and asked Washington to speed the delivery of promised weapons.

That raises the prospect of both the U.S. and Iran lending support to Mr. Maliki against ISIS insurgents, who are seeking to create a caliphate encompassing Iraqi and Syrian territory.

[snip]

An ISIS spokesman, Abu Mohamad al-Adnani, urged the group's Sunni fighters to march toward the "filth-ridden" Karbala and "the city of polytheism" Najaf, where they would "settle their differences" with Mr. Maliki.

That coarsely worded threat further vindicates Iran's view that the fight unfolding in Iraq is an existential sectarian battle between the two rival sects of Islam-Sunni and Shiite—and by default a proxy battle between their patrons Saudi Arabia and Iran.

[EJ]

Re: Meanwhile Back in the Sandbox...

Iran Deploys Forces to Fight al Qaeda-Inspired Militants in Iraq

Iranian Revolutionary Guard Forces Helped Iraqi Troops Win Back Control of Most of Tikrit, the Sources Said

In addition, Iran was considering the transfer to Iraq of Iranian troops fighting for the regime in Syria if the initial deployments fail to turn the tide of battle in favor of Mr. Maliki's government.

The Iraqi government has signaled to the U.S. it would allow airstrikes against insurgents and asked Washington to speed the delivery of promised weapons.

That raises the prospect of both the U.S. and Iran lending support to Mr. Maliki against ISIS insurgents, who are seeking to create a caliphate encompassing Iraqi and Syrian territory.

[snip]

An ISIS spokesman, Abu Mohamad al-Adnani, urged the group's Sunni fighters to march toward the "filth-ridden" Karbala and "the city of polytheism" Najaf, where they would "settle their differences" with Mr. Maliki.

That coarsely worded threat further vindicates Iran's view that the fight unfolding in Iraq is an existential sectarian battle between the two rival sects of Islam-Sunni and Shiite—and by default a proxy battle between their patrons Saudi Arabia and Iran.

[Slimprofits]

Re: Meanwhile Back in the Sandbox...



http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-0...aq-s-army.html

[Polish_Silver]

whose piece of sand?

Iran Deploys Forces to Fight al Qaeda-Inspired Militants in Iraq



That coarsely worded threat further vindicates Iran's view that the fight unfolding in Iraq is an existential sectarian battle between the two rival sects of Islam-Sunni and Shiite—and by default a proxy battle between their patrons Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Are the stakes so high that both sides feel they must "win"?

SA could not possibly win a war of attrition.

[lakedaemonian]

Re: whose piece of sand?

Are the stakes so high that both sides feel they must "win"?

SA could not possibly win a war of attrition.

I reckon it depends on "attrition of what".

The House of Saud possesses considerable financial horsepower to fund both professional mercenary and amateur hour insurgents, the loss of whom will have a negligible effect on the Saudi population.

Iran has been suffering a fair few casualties(based on the growing number of photos showing Iranian IRGC/Qods Force funerals) from it's support of the Assad regime in Syria.

Where I see weakness in the Saudi outsourced war model is the proxies they use are motivated by money(professional mercenaries) or ideology(amateur hour jihadists growing in experience and skill with each contact).

The problems I see with the Saudi model is that the professional mercenaries will be shaped by risk/reward...if the risk is too great for the reward, they could quickly abandon the House of Saud.

And the amateurs slowly turning into professional jihadists are a very volatile and corrosive arms length proxy that could quickly turn to bite the hand that feeds it.

But in terms of body count attrition, I don't think the Saudis would have a problem with sacrificing an infinite number of amateur jihadists and professional mercenaries to achieve it's foreign policy goals.

-----

My post excludes other vulnerabilities the House of Saud has that could be exploited by Iran.

[don]

Re: whose piece of sand?

The updated map of the situation in Iraq... (what they have...)



As WaPo reports, the remarkable success of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in capturing huge swaths of land in Iraq and Syria is even more surprising when you consider the scale of the lands captured: Iraq and Syria are big countries, and ISIS controls a lot of them.

This map helps to put ISIS' reach into perspective for U.S. readers. As you can see, it pretty much stretches from Illinois to Virginia.



There's another remarkable factor here. ISIS troop numbers are not huge: According to The Guardian, just 800 militants managed to force 30,000 Iraqi soldiers to flee in Mosul. In total, there are believed to be between 7,000 and 10,000 fighters.

Here is the oil and gas pipelines around Iraq's oil hub in Kirkuk (via Platts) which ISIL will gain control of (if allowed)



"This entire system is disintegrating like a house of cards that starts to collapse," Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz said.

As WSJ reports, the group—known as the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham—isn't a threat only to Iraq and Syria. It seeks to impose its vision of a single radical Islamist state stretching from the Mediterranean coast of Syria through modern Iraq, the region of the Islamic Caliphates established in the seventh and eighth centuries.

Governments and borders are under siege elsewhere, as well. For more than a year, Shiite militias from Lebanon have moved into Syria and operated as a virtual arm of the Syrian government. Meanwhile, so many Syrian refugees have gone in the opposite direction—fleeing into Lebanon—that Lebanon now houses more school-age Syrian children than Lebanese children.

And in Iraq, the Kurdish population has carved out a homeland in the north of the country that—with the help of Turkey and against the wishes of the Iraqi government—exports its own oil, runs its own customs and immigration operations and fields its own military, known as the Peshmerga.



The mess puts Mr. Obama in a box. A few weeks ago he laid out in a policy speech his rationale for staying out of the mire of such sectarian conflicts, since they seem far removed from concrete U.S. interests. Yet, he now seems to acknowledge the U.S. must do something.

The danger for the president is the U.S. are being drawn back into the fray, but with very few options, never mind good ones.

Especially when one considers the Sunni-Shiite splits across each and every nation in the region that the US is trying to befriend...

[Polish_Silver]

Re: whose piece of sand?

That is scary as hell, LD. What if Iran decides to put more steam under it's nuclear program?

Would they dare use them?

Iraq held off Iran for years, despite a big disadvantage in numbers. And plenty died during that war.

[lakedaemonian]

Re: whose piece of sand?

That is scary as hell, LD. What if Iran decides to put more steam under it's nuclear program?

Would they dare use them?

Iraq held off Iran for years, despite a big disadvantage in numbers. And plenty died during that war.

It's my opinion that Iran has been taking the "slowly slowly catchy monkey" approach to nuclear weapons acquisition.

My major concern would be such weapons in the hands of the more radical elements in Iran's theocracy/IRGC.

Iran certainly seems to have been playing chess to their opposition's checkers.

I've stated it before, and I'll state it again....if I was in a similar position(age, education, wealth, experience) I would be both pushing for the removal of Iran's theocracy, while at the same time supporting Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons solely for the purpose of deterrence.

Iran had few allies of convenience during it's 9 year war following the Iraqi invasion of Iran.

I would think anyone with half a brain in senior leadership in Iran would NOT risk trying to throw a nuke at Israel due to the inevitable conclusion to such an act being the complete annihilation of Iran and the Shia center of gravity.

They would be better off using a small nuclear deterrent as overwatch to continue their war against the Sunni probing GCC domestic vulnerabilities.

----------

The war between Iraq and Iran in 1980-89 was an extremely costly(and little known by the majority of the west) war in terms of lives, material, and national treasure.

It was largely a conventional war(Army, Navy, Air Force) that outside of rare examples was a modern day WWI with horrific losses matched by horrific battlefield and national leadership.

This newest chapter of conflict in the Middle East appears to be one that will largely be irregular(like most conflicts in history, conventional conflicts are actually the exception), unconventional, and asymmetric.

Interestingly, while it has been shown time and time again that Arab militaries typically perform quite poorly on the conventional battlefield(using either western weapons/doctrine or Soviet weapons/doctrine), they have shown since the times of TE Lawrence to be more adept at irregular/unconventional/asymmetric conflict performance.

----------

I have no idea of the outcome, but I suspect the following:

*Sunni insurgents groups exported and supported by the GCC have great potential to eventually become DR Frankenstein's monster, much like the Taliban in Pakistan eventually biting the hand that feeds it

*Iran is likely to face increasing economic hardship as the cost of one side of the COIN, Foreign Internal Defense, is typically FAR greater than the cost of the other side of the COIN Iran is most familiar with in the last 11 years, Unconventional Warfare.

*Atrocities will likely spike in fighting between Sunni and Shia compared with western forces operating under rules of engagement(although there have been numerous problems here over the last decade+)

I can only hope that if significant atrocities between Shia/Sunni make it into the western media that liberal folks who believe that we are some how enlightened and evolved as a species along the lines of technological revolution of recent decades, understand that while technology may have changed(making us better at killing each other), humans haven't.

There have been some references to comparing this recent set of events of South Vietnam leading up to April 1975.

I question it. Because I think it might be a bit more relevant to use Cambodia 1975 as an example.

----------

We live in a strange, strange world.

Would anyone imagine Turkey and the Kurdish people possibly having aligned interests and become allies of convenience? It's certainly looking that way.

It's feeling a bit like an alternate reality where some big picture things are completely opposite of what one would expect.

The closest thing to a natural ally to the US in the region is Iran...minus the radical element in its theocracy and it's Waffen SS IRGC and Qods Force(but I understand Iran/US history that led to this).

Yet the US is aligned with the GCC kingdoms who are intentionally lighting the region on fire.

----------

It's at times like this I wish fellas like William Eddy were still alive:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_A._Eddy

I have this book on him:

http://www.amazon.com/Arabian-Knight.../dp/0970115725

But it's a bit deep in the queue behind some more pressing work reading.

[jk]

Re: whose piece of sand?

Yet the US is aligned with the GCC kingdoms who are intentionally lighting the region on fire.

do you really think the gcc are "lighting the region on fire" any more than iran? think of the iranian sponsored syrian actions in lebanon and sponsorship of hezbollah, the involvement of hezbollah in the syrian "civil war," and the fact that the strongly sectarian maliki gov't in iraq is far more an iranian client than an american one. i'm really curious why you put more of the onus on the sunnis. i have the impression that both sides are equally motivated in the sunni-shia regional war, and i wonder why you think otherwise.

[lakedaemonian]

Re: whose piece of sand?

do you really think the gcc are "lighting the region on fire" any more than iran? think of the iranian sponsored syrian actions in lebanon and sponsorship of hezbollah, the involvement of hezbollah in the syrian "civil war," and the fact that the strongly sectarian maliki gov't in iraq is far more an iranian client than an american one. i'm really curious why you put more of the onus on the sunnis. i have the impression that both sides are equally motivated in the sunni-shia regional war, and i wonder why you think otherwise.

Please don't get me wrong.

I'm well aware of the horrible actions Iran, specifically it's theocracy and IRGC/Qods Force, are responsible for....as well as actions "by, with, thru" the likes of Hez and other Iranian proxies over the years.

What I think is that culturally, there's more synergy between Iranian society and the west, than the GCC and the west......UAE/Dubai notwithstanding.

I personally know folks on the receiving end of Iranian EFPs deployed by Iranian proxies.

In 2003 onwards, it was Iran fomenting the chaos.

But once Iran had gained influence and control in Iraq, and once Syria's regime started to falter, Iran went from being the party bent on starting fires, to being the one trying to put them out(same with the shift in Lebanon from being firestarter to firefighter over the last few decades)....as I mentioned in my other previous posts.....the tables have turned, roles have reversed.

[don]

Re: Meanwhile Back in the Sandbox...

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-0...aq-s-army.html

While the west and north of Iraq is relatively sparse in its oil infrastructure, eastern and southern regions are of greater importance.

These two overlays show where the 'good' and 'bad' sectarians are . . . .