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Wiki-Support Cyber Attacks- Never Layed a Glove on Us

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  • Wiki-Support Cyber Attacks- Never Layed a Glove on Us

    December 14, 2010, 10:58 am F.B.I. Memos Reveal Cost of a Hacking Attack

    Repelling a hacker attack can be costly as PayPal, Visa and MasterCard undoubtedly found out last week as they tried – with mixed success – to keep their Web sites from being knocked offline by supporters of Wikileaks.

    How much money exactly? An unrelated attack several years earlier on Google may provide some insight.

    In 2005 Google was battling the Santy worm, a bit of malicious software that caused infected computers across the globe to automatically enter search queries – so many, in fact, that Google was overwhelmed. Details of the episode are chronicled in internal F.B.I. memos obtained by The New York Times through a Freedom of Information Act request.

    On Dec. 22, 2005, Google complained to the F.B.I. that the attack had slowed its search engine’s performance. For 12 to 18 months previous, Google said it had been plagued by variants of the worm, which used search queries to find vulnerable Web sites and deface them by exploiting a security hole in community forum software PHP Bulletin Board.

    Under pressure from antivirus groups, Google had tried to filter queries containing phrases linked to the worm, but with limited success.

    “As Google filters out certain string search phrases, within minutes, the subjects modify the search phrase to once again bypass Google’s filters,” an F.B.I. agent in San Francisco wrote to colleagues in recommending that an investigation be opened.

    Moreover, Google’s efforts to stop the worm had unintended consequences. Its filters blocked legitimate searches, the agent wrote.

    In a measure in the seriousness of the attack, Google devoted an entire engineering team to the battle. Preliminary estimates put the cost to the company in terms of man hours and lost revenue at up to $500,000, according to the report.

    A year earlier, Google suffered a $100,000 loss from the MyDoom virus, which caused Google’s search engine to slow or stall for several hours, according to documents from a separate F.B.I. investigation.

    In examining the software code used in one variant of the Santy worm, Google engineers found a potential lead to the person responsible. In the code was embedded a Gmail address for a technical contact that the F.B.I. said may belong to the variant’s creator. That e-mail address was redacted from the document as were the names of any Google employees who spoke with the F.B.I.

    The F.B.I. issued two subpoenas shortly thereafter for an individual or individuals to appear before a federal grand jury in San Jose. All information about the subpoenas’ recipient was redacted.

    A few weeks later, Google had a change of heart. On Jan. 31, 2006, the F.B.I. noted that Google’s legal department had told the agency that the company was no longer interested in any further investigation.

    “Inasmuch as Google is the victim and their assistance in the form of providing logs is necessary to pursue prosecution, it is recommended this case be administratively closed,” the F.B. I. agent wrote.

    Google, of course, recovered from the attack and continued its rapid growth.

    http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/1...ing-attack/?hp

  • #2
    Re: Wiki-Support Cyber Attacks- Never Layed a Glove on Us

    A few weeks later, Google had a change of heart. On Jan. 31, 2006, the F.B.I. noted that Google’s legal department had told the agency that the company was no longer interested in any further investigation.
    No doubt because Google hired the 'hacker' [sarc off]

    Comment


    • #3
      Re: Wiki-Support Cyber Attacks- Never Layed a Glove on Us

      Originally posted by c1ue View Post
      No doubt because Google hired the 'hacker' [sarc off]
      Or the 'hacker' made Google an offer it could not refuse. This would be possible if the 'hacker' was not an isolated individual, but an element of some more substantial power, such as perhaps of some nations 'intelligence' operations.
      Most folks are good; a few aren't.

      Comment


      • #4
        Re: Wiki-Support Cyber Attacks- Never Layed a Glove on Us

        Originally posted by ThePythonicCow View Post
        Or the 'hacker' made Google an offer it could not refuse. This would be possible if the 'hacker' was not an isolated individual, but an element of some more substantial power, such as perhaps of some nations 'intelligence' operations.
        Maybe... but do you have any evidence that may corroborate this possibility or are you merely speculating?

        Could every event be perhaps some nations' 'intelligence' operations?

        Comment


        • #5
          Re: Wiki-Support Cyber Attacks- Never Layed a Glove on Us

          Ridding oneself of a pervasive worm and withstanding a DDoS attack are two very different things. A DDoS attack is simply solved by increasing bandwidth or waiting the attack out. Not a lot of investment necessarily, although I am sure there are costs associated with it.

          Originally posted by don View Post
          December 14, 2010, 10:58 am F.B.I. Memos Reveal Cost of a Hacking Attack

          Repelling a hacker attack can be costly as PayPal, Visa and MasterCard undoubtedly found out last week as they tried – with mixed success – to keep their Web sites from being knocked offline by supporters of Wikileaks.

          How much money exactly? An unrelated attack several years earlier on Google may provide some insight.

          In 2005 Google was battling the Santy worm, a bit of malicious software that caused infected computers across the globe to automatically enter search queries – so many, in fact, that Google was overwhelmed. Details of the episode are chronicled in internal F.B.I. memos obtained by The New York Times through a Freedom of Information Act request.

          On Dec. 22, 2005, Google complained to the F.B.I. that the attack had slowed its search engine’s performance. For 12 to 18 months previous, Google said it had been plagued by variants of the worm, which used search queries to find vulnerable Web sites and deface them by exploiting a security hole in community forum software PHP Bulletin Board.

          Under pressure from antivirus groups, Google had tried to filter queries containing phrases linked to the worm, but with limited success.

          “As Google filters out certain string search phrases, within minutes, the subjects modify the search phrase to once again bypass Google’s filters,” an F.B.I. agent in San Francisco wrote to colleagues in recommending that an investigation be opened.

          Moreover, Google’s efforts to stop the worm had unintended consequences. Its filters blocked legitimate searches, the agent wrote.

          In a measure in the seriousness of the attack, Google devoted an entire engineering team to the battle. Preliminary estimates put the cost to the company in terms of man hours and lost revenue at up to $500,000, according to the report.

          A year earlier, Google suffered a $100,000 loss from the MyDoom virus, which caused Google’s search engine to slow or stall for several hours, according to documents from a separate F.B.I. investigation.

          In examining the software code used in one variant of the Santy worm, Google engineers found a potential lead to the person responsible. In the code was embedded a Gmail address for a technical contact that the F.B.I. said may belong to the variant’s creator. That e-mail address was redacted from the document as were the names of any Google employees who spoke with the F.B.I.

          The F.B.I. issued two subpoenas shortly thereafter for an individual or individuals to appear before a federal grand jury in San Jose. All information about the subpoenas’ recipient was redacted.

          A few weeks later, Google had a change of heart. On Jan. 31, 2006, the F.B.I. noted that Google’s legal department had told the agency that the company was no longer interested in any further investigation.

          “Inasmuch as Google is the victim and their assistance in the form of providing logs is necessary to pursue prosecution, it is recommended this case be administratively closed,” the F.B. I. agent wrote.

          Google, of course, recovered from the attack and continued its rapid growth.

          http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/1...ing-attack/?hp

          Comment


          • #6
            Re: Wiki-Support Cyber Attacks- Never Layed a Glove on Us

            Originally posted by Ghent12 View Post
            Maybe... but do you have any evidence that may corroborate this possibility or are you merely speculating?
            I have no particular evidence. I was mostly just speculating. I am convinced that Google has a closer relation with some national intelligence operations than they make public. Also it usually suggests some hidden powers or influences are involved when a major player takes an about face as Google is described having done, earlier in this thread.

            Originally posted by Ghent12 View Post
            Could every event be perhaps some nations' 'intelligence' operations?
            Well ... not every event. I doubt that the CIA caused the sun rise over Texas earlier today.
            Most folks are good; a few aren't.

            Comment


            • #7
              Re: Wiki-Support Cyber Attacks- Never Layed a Glove on Us

              Originally posted by dcarrigg View Post
              Ridding oneself of a pervasive worm and withstanding a DDoS attack are two very different things. A DDoS attack is simply solved by increasing bandwidth or waiting the attack out. Not a lot of investment necessarily, although I am sure there are costs associated with it.
              Not so, in most interesting cases.

              If you have a single server, dependent on third party networking and backbone support over which you have little control (because you're a small customer), if the DDoS is mostly only lowering the available useful bandwidth to your site, and if you are not losing any significant server CPU, memory, network buffers, interrupt latency or other server resources to the DDoS, then you can't do much but wait it out.

              Almost no interesting DDoS attack fits these constraints.

              The big DDoS attacks are against big providers with elaborate integration into the Internet backbone, and these attacks can significantly impact their server resources. Much useful work can be done to identify and drop DDoS attacks earlier in the network before they get to your servers (only the big guys can expect such co-operation from the major ISP's and Internet backbone providers), and much useful work can be done to minimize the loss of critical server resources, once a DDoS packet hits your server anyway.
              Most folks are good; a few aren't.

              Comment

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