The Growing Income-Expense Gap
October 20, 2006 Laura Rowley - Yahoo! Finance)
In the second quarter of this year, consumers spent a record $14.40 of every $100 they took home after taxes to cover required principal and interest payments on mortgage and consumer debt, according to the Federal Reserve. The figure rises to $18.06 of every $100 of take-home pay if you include automobile lease payments, homeowners insurance, property tax payments, and rental payments on tenant-occupied property.
And there is more troubling evidence of our credit-driven lifestyle: Some 2.33 percent of mortgages were delinquent at the end of the third quarter, the highest level since 2003, according to Equifax and Moody's Economy.com.
The worrisome part of that figure? Most of the delinquencies were not related to job loss -- the usual suspect when people fall behind on their payments. The vast majority were related to what Economy.com calls "mortgage equity withdrawal," which gauges how much cash homeowners have extracted from their dwellings through refinancing, home-equity loans, or selling and keeping some of the profits.
AntiSpin: None required when Laura writes. She is among my favorite columnists for Yahoo! Finance. Since iTulip ran its Greenspan Credit Bubble Poll in 2000 (questions and answers), the statistics on US household debt to income, debt to savings, home equity, and other measures of household financial health have, as we can see from Laura's column, deteriorated significantly.
Continuing on the theme of the theme of the dead cat bounce of the 1990s stock market bubble we're seeing in the Dow today, I'm reminded by Laura's column of the invention of installment credit in the 1920s and the consequences of excesses in consumer credit during that period in the years that followed. As stated by Joseph A. Schumpeter in his book "Business Cycles" (1939):
In the 1930s, the Fed's means for creating inflation were hampered by the gold standard. Only after gold was confiscated and re-priced was the Fed able to increase the money supply, in 1933. The Fed operates with no such restrictions today. Yes, Japan suffered deflation from the 1990s until recently without the limitations on money creation of a gold standard, but when their stock and housing bubbles collapsed–the stock market bubble in 1990 and the housing bubble in 1993–they: 1) were a net creditor, running a trade surplus with the West, 2) made the fatal error of allowing real (inflation-adjusted) interest rates to fall below the zero bound, 3) followed the "advice" of the US–they had little choice, given Japan's reliance on the US for military protection–to allow the yen to appreciate; the yen has a built-in appreciation bias, due to the country's high savings rate and trade surplus, 4) credit creation was heavily dependent on their banking system, which was heavily capitalized by equities and thus became insolvent when the stock bubble collapsed, and 5) the nation is culturally inflation-phobic, as the last economic and financial catastrophe in Japan, akin to the US Great Depression, was a hyperinflation in the 1940s, leading to a policy bias against using monetary expansion to solve economic problems.
The US is a debtor. It's currency, the bonar, has a depreciation bias, its value no longer as much a function of economic performance relative to other countries as on continued demand for the currency for international transactions and trade. All the US needs to experience a massive inflation is for bonars already in circulation outside the US to come home. No additional domestic increase in the money supply is required. That is the essence of Ka-Poom Theory™. The last economic and financial catastrophe in the US, the Great Depression, was a deflationary collapse in the 1930s, leading to a policy bias toward using monetary expansion to solve economic problems. This bias toward using monetary expansion, the weapon of the last war, the war in deflation, will prove to be US policy makers' #1 future fatal error.
October 20, 2006 Laura Rowley - Yahoo! Finance)
In the second quarter of this year, consumers spent a record $14.40 of every $100 they took home after taxes to cover required principal and interest payments on mortgage and consumer debt, according to the Federal Reserve. The figure rises to $18.06 of every $100 of take-home pay if you include automobile lease payments, homeowners insurance, property tax payments, and rental payments on tenant-occupied property.
And there is more troubling evidence of our credit-driven lifestyle: Some 2.33 percent of mortgages were delinquent at the end of the third quarter, the highest level since 2003, according to Equifax and Moody's Economy.com.
The worrisome part of that figure? Most of the delinquencies were not related to job loss -- the usual suspect when people fall behind on their payments. The vast majority were related to what Economy.com calls "mortgage equity withdrawal," which gauges how much cash homeowners have extracted from their dwellings through refinancing, home-equity loans, or selling and keeping some of the profits.
AntiSpin: None required when Laura writes. She is among my favorite columnists for Yahoo! Finance. Since iTulip ran its Greenspan Credit Bubble Poll in 2000 (questions and answers), the statistics on US household debt to income, debt to savings, home equity, and other measures of household financial health have, as we can see from Laura's column, deteriorated significantly.
Continuing on the theme of the theme of the dead cat bounce of the 1990s stock market bubble we're seeing in the Dow today, I'm reminded by Laura's column of the invention of installment credit in the 1920s and the consequences of excesses in consumer credit during that period in the years that followed. As stated by Joseph A. Schumpeter in his book "Business Cycles" (1939):
"Consumers' borrowing is one of the most conspicuous danger points in the secondary phenomena of prosperity, and consumers' debts are among the most conspicuous weak spots in recession and depression.
"In other words, we shall readily understand why the load of debt thus light heartedly incurred by people who foresaw nothing but booms should become a serious matter whenever incomes fell, and that construction would then contribute, directly and through the effects on the credit structure of impaired values of real estate, as much to a depression as it had contributed to the preceding booms. Nothing is so likely to produce cumulative depressive processes as such commitments of a vast number of households to an overhead financed to a great extent by commercial banks."
Given this history, I can understand why so many commentators, such as Prechter, expect deflation to follow this period of excess as it did the last. "In other words, we shall readily understand why the load of debt thus light heartedly incurred by people who foresaw nothing but booms should become a serious matter whenever incomes fell, and that construction would then contribute, directly and through the effects on the credit structure of impaired values of real estate, as much to a depression as it had contributed to the preceding booms. Nothing is so likely to produce cumulative depressive processes as such commitments of a vast number of households to an overhead financed to a great extent by commercial banks."
In the 1930s, the Fed's means for creating inflation were hampered by the gold standard. Only after gold was confiscated and re-priced was the Fed able to increase the money supply, in 1933. The Fed operates with no such restrictions today. Yes, Japan suffered deflation from the 1990s until recently without the limitations on money creation of a gold standard, but when their stock and housing bubbles collapsed–the stock market bubble in 1990 and the housing bubble in 1993–they: 1) were a net creditor, running a trade surplus with the West, 2) made the fatal error of allowing real (inflation-adjusted) interest rates to fall below the zero bound, 3) followed the "advice" of the US–they had little choice, given Japan's reliance on the US for military protection–to allow the yen to appreciate; the yen has a built-in appreciation bias, due to the country's high savings rate and trade surplus, 4) credit creation was heavily dependent on their banking system, which was heavily capitalized by equities and thus became insolvent when the stock bubble collapsed, and 5) the nation is culturally inflation-phobic, as the last economic and financial catastrophe in Japan, akin to the US Great Depression, was a hyperinflation in the 1940s, leading to a policy bias against using monetary expansion to solve economic problems.
The US is a debtor. It's currency, the bonar, has a depreciation bias, its value no longer as much a function of economic performance relative to other countries as on continued demand for the currency for international transactions and trade. All the US needs to experience a massive inflation is for bonars already in circulation outside the US to come home. No additional domestic increase in the money supply is required. That is the essence of Ka-Poom Theory™. The last economic and financial catastrophe in the US, the Great Depression, was a deflationary collapse in the 1930s, leading to a policy bias toward using monetary expansion to solve economic problems. This bias toward using monetary expansion, the weapon of the last war, the war in deflation, will prove to be US policy makers' #1 future fatal error.
Comment