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swaps/CDO/mbs won't hurt Goldman/JPM? could be ... or maybe not ...

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  • swaps/CDO/mbs won't hurt Goldman/JPM? could be ... or maybe not ...

    http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?p...UNM&refer=home

    The single biggest collapse in the market has been that of New Century Financial Corp., the second-biggest subprime mortgage lender. When New Century collapsed it owed money to many, but the single biggest creditor, according to the London Times, was...Goldman Sachs Group Inc., followed by Morgan Stanley, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., etc., etc.


    >>> full article below <<<<<

    Subprime Mess Produces Unqualified Victims: Michael Lewis

    By Michael Lewis

    April 16 (Bloomberg) -- The story line of the newest American financial debacle is now clear:

    President Bill Clinton eased lending standards to encourage the rich people who run the mortgage market to embrace poor people with low credit ratings. Then these horrible rich people -- these unfeeling sharks -- went to work exploiting the poor.

    First, they talked poor people into borrowing money they should never have borrowed. Then they brought in some other sharks to package the loans as bonds, who in turn talked some other only slightly less poor people into buying the bonds. The rich middlemen took their fees and left the poor borrowers and slightly less poor lenders holding the bag.

    The moral of the story is also clear: No matter how much the government might try to help the poor, the rich people who run financial markets will find a way to screw them.

    At any rate, that's how it reads to me in the many scandal- tinged accounts of the subprime loan-market collapse. And on its surface the moral is appealing: the story is always better, and easier to write, when the rich guys are the crooks. But this interpretation of current events does raise a few questions. To wit:

    1) If the subprime home-loan market was a cynical conspiracy, why did so many of the putative conspirators wind up taking so much of the risk?

    The single biggest collapse in the market has been that of New Century Financial Corp., the second-biggest subprime mortgage lender. When New Century collapsed it owed money to many, but the single biggest creditor, according to the London Times, was...Goldman Sachs Group Inc., followed by Morgan Stanley, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., etc., etc.

    Out $1 Billion

    Interestingly, New Century's 10th-largest creditor -- again, according to the Times -- was another subprime lender, Countrywide Financial Corp. (Barclays Plc, out $1 billion, was a mere 15th on the list, which gives you an idea of the sums involved.) Given this, you just know that it's a matter of time before we learn of some hedge fund that's on the verge of collapse as a result of its investments in subprime mortgages.

    2) Why does the most financially obsessed and presumably well-informed character on earth, the American Investor, insist on playing the fool?

    Amazingly, in the wake of the Internet boom and bust, some meaningful number of American investors fails to ask why they are being offered fantastic returns on their investments. Paid six times the risk-free rate on the notes and bonds of a subprime lender called American Business Financial Services (a name that's a sign of bad things to come, if ever there was one), they don't wonder why it is that their investments yield such spectacular returns. Instead, they become outraged when American Business Financial Services collapses, then sue the Wall Street investment banks who sold them the bonds.

    Tell Your Story

    Then they go to the media. From Bloomberg News we learn the sad story of a small investor named Buck Meyer who lost $300,000 when American Business Financial Services tanks. The man has two children! He planned to use the amazingly high interest rates he earned on his American Business Financial Services bonds to pay the mortgage on his own new house in Chattanooga, Tennessee! How could they possibly fail to pay off?

    No one suggests that Buck Meyer, in effect, gambled his savings away -- that he might as well have grabbed the special offer of a free hotel room and flown to Las Vegas, groped his way to the roulette table, plopped his life savings down on 00, and then sued the casino for losing his money. Then again, the Vegas gambler can't expect journalists and juries to take his case seriously.

    Cheap Insurance

    Which raises yet another question: Did the knowledge that he could count on journalists and juries for sympathy embolden Buck Meyer to gamble his savings away? Even if Buck Meyer didn't consciously think ``If they don't give me my money back, I'll just sue 'em,'' was he not subconsciously aware that these lucrative if risky bonds came with a loose social insurance policy? Are the journalists and juries, therefore, partly to blame for his losses?

    3) Why in this new drama is it so easy to imagine borrowers in a different role, other than the one in which they are currently cast: The Victim?

    Moving is never pleasant or cheap, but that is the main cost to the subprime defaulter: He hands back the house, whose value has presumably plummeted, to the people who lent the money to buy it, and walks away. He rents. (Shrewdly!) In effect he bought a very cheap call option on the U.S. housing market. While he waited to see if his call option made him richer, he lived in a much nicer house than he could otherwise afford and probably wondered why rich people had become so recklessly open- handed. His behavior was irresponsible, but the markets let him do it and so it's hard to blame him for taking a flier.

    Am I the only one who wonders how a person who borrows money he can't repay, buys a house he can't afford, and then stiffs his creditors, is allowed to play the victim?

    A more convincing victim, I would have thought, is the person with weak credit but strong resolve who stood to benefit from a subprime loan -- and who now can't get one because the market is scared of his shadow.

  • #2
    Alabama County Overpaid for Interest-Rate Swaps, Adviser Says

    http://bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=2...PHA&refer=home

    By Martin Z. Braun

    April 26 (Bloomberg) -- Jefferson County, Alabama overpaid banks by as much $100 million for arranging $5.7 billion of derivative contracts designed to lower borrowing costs on sewer debt, the county's financial adviser estimated.

    The adviser, Porter, White & Co., found the county paid JPMorgan Chase & Co. Inc., Bear Stearns Cos., Bank of America Corp. and Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. $120.2 million to arrange 17 swaps without competitive bidding beginning in 2001, according to a report. Bloomberg News reported in an August 2005 article that the county paid fees of $100 million on 11 of the contracts, about two times the fees collected by banks for similar deals.

    ``This is an opaque market,'' said James White, president of Porter, White, based in Birmingham. ``In this market you're never going to know you got a fair price unless you bid it.''

    The county in December disclosed that the Securities and Exchange Commission had subpoenaed three current and two former commissioners, asking for records related to the county's interest-rate swaps. The SEC requested information regarding payments, fees and gifts relating to the deals.

    A growing number of U.S. state and local borrowers are arranging swaps and other complex derivatives in attempts to lower debt costs and protect against rising interest rates. The lack of transparency in the over-the-counter market makes it difficult for officials and taxpayers to determine whether they are paying a fair price for the private contracts, White said.

    Exchanging Payments

    A derivative is a financial contract whose value is derived from stocks, bonds, loans, currencies and commodities, or linked to specific events such as changes in interest rates or the weather. In a swap, parties agree to exchange interest payments, usually a fixed payment for one that varies based on the movement of benchmark indexes.

    White estimated the county overpaid between $80 million and $100 million for its swaps, based on an analysis of other deals and conversations with other financial advisers and dealers about the pricing of competitively bid swaps at the time.

    ``It is very hard for us to make a definitive statement,'' White said. ``These real transactions are not found in any publicly available database and to imply that there's certainty in these estimates is grossly misleading and may lead people to ignore what part of the problem is.''

    Swap Fees

    According to White's report, which doesn't lay out how the firm determined the $80 million to $100 million figure, the county paid fees on the swaps ranging from 6.1 basis points to 39.6 basis points above average market rates. White said the county shouldn't have paid more than 10 basis points for the swaps. A basis point is a hundredth of a percentage point.

    Steve Sayler, Jefferson County's finance director, said White's analysis ``is what it is.''

    ``There's nothing in the report that makes a statement about an $80 million to $100 million overpayment,'' Sayler said.

    Brooke Harlow, a spokeswoman for New York-based JPMorgan, and Kerrie Cohen, a spokeswoman for Lehman, also based in New York, declined to comment. Russell Sherman, a spokesman for Bear Stearns, didn't immediately return a call seeking comment. Scott Silvestri, a spokesman for Charlotte, North Carolina-based Bank of America, also didn't immediately return a call.

    Lower Rates

    Sayler said the swaps enabled the county to refinance about $3 billion of sewer bonds, at an interest rate of less 4 percent over 40 years. It isn't clear that the county could have gotten a better deal by holding an auction for the swaps, he said.

    ``It's impossible to say for a fact that bidding is better than negotiated,'' Sayler said. ``It's quite obvious that bidding may not always produce the best results and the most legal results.''

    Sayler cited a federal criminal antitrust probe of bid- rigging of investment contracts that are sold to states and municipalities. More than a dozen banks and brokers have been subpoenaed in the investigation, the widest-ever conducted of the municipal bond industry.

    Jefferson County Commission chairman Bettye Fine Collins was traveling and didn't return a call seeking comment. Larry Langford, chairman of the commission when the swaps were started, also didn't return a call.

    Allan Ripp, a spokesman for Beverly Hills, California-based CDR Financial Products, which advised the county on most of the swaps, said the firm stood by its pricing and disputed White's contention that the county shouldn't have paid more than 10 basis points in fees.

    Ripp said Porter White didn't take into account the county's credit profile, collateral provisions between the county and the banks and the precise time of the derivative trades.

    ``CDR, which has its own proprietary pricing, believes that it accounts for a number of both real time and market realities, that Porter White just doesn't come close to examining,'' Ripp said. ``Their conclusions on overpayment are not correct.''

    To contact the reporter on this story: Martin Z. Braun in New York at mbraun6@bloomberg.net .

    Last Updated: April 26, 2007 15:02 EDT
    There are a lot of people being taken for a ride, least of all municipal governments run by incompetent or corrupt fools.

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