The Great Game: Geopolitics and Oil

[Master Shake]

Re: The Great Game: Geopolitics and Oil

I'll tell you what else gives me pause, he doesn't even mention the pop up function of the Dong Feng ballistic missile. If you are going to talk about projection of hard power through carrier groups, in fact start with it as your lead tenant, the Dong Feng should at least be mentioned. We can project hard power to many nations, but to China it's a lot harder.

I don't think he's saying that we can project it to China, only that we can to lots of critical areas and the Chinese have no capability in this regard.

[thriftyandboringinohio]

Re: The Great Game: Geopolitics and Oil

I'll tell you what else gives me pause, he doesn't even mention the pop up function of the Dong Feng ballistic missile. If you are going to talk about projection of hard power through carrier groups, in fact start with it as your lead tenant, the Dong Feng should at least be mentioned. We can project hard power to many nations, but to China it's a lot harder.

The US aircraft carriers are so potent a military force that all serious rivals have been devising ways to defeat them for 50 years. The old USSR, modern Russia, and modern China all seem to conclude missiles can sink carriers. I wonder if our carriers would survive the first week of any large traditional war between uniformed national armies.

[Southernguy]

Re: The Great Game: Geopolitics and Oil

1) Things in Afghanistan and Irak are not going well for the Empire. In both places there seems to be a limit for foreign forces staying there, which is no longer than 2013. Then, in Afghanistan an Pakistan-Taliban alliance shall take power. In Irak, shias under Iran influence seem about to hold power after US and itīs allies leave.
2) Is it so easy for the USA to ask-oblige Saudi Arabia to rise oil production in such a way as to let itīs price go to $ 25? I donīt think so. But as GRG55 says, nobody knows.
3) A good point, owning mineral resources in other places does not guarantee supplies. Chinaīs position in Africa is fragile.
4) Another good point: US shall do what it takes to protect the well being of dollar reserve currency status.....but; is that possible? As a net debtor nation, I donīt think so. The base of that condition is weakening with each accord between nations to not trade in dollars. Why keep dollars if you can buy your stuff with rubles, yuans, reals, etc?
Of course, for the time being countries are buying US securities to not allow their currency to appreciate against the dollar, but slowly they are shifting towards currency, capital controls and commercial protectionist measures, which do not imply holding dollars. I think the Megaīs "nails in the coffin" are going on by the days. It will take time, buy it can accelerate suddenly......as Itulipīs theory states.
5) It is possible that, in the short run (couple of years at best), a new deflation episode happens. The sharp expenditure cuts inplaces from Greece to Spain to UK, coupled with a new Japanes recession, and a new US recession can very well set it off.
Then we can, yes, see oil at $25 and some other commodities going down the drain. Gold price may go down the drain as well
What shall the dynamics between such an episode and the dollar demise as reserve currency develop?
Anyway, the US position as a global empire is doomed, maybe ten years from now. Thatīs the result form the contradiction between the short terms interests of their corporate establishment and the long term intersts of same.

[Master Shake]

Re: The Great Game: Geopolitics and Oil

The US aircraft carriers are so potent a military force that all serious rivals have been devising ways to defeat them for 50 years. The old USSR, modern Russia, and modern China all seem to conclude missiles can sink carriers. I wonder if our carriers would survive the first week of any large traditional war between uniformed national armies.

You don't think we've developed missile defense systems?

[thriftyandboringinohio]

Re: The Great Game: Geopolitics and Oil

I hope so.

I don’t think Phalanx will defeat 15 or 20 hypersonic missiles arriving simultaneously, half skimming the wave tops and jinking violently, half coming in straight vertical, all going 2,500 mph.

I truly hope the boys at the Office of Naval Research have some highly classified trick up their sleeve as a counter measure.

[don]

Re: The Great Game: Geopolitics and Oil

The following are important excerpts and passages from former U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski’s book, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geo-strategic Imperatives. Brzezinski also states that both Turkey and Iran, the two most powerful states of the “Eurasian Balkans,” located on its southern tier, are “potentially vulnerable to internal ethnic conflicts [balkanization],” and that, “If either or both of them were to be destabilized, the internal problems of the region would become unmanageable.”¹⁰

It seems that a divided and balkanized Iraq would be the best means of accomplishing this. Taking what we know from the White House's own admissions; there is a belief that “creative destruction and chaos” in the Middle East are beneficial assets to reshaping the Middle East, creating the “New Middle East,” and furthering the Anglo-American roadmap in the Middle East and Central Asia:

In Europe, the Word “Balkans” conjures up images of ethnic conflicts and great-power regional rivalries. Eurasia, too, has its “Balkans,” but the Eurasian Balkans are much larger, more populated, even more religiously and ethnically heterogenous. They are located within that large geographic oblong that demarcates the central zone of global instability (...) that embraces portions of southeastern Europe, Central Asia and parts of South Asia [Pakistan, Kashmir, Western India], the Persian Gulf area, and the Middle East.

The Eurasian Balkans form the inner core of that large oblong (…) they differ from its outer zone in one particularly significant way: they are a power vacuum. Although most of the states located in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East are also unstable, American power is that region’s [meaning the Middle East’s] ultimate arbiter. The unstable region in the outer zone is thus an area of single power hegemony and is tempered by that hegemony. In contrast, the Eurasian Balkans are truly reminiscent of the older, more familiar Balkans of southeastern Europe: not only are its political entities unstable but they tempt and invite the intrusion of more powerful neighbors, each of whom is determined to oppose the region’s domination by another. It is this familiar combination of a power vacuum and power suction that justifies the appellation “Eurasian Balkans.”

The traditional Balkans represented a potential geopolitical prize in the struggle for European supremacy. The Eurasian Balkans, astride the inevitably emerging transportation network meant to link more directly Eurasia’s richest and most industrious western and eastern extremities, are also geopolitically significant. Moreover, they are of importance from the standpoint of security and historical ambitions to at least three of their most immediate and more powerful neighbors, namely, Russia, Turkey, and Iran, with China also signaling an increasing political interest in the region. But the Eurasian Balkans are infinitely more important as a potential economic prize: an enormous concentration of natural gas and oil reserves is located in the region, in addition to important minerals, including gold.

The world’s energy consumption is bound to vastly increase over the next two or three decades. Estimates by the U.S. Department of Energy anticipate that world demand will rise by more than 50 percent between 1993 and 2015, with the most significant increase in consumption occurring in the Far East. The momentum of Asia’s economic development is already generating massive pressures for the exploration and exploitation of new sources of energy, and the Central Asian region and the Caspian Sea basin are known to contain reserves of natural gas and oil that dwarf those of Kuwait, the Gulf of Mexico, or the North Sea.

Access to that resource and sharing in its potential wealth represent objectives that stir national ambitions, motivate corporate interests, rekindle historical claims, revive imperial aspirations, and fuel international rivalries. The situation is made all the more volatile by the fact that the region is not only a power vacuum but is also internally unstable.

The Eurasian Balkans include nine countries that one way or another fit the foregoing description, with two others as potential candidates. The nine are Kazakstan [alternative and official spelling of Kazakhstan] , Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia—all of them formerly part of the defunct Soviet Union—as well as Afghanistan.

The potential additions to the list are Turkey and Iran, both of them much more politically and economically viable, both active contestants for regional influence within the Eurasian Balkans, and thus both significant geo-strategic players in the region. At the same time, both are potentially vulnerable to internal ethnic conflicts. If either or both of them were to be destabilized, the internal problems of the region would become unmanageable, while efforts to restrain regional domination by Russia could even become futile. ¹¹






The Middle East, in some regards, is a striking parallel to the Balkans and Central-Eastern Europe during the years leading up the First World War. In the wake of the the First World War the borders of the Balkans and Central-Eastern Europe were redrawn. This region experienced a period of upheaval, violence and conflict, before and after World War I, which was the direct result of foreign economic interests and interference.

The reasons behind the First World War are more sinister than the standard school-book explanation, the assassination of the heir to the throne of the Austro-Hungarian (Habsburg) Empire, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, in Sarajevo. Economic factors were the real motivation for the large-scale war in 1914.

Norman Dodd, a former Wall Street banker and investigator for the U.S. Congress, who examined U.S. tax-exempt foundations, confirmed in a 1982 interview that those powerful individuals who from behind the scenes controlled the finances, policies, and government of the United States had in fact also planned U.S. involvement in a war, which would contribute to entrenching their grip on power.

The following testimonial is from the transcript of Norman Dodd's interview with G. Edward Griffin;


We are now at the year 1908, which was the year that the Carnegie Foundation began operations. And, in that year, the trustees meeting, for the first time, raised a specific question, which they discussed throughout the balance of the year, in a very learned fashion. And the question is this: Is there any means known more effective than war, assuming you wish to alter the life of an entire people? And they conclude that, no more effective means to that end is known to humanity, than war. So then, in 1909, they raise the second question, and discuss it, namely, how do we involve the United States in a war?

Well, I doubt, at that time, if there was any subject more removed from the thinking of most of the people of this country [the United States], than its involvement in a war. There were intermittent shows [wars] in the Balkans, but I doubt very much if many people even knew where the Balkans were. And finally, they answer that question as follows: we must control the State Department.
And then, that very naturally raises the question of how do we do that? They answer it by saying, we must take over and control the diplomatic machinery of this country and, finally, they resolve to aim at that as an objective. Then, time passes, and we are eventually in a war, which would be World War I. At that time, they record on their minutes a shocking report in which they dispatch to President Wilson a telegram cautioning him to see that the war does not end too quickly. And finally, of course, the war is over.
At that time, their interest shifts over to preventing what they call a reversion of life in the United States to what it was prior to 1914, when World War I broke out.


http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=3882

[don]

Re: The Great Game: Geopolitics and Oil

Over a hundred years ago, three nations were emerging into what we now call the First World. The United States, Japan and Germany. All wanted entry into the most exclusive poker game on the planet. The US chose Spain, Japan Russia, as their points of entry. After those conflicts, both were vetted members in the colonial game. Germany had a more complex problem, being anchored in the cockpit of its rival European powers. A century later there has been both great change and nothing has changed at all.

[c1ue]

Re: The Great Game: Geopolitics and Oil

There's been talk before about US Aircraft Carrier force projection capabilities - here is an outside viewpoint:

http://www.defence.pk/forums/world-a...time-bomb.html

In the world of big business, and big military, money is power. The more money one controls, the more powerful one is. And, in the U.S. military, the bigger the program and sexier the hardware/technology, the more prestige you've got, especially if that hardware can rain a lot of destruction down on the enemy. Perhaps those are just a few of a multitude of reasons the U.S. Navy wants to spend an estimated $13.7 billion per unit for a future Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carrier a.k.a. "super carrier" called the CVN 21 (formerly CVNX).

Basically, the stated mission of the Northrop Grumman CVN 21 Program is to "conceptualize, design, build, test and deliver a state-of-the-art aircraft carrier that meets operational requirements of the United States Navy and results in specified reductions in acquisition costs, manning and weight while enhancing operational capabilities." How, a 13.7 billion super aircraft carrier is going to lead to reductions in acquisition costs is anyone's guess, but it sounds good. And, good PR is everything these days when it comes to huge-budget military programs.

However, there are a couple of little "flies in the ointment" in the form of...

the latest ship-killing unmanned weapon systems like supercavitating torpedoes and supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles being produced and/or developed by other countries that can probably sink the CVN-21, even if it is protected by its own highly-advanced, highly-lethal systems like fighter aircraft (primarily F/A-18s), ASW (Anti-Submarine Warfare i.e. "sub-hunting") aircraft, the Raytheon Ship Self-Defense System (SSDS), Aegis-radar-equipped and highly-weaponized cruisers and destroyers, submarines, etc. That's not to mention unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) a.k.a. unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) being produced and developed by other countries that can also potentially wreak a lot of havoc and destruction on surface ships. And, at the end of the day, that's what the CVN-21 will be, a large, hulking, incredibly expensive (albeit very sexy) surface ship.

The thing about surface ships is, they're vulnerable to anti-ship missiles, torpedoes, AND UAS/UAVs, the whole trifecta, and these unmanned yet highly lethal weapons are increasing in sophistication all the time. Take the BrahMos Supersonic Cruise Missile, for instance. An Indian-Russian joint venture, the BrahMos can be launched from aircraft, ships, and subs, and flies at approx. three (3) times the speed ("high supersonic velocity") of standard subsonic cruise missiles like the Raytheon BGM-109 Tomahawk Land-Attack Missile (TLAM) (submarine or ship-launched) and Boeing AGM-84 Harpoon/SLAM (Stand-off Land Attack Missile) anti-ship cruise missile. It's fire-and-forget, has a low radar signature, and can be programmed for a variety of attack trajectories. The Brahmos Aerospace website has an "operational scenario" illustration that shows the BrahMos Universal Supersonic Cruise Missile's versatility with regard to launching platforms.



Basically, the BrahMos supersonic air-breathing cruise missile looks like an excellent complement/companion to the Russian SS-N-22 Sunburn (a.k.a. 3M-82 Moskit a.k.a. P270 Moskit) ramjet-powered anti-ship missile, SS-NX-26 Yakhonts missile (follow-on to the Sunburn missile, also ramjet powered) and VA-111 Shkval Supercavitating Rocket Torpedo, (which, by the way, is capable of speeds exceeding 200 knots under water).

A quick note on the Shkval: The VA-111 Shkval's high speed is achieved via supercavitation, where a vacuum bubble forms in front of and around the body of the torpedo, greatly reducing water resistance (i.e. friction). Pretty cool, except for the fact that the Russian military has it, and ours (U.S.) doesn't. The good news is, word on the street is that the Shkval is "****", meaning it's not a guided fire-and-forget torpedo. At least that's what the public's being told. The bad news? The bad news is, that even if this is true, the Russians aren't stupid, militarily complacent, or devoid of ideas and plans, and their military technology is constantly marching forward for the motherland just like ours is--sometimes even faster. So, it's just a matter of time (probably not much, at that) before a successor to the Shkval series of supercavitating torpedoes is developed that's a "smart" guided fire-and-forget weapon that will home in on our very expensive ships and subs with the single-minded precision and obsession of a lion pack on a wounded water buffalo.

By the way, what if the Russians already have a "smart" precision-guided supercavitating torpedo? Chances are, the Shkval isn't the most advanced supercavitating torpedo they've got. Remember, they don't have as open a press or society there as we do (especially under Putin), so theoretically it should be easier for them to keep the latest advanced military weapons a secret. Same goes for China. While we're on the subject, what if the Russians and/or Chinese have a more advanced supersonic anti-ship cruise missile (one with countermeasures and multi-mode guidance/targeting) than the Brahmos, Sunburn, Yakhonts, or any other missile that's been reported on so far in the press? It's not exactly unlikely, since the Russians and Chinese have their own classified systems just like we have ours. Using that same argument, let's hope we (the U.S.) have some classified ship-defense systems (particularly for our carriers) of which DefenseReview is unaware to counter anything (anti-ship weapons) the Russians, Chinese, et al could possibly have at their disposal.

It's ironic that in the post-cold-war world, some might say, well, "if somebody's got to have weapons like that, at least it's just Russia" (oh, and India), right? Not really. On January 18, 2006, Jane's Defence Weekly published an article on the development of a D-21 medium-range ballistic missile-based anti-ship missile being develped by the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA). And that's not all the Chinese have. Apparently, the Chinese now reportedly have Russian Sovremenny-class destroyers armed with the afformentioned Russian 3-M-82 Moskit/SS-N-22 Sunburn anti-ship missiles. Thank God the Chinese are our "friends", too, just like the Russians, huh? I mean, both of those "friendly" countries need us as a trading partner into the forseeable future, so they wouldn't launch those big, mean anti-ship missiles and torpedoes against our big expensive (approx. $5 billion--without the planes on it) Nimitz-class aircraft carriers or CVN-21 future aircraft carrier, would they? Of course not. For now.

That's the thing about this crazy world. Things have a funny way of changing. Sometimes they change gradually, and sometimes they change very quickly. The world turns, paradigms shift, and the next thing ya' know the Russians or the Chinese are launching a battery (let's say 20-100) anti-ship missiles and torpedoes at one time against a single U.S. aircraft carrier, and yesterday's friend is suddenly today's enemy sinking your very expensive battleship. But, again, why would the Chinese want to sink one or several of our aircraft carriers? After all, they don't still want Taiwan back. And, it's not like we've ever threatened to send in our aircraft carriers and other surface ships to protect Taiwan. Hell, they've probably forgotten all about that technologically and monetarily-rich little island sitting right off their coast. They're probably past it. On to the next thing. After all, the Chinese are known for their forgetful nature and let-bygones-be-bygones attitude.

O.k., so, the Russians, the Chinese, and the Indians can all sink our aircraft carriers faster than a pitbull can down a steak. At least the Iranians don't have anything like that. Ya' know, 'cause that would be alarming. What? The Iranian's do have something like that? Oh, God, that's right, remember what I wrote about the world changing? It seems that the Iranians are developing their own supercavitating torpedo called the "Hoot" (or "Whale") "sonar-evading underwater missile" a.k.a. supercavitating torpedo, most likely based on the Russian Shkval tech, since the Russians were helping them develop it, at least in the late 1990's. The Iranians claim that "no submarine or warship can escape." So, there's Russian technology and technical expertise behind it. Perfect. That's just wonderful.

Now, what if Russian president Vladimir Putin or his successor decides to sell the Sunburn or Yakhonts missile to the Iranians, just like the U.S. once did with the Stinger shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missile to the Afgani Mujahedeen in the 1980's. Just like the Stinger turned that war around for the Afghani's, so would the Sunburn or Yakhonts change the game for the Iranian's versus the U.S. Navy. If that were to happen, payback would truly be a *****, for us.

I know what you're thinking. You're thinking "So what?" Even if the Iranians get one of those super-duper missiles, the U.S. Navy's got SeaRAM, which can defeat those nasty Mach 2.5 (approx.) anti-ship missiles. The SeaRAM Anti-Ship Missile Defense System can defeat it. It's our salvation. Well, not so fast. Ya' see, that little theory depends on two things: 1) that the enemy missile threat will be detected in time and SeaRAM will have a 100% kill rate, and 2) the 11-missile RAM launcher won't run out of missiles before the enemy does.

Boy, that's a lot to depend on. In the tactical shooting a.k.a. defensive shooting world, there's an old saying: "Action beats reaction." In other words, the actor always has the time advantage over the reactor. Time is the reactor's enemy, which means it will be our ships' enemy, if any of the now multiple countries who have supersonic anti-ship missiles and high-speed supercavitating torpedoes decide to launch them on us. Make no mistake, the first ships they'll launch against will be our aircraft carriers, and they'll probably launch a large number of these missiles at one time.

Let's give the U.S. Navy the benefit of the doubt, and say that it can stop 90% of the enemy missiles and/or torpedos streaking towards the carrier(s). The result's going to be the same. Understand that if just one of these missiles or torpedos hits the carrier, it's probably done. Even if it doesn't sink, it will most likely be taken out of operation. So, in effect, no more carrier. Let's say it takes two hits to destroy the carrier. All the enemy will have to do is fire at least 20 missiles at once, get its two hits on the carrier, and no more carrier. What if the enemy launches 20 missiles and 20 torpedos at the carrier at the same time? Get the picture? 20 anti-ship missiles and 20 torpedos might read like a big investment, but it's nowhere near the investement of a $5-$13.7 billion aircraft carrier. Not even close.

And, then there's the threat of bomb-laiden enemy unmanned aircraft systems/unmanned aerial vehicles (UAS/UAVs). Back in June 2006, an Iranian UAV/UAS flew and loitered over the USS Ronald Reagan supercarrier undetected and unmolested for 25 minutes before flying back safely to its base. That's a problem. One of the factors contributing to this blind spot/vulnerability for U.S. warships may be the lack of slow-speed/long-loiter time fixed-wing observation/reconnaissance/detection aircraft that can be launched from and fly continuously over U.S. aircraft carriers and the rest of the ships in the battle group, leaving them without the requisite air cover to defend against enemy UAV/UAS threats. As Defense Review outlined in a previous article, U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups are no longer launching S-3B Viking ASW/ASuW (Anti-Submarine Warfare/Anti-Surface Warfare) aircraft off the deck. Obviously, this leaves all the ships in a U.S. aircraft carrier battle group vulnerable to submarine attack (missile and torpedo), but the S-3B Viking, if it were still operational, could probably also assist in protecting against enemy UAV/UAS attacks.

Perhaps the best low-speed/long-loiter aircraft for this role would be an two-seat, navalized version of the Northrop Grumman A-10 Thunderbolt II "Warthog" ground attack aircraft, or "Sea Hog", if you will. Having a man in the second seat (rear seat) would be an important element in the Seahog's ability to protect the battlegroup. A second man would provide a second pair of eyes (a valuable addition in itself), and he could concentrate on the observation, reconnaissance and detection roles, freeing up the pilot to concentrate/focus on flying the aircraft (and not crashing). Basically, the second man would be an AFAC, or "Airborne Forward Air Controller".

By the way, while we're at it, we might want to consider bringing tactical seaplanes back. In case you're woried about speed, jet-powered seaplanes like the Convair F2Y Sea Dart proved a long time ago that seaplane fighter aircraft can fly just as fast as land-based fighter aircraft, not that they necessarily need to fly that fast (per the previous two paragraphs). Seaplanes would obviate the need for a catapult launch and recovery system, and give the battle group enhanced air defense and attack capability.

Bottom line, if we get into any kind of serious beef with ANY country that has a decent arsenal of these weapons, our aircraft carriers will most likely be destroyed and sunk within minutes. They're just too big, too slow, and too visible to survive, even with all their onboard and offboard networked defenses. The fact is that high-speed, sophisticated precision anti-ship weapons technology is cheaper and can therefore outpace our ability to protect our big, slow carriers. In the end, war is a financial transaction. Russian helicopters cost a lot more to produce, field and replace than Stinger missiles, and U.S. Aircraft carriers cost A LOT more to produce, field and replace than even the most sophisticated anti-ship weapons.

But, here's the kicker: The enemy might not even have to rely on the above-discussed weapons to sink our carriers. Back in 2002, the U.S. Navy conducted a training exercise called "Millenium Challenge 02", which was designed to showcase high-tech joint-force doctrine. Instead, it ended up showcasing the ability of the Opposing Force (OPFOR) Commander, Gen. Paul Van Riper, to sink two-thirds of the U.S. fleet with "nothing more than a few small boats (fishing boats, patrol boats, etc.) and aircraft." Here's how Gary Brecher a.k.a. "War Nerd" described Gen. Van Riper's naval combat tactics, and the ramifications (i.e. big-picture significance) of the resulting carnage to our warships:

"He kept them circling around the edges of the Persian Gulf aimlessly, driving the Navy crazy trying to keep track of them. When the Admirals finally lost patience and ordered all planes and ships to leave, van Ripen had them all attack at once. And they sank two-thirds of the US fleet.

That should scare the hell out of everybody who cares about how well the US is prepared to fight its next war. It means that a bunch of Cessnas, fishing boats and assorted private craft, crewed by good soldiers and armed with anti-ship missiles, can destroy a US aircraft carrier. That means that the hundreds of trillions (yeah, trillions) of dollars we've invested in shipbuilding is wasted, worthless."

And, that's about right. Pretty accurate assessment. DefenseReview recommends that you read the article.

Now, in case you're thinking that Millenium Challenge 02 was just an anomoly, Bill Sweetman recently reported for Ares defense technology blog on submarine HMCS Corner Brook successfully targeting British aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious a.k.a. "Lusty. To prove that this actually happened, the Canadian Navy released a photograph of the Illustrious that was taken through the Corner Brook's periscope. "The picture represents hard evidence that the submarine was well within attack parameters and would have been successful in an attack," said Commander Luc Cassivi of Submarine Division, Halifax.

If the Corner Brook had been a hostile sub, good ol' Lusty would have been seconds away from being sunk by a Mk 48 heavyweight torpedo--and that's not even a high-speed supercavitating torpedo. Truth is, the torpedo doesn't have to be that fast, because action beats reaction, and the threat you don't see is probably the threat that will kill you--and Illustrious couldn't see Corner Brook.

So, what's the solution? There are a few, actually. The most intelligent solution is probably to go to an all-submarine combat fleet, with quiet-running (or, even better, silent-running) submarine aircraft carriers, cruisers, and destroyers. This should be within the United States' technological capability. However, even if we can't make our warships true submarine warships (capable of going very deep), we should at least be able to make them submersible to an adequate depth where they can't be effectively targeted by anti-ship missiles. The submarine ships of all types should be outfitted with advanced anti-ship missiles and torpedos, and equally-advanced anti-aircraft missiles. The second solution is to go with a partial submarine, partial surface fleet. Ideally, the surface ships (cruisers, destroyers, etc.) should sit low in the water and incorporate design and weaponization aspects similar to the developmental NGSS (Northrop Grumman Ship Systems)/General Dynamics DDG-1000 Zumwalt Class Destroyer a.k.a. (formerly DD 21 Destroyer) and CG(X) Cruiser. One of these design aspects is a low-profile "tumblehome" hull form for stealth, reducing the radar cross section (RCS) significantly. Another is the proposed Peripheral Vertical Launch System (PVLS), to reduce the ship's vulnerability to a single hit. All ships (surface and submarine) should be as small and fast as possible, and be capable of carrying, launching, and recovering 2-12 F-35B (STOVL) or F-35C Lightning II JSF (Joint Strike Fighter) aircraft.

A larger number of smaller, faster, stealthier ships, all networked and each capable of launching their own F-35 fighter aircraft, would yield a big combat advantage over a smaller number of much larger ships that are much easier to target, track and hit. In the age of high-tech, high-speed fire-and-forget missiles and torpedoes, a smaller, faster, more dispersed and less-visible fleet is most likely the smarter way to go. Each ship will be organically less vulnerable to anti-ship missile and torpedo attack, cost less and take less time to build (and thus replace if destroyed), and carry less men on it (so less men will be injured and/or killed if it's sunk). Each ship will also be individually less important/crucial to the overall fight than a single, huge, uber-expensive super carrier like a Nimitz class or CVN 21 supercarrier. Why put all our eggs (or most of them) in one basket, when we can disperse the force and the risk?

The third solution is to at least make our aircraft carriers submarine (or at least submersible). You'd probably be limited to approx. 12 aircraft per boat, but so what? Just build more boats. Yes, a big, shiny CVN-21 supercarrier surface ship will look really impressive initially when it shows up off someone's coast. But, how impressive will it look when it's sinking to the bottom after getting pulverized with anti-ship missiles and torpedos? If the U.S. Navy keeps building gigantic surface aircraft carriers and daring people to sink them, odds are, eventually, someone will take us up on it and do just that. My personal prediction is that this will happen within the next 10-20 years. Within 10-20 years, one of our aircraft carriers will get sent to the bottom by enemy missiles or torpedos (or both)--or possibly even UAVs/UAS. This scenario could even happen within the next five years. I hope I'm wrong about this. I really do. It would be a terrible loss of life. But, by building these humugous surface ships, we're asking for it, and it's probably going to take a tragedy like this to wake up the top brass in Navy and DoD--if they get the right message at all. It's possible that they'll learn the wrong lesson and just build a bigger aircraft carrier with more armor, weapons and aircraft on it. Let's hope that doesn't happen.

A very wise U.S. submarine commander once said "There are two kinds of ships in the US Navy: subs and targets."

How right he was.

Author's note: In a previous article, DefenseReview suggested un-mothballing our surviving battleships for redeployment if/when necessary. To clarify, we only recommend this as an interim solution, since they (the battleships) already exist, and only if they're modernized with the latest weapons, radar, and ship-defense systems, and outfitted with aircraft-carrier-type catapult launch and recovery decks for aircraft (preferably with ski-jump-type take-off ramps). The battleships would need to be able to carry, launch, and recover their own aircraft in order to be totally self-sufficient and provide their own air cover. Again, we would recommend the F-35B Lightning II STOVL "Joint Strike Fighter" (JSF) aircraft for air-to-air defense missions, and a navalized 2-seat A-10 "Warthog", or "Sea Hog", aircraft for low-speed/long-loiter-time ship defense missions.

[ThePythonicCow]

Re: The Great Game: Geopolitics and Oil

I'm not especially fond of them either, but I'm not willing to cut off my nose to spite my face.

The American power elite are no longer my nose. They are for the most part my enemy (despite that I still have several Bush and McCain/Palin bumper stickers on my car.)

Is your view of the Chinese Elites any less dark?

I am much less familiar with the Chinese elite, and cannot speak nor read one word of Chinese, but I doubt they are any better, quite possibly worse inside their nation.

I was just hoping that these various elite would do grave damage to each other, to the benefit, after a fashion, of the rest of us.

The Chinese elite do have one advantage, in my current view, at least as applies to Americans.. Outside of China, they are less powerful. A medium sized bad guy is less bad than big sized bad guy, especially when the medium sized bad guy is further away.

[ThePythonicCow]

Re: The Great Game: Geopolitics and Oil

That means that the hundreds of trillions (yeah, trillions) of dollars we've invested in shipbuilding is wasted, worthless."

Not wasted, rather the trigger for general (major nuclear) war. You sink our aircraft carrier, we sink your nation. Go ahead, make my day.

Aircraft carriers are used to deliver force to places that cannot fight a major nuclear war. Most likely, they can't take out the aircraft carrier, and if they manage to anyway, they are toast, and they won't even get the fleeting joy of extracting revenge.

We will not see (crossing fingers and praying madly) general nuclear war between the major powers. We will see continued military aggression in areas outside the actual borders of the major powers, ostensibly fighting on one or the other (or both) sides of conflicts in resource rich regions. We will continue to see more ambiguous intrigues and covert operations everywhere. Aircraft carriers are quite useful to the U.S. in such operations.

[sishya]

Re: The Great Game: Geopolitics and Oil

A falling Oil Price will not put a sqeeeze on china, but rather a high oil price will put a squeeze on everyone except US and it's middle east allies/enemies.
I don't believe this - US will engineer a high Oil price.

[c1ue]

Re: The Great Game: Geopolitics and Oil

Not wasted, rather the trigger for general (major nuclear) war. You sink our aircraft carrier, we sink your nation. Go ahead, make my day.

This has been bandied about - but then again it would be quite interesting to see how the US will be able to justify use of nuclear weapons if a US carrier is damaged/destroyed in someone else's territorial waters.

Who exactly is the aggressor at that point?

We will not see (crossing fingers and praying madly) general nuclear war between the major powers. We will see continued military aggression in areas outside the actual borders of the major powers, ostensibly fighting on one or the other (or both) sides of conflicts in resource rich regions. We will continue to see more ambiguous intrigues and covert operations everywhere. Aircraft carriers are quite useful to the U.S. in such operations.

I am afraid that I disagree with your viewpoint. Even in Pakistan and Afghanistan - which are relatively near the ocean, the type of force projected from aircraft carriers has been of minimal use.

There is a reason why the Predators are more commonly used.

Looking at Iraq - even there the jet fighters/bombers deployed off US aircraft carriers were only useful for destroying the official Iraqi army.

They were totally useless against the insurgency.

The point of the article which you missed is that in a world where there are other powers with the technology to damage the multi-trillion dollar carrier platforms, similarly said world primarily involving LIC type operations, the cost/benefit ratio for carriers is increasingly skewed.

The propaganda value, of course, remains.

More grist for the mill - this one from the US Navy Institute

http://www.usni.org/magazines/procee...erability-myth

America's nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, especially in today's irregular, asymmetric warfare climate, could be little more than slow-moving targets.

The recently renewed debate over aircraft carrier requirements has focused mainly on the factors of cost and utility. These issues notwithstanding, analysts often overlook or understate the carriers' inherent vulnerabilities. Regardless of the number of carriers national leadership decides to maintain, because they remain the U.S. Navy's preeminent capital ship and a symbol of American global power and prestige, they are a potential key target for both unconventional and conventional adversaries. Carrier proponents, however, universally seem to accept on faith alone the premise that a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (CVN) is essentially invulnerable.

Yet an intelligent adversary could potentially exploit carrier weaknesses. The sudden, unexpected loss of a CVN, especially by unanticipated asymmetric means, would shock both the military establishment and the American psyche-perhaps being a military equivalent to the Twin Towers' collapse on 9/11. The truth is, a deployed aircraft carrier is more vulnerable to mission kill than is commonly believed, and the Department of Defense should consider efforts to prevent or mitigate such an exigency.

The carrier debate is alive and well. The current effort surrounding the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)and the near-term decommissioning of the nearly 50-year-old USS Enterprise (CVN-65) are raising the volume of the argument, specifically on the number of carrier strike groups (CSGs) needed to meet national and combatant commander demands.
Recurring congressional statutes also dictate minimum carrier fleet size, often despite differing advice from Navy secretaries and military leaders.¹ The carrier's value in the post-9/11 era amidst a global security paradigm defined by the often ambiguous characteristics of irregular, asymmetric, or hybrid warfare-remains an unanswered question. While combat-proven in conventional conflicts and for certain aspects of irregular warfare, future roles and structure of the carrier force remain murky.

Assessments of aircraft carrier vulnerability are not new. The Soviets debated building a significant carrier fleet in the 1960s but determined that large carriers had no place in the nuclear age, partly because of their vulnerability to missiles with nuclear warheads.² While later choosing to build larger carriers, Moscow always retained the view that carriers remained vulnerable. While the American carrier debate has continued since 1945, it has focused largely on missions, cost, and force structure-not vulnerability.
Presumed Impregnable

The U.S. view of carrier invulnerability is a perilous assumption. If 9/11 taught Washington anything, it clearly demonstrated that fortress America was vulnerable in ways its citizens and defenders never imagined. Terrorists selected targets with maximum psychological impact, employing a relatively sophisticated asymmetric method, seemingly incorporating many of the basic principles of war and operational art: simplicity, synergy, simultaneity and depth, surprise, tempo and timing, security, etc.

The basic operational plan also reflected an awareness of the efficacy of the classic indirect approach-a key aspect of asymmetric warfare. They also exploited a basic vulnerability of open, democratic political systems-a benign operating environment. If a handful of Saudis could plan and carry out effective attacks halfway around the world in a foreign land, why then could other adversaries not accomplish the same in local waters familiar to them?


The typical carrier capabilities that lead to presumptions of impregnability include: speed, armor, compartmentalization, size, defenses (air wing, own-ship, escorts, etc.), blue-water sanctuary (range from shore and from adversary/targets), and technological superiority of U.S. weapon systems. Not often discussed, though, is how a smart enemy might exploit technology or subterfuge to obviate some traditional carrier strengths. Some potential examples include:

• Mass media, satellite communication, and the Internet can provide location and disposition of U.S. carriers when they are near shipping lanes or coastal waters; carrier presence is obvious well before the silhouette appears on the horizon.
• Carriers not supporting a conflict requiring continuous air wing operations will not be operating at higher speeds, especially at night.
• Fast, low profile, open-ocean craft are widely available.
• Armored hangar bay doors are useless when open, typical to lower conditions of readiness.
• Carrier crew size and diversity would likely allow unfettered access to clandestine infiltrators of almost any ethnicity.
• While nuclear power provides virtually unlimited steaming, carriers remain dependent on forward staging areas and supply ships for food, aviation fuel, and stores.
• The insatiable appetite for information afloat is satisfied by way of precious, uninterrupted bandwidth flowing through multiple nodes with varying vulnerabilities.

Next-Generation Weapons Are Here Now

Emerging technologies and new classes of advanced conventional weapons are also making the carriers' ostensible invulnerability more suspect. Most experts see recent advances in foreign antiship cruise missiles (ASCM), offensive information operations capabilities, stealthy diesel and nuclear-powered submarines, deep water rising mines, and antiship ballistic missiles (ASBM) as direct threats to carrier strike groups proximate to the littorals (i.e., when supporting air operations inland). While contemporary conflicts demonstrate no such apparent threats to carriers, they also involve state adversaries without advanced conventional naval weapons.

Hezbollah's effective use of a C802 ASCM against an Israeli warship in 2006, however, illustrates that state order of battle calculations alone cannot provide a total picture of enemy capabilities. Although most Navy leaders avow carrier invulnerability, then-Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral Timothy Keating admitted that the ability to defend against such advanced threats is uncertain.³ While it is beyond the scope of this article to cite specifics, a quick scan of any recent DOD global threat assessment reveals a plethora of emerging weapon systems of concern.⁴

A corollary to the expanding advanced conventional weapons threat could change the fundamental calculus of the carrier's value. Simply put, increasing adversary offensive threats to carriers require concomitant carrier and strike group defenses to mitigate them. For instance, if the security environment changes such that carriers are threatened with new, better weapons, but in much the same way they were during the Cold War, the brunt of the carrier air wing will again be needed for strike group defense.

The resultant reduction in offensive carrier strike capability-not to mention the significant shift in aircraft/weapons mix and predeployment air wing and ship defensive training-may diminish the carriers' primary role of power projection. Similarly, increased defensive tasking to strike group escorts would limit their support for the myriad regional non-combat missions espoused in the current maritime strategy. Indeed, the reliable provision of air power from an unchallenged carrier witnessed during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom may well not be the future norm.
Asymmetric Challenges Loom

Conventional threats notwithstanding, carriers are also vulnerable to unconventional or asymmetric threats.⁵ These potentially include terrorism, sabotage, infiltration, denial and subterfuge (information operations [IO], including cyber and psychological operations), interdiction, and homeport or logistics hub attacks, among others. While many admirals discount such threats outright, again, one need only recall the shock and confusion following the 9/11 attacks.

One reason these threats make military leaders uncomfortable is that they are vague and indiscriminate. Another is that few weapons in the Carrier Strike Group arsenal can directly address them. Indeed, the strike group's inherent capabilities are usually irrelevant against asymmetric threats. Finally, since an unconventional adversary may seek any of these means-and perhaps yet unknown methods-to achieve a mission kill (i.e., not necessarily a catastrophic kill), leaders often swear off as impractical the vouchsafing of every potential carrier vulnerability.

Just as operational art demands a rigorous assessment of adversary center of gravity and critical vulnerabilities, one cannot assume away the enemy's ability to do the same. The 2006 Israeli experience in Lebanon is a recent example of a hybrid conflict, wherein an unconventional enemy knew its opponent well, exploited technology to defeat its armor, directed a sophisticated IO campaign to manage perceptions, and threatened the homeland with incessant rocket and missile barrages.

Gone are the days when the most serious unconventional threats were ignorant, lightly armed fanatics conducting improvised attacks on hardened targets. As such, it is a relatively simple task with readily available information to evaluate the carrier as a system, with critical elements of varying dependency, many of which could degrade mission capability if assailed. Admittedly, adversaries require global reach and significant capability to threaten some elements over the longer-term, but a creative opponent could still seriously limit a carrier's effectiveness, at least temporarily.

Any neophyte can generate a basic list of forward-deployed military unit vulnerability: communications, logistics/lines of communication, crew readiness/morale, mobility, etc. Because the CSG cannot protect everything, the aggressor has the advantage in target selection and surprise.
Pondering the Unthinkable


Carrier proponents typically fail to mention such vulnerabilities. Instead they promote the carriers' inherent ability to operate unfettered off an enemy coast-a virtual fortress at sea. In fairness to the carrier admirals, when threat assessments on the future operating environment present only shadowy non-state actors with undefined or unpredictable capabilities, it is easy to see how some would prefer to focus on the black and white conventional threats. Listing a few hypothetical examples might help demonstrate potential asymmetric carrier threats:

• A carrier operating with only a single escort on an OEF no-fly day, far separated from other strike group warships, is approached by a small team of highly trained, well-armed saboteurs in a low-profile, fast boat at night in international waters. They gain access via a lowered elevator when the ship is in low readiness conditions for a quick surprise attack with satchel charges in the hangar and flight decks to destroy most carrier air wing aircraft before the ship musters a response.
• An adversary state about to seize several small islands in the Persian Gulf directs a small team of special forces to commandeer a large container ship, which veers into the path of a CVN exiting the southern Suez Canal in a restricted waterway. The resultant collision and carrier grounding causes enough damage to limit the carrier to ten knots, preventing most fixed-wing flight operations indefinitely.
• An extremist group targeted by carrier air wing operations identifies the less protected fleet auxiliaries providing carrier strike group logistics in a forward theater and targets them simultaneously with waterborne improvised explosive devices. Critical fuel, food, and stores shortages severely limit air wing operations for a period of weeks.

We Must Not Assume Away Threats

Instilling paranoia is not the intent of these examples; it is only to present the art of the possible. So what can naval leaders do to lessen the likelihood of asymmetric attacks focused on carrier mission kills? First, they must admit that such attacks are possible. Then, undertake a comprehensive assessment of carrier vulnerabilities, with most likely and most dangerous scenarios addressed first for prevention and mitigation plans. Next, naval war game and doctrine developers should make a commitment to present warfighters and defense leaders at war games and red team exercises with situations where conventional, unconventional/asymmetric, and/or hybrid threats marginalize or threaten CSGs.

This will force leaders to challenge traditional assumptions of carrier invulnerability. Finally, leaders and strategists should evaluate military plans and force capabilities in light of the fact that asymmetric attacks may come from either conventional or nontraditional adversaries.

Presuming carrier invulnerability is dangerous. It promotes complacency, prevents a healthy degree of critical thinking, and limits America's ability to prevent and respond to a completely new class of threats. As a CATO Institute study amidst the post-Desert Storm carrier debate related, "Carriers and their battle groups are awesome instruments of war, but they are not juggernauts, as their supporters claim. . . ."⁶

Pre-9/11 American society provided opportunity enough for a band of radical Muslim brothers to shut down the United States temporarily. Why then could peaceful international waters or territorial seas not provide a similarly benign operating environment today? As defense leaders prepare to make hard QDR decisions, it is high time to renew the carrier vulnerability debate. As former President George W. Bush was wont to state, "Bring it on."

---

1. The 2005 QDR endorsed an 11-carrier force, which has since been supported by Congress (current plan for 12 in 2019), though the force will drop to 10 upon the CVN-65 decommissioning in 2012.
2. Charles C. Petersen, "Aircraft Carriers in, Soviet Naval Theory from 1960 to the Falklands War," Center for Naval Analyses, Professional Paper 405, January 1984, p. 3.
3. David W. Wise, "Carrier culture shock: The Navy's maritime strategy does not go far enough in reshaping the fleet," Armed Forces Journal, June 2009, http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2009/06/4034155.
4. See Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China, 2009," especially chapters 4 and 5.
5. Asymmetric attack/warfare is characterized by several properties: difficult to detect/recognize, dissimilar in type, disproportional in size and effect, avoids strengths and targets weaknesses, and has significant shock value.
6. David Isenberg, "The Illusion of Power: Aircraft Carriers and U.S. Military Strategy," CATO Institute, Policy Analysis No. 134, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa134.html.
Commander Patch is a faculty member at the U.S. Army War College and a member of the U.S. Naval Institute Editorial Board. He is a retired U.S. Navy surface warfare and intelligence officer and career intelligence analyst. He served on board the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) from 2000 to 2002 during Operation Enduring Freedom.

EDIT: A picture of the Israeli ship in question. Supposedly the anti-missile radars were not up (possibly a little strange given that the Hezbollah/Israel shooting war was on), but nonetheless this ship is hardly a 5inch gun armed corvette of a third world nation, it is a relatively modern guided missile ship.

[flintlock]

Re: The Great Game: Geopolitics and Oil

As we've seen so many times in the past, in the short run the price of oil is entirely unpredictable and it can go anywhere. The streets are littered with the corpses of oil analysts that thought they could forecast the movements in the price of crude.

Oil is the most political of commodities...and that is the reason forecasting the short-term price movements is a hopeless exercise...

I agree!

[sutro]

Re: The Great Game: Geopolitics and Oil

I'll tell you what else gives me pause, he doesn't even mention the pop up function of the Dong Feng ballistic missile. If you are going to talk about projection of hard power through carrier groups, in fact start with it as your lead tenant, the Dong Feng should at least be mentioned. We can project hard power to many nations, but to China it's a lot harder.

I agree he should have mentioned the Dong Feng but unless they deploy them in the Persian Gulf they won't help China protect its overseas supply lines.

Beyond Carrier groups, what are the Chinese doing with anti-submarine warfare? Our subs might do a better job of "commerce raiding" than the carriers.

[ThePythonicCow]

Re: The Great Game: Geopolitics and Oil

A falling Oil Price will not put a sqeeeze on china, but rather a high oil price will put a squeeze on everyone except US and it's middle east allies/enemies.
I don't believe this - US will engineer a high Oil price.

A low oil price puts pressure on producers. It would be part of gaining greater control over uncooperative oil producers, such as perhaps Venezuela.