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A midsummer tale of two Chinese spies
By Peter J Brown
Tales of Chinese spies and United States space and satellite technology are making headlines together this month. The cases have arisen just as the US marks the 10th anniversary of the "Cox Report", a lengthy investigation of sensitive US technology transfers and Chinese espionage activities dedicated to obtaining US nuclear weapons and missile technology secrets that was carried out during the Bill Clinton administration.
The investigation was conducted in 1999 by a bi-partisan select committee of the US House of Representatives, chaired by US Representative Christopher Cox.
Dongfan "Greg" Chung, was on July 15 found guilty on six counts of economic espionage and other charges. A former engineer at various US defense contractors, including Boeing, China-born Chung was convicted of stealing trade secrets related to US space shuttle and rocket technology. The 73-year-old could receive a maximum sentence of more than 90 years in prison when sentenced later this year. Chung's attorney said that he will appeal his conviction.
Earlier in the month, Chinese national Chi Tong Kuok of Macau was arrested in Atlanta and subsequently indicted for conspiring to violate US export law. He had been under investigation since 2006 for using multiple Chinese and Japanese aliases to allegedly acquire US military radio and satellite equipment using eBay and other internet sources.
These two Chinese spies represent opposite ends of the world of espionage. Chung was a trusted employee, an insider who was employed by US defense contractors that simply took hundreds of thousands of documents home with him after work. Kuok on the other hand was an outsider and an adept virtual networker who exploited the Internet in a very creative fashion. Kuok has admitted that he was working for the Chinese government, while Chung denies it.
According to Stephanie Lieggi, a research associate for the East Asia Non-proliferation Program at the Monterey, California-based James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, both the Chinese space and missile programs benefit from China's ability to access US technology and expertise.
"The Loral/Hughes case [in the early 1990s, which was discussed at length in the Cox Report] was probably the most blatant - albeit inadvertent - instance when China was able to convert what it learned from US sources to improve its rockets accuracy and reliability," said Lieggi. "However, if you look at the speed at which China was able to move forward its rocket systems and ballistic missiles, it is not hard to imagine that foreign dual-use technology and information gathered by Chinese sources played a role in helping the Chinese programs deal with certain technical challenges."
In the Loral/Hughes affair, US companies deliberately shared information with their Chinese counterparts in order to improve the reliability of Chinese launch vehicles. Thus, an act of espionage did not take place. Finding concrete proof today about how much success Chinese spies have enjoyed in their pursuit of US missile and rocket secrets is quite difficult.
"It is hard to find - at least in open-source documentation - strong 'proof' of how China is using illicitly acquired technology for military or space programs. The information gathered by Chinese sources is most likely integrated into larger indigenous programs as [a way to 'leap-frog'] over certain technical hurdles," said Lieggi. "Unless someone with the specific understanding of the technologies involved were able to thoroughly examine the Chinese systems, it would be hard to specifically pinpoint this."
Richard Fisher, a Chinese military expert at the Washington, DC-based International Assessment and Strategy Center, points specifically to the launch of the Asiasat-2 satellite launch in 1995 as an example where China's military espionage apparatus was deeply involved in making sure Chinese engineers were pressing the US side for maximum revelations. In this instance, China was intently focused on increasing its knowledge of so-called satellite kick motors, which are used to propel satellites quickly and safely into their proper orbits.
"The impact of this one transfer has been catastrophic. In 1999, a Chinese scientist told journalist and former US Senate candidate Ken Timmerman and I that data [obtained from a US company] helped them perfect a satellite kick motor, which was then applied to the DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile," said Fisher. "Prior to this help, the DF-21 had a record of failure and was on the verge of being cancelled. I have concluded that this same assistance has been applied to enable the PLA [People's Liberation Army] to produce its latest solid-fueled ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missile] and SLBMs [submarine-launched ballistic missiles], the DF-31, DF-31A and JL-2. These nuclear missiles are now being deployed or are in advanced development, and all are aimed at Americans."
But beyond this, and other examples in the 1990s which might be described as unfortunate lapses in judgment on the part of US companies at the time, any hard evidence of specific US components which somehow evolved into existing Chinese missile and satellite hardware as the result of any espionage conducted by China over the past decade is just not available in the public domain.
"So much of the hard data on this is shrouded in secrecy that it is almost impossible to get a good grasp on it as an outsider," said Brian Weeden, technical advisor at the Colorado-based Secure World Foundation. "Many of the 'leaks' from unnamed officials and the few heavily publicized cases are done so precisely to advance a political position, which clouds the situation. It is clear that the reliability of PRC [People's Republic of China] space launch vehicles has improved considerably, and by association, probably their ballistic missiles, too."
Complicating matters is the fact that while information can be declared secret or classified for a variety of reasons, sharing information that is not necessarily secret or classified but still subject to export controls by the US government is a serious offense. At the same time, the space-related materials section on the US Munitions List is extraordinarily broad.
"It can be and is often the case that unclassified data falls under export controls," said Weeden. "For example, 'non-automatic, semi-automatic and fully automatic firearms to caliber .50 inclusive, and all components and parts for such firearms' are on the US Munitions List, but they still can be purchased in almost any gun store in the US. Thus, using the phrase 'stolen military secrets' in the case of a violation of controlled [but unclassified] data is incorrect."
There is no question that Chung possessed classified material. However, Weeden points to another heavily publicized case recently, that of Quan-shen Shu, where there is no evidence that actual secrets were involved. "The accused plead guilty to export violations, but did not have a security clearance and did not have any classified data. And in this particular case, the technology involved mainly revolved around that for production and storage of large amounts of liquid oxygen and hydrogen, which is in use by every state which operates large rockets," said Weeden. "Shu was actually bribing a French company to secure a contract for this technology on behalf of a Chinese firm, and it is unclear whether the technology in question was purely American or in use by the French as well."
Still, there is widespread agreement that China is more active than it was a decade ago in terms of espionage aimed at the US missile and space sectors.
"It is unquestioned that the PRC along with other states - some of which are allies of the US - have had a long history of espionage in the US aerospace and defense industry. In some cases this espionage was aimed at economic advantages, in others military capabilities, and in many cases both. So it is likely that the espionage efforts of the PRC and other states in aerospace are just as prevalent [or more so] today than it was 10 years ago," said Weeden.
Fisher notes the fact that in the decade since the Cox Report was released, the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has consistently listed China as the principle espionage threat in the US.
"This has to tell us that China's general espionage effort is growing," said Fisher. "The Chi Mak and Greg Chung cases tell us that China places a very high priority on targeting ethnic Chinese working in the US defense sector with nationalist and other appeals. Sadly, the Mak and Chung cases are proof that China has and will continue to succeed with ... appeals to convince Chinese-Americans to undermine the security of a nation that has enabled their professional and personal success.
"Tragically, this threat will only continue for as long as US government officials confine their response to law enforcement and ignore the need for political outreach, dialogue and education," added Fisher. "I know of one Ministry of State Security 'scholar' posing as a visiting fellow at a US university who bragged to me of his op-ed writing for Chinese-language US newspapers. How many US officials, elected or otherwise, take the time to respond?"
Brett Kingstone, an expert on China's economic and military espionage activities in the US, estimates that China has more than 3,500 operatives in the US specifically to steal US secrets. These people hold student and H1B or special work visas.
"What has happened in the last 10 years has been a transformation in the way China gathers its information," said Lieggi. "It is less likely that they specifically send out 'spies' because US authorities are more likely to identify these individuals. However, there seems to be a more informal recruitment of Chinese nationals living or traveling to the US or elsewhere who may have access to information that would be useful. In some cases it is for financial gain; in others nationalism seems to be the driving factor."
The Kuok case underscores another shift that is underway not in the realm of espionage, but in the vital realm of how China quietly obtains sensitive technologies from the US.
"The internet is creating a new market place for sensitive items that is harder to monitor and control," said Lieggi. "EBay, the e-commerce company, does not see itself as selling or exporting anything, and expects the seller and buyer to work out the legal issues; however, in many ways eBay could be seen by the government as the 'broker' of the deal and thus must consider export control implications. I doubt they are putting that much time into it, although after [the Kuok] case they may."
Weeden sees the Internet as a game-changer. The combination of new social engineering trends and virtual communities such as MySpace and Facebook and, the enormous amounts of information in the public domain that flows via the Internet makes it harder to prevent espionage.
"Much of what is known as 'hacking' is actually manipulation of people and not computers. that flows via the Internet makes it harder to prevent espionage.
"Much of what is known as 'hacking' is actually manipulation of people and not computers. The Internet allows easier collection of [operational security] and personal information which could allow for social engineering attacks which could then allow a spy to gain access to a classified system or materials," said Weeden.
"Unclassified information that is still controlled via the Munitions List is undoubtedly on many government and contractor computers that are attached to the Internet, and it is very feasible for cyber-espionage to gain access to that data."
As for the overall effectiveness and the legacy of the Cox Report, there are decidedly mixed opinions about this.
"The sensationalized report, largely debunked by both political and technical analysts very quickly, has become urban legend 'truth', and government policy, to the detriment of the US aerospace industry and US national security," said Dr Joan Johnson-Freese, chair of the National Security Decision Making Department at the US Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. "The recommendations for strengthening the International Traffic in Arms Regulations [ITAR], and, putting satellite and related technology on the Munitions List were seized upon by the US State Department and in fact extended even further - to the delight of the anti-China Blue Team in Washington."
"When aerospace industries, particularly in California, began to suffer, finger-pointing and questions about 'how did this happen' quickly surfaced, including from those in Congress who had been the biggest supporters of stronger regulations," Johnson-Freese added. "US efforts to control sensitive technology have been so diffused that the new challenges have received less attention than they deserve because so much time is spent on 'protecting' often superfluous items and satisfying an impossible process."
For Weeden, the real question at hand is whether the recommendations concerning space and missile technology proposed by the Cox Commission, and implemented primarily through the Strom Thurmond National Defense Act, have improved the strategic economic and military position of the US.
"There is strong evidence that the answer is no. The end result of these recommendations has been the stifling of the US aerospace industry and the creation of a vacuum which was summarily filled by a host of international aerospace firms, notably those from Europe," said Weeden. "US industry has lost a significant portion of its global aerospace technology lead and market share, and the PRC has been able to continue to have access to advanced aerospace technology. Obviously, some will argue that the ITAR regulations need to be strengthened even more to prevent China from acquiring advanced aerospace technology through commercial transfers. But this ideological position does not jive with the reality of the situation nor real world evidence of the last 10 years."
According to Fisher, the fact that there never any attempt to implement the first recommendation made by the Select Committee for a semi-annual report to the US Congress on PRC espionage is troubling.
"There has long been a need for such a report on par with the Pentagon's report on Chinese military modernization which has been mandated by the US Congress. For example, there has been no public assessment of China's ability to exploit the US university system to train military engineers and to accelerate military technology development. A regular public report on China's espionage efforts and methods could become a vital tool to educate public and private sector officials about this threat," said Fisher.
Espionage cases involving China and the US space and missile sectors are nothing new. China is intensely focused on obtaining whatever it needs to become a more powerful player in space. And because so many doors are opening quickly - and sooner than many might have expected - China may find itself buying much of this technology instead of attempting to steal it.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/KG31Ad01.html
By Peter J Brown
Tales of Chinese spies and United States space and satellite technology are making headlines together this month. The cases have arisen just as the US marks the 10th anniversary of the "Cox Report", a lengthy investigation of sensitive US technology transfers and Chinese espionage activities dedicated to obtaining US nuclear weapons and missile technology secrets that was carried out during the Bill Clinton administration.
The investigation was conducted in 1999 by a bi-partisan select committee of the US House of Representatives, chaired by US Representative Christopher Cox.
Dongfan "Greg" Chung, was on July 15 found guilty on six counts of economic espionage and other charges. A former engineer at various US defense contractors, including Boeing, China-born Chung was convicted of stealing trade secrets related to US space shuttle and rocket technology. The 73-year-old could receive a maximum sentence of more than 90 years in prison when sentenced later this year. Chung's attorney said that he will appeal his conviction.
Earlier in the month, Chinese national Chi Tong Kuok of Macau was arrested in Atlanta and subsequently indicted for conspiring to violate US export law. He had been under investigation since 2006 for using multiple Chinese and Japanese aliases to allegedly acquire US military radio and satellite equipment using eBay and other internet sources.
These two Chinese spies represent opposite ends of the world of espionage. Chung was a trusted employee, an insider who was employed by US defense contractors that simply took hundreds of thousands of documents home with him after work. Kuok on the other hand was an outsider and an adept virtual networker who exploited the Internet in a very creative fashion. Kuok has admitted that he was working for the Chinese government, while Chung denies it.
According to Stephanie Lieggi, a research associate for the East Asia Non-proliferation Program at the Monterey, California-based James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, both the Chinese space and missile programs benefit from China's ability to access US technology and expertise.
"The Loral/Hughes case [in the early 1990s, which was discussed at length in the Cox Report] was probably the most blatant - albeit inadvertent - instance when China was able to convert what it learned from US sources to improve its rockets accuracy and reliability," said Lieggi. "However, if you look at the speed at which China was able to move forward its rocket systems and ballistic missiles, it is not hard to imagine that foreign dual-use technology and information gathered by Chinese sources played a role in helping the Chinese programs deal with certain technical challenges."
In the Loral/Hughes affair, US companies deliberately shared information with their Chinese counterparts in order to improve the reliability of Chinese launch vehicles. Thus, an act of espionage did not take place. Finding concrete proof today about how much success Chinese spies have enjoyed in their pursuit of US missile and rocket secrets is quite difficult.
"It is hard to find - at least in open-source documentation - strong 'proof' of how China is using illicitly acquired technology for military or space programs. The information gathered by Chinese sources is most likely integrated into larger indigenous programs as [a way to 'leap-frog'] over certain technical hurdles," said Lieggi. "Unless someone with the specific understanding of the technologies involved were able to thoroughly examine the Chinese systems, it would be hard to specifically pinpoint this."
Richard Fisher, a Chinese military expert at the Washington, DC-based International Assessment and Strategy Center, points specifically to the launch of the Asiasat-2 satellite launch in 1995 as an example where China's military espionage apparatus was deeply involved in making sure Chinese engineers were pressing the US side for maximum revelations. In this instance, China was intently focused on increasing its knowledge of so-called satellite kick motors, which are used to propel satellites quickly and safely into their proper orbits.
"The impact of this one transfer has been catastrophic. In 1999, a Chinese scientist told journalist and former US Senate candidate Ken Timmerman and I that data [obtained from a US company] helped them perfect a satellite kick motor, which was then applied to the DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile," said Fisher. "Prior to this help, the DF-21 had a record of failure and was on the verge of being cancelled. I have concluded that this same assistance has been applied to enable the PLA [People's Liberation Army] to produce its latest solid-fueled ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missile] and SLBMs [submarine-launched ballistic missiles], the DF-31, DF-31A and JL-2. These nuclear missiles are now being deployed or are in advanced development, and all are aimed at Americans."
But beyond this, and other examples in the 1990s which might be described as unfortunate lapses in judgment on the part of US companies at the time, any hard evidence of specific US components which somehow evolved into existing Chinese missile and satellite hardware as the result of any espionage conducted by China over the past decade is just not available in the public domain.
"So much of the hard data on this is shrouded in secrecy that it is almost impossible to get a good grasp on it as an outsider," said Brian Weeden, technical advisor at the Colorado-based Secure World Foundation. "Many of the 'leaks' from unnamed officials and the few heavily publicized cases are done so precisely to advance a political position, which clouds the situation. It is clear that the reliability of PRC [People's Republic of China] space launch vehicles has improved considerably, and by association, probably their ballistic missiles, too."
Complicating matters is the fact that while information can be declared secret or classified for a variety of reasons, sharing information that is not necessarily secret or classified but still subject to export controls by the US government is a serious offense. At the same time, the space-related materials section on the US Munitions List is extraordinarily broad.
"It can be and is often the case that unclassified data falls under export controls," said Weeden. "For example, 'non-automatic, semi-automatic and fully automatic firearms to caliber .50 inclusive, and all components and parts for such firearms' are on the US Munitions List, but they still can be purchased in almost any gun store in the US. Thus, using the phrase 'stolen military secrets' in the case of a violation of controlled [but unclassified] data is incorrect."
There is no question that Chung possessed classified material. However, Weeden points to another heavily publicized case recently, that of Quan-shen Shu, where there is no evidence that actual secrets were involved. "The accused plead guilty to export violations, but did not have a security clearance and did not have any classified data. And in this particular case, the technology involved mainly revolved around that for production and storage of large amounts of liquid oxygen and hydrogen, which is in use by every state which operates large rockets," said Weeden. "Shu was actually bribing a French company to secure a contract for this technology on behalf of a Chinese firm, and it is unclear whether the technology in question was purely American or in use by the French as well."
Still, there is widespread agreement that China is more active than it was a decade ago in terms of espionage aimed at the US missile and space sectors.
"It is unquestioned that the PRC along with other states - some of which are allies of the US - have had a long history of espionage in the US aerospace and defense industry. In some cases this espionage was aimed at economic advantages, in others military capabilities, and in many cases both. So it is likely that the espionage efforts of the PRC and other states in aerospace are just as prevalent [or more so] today than it was 10 years ago," said Weeden.
Fisher notes the fact that in the decade since the Cox Report was released, the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has consistently listed China as the principle espionage threat in the US.
"This has to tell us that China's general espionage effort is growing," said Fisher. "The Chi Mak and Greg Chung cases tell us that China places a very high priority on targeting ethnic Chinese working in the US defense sector with nationalist and other appeals. Sadly, the Mak and Chung cases are proof that China has and will continue to succeed with ... appeals to convince Chinese-Americans to undermine the security of a nation that has enabled their professional and personal success.
"Tragically, this threat will only continue for as long as US government officials confine their response to law enforcement and ignore the need for political outreach, dialogue and education," added Fisher. "I know of one Ministry of State Security 'scholar' posing as a visiting fellow at a US university who bragged to me of his op-ed writing for Chinese-language US newspapers. How many US officials, elected or otherwise, take the time to respond?"
Brett Kingstone, an expert on China's economic and military espionage activities in the US, estimates that China has more than 3,500 operatives in the US specifically to steal US secrets. These people hold student and H1B or special work visas.
"What has happened in the last 10 years has been a transformation in the way China gathers its information," said Lieggi. "It is less likely that they specifically send out 'spies' because US authorities are more likely to identify these individuals. However, there seems to be a more informal recruitment of Chinese nationals living or traveling to the US or elsewhere who may have access to information that would be useful. In some cases it is for financial gain; in others nationalism seems to be the driving factor."
The Kuok case underscores another shift that is underway not in the realm of espionage, but in the vital realm of how China quietly obtains sensitive technologies from the US.
"The internet is creating a new market place for sensitive items that is harder to monitor and control," said Lieggi. "EBay, the e-commerce company, does not see itself as selling or exporting anything, and expects the seller and buyer to work out the legal issues; however, in many ways eBay could be seen by the government as the 'broker' of the deal and thus must consider export control implications. I doubt they are putting that much time into it, although after [the Kuok] case they may."
Weeden sees the Internet as a game-changer. The combination of new social engineering trends and virtual communities such as MySpace and Facebook and, the enormous amounts of information in the public domain that flows via the Internet makes it harder to prevent espionage.
"Much of what is known as 'hacking' is actually manipulation of people and not computers. that flows via the Internet makes it harder to prevent espionage.
"Much of what is known as 'hacking' is actually manipulation of people and not computers. The Internet allows easier collection of [operational security] and personal information which could allow for social engineering attacks which could then allow a spy to gain access to a classified system or materials," said Weeden.
"Unclassified information that is still controlled via the Munitions List is undoubtedly on many government and contractor computers that are attached to the Internet, and it is very feasible for cyber-espionage to gain access to that data."
As for the overall effectiveness and the legacy of the Cox Report, there are decidedly mixed opinions about this.
"The sensationalized report, largely debunked by both political and technical analysts very quickly, has become urban legend 'truth', and government policy, to the detriment of the US aerospace industry and US national security," said Dr Joan Johnson-Freese, chair of the National Security Decision Making Department at the US Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. "The recommendations for strengthening the International Traffic in Arms Regulations [ITAR], and, putting satellite and related technology on the Munitions List were seized upon by the US State Department and in fact extended even further - to the delight of the anti-China Blue Team in Washington."
"When aerospace industries, particularly in California, began to suffer, finger-pointing and questions about 'how did this happen' quickly surfaced, including from those in Congress who had been the biggest supporters of stronger regulations," Johnson-Freese added. "US efforts to control sensitive technology have been so diffused that the new challenges have received less attention than they deserve because so much time is spent on 'protecting' often superfluous items and satisfying an impossible process."
For Weeden, the real question at hand is whether the recommendations concerning space and missile technology proposed by the Cox Commission, and implemented primarily through the Strom Thurmond National Defense Act, have improved the strategic economic and military position of the US.
"There is strong evidence that the answer is no. The end result of these recommendations has been the stifling of the US aerospace industry and the creation of a vacuum which was summarily filled by a host of international aerospace firms, notably those from Europe," said Weeden. "US industry has lost a significant portion of its global aerospace technology lead and market share, and the PRC has been able to continue to have access to advanced aerospace technology. Obviously, some will argue that the ITAR regulations need to be strengthened even more to prevent China from acquiring advanced aerospace technology through commercial transfers. But this ideological position does not jive with the reality of the situation nor real world evidence of the last 10 years."
According to Fisher, the fact that there never any attempt to implement the first recommendation made by the Select Committee for a semi-annual report to the US Congress on PRC espionage is troubling.
"There has long been a need for such a report on par with the Pentagon's report on Chinese military modernization which has been mandated by the US Congress. For example, there has been no public assessment of China's ability to exploit the US university system to train military engineers and to accelerate military technology development. A regular public report on China's espionage efforts and methods could become a vital tool to educate public and private sector officials about this threat," said Fisher.
Espionage cases involving China and the US space and missile sectors are nothing new. China is intensely focused on obtaining whatever it needs to become a more powerful player in space. And because so many doors are opening quickly - and sooner than many might have expected - China may find itself buying much of this technology instead of attempting to steal it.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/KG31Ad01.html
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