Interview with Paul Kasriel
December 12, 2006 (Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis)
Mish: Would you say that consumer debt in the US as opposed to the lack of consumer debt in Japan increases the deflationary pressures on the US economy?
Kasriel: Yes, absolutely. The latest figures that I have show that banks' exposure to the mortgage market is at 62% of their total earnings assets, an all time high. If a prolonged housing bust ensues, banks could be in big trouble.
Mish: What if Bernanke cuts interest rates to 1 percent?
Kasriel: In a sustained housing bust that causes banks to take a big hit to their capital it simply will not matter. This is essentially what happened recently in Japan and also in the US during the great depression.
AntiSpin: Two colleagues in the business that I respect, Mish and Paul, believe the current asset bubbles will end in monetary deflation. As iTulip readers know, I have been in the iTulip "Ka-Poom Theory" disinflation/inflation camp since 1999, and executed a profitable trade against it in 2000 and 2001–sold stocks before the end of the stock market bubble in Q1 and Q2 2000, stayed in cash and Treasury securities until the disinflationary part of that Ka-Poom cycle ended, then bought precious metals in Q3 2001 when I perceived a bottom in the disinflationary part of the cycle. Can lightening strike twice?
Mish and Paul believe, as you can see from the interview, that the housing bust now in progress may push the U.S. into a Japan 1990 - 2006 or U.S. 1930s style "deflation." The argument is that the Fed can cut interest rates but it won't matter. The Fed will experience the monetary "pushing on a string" problem because the Fed can't force banks to lend or households to borrow, and as 2/3 of the U.S. economy depends on consumer spending, a deflationary recession–what used to be called a depression–may ensue.
I believe that the collapse of the housing bubble, along with the end of the speculative parties in 8,000 "hedge funds" (USIPs) and emerging markets, will unleash powerful deflationary forces, but that the Fed and global central banks are prepared to deal with the event. The Fed has been clear about the range of measures it is willing to take, and have demonstrated a willingness to take them, such as allowing the housing bubble to occur following the collapse of the stock market bubble.
Bernanke has indicated that the Fed can "buy across the yield curve," and print money to buy debt and assets that are currently restricted, such as mortgages. The Fed has long argued that if the Bank of Japan were willing to do this, they could end their "deflation" quickly. Many forget that in fact the BoJ purchased stocks on the Japanese stock market directly to support the market in the 1990s, then slowly and quietly sold them later. They had to do this because so many Japanese banks held stocks as reserves against loans, and a self reinforcing cycle of falling reserves, declining loans, and falling stocks was crippling the Japanese financial system. U.S. banks do not use equities as bank reserves, but there is nothing to keep the Fed from purchasing bank reserve assets directly with printed money. In fact, they have stated that if needed, that is precisely what they will do. I expect we'll see a period of disinflation as after the end of the stock market bubble, but with varied characteristics because of the difference between a collapsing stock and housing bubbles–fast and shallow versus slow and broad. The Fed will watch the rate of inflation and keep interest rates below the rate of inflation. The well recognized mistake that the Fed made in 1930s and that the BoJ made in the 1990s is that the central banks allowed inflation to fall below zero; as the Fed cannot lower rates below zero (actually, they can and central banks in other countries in the past have done that, effectively paying borrowers to borrow money, but that's a discussion for another day), the Fed was left powerless (at least in theory) to take an accommodative (inflationary) interest rate stance. The Fed did not make that mistake in 2001, and will not make again in 2007-2008.
Only time will settle the argument, but Mish and I spoke yesterday and decided that our readers will enjoy watching the two of us get in the ring with a moderator to duke it out–in friendly way–in a podcast. We will record it tomorrow and published it on both Mish's site and iTulip shortly thereafter. Stay tuned here for an announcement or sign up for iTulip Alerts to be notified when the podcast becomes available.
December 12, 2006 (Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis)
Mish: Would you say that consumer debt in the US as opposed to the lack of consumer debt in Japan increases the deflationary pressures on the US economy?
Kasriel: Yes, absolutely. The latest figures that I have show that banks' exposure to the mortgage market is at 62% of their total earnings assets, an all time high. If a prolonged housing bust ensues, banks could be in big trouble.
Mish: What if Bernanke cuts interest rates to 1 percent?
Kasriel: In a sustained housing bust that causes banks to take a big hit to their capital it simply will not matter. This is essentially what happened recently in Japan and also in the US during the great depression.
AntiSpin: Two colleagues in the business that I respect, Mish and Paul, believe the current asset bubbles will end in monetary deflation. As iTulip readers know, I have been in the iTulip "Ka-Poom Theory" disinflation/inflation camp since 1999, and executed a profitable trade against it in 2000 and 2001–sold stocks before the end of the stock market bubble in Q1 and Q2 2000, stayed in cash and Treasury securities until the disinflationary part of that Ka-Poom cycle ended, then bought precious metals in Q3 2001 when I perceived a bottom in the disinflationary part of the cycle. Can lightening strike twice?
Mish and Paul believe, as you can see from the interview, that the housing bust now in progress may push the U.S. into a Japan 1990 - 2006 or U.S. 1930s style "deflation." The argument is that the Fed can cut interest rates but it won't matter. The Fed will experience the monetary "pushing on a string" problem because the Fed can't force banks to lend or households to borrow, and as 2/3 of the U.S. economy depends on consumer spending, a deflationary recession–what used to be called a depression–may ensue.
I believe that the collapse of the housing bubble, along with the end of the speculative parties in 8,000 "hedge funds" (USIPs) and emerging markets, will unleash powerful deflationary forces, but that the Fed and global central banks are prepared to deal with the event. The Fed has been clear about the range of measures it is willing to take, and have demonstrated a willingness to take them, such as allowing the housing bubble to occur following the collapse of the stock market bubble.
Bernanke has indicated that the Fed can "buy across the yield curve," and print money to buy debt and assets that are currently restricted, such as mortgages. The Fed has long argued that if the Bank of Japan were willing to do this, they could end their "deflation" quickly. Many forget that in fact the BoJ purchased stocks on the Japanese stock market directly to support the market in the 1990s, then slowly and quietly sold them later. They had to do this because so many Japanese banks held stocks as reserves against loans, and a self reinforcing cycle of falling reserves, declining loans, and falling stocks was crippling the Japanese financial system. U.S. banks do not use equities as bank reserves, but there is nothing to keep the Fed from purchasing bank reserve assets directly with printed money. In fact, they have stated that if needed, that is precisely what they will do. I expect we'll see a period of disinflation as after the end of the stock market bubble, but with varied characteristics because of the difference between a collapsing stock and housing bubbles–fast and shallow versus slow and broad. The Fed will watch the rate of inflation and keep interest rates below the rate of inflation. The well recognized mistake that the Fed made in 1930s and that the BoJ made in the 1990s is that the central banks allowed inflation to fall below zero; as the Fed cannot lower rates below zero (actually, they can and central banks in other countries in the past have done that, effectively paying borrowers to borrow money, but that's a discussion for another day), the Fed was left powerless (at least in theory) to take an accommodative (inflationary) interest rate stance. The Fed did not make that mistake in 2001, and will not make again in 2007-2008.
Only time will settle the argument, but Mish and I spoke yesterday and decided that our readers will enjoy watching the two of us get in the ring with a moderator to duke it out–in friendly way–in a podcast. We will record it tomorrow and published it on both Mish's site and iTulip shortly thereafter. Stay tuned here for an announcement or sign up for iTulip Alerts to be notified when the podcast becomes available.
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