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Unlike economics, Wildland Fire Science is actually a science. Unlike economists, normal people actually know what the future holds. Debt matters, deleveraging is a bitch, and economist religious rituals ensure our destruction will be more severe and complete than any conceivable alternative. Beware the inevitable conflagration resulting from high levels of debt, followed by extended low interest rates.
One can get a college degree in Fire Science. Remember what it’s like to work in an actual professional discipline? Given a set of preconditions, experts in the field can utilize principles and understanding to deterministically predict a result within an acceptable degree of error. You know, Science.
Your local fire department typically deals with structure fires. There’s a lot involved, and it’s important. However, many of those principles, techniques, and equipment don’t translate over to the fundamentally different world of Wildland Fire Science. One professional may need to know more about electrical, chemical, and combusting metal fires, as well as dynamics within burning sealed structures; while the other deals with conflagrations that can go from zero to more than two thousand acres in a couple hours with changing behaviors in different biotopes and surface features.
Find a professional in wildland fire science. Speak the phrase, “Long periods of drought, followed by high winds.”
A sane response by a seasoned professional in that field would be, “Oh, CR*P!”
A quick review:
Wildland Fire Science: A science.
Economics: Not.
The Yellowstone fires that burned more than a million acres in and around Yellowstone National Park in 1988 are an example of long periods of drought, followed by high winds. The Long Mesa Fire at Mesa Verde National Park in 1989 is another example, going from zero to over two thousand acres in a few hours, with 100-foot high walls of flames. Southern California fires in years with the Santa Ana winds are always a good example of “drought, followed by high winds”.
If economics were a science, or even a professional discipline, then every “expert” would similarly understand the corollary, “high levels of debt, followed by low interest rates”. Since economists (other than a very few, like Steven Keen) are too ignorant to say it, we shall say it on their behalf: “Oh, CR*P!”
It is hard to overestimate the significance of long periods of drought, which kills vegetation, increases fuels loading, and dries out even the largest diameter branches on the ground to the point that when they burn, they will do so completely, at high temperature, which can sterilize the soil such that no vegetation of any kind will grow on that spot for decades. Debt has the exact same effect:
Debt (Pro): Can increase productivity through leverage (if taken for productive activity, NOT for consumption).
Debt (Con): Always increases risk and decreases the risk-adjusted return on productive activities.
Debt is always a drag on productive activity, because it must be serviced. Debt tends to compound, unless future expenditures are significantly reduced (as debt principal and interest is repaid). Debt kills, as it increases risks associated with cashflow, and fundamentally changes the worth of productive activities (which must now be productive in excess of debt servicing and repayment). While it’s true that you might be better off by borrowing money for a productive venture, and later paying that debt off (i.e., leverage), you would have made more money if you already had the capital to do that venture without borrowing (because nothing would have gone to debt servicing).
Don’t forget the theorem: Deleveraging is a bitch.
Of course, these are “silly” arguments that apply to households, businesses, and any responsible (or accountable) institution. One might argue that they don’t apply to sovereigns (who never intend to repay their debt, but rather intend to forever “roll” their debt), or central banks (who merely print their way out of any corner in which they find themselves). While we might disagree on whether sovereigns and central banks can really operate like this over an extended period, we can all agree that past debt is always a drag on the present, even for sovereigns and central banks.
High winds merely amplify the speed and severity of what was already going to happen. Within any finite (relatively short) period of time, while it’s possible you won’t get a lightening strike, and it’s possible no camper will lose control of his campfire, increasing debt levels increases the probability that something is going to get started (e.g., it increases “fuels loading”). In time, probability dictates you will get that lightening strike, and you will get that out-of-control campfire. High winds ensure that inevitable event will spread quickly, and severely.
When debt levels are high, and have been high for an extended period, it’s the same thing as high fuels loading after extended drought. It’s inevitable that deleveraging will begin, and will be significant, even if you’re merely talking about the increasing roll-risk of existing debt. When those high debt levels coincide with an extended period of low interest rates, you can be assured that people have maximized their leverage, and dreamed up mechanisms for risk never previously imagined. When interest rates are high, there is at least a possible “pressure valve” of lowering interest rates (indeed, that’s what central banks for decades promised us was their job), and the cost of money helps ensure truly stupid ideas are not funded (because the money is expensive). However, with low interest rates, we are sure to fund even the most moronic bridges to nowhere, and there is literally no pricing pressure on stupidity (an infinite governmental resource).
Rest Here.
http://www.zerohedge.com/article/lon...wed-high-winds
One can get a college degree in Fire Science. Remember what it’s like to work in an actual professional discipline? Given a set of preconditions, experts in the field can utilize principles and understanding to deterministically predict a result within an acceptable degree of error. You know, Science.
Your local fire department typically deals with structure fires. There’s a lot involved, and it’s important. However, many of those principles, techniques, and equipment don’t translate over to the fundamentally different world of Wildland Fire Science. One professional may need to know more about electrical, chemical, and combusting metal fires, as well as dynamics within burning sealed structures; while the other deals with conflagrations that can go from zero to more than two thousand acres in a couple hours with changing behaviors in different biotopes and surface features.
Find a professional in wildland fire science. Speak the phrase, “Long periods of drought, followed by high winds.”
A sane response by a seasoned professional in that field would be, “Oh, CR*P!”
A quick review:
Wildland Fire Science: A science.
Economics: Not.
The Yellowstone fires that burned more than a million acres in and around Yellowstone National Park in 1988 are an example of long periods of drought, followed by high winds. The Long Mesa Fire at Mesa Verde National Park in 1989 is another example, going from zero to over two thousand acres in a few hours, with 100-foot high walls of flames. Southern California fires in years with the Santa Ana winds are always a good example of “drought, followed by high winds”.
If economics were a science, or even a professional discipline, then every “expert” would similarly understand the corollary, “high levels of debt, followed by low interest rates”. Since economists (other than a very few, like Steven Keen) are too ignorant to say it, we shall say it on their behalf: “Oh, CR*P!”
It is hard to overestimate the significance of long periods of drought, which kills vegetation, increases fuels loading, and dries out even the largest diameter branches on the ground to the point that when they burn, they will do so completely, at high temperature, which can sterilize the soil such that no vegetation of any kind will grow on that spot for decades. Debt has the exact same effect:
Debt (Pro): Can increase productivity through leverage (if taken for productive activity, NOT for consumption).
Debt (Con): Always increases risk and decreases the risk-adjusted return on productive activities.
Debt is always a drag on productive activity, because it must be serviced. Debt tends to compound, unless future expenditures are significantly reduced (as debt principal and interest is repaid). Debt kills, as it increases risks associated with cashflow, and fundamentally changes the worth of productive activities (which must now be productive in excess of debt servicing and repayment). While it’s true that you might be better off by borrowing money for a productive venture, and later paying that debt off (i.e., leverage), you would have made more money if you already had the capital to do that venture without borrowing (because nothing would have gone to debt servicing).
Don’t forget the theorem: Deleveraging is a bitch.
Of course, these are “silly” arguments that apply to households, businesses, and any responsible (or accountable) institution. One might argue that they don’t apply to sovereigns (who never intend to repay their debt, but rather intend to forever “roll” their debt), or central banks (who merely print their way out of any corner in which they find themselves). While we might disagree on whether sovereigns and central banks can really operate like this over an extended period, we can all agree that past debt is always a drag on the present, even for sovereigns and central banks.
High winds merely amplify the speed and severity of what was already going to happen. Within any finite (relatively short) period of time, while it’s possible you won’t get a lightening strike, and it’s possible no camper will lose control of his campfire, increasing debt levels increases the probability that something is going to get started (e.g., it increases “fuels loading”). In time, probability dictates you will get that lightening strike, and you will get that out-of-control campfire. High winds ensure that inevitable event will spread quickly, and severely.
When debt levels are high, and have been high for an extended period, it’s the same thing as high fuels loading after extended drought. It’s inevitable that deleveraging will begin, and will be significant, even if you’re merely talking about the increasing roll-risk of existing debt. When those high debt levels coincide with an extended period of low interest rates, you can be assured that people have maximized their leverage, and dreamed up mechanisms for risk never previously imagined. When interest rates are high, there is at least a possible “pressure valve” of lowering interest rates (indeed, that’s what central banks for decades promised us was their job), and the cost of money helps ensure truly stupid ideas are not funded (because the money is expensive). However, with low interest rates, we are sure to fund even the most moronic bridges to nowhere, and there is literally no pricing pressure on stupidity (an infinite governmental resource).
Rest Here.
http://www.zerohedge.com/article/lon...wed-high-winds