Re: A doomed currency
Reading the article cited for the Euro area disintegration risk, and especially looking at some of the comments posted to it, has given me considerable pause. I think my initial expectation and intuition that the Euro will survive (and in fact, be strong) is still correct.
What I found most compelling were the comments that pointed out that there are many precedents for somewhat economically disparate regions sticking together into coherent currency zones -- for example, the states in the USA. This suggests there is something more to the situation than whether one region is being "outcompeted" by the other in some particular aspect such as export manufacturing.
Typically an entire region doesn't actually lose in such arrangements, even when it might appear to; it's just that producer groups may lose out relative to consumers and corporations, or some other redistributive dynamic.
Even if there is some "interest rate mismatch," I think a critical calculation applies: does the "losing" region actually lose overall when one considers the benefits gained from more expanded trade, and liquid trade and investment?
I continue to think there is a considerable amount of force pushing inward on the Eurozone, keeping it together, even beyond the inherent benefit to the participants (and I think they all probably benefit, as explained above). It's not as if the dollar zone provides a more sound investment or trade basis, that's for sure. And goods, services, and investment, are not actually denominated in gold, as nice as gold is for long-term storage of value, so I don't see that happening as an "official" alternative.
Thus, I think the Euro will surprise by sticking together.
I think this fits into a larger thesis, based in the first place on the following observables:
1. Something is obviously needed to grease global trade and facilitate investment (currently this is the dollar).
2. A single country cannot really be trusted with control of a global-scale currency... conflict of interest (look at who pays and who benefits from US inflation and high levels of structural debt; everyone is now angry about this other than the US)
3. At least one major regional currency union has formed and appears to be growing, not shrinking (the Euro)
4. There is already talk of other regional currency unions (e.g. Asian, Persian, North American). This was until recently unthinkable; then suddenly it was said -- in many parallel instances.
Conclusions:
1. Any single country's currency is "too small" to grease global trade and facilitate investment, and one cannot be trusted, therefore it is naturally the case that more transparent, multi-country unions should be preferred
2. Regions have distance advantages that make trade economical and generally share cultural similarities, therefore the unions will naturally tend to be regionally-based.
3. There is likely some size level at which the unweildy management and poor fit of a currency to member regions' conditions limits it's size; therefore a whole-world currency is unlikely.
4. The world is likely to break from a dollar basis into an ensemble of regional currency zones, guided by regional trade and cultural ties, and competing with each other for trade and investment.
So far this thesis seems to conform to what has happened, what is happening, what appears to be on the horizon, and what would seem to be optimal based on first principles.
Oh, and I also predict that soon we will see oil bourses in a variety of currencies, not just the dollar (if the dollar even ends up being used much at all since the US is not a net exporter of crude).
Reading the article cited for the Euro area disintegration risk, and especially looking at some of the comments posted to it, has given me considerable pause. I think my initial expectation and intuition that the Euro will survive (and in fact, be strong) is still correct.
What I found most compelling were the comments that pointed out that there are many precedents for somewhat economically disparate regions sticking together into coherent currency zones -- for example, the states in the USA. This suggests there is something more to the situation than whether one region is being "outcompeted" by the other in some particular aspect such as export manufacturing.
Typically an entire region doesn't actually lose in such arrangements, even when it might appear to; it's just that producer groups may lose out relative to consumers and corporations, or some other redistributive dynamic.
Even if there is some "interest rate mismatch," I think a critical calculation applies: does the "losing" region actually lose overall when one considers the benefits gained from more expanded trade, and liquid trade and investment?
I continue to think there is a considerable amount of force pushing inward on the Eurozone, keeping it together, even beyond the inherent benefit to the participants (and I think they all probably benefit, as explained above). It's not as if the dollar zone provides a more sound investment or trade basis, that's for sure. And goods, services, and investment, are not actually denominated in gold, as nice as gold is for long-term storage of value, so I don't see that happening as an "official" alternative.
Thus, I think the Euro will surprise by sticking together.
I think this fits into a larger thesis, based in the first place on the following observables:
1. Something is obviously needed to grease global trade and facilitate investment (currently this is the dollar).
2. A single country cannot really be trusted with control of a global-scale currency... conflict of interest (look at who pays and who benefits from US inflation and high levels of structural debt; everyone is now angry about this other than the US)
3. At least one major regional currency union has formed and appears to be growing, not shrinking (the Euro)
4. There is already talk of other regional currency unions (e.g. Asian, Persian, North American). This was until recently unthinkable; then suddenly it was said -- in many parallel instances.
Conclusions:
1. Any single country's currency is "too small" to grease global trade and facilitate investment, and one cannot be trusted, therefore it is naturally the case that more transparent, multi-country unions should be preferred
2. Regions have distance advantages that make trade economical and generally share cultural similarities, therefore the unions will naturally tend to be regionally-based.
3. There is likely some size level at which the unweildy management and poor fit of a currency to member regions' conditions limits it's size; therefore a whole-world currency is unlikely.
4. The world is likely to break from a dollar basis into an ensemble of regional currency zones, guided by regional trade and cultural ties, and competing with each other for trade and investment.
So far this thesis seems to conform to what has happened, what is happening, what appears to be on the horizon, and what would seem to be optimal based on first principles.
Oh, and I also predict that soon we will see oil bourses in a variety of currencies, not just the dollar (if the dollar even ends up being used much at all since the US is not a net exporter of crude).
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