Principal Reduction: Inside the Rabbit Hole

[don]

As millions of Americans struggle in foreclosure with little hope of relief, big banks are going to borrowers who are not even in default and cutting their debt or easing the mortgage terms, sometimes with no questions asked.

Two of the nation’s biggest lenders, JPMorgan Chase and Bank of America, are quietly modifying loans for tens of thousands of borrowers who have not asked for help but whom the banks deem to be at special risk.

Rula Giosmas is one of the beneficiaries. Last year she received a letter from Chase saying it was cutting in half the amount she owed on her condominium.

Ms. Giosmas, who lives in Miami, was not in default on her $300,000 loan. She did not understand why she would receive this gift — although she wasted no time in taking it.

Banks are proactively overhauling loans for borrowers like Ms. Giosmas who have so-called pay option adjustable rate mortgages, which were popular in the wild late stages of the housing boom but which banks now view as potentially troublesome.

Before Chase shaved $150,000 off her mortgage, Ms. Giosmas owed much more on her place than it was worth. It was a fate she shared with a quarter of all homeowners with mortgages across the nation. Being underwater, as it is called, can prevent these owners from moving and taking new jobs, and places the households at greater risk of foreclosure.

“It’s a huge problem,” said the economist Sam Khater. “Reducing negative equity would spark a housing recovery.”

While many homeowners desperately need help to keep their homes and cannot get it, the borrowers getting unsolicited relief from Chase sometimes suspect a trick.

Option ARM loans like Ms. Giosmas’s gave borrowers the option of skipping the principal payment and some of the interest payment for an introductory period of several years. The unpaid balances would be added to the body of the loan.

Ms. Giosmas bought her two-bedroom, two-bath apartment north of downtown Miami for $359,000 in early 2006, according to real estate records. She made a large down payment, but because each month she paid less than was necessary to pay off the loan, her debt swelled to about $300,000.

Meanwhile, the value of the apartment nosedived. By the time Ms. Giosmas got the letter from Chase, the condominium was worth less than half what she paid. “I would not have defaulted,” she said. “But they don’t know that.”

The letter, which Ms. Giosmas remembers as brief and “totally vague,” said Chase was cutting her principal by $150,000 while raising her interest rate to about 5 percent. Her payments would stay roughly the same.

A few months ago, Ms. Giosmas sold the place for $170,000, making a small profit. Having a loan that her lender considered toxic, she said, “turned out to be a blessing in disguise.”

Chase, which declined to comment on its program, got $50 billion in option ARM loans when it bought Washington Mutual in 2008. The lender, which said last fall that it had dealt with 22,000 option ARM loans with an unpaid principal balance of $8 billion, still has $33 billion of them in its portfolio.

Bank of America acquired a portfolio of 550,000 option ARMs from its purchase of Countrywide Financial in 2008. The lender said more than 200,000 had been converted to more stable mortgages.

Dan B. Frahm, a spokesman for Bank of America, said it was using every technique short of principal reduction to remake its loans, including waiving prepayment penalties, refinancing, lowering the interest rate, postponing some of the balance and extending the term.

“By proactively contacting pay option ARM customers and discussing other products with better options for long-term, affordable payments, we hope to prevent customers from reaching a point where they struggle to make their payments,” Mr. Frahm said.

Chase, Bank of America and the other big lenders are negotiating with the Obama administration and the nation’s attorneys general over foreclosures. Debt forgiveness and the moral hazard question of who deserves to be helped are among the most contentious issues.

The banks say cutting mortgage balances would be unfair to borrowers who remain current as well as impractical because so many loans are securitized into pools owned by investors. Bank of America’s chief executive, Brian T. Moynihan, told the attorneys general in April that cutting principal for current borrowers would send the wrong message to all those who have struggled to pay their bills. His counterpart at Chase, Jamie Dimon, bluntly said it was “off the table.”

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/03/bu...ef=todayspaper

By now your head should be spinning . . . .

three who put moral hazard at the top of their priorities . . .

[mmr]

Re: Principal Reduction: Inside the Rabbit Hole

This isn't that surprising, since with these particular loans, JPM might not be taking any loss in reducing the principal.

All of the loans mentioned in the article were purchased by JPM when it assumed WaMu after it failed (or B of A when it bought Countrywide at a massive discount).

JPM wrote down the value of these Option ARMs to "fair value" when it bought them, with "fair value" probably being a ~25% discount in aggregate (and a greater discount for riskier loans).

Effectively, JPM might have initially assigned a value to the loan quite a bit lower than $300,000 for the loan - it's possible that they put that particular loan on their books originally at $150,000. If so, they could forgive half of the loan without booking a loss (if the loan paid off at $150,000, they're made whole from an accounting perspective. If the loan had paid off at $300,000, they would have actually been able to book a $150,000 gain.)

Ultimately, WaMu's former shareholders and uninsured creditors already took these losses years ago.

If JPM were doing this with any loans that it originated (i.e., a $300,000 loan carried on its books at $300,000, which would create a $150,000 loss if written down), then I'd be a bit surprised.

[c1ue]

Re: Principal Reduction: Inside the Rabbit Hole

Or there might be a scam involved.

A friend of mine bought 2 condos in Florida during the boom: 1 in his name, 1 in his girlfriends.

Both unsurprisingly were deeply underwater by 2008.

He got out of it by getting a writedown on the "girlfriend's" condo, buying it "himself" - the net result being:

1) His total rent from the 2 condos now is roughly equal to his total mortgages, 1 deeply negative.

2) His girlfriend's credit was wrecked

3) He married his girlfriend.

Things that make you go, "Hmmmm"...

[LazyBoy]

Re: Principal Reduction: Inside the Rabbit Hole

I can't help but wonder if you sign something less advantageous when you get a gift like this. Maybe a no-walk-away clause?

[don]

Re: Principal Reduction: Inside the Rabbit Hole

Big banks foster false hope with lottery-style principal forgiveness

To give the hopeless a reason not to strategically default, several banks have singled out a few deeply underwater loan owners for principal forgiveness. By spreading news of their magnanimous deeds, they hope the remainder will keep paying.

Irvine Home Address ... 37 LONG Mdw #15 Irvine, CA 92620
Resale Home Price ...... $374,900

There are secrets that we still have left to find
There have been mysteries from the beginning of time
There are answers we're not wise enough to see
Five For Fighting -- The Riddle

Banks have a problem, a riddle they must solve. Twenty-five percent of their borrowers are underwater, and when you factor in second mortgages and sales commissions, more than half can't sell their homes without writing a check for the shortfall. And house prices are still going down. When homeowners have no equity, they are no longer homeowners, they are loan owners. If a loan owner's payments are less than the cost of a comparable rental, they have an incentive to stay and pay, but when the payment exceeds a comparable rental -- and the huge mortgage balances of the bubble make this common -- loan owners have an incentive to keep their money and strategically default on their mortgage.

Underwater loan owners have their names on title, and if they keep making payments long enough, amortization may catch them up, and prices may come back, so they may have equity again someday. The more their payments exceed the cost of rental, the further a loan owner is underwater, and the longer they perceive they will have to wait to have equity again, the more likely they are to give up and strategically default. If a loan owner strategically defaults, the lender is forced to make a choice; foreclose on the property when the resale value is worth less than the loan, or allow the loan owner to squat in the property. Neither choice is palatable to the lender.

Lenders have responded to these circumstances -- conditions the lenders created through irresponsible lending which inflated the housing bubble -- by using both a carrot and a stick to keep borrowers paying when it is in the best interest of the borrower to strategically default. The stick is the threat of foreclosure, debt collection, reduced access to credit in the future, and an appeal to morality. The specter of consequences to borrowers has been wildly exaggerated, and these circumstances are lessening by the day. The appeal to morality has been steadily eroding as borrowers are coming to realize they have a greater moral responsibility to their families than they have to their lenders.

Lenders threats of foreclosure have been neutralized by reports of delinquent mortgage squatters obtaining years of free rent. In fact, instead of being a deterrent to strategic default, the long foreclosure timelines have actually become an inducement. Lenders combat this perception with the use of terrorist tactics. Each month, lenders will randomly select a small number of fresh delinquencies to push through the system as quickly as possible. If some of the herd are executed quickly while others are allowed to squat indefinitely, it creates uncertainty. This uncertainty keeps some paying rather than play Russian roulette.

The carrot lenders dangle in front of loan owners comes through rumors of principal reduction windfalls. Like the random executions of freshly delinquent borrowers, a very small number of principal reductions given to loan owners who are doing what lenders want -- making all payments -- provides the lottery-style false hope to motivate the masses. Today's featured article is part of the public relations campaign lenders use to get the word out concerning the principal reduction lottery windfall ostensibly available to loan owners who dutifully make their payments.
If someone somewhere got a principal reduction, it could happen to anyone. I hope nobody is holding their breath.

Big Banks Easing Terms on Loans Deemed as Risks

As millions of Americans struggle in foreclosure with little hope of relief, big banks are going to borrowers who are not even in default and cutting their debt or easing the mortgage terms, sometimes with no questions asked.

The ultimate debtors fantasy: money for nothing.

Two of the nation’s biggest lenders, JPMorgan Chase and Bank of America, are quietly modifying loans for tens of thousands of borrowers who have not asked for help but whom the banks deem to be at special risk.
Rula Giosmas is one of the beneficiaries. Last year she received a letter from Chase saying it was cutting in half the amount she owed on her condominium.
Ms. Giosmas, who lives in Miami, was not in default on her $300,000 loan. She did not understand why she would receive this gift — although she wasted no time in taking it.

Ms. Giosmas received the gift because Chase probably recognized she was one of the last who didn't strategically default, and based on their analysis, there was a very high probability of her doing so in the future. The likely reduced her balance to a level that reduced their loss from what it would have been if Chase had to foreclose and resell another REO. Plus, they could then get this story written.

Banks are proactively overhauling loans for borrowers like Ms. Giosmas who have so-called pay option adjustable rate mortgages, which were popular in the wild late stages of the housing boom but which banks now view as potentially troublesome.

Before Chase shaved $150,000 off her mortgage, Ms. Giosmas owed much more on her place than it was worth. It was a fate she shared with a quarter of all homeowners with mortgages across the nation. Being underwater, as it is called, can prevent these owners from moving and taking new jobs, and places the households at greater risk of foreclosure. “It’s a huge problem,” said the economist Sam Khater. “Reducing negative equity would spark a housing recovery.”

Giving away free money will not spark a housing recovery. It would however reward those who overborrowed under stupid terms which would encourage imprudent borrowing again in the future.

While many homeowners desperately need help to keep their homes and cannot get it, the borrowers getting unsolicited relief from Chase sometimes suspect a trick. Cutting loan balances, even for loans in default, is supposedly so rare that Federal Reserve economists wrote in a paper in March that “we could find no evidence that any lender was actually reducing principal” on mortgages.

Principal forgiveness is rare because it is really stupid. Rumors of principal reduction have been used by lenders in the past to get borrowers to contact them to try to work out loan modifications, but lenders don't want to start reducing principal because all of their customers would ask for it. Besides, foreclosure is a superior form of principal reduction because the borrower has consequences for their foolish borrowing.

“I used to say every day, ‘Why doesn’t anyone get rewarded for doing the right thing and paying their bills on time?’ ” said Ms. Giosmas, who is an acupuncturist and real estate investor. “And I got rewarded.”

No, Ms. Giosmas got rewarded for taking out a very foolish loan at the worst possible time. It encourages the worst form of borrower stupidity. Lenders are happy to have this framed as a reward for making payments on time in hopes that others will do the same. They couldn't have scripted her comments any better.

Option ARM loans like Ms. Giosmas’s gave borrowers the option of skipping the principal payment and some of the interest payment for an introductory period of several years. The unpaid balances would be added to the body of the loan. Bank of America and Chase inherited their portfolios of option ARMs when they bought troubled lenders during the housing crash.
Chase, which declined to comment on its program, got $50 billion in option ARM loans when it bought Washington Mutual in 2008. The lender, which said last fall that it had dealt with 22,000 option ARM loans with an unpaid principal balance of $8 billion, still has $33 billion of them in its portfolio.

I foresee some major write-downs still to come.

Bank of America acquired a portfolio of 550,000 option ARMs from its purchase of Countrywide Financial in 2008. The lender said more than 200,000 had been converted to more stable mortgages.
Dan B. Frahm, a spokesman for Bank of America, said it was using every technique short of principal reduction to remake its loans, including waiving prepayment penalties, refinancing, lowering the interest rate, postponing some of the balance and extending the term. “By proactively contacting pay option ARM customers and discussing other products with better options for long-term, affordable payments, we hope to prevent customers from reaching a point where they struggle to make their payments,” Mr. Frahm said.
Chase, Bank of America and the other big lenders are negotiating with the Obama administration and the nation’s attorneys general over foreclosures. Debt forgiveness and the moral hazard question of who deserves to be helped are among the most contentious issues.

These news stories make moral hazard sound like some minor inconvenience when it is the core of the problem. If you give away money, it isn't a loan anymore, it is welfare going to the least deserving.

The banks say cutting mortgage balances would be unfair to borrowers who remain current as well as impractical because so many loans are securitized into pools owned by investors. Bank of America’s chief executive, Brian T. Moynihan, told the attorneys general in April that cutting principal for current borrowers would send the wrong message to all those who have struggled to pay their bills. His counterpart at Chase, Jamie Dimon, bluntly said it was “off the table.”

Good. It should be off the table. Foreclosure and bankruptcy are viable alternatives which provide consequences to the borrower for their behavior. Without consequences, no borrower would exercise any judgment or self control when considering a loan. Loans become free money for the taking.

Having an option ARM loan, however, apparently qualifies the borrower for special help. The loans, with their low initial payments and “teaser” interest rates, were immediately popular with buyers who could not afford or did not want to pay the soaring prices on houses. The problem was, eventually the rate would reset or the loan balance would have to be paid in full. “Nightmare Mortgages” they were called in a 2006 BusinessWeek cover piece. Option ARMs were never quite as bad as predicted, partly because the crisis pushed down interest rates so far that the resets were relatively mild. Many owners did default on them, but others, like Ms. Giosmas, were quite happy to pay less for years than they would have under a conventional loan. She used option ARMs on her investment properties too.
“They saved me,” she said. “Why would I want to pay a lot more every month? I’d rather have it in my pocket.”

Does anyone else see the insanity being encouraged here? This woman believed she was making a wise financial decision using an Option ARM, and the bank is reinforcing this belief by giving her a principal reduction. Borrowers incentives should be to pay down debt to reduce risk for both the lender and the borrower. If borrowers have the mindset to maximize their debt and minimize their payments, that's how Ponzi schemes are born. Our housing market will never find stability under
those terms.

The concern the banks are showing for those who might get in trouble contrasts sharply with their efforts toward those already foreclosed. Bank of America and Chase were penalized last month by regulators for doing a poor job modifying mortgages in default.
Adam J. Levitin, a Georgetown University law professor, said these little-publicized programs were more evidence that the banks were behaving in contradictory and often maddening ways. “Loan modifications that should be happening aren’t, while loan modifications that shouldn’t be happening are,” he said. “Homeowners of any sort, whether current or in default, would rightly be confused and angry by this.”

Borrowers who borrowed prudently and make their loan payments should be the most outraged by principal reductions. They aren't getting any free money from the banks; however, their foolish neighbors who borrowed irresponsibly are obtaining
windfalls.

The homeowners getting new loans, however, are quite pleased. In effect, the banks are paying the debt these owners accrued as the housing market plunged. Ms. Giosmas bought her two-bedroom, two-bath apartment north of downtown Miami for $359,000 in early 2006, according to real estate records. She made a large down payment, but because each month she paid less than was necessary to pay off the loan, her debt swelled to about $300,000.

Meanwhile, the value of the apartment nosedived. By the time Ms. Giosmas got the letter from Chase, the condominium was worth less than half what she paid. “I would not have defaulted,” she said. “But they don’t know that.” The letter, which Ms. Giosmas remembers as brief and “totally vague,” said Chase was cutting her principal by $150,000 while raising her interest rate to about 5 percent. Her payments would stay roughly the same.

A few months ago, Ms. Giosmas sold the place for $170,000, making a small profit. Having a loan that her lender considered toxic, she said, “turned out to be a blessing in disguise.”

Everyone should take out toxic loans, right? This woman got a principal reduction and actually made money after the sale, all because she took out the worst loan imaginable at the worst possible time and made only the minimum payment. Lenders are telling borrowers they can get free money if they borrow imprudently enough. What impact will that have?

The real message lenders are trying to send is aimed at the masses: keep making your payments, and you may also receive free money from the bank. Of course, the odds are about the same as playing the lottery, but as lottery sales attest to, if there is a chance, many will be willing to play.

http://www.irvinehousingblog.com/blo....net#blogtitle

[don]

Re: Principal Reduction: Inside the Rabbit Hole

is principal reduction the 3rd rail of RE?

Option ARMs are arguably the most devious, insidious, and deceptive mortgage products to spawn out of the housing bubble mania. For those of you only starting to follow the housing market in the last year or so, an option ARM was essentially a mortgage product that sought to lower the monthly payments with extremely high commissions for mortgage brokers and Wall Street and gave the illusion to borrowers of a buffet of reasonable monthly payments. Wall Street loved the option ARM because it allowed incredible leverage and this added billions of dollars in mortgages to their pot to speculate on. One feature of a traditional mortgage, actually paying principal and interest on a monthly basis was actually removed from many option ARMs. This negative amortization actually increased the balance owed on a mortgage. Think about how financially backwards that is. This is like the dark ages version of a mortgage. The option ARM was a loan designed to function only in a bubble. It could only succeed in a market with incredible manic real estate appreciation. Most that took on option ARMs (unlike subprime borrowers) realized what they were doing. They were fixated on a low monthly cost even though it meant long-term disaster if they were unable to sell. They never expected home prices to crater. Banks have kept the implosion of option ARMs under wraps. In fact, many are now implementing shadow bailouts of those who entered into option ARMs while putting the screws on those who diligently pay on prime mortgages.

Rewarding the speculators

Many of you sent over a New York Times piece discussing the principal reductions being conducted by some of the too big to fail banks. If you wonder what is occurring with some option ARMs, take a look below:

“(NY Times) I used to say every day, ‘Why doesn’t anyone get rewarded for doing the right thing and paying their bills on time?’ ” said Ms. Giosmas, who is an acupuncturist and real estate investor. “And I got rewarded.”

Option ARM loans like Ms. Giosmas’s gave borrowers the option of skipping the principal payment and some of the interest payment for an introductory period of several years. The unpaid balances would be added to the body of the loan.”

The “option” in an option ARM meant borrows had the ability to pay varying amounts each month. They could pay the principal and interest and have it function like a regular mortgage, they could pay the interest only and have the loan work out like an interest only loan, or they could go for what the vast majority went for and go into the negative amortization dark waters. Not much interest has been shed on option ARMs in the last year even though 2011 and 2012 would be the worst years for these products (and it still is for those loans that haven’t already imploded). The reason for this is:

-Many have flat out imploded
-Banks are implementing a new strategy of simply ignoring loans (so who really cares what kind of loan you have if banks take up to two years on foreclosing on properties)
-Lowering the principal on many option ARMs

First, we should examine some data on the current state of option ARMs:

Let us be clear to begin with. Option ARMs have the highest default rates even passing up many subprime products. So it isn’t like these loan products are being remedied over time. What has changed over time is the trillions of dollars injected into banks (remember when a billion dollars actually meant something?). The same banks that benefitted from dishing out questionable loans have inherited these options ARMs through their acquisitions of Countrywide Financial, Washington Mutual, and Wachovia. From the NY Times article, we are told that Chase has re-worked $8 billion in option ARMs leaving $33 billion left in the portfolio. We are also given the data that Bank of America has re-worked over 200,000 loans but still has a portfolio of 350,000 option ARMs. We should also be clear that over 50 percent of option ARMs were made in California in terms of mortgage balance. This is not a nationwide problem.

The article was sent over many times and what I believe has infuriated people is simply the lottery like dolling out of modifications from banks that have been bailed out by taxpayers. Many of these taxpayers have loans with these too big to fail banks and they have received little reprieve during this crisis. So when they see banks being rewarded for bad behavior and then these same banks reward mortgage holders who are the biggest speculators many questions have to be asked:

“(NY Times) Meanwhile, the value of the apartment nosedived. By the time Ms. Giosmas got the letter from Chase, the condominium was worth less than half what she paid. “I would not have defaulted,” she said. “But they don’t know that.”

The letter, which Ms. Giosmas remembers as brief and “totally vague,” said Chase was cutting her principal by $150,000 while raising her interest rate to about 5 percent. Her payments would stay roughly the same.

A few months ago, Ms. Giosmas sold the place for $170,000, making a small profit. Having a loan that her lender considered toxic, she said, “turned out to be a blessing in disguise.”

The article states the place was purchased for $359,000 in Florida with a “large” down payment. The mortgage of $300,000 was cut in half automatically and in the end, a speculator made a profit on this investment courtesy of taxpayer bailouts even though the property value has fallen by 50 percent. I know this appears on the surface as a giant moral hazard (it is). The too big to fail banks realize this and that is why they are keeping it under wraps. It looks like they are simply hand picking certain borrowers to reward (ironically the majority of borrowers who diligently pay their mortgage get no aid and actually now have to deal with more banking fees and hassles). What do you expect from the same financial industry that profited from the housing bubble?

The silver lining (if you can even call it that) in all of this is that looking at the data closely we see that principal reductions are still a very rare form of modifying loans:

Out of all loan modifications roughly 2.7 percent are being modified via principal reductions. Now for those that are claiming that things are looking up for housing even the big banks realize there is little hope for some markets. Why else would they offer, right off the bat a 50 percent cut in principal in Florida for this person? This will actually add lower priced properties on the market and this speculator eventually sold the home for $170,000 (a far cry from $359,000).

If we look at the futures market, many see no rise in home prices in expensive locations:

Source: ZoyZoy

For some locations in California those placing bets with money see no rise in home prices well into 2015. And why would prices rise? Household incomes show no sign of going up. In fact, option ARMs were a symptom of weak household incomes and big housing appetites. There were countless stories of households barely making $100,000 but taking on option ARMs that were $600,000, $800,000, or even higher during the boom. In the end the only salvation for home prices is higher household incomes or lower home prices to reflect actual incomes. My bet was always on lower prices and that is what we currently have. There is no sign of rising incomes so to expect home prices to rise because of cutting loan principal makes absolutely no sense. Given what we have lived through in the last decade, there is little that surprises me at this point when it comes to our financial sector.

http://www.doctorhousingbubble.com/r...debtors-banks/

[cjppjc]

Re: Principal Reduction: Inside the Rabbit Hole

Ms. Giosmas is getting famous.

[don]

Re: Principal Reduction: Inside the Rabbit Hole

Ms. Giosmas is getting famous.

More than she might like!