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  • Re: Remembering the Past

    http://www.militarytimes.com/longfor.../?sf34440316=1

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    • Re: Remembering the Past

      is morale a factor in these raids?

      US officials have defended the commando raid in south Yemen early on Saturday that led to the deaths of two hostages, saying they did not know the soon-to-be-freed South African teacher Pierre Korkie was being held at the site they attacked.

      Korkie and a US photojournalist, Luke Somers, were in the same room and were apparently killed by their captors when a US special forces squad was within 100 metres of their mountain compound.

      A senior US administration official said intelligence experts had concluded, before the raid, that two hostages were being held side-by-side. “One was assessed to be Luke Somers,” the senior US official told the Guardian. “We did not know who the second hostage was.”

      While Somers’ fate had remained unclear, a South African charity said it had been close to finalising a deal to free Korkie, who was seized along with his wife, Yolande, by al-Qaida in May 2013. The couple had been in Yemen for four years with two teenage children; he worked as a teacher and she did relief work. Yolande was released without ransom in January after negotiations conducted by Gift of the Givers, a South African charity.

      The charity said on Saturday: “The psychological and emotional devastation to Yolande and her family will be compounded by the knowledge that Pierre was to be released by al-Qaida tomorrow.”

      News of the deaths was still sinking in in Sana’a. Baraa Shiban, an activist who campaigns against US counter-terror policy in Yemen and met Somers during Yemen’s 2011 uprising, said: “He was a victim of the same process that he himself was trying to advocate against. I knew his politics. He was anti-drones, he advocated for the Guantánamo families.” This, he said, made the way he died particularly difficult to bear. “It hurts that he got caught in the middle of this mess.”

      Gregory D. Johnsen, the author of a book on Al Qaeda’s branch in Yemen who was nearly kidnapped on the same street in Sana where Mr. Somers was abducted last year, said he was troubled by the United States’ approach.

      “When the U.S. unilaterally takes all the other options off the table and leaves itself with only the military option, then if that goes wrong, the results can be tragic,” he said. “There are a lot of different ways to negotiate even without paying ransom. It calls for innovative diplomacy.”

      It was the second attempt by United States forces to rescue Mr. Somers from Yemen in less than two weeks.

      The challenges of distance, weather, equipment failure, pinpoint intelligence — and unpredictable actions by the adversary — are ever-present.

      A raid in July by Special Operations forces against an Islamic State safe house in Syria also failed to free American hostages, who apparently had been relocated in advance of the mission.

      In the case of the raid Saturday, the intelligence on Mr. Somers’s location was accurate.

      The compound, which was located in a remote, hilly area, surrounded by scrub, was guarded by about half a dozen gunmen, already jittery about a possible repeat of the previous rescue attempt. And the approach to the compound was sufficiently difficult that the commandos had virtually no element of surprise, which they typically plan for and rely on. The commandos were detected when they were less than 100 yards from the compound. It was not clear what alerted the militants.

      “It was very difficult to catch them by enough surprise to prevent them from having time to execute the hostages,” said the senior military official, who monitored the operation overnight Friday into Saturday.

      Heavily armed and wearing night-vision goggles, the commandos breached the compound and knew in which building the hostages were being held. But their advantage was already lost: The commandos saw one of the militants go into a small building long enough to shoot the hostages and leave. By the time the Americans reached the building, the militants had already fled. The commandos recovered Mr. Somers and Mr. Korkie, who were both gravely wounded. One of the hostages — officials did not say which one — died on the Osprey ride to the amphibious assault ship Makin Island, from which the rescue mission was launched off the Yemeni coast.

      The other hostage died on the operating table after reaching the ship.

      In the village where the rescue attempt took place, in the southern province of Shabwah, a tribal leader, Tarek al-Daghari al-Awlaki, said the American commandos had raided four houses, killing at least two militants but also eight civilians. He said that one of the civilians killed was a 70-year-old man.

      “The shooting caused panic,” Mr. Daghari said. “Nine of the dead are from my tribe.” He added that villagers had spent the rest of Saturday burying the dead.

      Local people said 11 people had died, including a woman and a 10-year-old child.

      Comment


      • Re: Remembering the Past

        Double Post

        Comment


        • Re: Remembering the Past

          Originally posted by don View Post
          is morale a factor in these raids?

          US officials have defended the commando raid in south Yemen early on Saturday that led to the deaths of two hostages, saying they did not know the soon-to-be-freed South African teacher Pierre Korkie was being held at the site they attacked.

          Korkie and a US photojournalist, Luke Somers, were in the same room and were apparently killed by their captors when a US special forces squad was within 100 metres of their mountain compound.

          A senior US administration official said intelligence experts had concluded, before the raid, that two hostages were being held side-by-side. “One was assessed to be Luke Somers,” the senior US official told the Guardian. “We did not know who the second hostage was.”

          While Somers’ fate had remained unclear, a South African charity said it had been close to finalising a deal to free Korkie, who was seized along with his wife, Yolande, by al-Qaida in May 2013. The couple had been in Yemen for four years with two teenage children; he worked as a teacher and she did relief work. Yolande was released without ransom in January after negotiations conducted by Gift of the Givers, a South African charity.

          The charity said on Saturday: “The psychological and emotional devastation to Yolande and her family will be compounded by the knowledge that Pierre was to be released by al-Qaida tomorrow.”

          News of the deaths was still sinking in in Sana’a. Baraa Shiban, an activist who campaigns against US counter-terror policy in Yemen and met Somers during Yemen’s 2011 uprising, said: “He was a victim of the same process that he himself was trying to advocate against. I knew his politics. He was anti-drones, he advocated for the Guantánamo families.” This, he said, made the way he died particularly difficult to bear. “It hurts that he got caught in the middle of this mess.”

          Gregory D. Johnsen, the author of a book on Al Qaeda’s branch in Yemen who was nearly kidnapped on the same street in Sana where Mr. Somers was abducted last year, said he was troubled by the United States’ approach.

          “When the U.S. unilaterally takes all the other options off the table and leaves itself with only the military option, then if that goes wrong, the results can be tragic,” he said. “There are a lot of different ways to negotiate even without paying ransom. It calls for innovative diplomacy.”

          It was the second attempt by United States forces to rescue Mr. Somers from Yemen in less than two weeks.

          The challenges of distance, weather, equipment failure, pinpoint intelligence — and unpredictable actions by the adversary — are ever-present.

          A raid in July by Special Operations forces against an Islamic State safe house in Syria also failed to free American hostages, who apparently had been relocated in advance of the mission.

          In the case of the raid Saturday, the intelligence on Mr. Somers’s location was accurate.

          The compound, which was located in a remote, hilly area, surrounded by scrub, was guarded by about half a dozen gunmen, already jittery about a possible repeat of the previous rescue attempt. And the approach to the compound was sufficiently difficult that the commandos had virtually no element of surprise, which they typically plan for and rely on. The commandos were detected when they were less than 100 yards from the compound. It was not clear what alerted the militants.

          “It was very difficult to catch them by enough surprise to prevent them from having time to execute the hostages,” said the senior military official, who monitored the operation overnight Friday into Saturday.

          Heavily armed and wearing night-vision goggles, the commandos breached the compound and knew in which building the hostages were being held. But their advantage was already lost: The commandos saw one of the militants go into a small building long enough to shoot the hostages and leave. By the time the Americans reached the building, the militants had already fled. The commandos recovered Mr. Somers and Mr. Korkie, who were both gravely wounded. One of the hostages — officials did not say which one — died on the Osprey ride to the amphibious assault ship Makin Island, from which the rescue mission was launched off the Yemeni coast.

          The other hostage died on the operating table after reaching the ship.

          In the village where the rescue attempt took place, in the southern province of Shabwah, a tribal leader, Tarek al-Daghari al-Awlaki, said the American commandos had raided four houses, killing at least two militants but also eight civilians. He said that one of the civilians killed was a 70-year-old man.

          “The shooting caused panic,” Mr. Daghari said. “Nine of the dead are from my tribe.” He added that villagers had spent the rest of Saturday burying the dead.

          Local people said 11 people had died, including a woman and a 10-year-old child.
          The successful hostage rescue mission(I think it was 8 hostages from the region recovered) less than 2 weeks ago reportedly just missed Somers and Korkie(moved 2 days prior), hence the followup mission reportedly based on short notice threat of execution to one or both of the hostages, even though negotiations were underway.

          I don't know, I wasn't there, but some things to consider:

          1)Who was conducting the hostage negotiations for Somers/Korkie? A charity like on Yolande's behalf?

          If so, were they effectively liaising with diplomats? It's an open secret that a good few countries pay ransoms, some more easily/rapidly than others.

          This can lead to an escalating cycle of kidnappings/ransoms(Japanese in Mexico in the 90's, everyone in Iraq in the last decade).

          It can also lead to incidents when efforts are not deconflicted such as what happened with the successful rescue of Giuliana Sgrena by Italian forces(ransom paid) in Iraq in 2005.

          2)Was the claimed death of a 70 year old man, woman, and 10 year old child, and 5-8 additional civilians if the first 3 were not combatants verified?

          Often times(but clearly not always) these civilian(elderly, women, children) casualty figures are inflated and used for propaganda purposes.

          3)There are consequences for failure. In the Linda Norgrove hostage rescue it was found she died due to wounds sustained by a grenade thrown by a rescuer. It is believed this had career ending consequences for the rescuer in question.

          Australia's Director of Military Prosecutions charged 3 commandos serving in Afghanistan a few years ago for using a grenade to clear a room from which they were being fired on by an insurgent. Unfortunately, several children were killed.

          There would have been literally thousands of kill/capture type raids conducted in the region in the last 10+ years.

          In terms of the mechanics of conducting such raids, there's never been a higher level of capability. Hostage rescue missions would be at the very top of the pyramid, making up only a very small percentage of those thousands of raids.

          Sometimes things don't go your way.

          Bad intelligence or the "time and space" going against you in being able to do anything about it.

          Sometimes you get compromised by a dog, goat herder, or a bad guy in the wrong place at the wrong time.

          Sometimes mistakes happen.

          As far as morale being a factor, it certainly could be, but I reckon on the part of the Yemen government. The successful raid conducted two weeks ago was advertised as a "joint" Yemen/US raid.

          Morale could also be a factor for the other side regarding the local casualty count. If true, it would be more than a bit troubling.

          I think it's safe to say it was US led, but probably sold locally as Yemen led/US supported mission to strengthen perceptions of Yemen security force capabilities and indirectly Yemen government governance.

          Comment


          • Re: Remembering the Past


            That's a pretty good article and tells a story that aligns with what I'm hearing from my friends in the service in the US.

            Due to the incredible advances in trauma care(the loss of life from massive bleeding and tension pnuemothorax have dropped considerably) battlefield fatalities have dramatically reduced compared to previous conflicts.

            But the horrific IED blast injuries will result in huge long term financial costs to support the wounded long-term, as well as the genuine but nebulous costs associated with traumatic brain injuries(TBIs) down to lower levels including folks involved on the periphery of IEDs as well as explosive breaching.

            To me, I get the sense the US military is heading into a post Vietnam funk.

            Not a change from conscription to professional, but a change from war-fighting by many(anyone in teeth arms in Iraq mid decade), to war-fighting by only some(JSOC/SOCOM).

            So not a peacetime military as such, but one that is pulling back from a decade plus of high tempo combat operations.

            There are always big problems and attitude shifts required in that shift.

            The greatest value acquired is in the institutional knowledge hard earned since 2001, which walks in and out the door every day(much like companies on civvie street). Retention of subject matter experts and proven commanders is going to be critically important and sounds like there is room for improvement.

            What is not mentioned is the wear and tear on gear, to match the wear and tear on people(and the high future costs associated with broken bodies/minds).

            When weapon systems, aircraft, and vehicles are designed, planned, procured....they have a measurable life.

            The "lives" of these systems are planned out decades and include contingency operations and even wartime hard use.

            But I doubt the plans conducted in the 70's/80's/90's included anything near the extremely high tempo and hard use of a large chunk of the US inventory over the last 14+ years.

            There will be some very serious lifecycle replacement(probably sustainability of increasingly old equipment) issues and costs in the next decade or two because of what happened since 2001.

            Comment


            • Re: Remembering the Past

              Afghanistan, longest war in US history . . . serial invasions of Iraq . . . numerous smaller incursions, many unacknowledged (including soldiers' combat status withheld for official denial purposes) . . . no definitive 'winning' closure.

              Is it any wonder . . . .

              Comment


              • Re: Remembering the Past

                Originally posted by don View Post
                Afghanistan, longest war in US history . . . serial invasions of Iraq . . . numerous smaller incursions, many unacknowledged (including soldiers' combat status withheld for official denial purposes) . . . no definitive 'winning' closure.

                Is it any wonder . . . .

                we are in a war economy......
                next up

                http://www.defenseinnovationmarketpl...Initiative.pdf


                http://breakingdefense.com/2014/11/h...-technologies/

                http://breakingdefense.com/2014/12/d...out-some-help/


                whos going to run the DOD just nominated Mr Carter?

                http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/TPV3/...means-more-war

                Comment


                • Re: Remembering the Past

                  Logical and conventional thinking for areas of focus to attempt to maintain overmatch against peer/near-peer countries moving forward.

                  Unfortunately, it largely neglects two future guarantees:

                  1)A healthy percentage of military equipment in the US inventory has burned through it's useful life faster than originally planned and it is being ignored or payed forward like a rather expensive hot potato.

                  2)Beyond some opportunities with sensor miniaturisation(particularly cost) and swarming, none of this will help the US to improve the stability and security of current and future mega ghettos…which is where the people increasingly live(well over 50% of global population living in urban centre of >1 million, likely to be 70% in the next 1-2 decades).

                  Wars happen where people live.

                  -----

                  The technology in question will certainly help to ensure things like SLOCs(Sea Lanes of Control/Communication) which provide leverage for influence/control over national/regional/global trade.

                  But I think we will be facing situations where superpowers will be able to continue to influence and control sovereign states via conventional high tech power projection.

                  But they will be increasingly unable to influence and control un/under-governed mega ghettos of the present and future.

                  I reckon nothing would frighten a contemporary western commander more than having to develop a plan to seize/control(politically impossible and militarily untenable) or even just assist/influence a host nation's efforts to gain effective governance of current/future mega-ghettos where everyone is increasingly living.

                  It reminds me a bit of McNamara's Whiz Kids of the 1960's.

                  Some of that is totally relevant and forward thinking.

                  Some of it is absolutely asinine as found when very, very expensive efforts were made to penetrate the jungles of Southeast Asia with remote sensors. And while the ability for sensors to penetrate jungle canopy has made leaps and bounds in the last 40+ years, it's still imperfect.

                  It took people to do it.

                  The urban jungle, particularly in the developing world where Google Street view can't or doesn't exist, is going to be an increasing problem for both host nation government and global powers who desire influence over parts of it.

                  Comment


                  • Re: Fifth Generation of Warfare (5GW) is "indistinguishable from magic"

                    Where to buy this book in ebook format and DRM-free?

                    Comment


                    • Re: Fifth Generation of Warfare (5GW) is "indistinguishable from magic"

                      The Quiet American

                      by Graham Greene, Robert Stone (Introduction)

                      Graham Greene's classic exploration of love, innocence, and morality in Vietnam

                      "I never knew a man who had better motives for all the trouble he caused," Graham Greene's narrator Fowler remarks of Alden Pyle, the eponymous "Quiet American" of what is perhaps the most controversial novel of his career. Pyle is the brash young idealist sent out by Washington on a mysterious mission to Saigon, where the French Army struggles against the Vietminh guerrillas.

                      As young Pyle's well-intentioned policies blunder into bloodshed, Fowler, a seasoned and cynical British reporter, finds it impossible to stand safely aside as an observer. But Fowler's motives for intervening are suspect, both to the police and himself, for Pyle has stolen Fowler's beautiful Vietnamese mistress.

                      Originally published in 1956 and twice adapted to film, The Quiet American remains a terrifiying and prescient portrait of innocence at large. This Graham Greene Centennial Edition includes a new introductory essay by Robert Stone.

                      the movie is also well done.

                      Comment


                      • Re: Fifth Generation of Warfare (5GW) is "indistinguishable from magic"

                        Originally posted by don View Post
                        The Quiet American

                        by Graham Greene, Robert Stone (Introduction)

                        Graham Greene's classic exploration of love, innocence, and morality in Vietnam

                        "I never knew a man who had better motives for all the trouble he caused," Graham Greene's narrator Fowler remarks of Alden Pyle, the eponymous "Quiet American" of what is perhaps the most controversial novel of his career. Pyle is the brash young idealist sent out by Washington on a mysterious mission to Saigon, where the French Army struggles against the Vietminh guerrillas.

                        As young Pyle's well-intentioned policies blunder into bloodshed, Fowler, a seasoned and cynical British reporter, finds it impossible to stand safely aside as an observer. But Fowler's motives for intervening are suspect, both to the police and himself, for Pyle has stolen Fowler's beautiful Vietnamese mistress.

                        Originally published in 1956 and twice adapted to film, The Quiet American remains a terrifiying and prescient portrait of innocence at large. This Graham Greene Centennial Edition includes a new introductory essay by Robert Stone.

                        the movie is also well done.
                        Well done, but not at all the story Greene wrote. At that time Greene was denounced as “anti-American” by many leading US critics who deliberately distorted or ignored the story’s unambiguous condemnation of US covert operations in Vietnam. A New York Times review in 1956 suggested it was full of “custom-made characters” and regretted the absence of an “experienced and intelligent anti-Communist” in the story.

                        Two years later, Joseph L. Mankiewicz directed a Hollywood movie of the book staring Michael Redgrave and former US war hero Audie Murphy. Mankiewicz twisted the story to present Pyle as an innocent but courageous fighter for democracy and dedicated his film to the US-backed South Vietnamese puppet regime of Ngo Dinh Diem.

                        Mankiewicz consulted the infamous US military counter-insurgency expert Edward G. Lansdale on the script and told the press that “anti-Americanism” and “Communist footsie-ism” was “loose in the world”. Lansdale, who helped establish “third force” proxies in the Philippines and Vietnam in the 1940s and 50s and was a senior US advisor to Diem, was one of the models for Pyle in Greene’s book.

                        Greene condemned Mankiewicz’s movie as a “propaganda film for America” and defended his book, explaining that rather than his characters being contrived or “custom-made” there was “more direct rapportage in The Quiet American than in any other novel” he had written. He described Mankiewicz’s distortions as “treachery” and commented that the film appeared to have been “deliberately made to attack the book and the author”.

                        US intelligence regarded Greene as “dangerous”. He was defined as a “communist sympathiser” and for a time barred entry to the US, despite the fact that he vetoed publication of his novels and short stories in the Soviet Union for many years in protest over the Stalinist political repression in Eastern Europe and the USSR.

                        According to documents obtained last week by Britain’s Guardian newspaper under Freedom of Information, Greene was under constant surveillance by US intelligence agencies from the 1950s until his death in 1991. US officials, according to the newspaper, “went to extraordinary lengths” to spy on Greene, reading his mail when he was temporarily refused entry to the US, and gathering reports by US diplomats and other shadowy figures on his travels, particularly in Latin America, and international public appearances.

                        A better and certainly more honest film is "The Ugly American."



                        Written by the same authors as "Fail Safe", it told the story of how communism was spreading through SE Asia - helped on its way by the stupid, arrogant behavior of the Americans there.

                        But the hero of the novel - an American engineer called Homer Atkins - behaves differently. He goes and works in local villages to help the local people develop and modernize. Then an American military officer points out that what Atkins is doing is exactly the same as Mao's revolutionary theories set out to do - "win the minds and the hearts" of the local people.

                        The Ugly American was a runaway bestseller and was later made into a film starring Marlon Brando. Senator John Kennedy was gripped by The Ugly American. In 1960 he and five other opinion leaders bought a large advertisement in the New York Times saying that they had sent copies of the novel to every US senator because its message was so important.

                        Adam Curtis has an interesting piece where he ties this in with torture and the Iraq/Afghan adventures and the disastrous counter insurgency strategies employed to such awful effect then and now.

                        Comment


                        • Re: Fifth Generation of Warfare (5GW) is "indistinguishable from magic"

                          That blurb is ripe for de-construction. Love the "innocent abroad" tag. The newer film version of the book with Michael Caine is closer to Greene's story.

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