Originally posted by EJ
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And would we be wrong in saying that the central banks actually can get the markets moving upward again, but at such great cost that they'd be unlikely to do so before that 1987-type event occured? I believe Ben Bernanke when he says "the U.S. government has a technology, called a printing press (or, today, its electronic equivalent), that allows it to produce as many U.S. dollars as it wishes at essentially no cost. By increasing the number of U.S. dollars in circulation, or even by credibly threatening to do so, the U.S. government can also reduce the value of a dollar in terms of goods and services, which is equivalent to raising the prices in dollars of those goods and services ... [and] ... always generate higher spending and hence positive inflation."
While Bernanke doesn't mention financial markets, he can sure "reduce the value of the dollar" in terms of stocks - and thereby support nominal stock prices even as real values tank. The problem is what happens if he does? So the Fed cuts rates to the bone. Hedge funds borrow and buy stocks. Since there is little demand left in the real economy for credit, the Treasury borrows and "cuts checks", say as "tax rebates" or mortgage bailouts. But this panics foreign creditors, they start dumping UST, and you get a huge spike in long interest rates, not exactly a balm for aching mortgage markets. Or they dump USD, import prices skyrocket, and all credibility on the inflation front disintegrates. Or competive devaluation resumes and global inflation skyrockets again. Or some combination of the three. Either way, real US consumption wherewithal goes down fast. So while they theoretically can "control" the markets, the choices they have are sharply limited, and the question boils down to what mix of painful outcomes they opt for. How does what you see differ, if it does? And can you make out any features on the other side of this financial singularity?
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