Afghanistan

[ThePythonicCow]

Re: Afghanistan

In my opinion, Afghanistan is not about resources. The whole reason we have a security problem there today is because once we "solved" our initial security problem (the Soviet invasion), we disengaged rather than helping them put a functioning society back together (or imposing our own influence, at any rate).

You seem to explain why Afghanistan has a problem ... but not why it is our (U.S.) problem now. Why do we (the callous government, not the kind hearted citizenry) care if we left Afghanistan a basket case some decade past?

While reading your good reply, ASH, I was yelling "Pipeline, pipeline!" at the computer screen the first half of your post. But you kinda took a bazooka to that retort in the last part of your reply, so I guess I won't suggest that possible motive ;).

What is the real reason, in your view, that Obama is scaling up our Afghanistan effort?

[ThePythonicCow]

Re: Afghanistan

ASH,Your views on America's presence in Afghanistan having to do with reasons other than resources might be more convincing if Brzezinski and company had not already devoted books, lectures, and all sorts of money in pursuit of control over Chaostan resources.

I usually presume, when listening to people such as Brzezinski, that they are quite capable of misrepresenting their motives if it serves their interests to do so.

[c1ue]

Re: Afghanistan

Mooster,

What possible point would be for Brzezinski to present the views he has been? Given that his policy is being carried out in an administration under his side of the American kabuki theater?

Secondly, my mistake.

There-are-more-americans-fighting-in-afghanistan-today-than-the-soviets-deployed-at-their-peak/

We're Number One!

We're Number One!

[ASH]

Re: Afghanistan

ASH,

Your views on America's presence in Afghanistan having to do with reasons other than resources might be more convincing if Brzezinski and company had not already devoted books, lectures, and all sorts of money in pursuit of control over Chaostan resources.

http://www.itulip.com/forums/showthread.php?t=4881

http://www.itulip.com/forums/archive...hp/t-8766.html

Your first link defines "Chaostan" as a much larger region than Afghanistan. I agree that extracting resources from "Greater Chaostan" is a long-standing goal of American foreign policy, but my position is that American dominance of Afghanistan is not essential to doing so. We had little interest in establishing influence in Afghanistan prior to the Soviet invasion, and we had little interest afterwards. We would have little interest today, had not the Taliban sheltered Al Qaeda, and had we not tied our national prestige up in a limping intervention that was initially driven by the public's demand for vengeace.

[ASH]

Re: Afghanistan

You seem to explain why Afghanistan has a problem ... but not why it is our (U.S.) problem now. Why do we (the callous government, not the kind hearted citizenry) care if we left Afghanistan a basket case some decade past?

I meant to imply that the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan resulted from (a) channeling our support of the Mujahedin through Pakistan, and (b) leaving Afghanistan a basket case after the war. The Taliban present themselves as a popular movement in reaction to the lawlessness which followed, and I think there is some truth to that. That became our problem after the Al Qaeda leadership was expelled by Sudan in response to American pressure, and found sanctuary in Afghanistan.

While reading your good reply, ASH, I was yelling "Pipeline, pipeline!" at the computer screen the first half of your post. But you kinda took a bazooka to that retort in the last part of your reply, so I guess I won't suggest that possible motive ;).

What is the real reason, in your view, that Obama is scaling up our Afghanistan effort?

Well, I realize that many here would not agree with my assessment that the pipeline isn't a deciding factor. But my take about the 'real' reason is that this is primarily about the political needs of President Obama. Obama could not win the Presidency running as a straight-up dove; if he said that both Iraq and Afghanistan were mistakes, he would have been branded as a namby-pamby intellectual girly-man and possible muslim sympathizer. Sad that those characterizations could sway a significant number of voters, but it's true. Since "neither war" was the politically wrong answer, Obama's message was "Iraq is the wrong war -- a needless and wasteful fight chosen by the Republicans -- but I'll kick ass and take names in Afghanistan, because that is the right war." By taking this stance, he could still look reassuringly tough to foreign policy hawks (among the political establishment) and flag-waving nationalists like myself (among the electorate), while still attacking the Republicans for the Iraq fiasco. Now he is simply following through on that position, for much the same political reasons. When the political calculation changes, I expect the policy to change, regardless of any putative strategic interests.

[D-Mack]

Re: Afghanistan

ASH,

Your views on America's presence in Afghanistan having to do with reasons other than resources might be more convincing if Brzezinski and company had not already devoted books, lectures, and all sorts of money in pursuit of control over Chaostan resources.

For Pakistan, the primary interest is to gain
geostrategic depth through political influence in Afghanistan—and
to deny to Iran the exercise of such influence in Afghanistan and
Tajikistan—and to benefit eventually from any pipeline construction
linking Central Asia with the Arabian Sea. India, in reaction to Pakistan
and possibly concerned about China's long-range influence in
the region, views Iranian influence in Afghanistan and a greater
Russian presence in the former Soviet space more favorably.
Although distant, the United States, with its stake in the maintenance
of geopolitical pluralism in post-Soviet Eurasia, looms in
the background as an increasingly important if indirect player,
clearly interested not only in developing the region's resources but
also in preventing Russia from exclusively dominating the region's
geopolitical space. In so doing, America is not only pursuing its
larger Eurasian geostrategic goals but is also representing its own
growing economic interest, as well as that of Europe and the Far
East, in gaining unlimited access to this hitherto closed area.
Thus, at stake in this conundrum are geopolitical power, access
to potentially great wealth, the fulfillment of national and/or religious
missions, and security. The particular focus of the contest,
however, is on access. Until the collapse of the Soviet Union, access
to the region was monopolized by Moscow. All rail transport,
140 THE GRAND CHESSBOARD
gas and oil pipelines, and even air travel were channeled through
the center. Russian geopoliticians would prefer it to remain so,
since they know that whoever either controls or dominates access
to the region is the one most likely to win the geopolitical and economic
prize.
It is this consideration that has made the pipeline issue so central
to the future of the Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia. If the
main pipelines to the region continue to pass through Russian territory
to the Russian outlet on the Black Sea at Novorossiysk, the
political consequences of this condition will make themselves felt,
even without any overt Russian power plays. The region will remain
a political dependency, with Moscow in a strong position to
determine how the region's new wealth is to be shared. Conversely,
if another pipeline crosses the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan
and thence to the Mediterranean through Turkey and if one more
goes to the Arabian Sea through Afghanistan, no single power will
have monopoly over access.

The troubling fact is that some elements in the Russian political
elite act as if they prefer that the area's resources not be developed
at all if Russia cannot have complete control over access. Let
the wealth remain unexploited if the alternative is that foreign investment
will lead to more direct presence by foreign economic,
and thus also political, interests. That proprietary attitude is
rooted in history, and it will take time and outside pressures before
it changes.

http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119973.pdf

Doesn't sound like Brzezinski was concerned about competition.

[c1ue]

Re: Afghanistan

Your first link defines "Chaostan" as a much larger region than Afghanistan. I agree that extracting resources from "Greater Chaostan" is a long-standing goal of American foreign policy, but my position is that American dominance of Afghanistan is not essential to doing so. We had little interest in establishing influence in Afghanistan prior to the Soviet invasion, and we had little interest afterwards. We would have little interest today, had not the Taliban sheltered Al Qaeda, and had we not tied our national prestige up in a limping intervention that was initially driven by the public's demand for vengeace.

ASH,

American dominance of Afghanistan may not be essential, but it is definitely critical.

If we look at bart's pic on http://www.nowandfutures.com/world.html
you'll note there are only 3 ways to get resources from around the Caspian Sea out: Georgia, Iraq/Iran, and Afghanistan.

I discount the Russian side for obvious reasons.

Not coincidentally the US is busy as a bee in all three areas.

To apply the exact same rationale to the Middle East: it is the Persian Gulf which was a focal point for power in the 60s and 70s. Not coincidentally, the US ensured a faceoff between Iran/Iraq to tie off one end, then monopolized the other via Saudi Arabia and the UAE while simultaneously ensuring Afghanistan never fell under Soviet Russian control.

Control over ports and pipelines matters because alternate routes means having to more likely pay market prices.

And whats the geopolitical advantage of that?

As for prestige - prestige would have been perfectly served by booting the Taliban and then leaving. But of course that didn't happen.

As for the public's demand for vengeance: again, where are the bombs dropping on Saudi Arabia? I've never yet seen a banner saying "Let's bomb the crap out of Afghanistan for them inflicting 9/11 on the good old US of A". For that matter, the 9/11 connectedness of Iraq has still not been proven - nor were there any banners of "Let's bomb the crap out of Iraq for Saddam taking down the World Trade Center".

From my point of view, what we're seeing now is more a case of management of the American public than a case of the American public getting what it wants.

[ThePythonicCow]

Re: Afghanistan

Mooster,

What possible point would be for Brzezinski to present the views he has been?

Beats me. Sorry.

[ThePythonicCow]

Re: Afghanistan

I meant to imply ...

Well, I realize ...

Thank-you for your reply, ASH. Well stated.

The reason I had to ask was that I do not view Al Qaeda as a serious threat. This is a change in my viewpoint of a few years ago, when I was a strong supporter of Bush's War on Terror. My current instincts lay more with John Perkins view (he of the Economic Hit Man) which holds Al Qaeda as a propaganda created alias or excuse for undercover CIA operations. But that is getting a little too far out for this discussion. Sorry.

[Starving Steve]

Re: Afghanistan

Even if you don't believe in radiation toxicity, like one of the army experts
DU rounds are for blowing stuff up.



Some people in Iraq/Afghanistan blame it for their mutations
http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/cgi-b...06/04/29/p7926

I would think depleted uranium would be quite effective as a weapon when shot from a gun because of the high atomic weight of uranium. "It would tear some nice big holes in those 'sons-of-bitches'", to use an expression from the movie, Death Wish. "Nothing is too good for our friends."

[Slimprofits]

Re: Afghanistan

http://www.thenation.com/doc/20091130/roston/single

by ARAM ROSTON

This article appeared in the November 30, 2009 edition of The Nation.
November 11, 2009

Two years ago, a top Afghan security official told me, Afghanistan's intelligence service, the National Directorate of Security, had alerted the American military to the problem. The NDS delivered what I'm told are "very detailed" reports to the Americans explaining how the Taliban are profiting from protecting convoys of US supplies.

The Afghan intelligence service even offered a solution: what if the United States were to take the tens of millions paid to security contractors and instead set up a dedicated and professional convoy support unit to guard its logistics lines? The suggestion went nowhere.

The bizarre fact is that the practice of buying the Taliban's protection is not a secret. I asked Col. David Haight, who commands the Third Brigade of the Tenth Mountain Division, about it. After all, part of Highway 1 runs through his area of operations. What did he think about security companies paying off insurgents? "The American soldier in me is repulsed by it," he said in an interview in his office at FOB Shank in Logar Province. "But I know that it is what it is: essentially paying the enemy, saying, 'Hey, don't hassle me.' I don't like it, but it is what it is."

As a military official in Kabul explained contracting in Afghanistan overall, "We understand that across the board 10 percent to 20 percent goes to the insurgents. My intel guy would say it is closer to 10 percent. Generally it is happening in logistics."

In a statement to The Nation about Host Nation Trucking, Col. Wayne Shanks, the chief public affairs officer for the international forces in Afghanistan, said that military officials are "aware of allegations that procurement funds may find their way into the hands of insurgent groups, but we do not directly support or condone this activity, if it is occurring." He added that, despite oversight, "the relationships between contractors and their subcontractors, as well as between subcontractors and others in their operational communities, are not entirely transparent."