The productivity watch: The nirvana of high growth and low inflation may be over
August 22 2006 (Fortune)
At 2 p.m. on Aug. 8, the Federal Reserve declared a cease-fire in its long-running rate-hike campaign. A week later the government reported benign inflation figures for July: The producer price index rose a meager 0.1 percent, while the core consumer price index was up just 0.2 percent.
Investors and Fed watchers concluded that inflation is under control. And newly confident in the sound judgment of Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke, they began spinning happy scenarios of a soft landing.
But less noticed on Aug. 8 was the first dissent of the Bernanke era: Jeffrey M. Lacker, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, voted for a 25-basis-point increase.
He may have been reacting to a bit of news released just days before - one that may indicate we're in for a bumpy macroeconomic ride. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that in the second quarter productivity growth came to a screeching halt, falling to 1.1 percent from 4.3 percent in the first quarter.
If lower productivity and higher inflation amplify each other - as higher productivity and lower inflation did in the 1990s - we face the risk of a bizarro virtuous circle, says Achuthan: a vicious reinforcement, in which lower productivity drives inflation higher, which in turn drives productivity lower.
The most recent productivity release showed unit labor costs rose 4.2 percent in the second quarter of 2006, up from 2.5 percent in the first quarter.
"These are traditional markers of a cyclical inflation upswing," says Allen Sinai, chief global economist at Decision Economics.
AntiSpin: Takes the mystery out of comments today from Chicago Federal Reserve President Michael Moskow who's joining the Lacker choir saying that higher inflation risks outweigh concerns about slower economic growth. This begs the question, does the Fed really have a choice between the two? Not really, but Wall Street hasn't figured this out yet, and the suggestion that the Fed might have to tighten some more someday caused the usual knee-jerk reaction in the markets, it sent stocks into the red from a minor rally earlier in the day. Some day stocks will decline for the right reason, with a full comprehension of structural inflation and all that entails... but not yet.
Meanwhile, Merrill Lynch's bearish chief economist David Rosenberg, hired in the fall of 2003 after the bullish Bruce Steinberg was fired just as the economy and markets were starting to recover, continued to wax bear-colic, stating: "Practically every indicator at our disposal tells us that we are very late cycle, and the historical record also suggests that the next wave after the Fed has inverted the entire yield curve is either a hard landing or a very bumpy soft landing. Either way, the economy is going to have some sort of a ‘landing,' which is far different than a ‘takeoff.'"
In other words, a recession.
Last time I called a recession was January 29, 2001. Let's compare my Short Term Predictions from then to what actually happened:
"The U.S. economy will experience negative GDP growth for Q1 and Q2 with possibly some moderation in Q3 but no return to positive GDP growth until 2002 at the earliest."
Good call. The US experienced an eight month recession that lasted from March until November 2001.
"Unemployment doubles from 4% to 8% by the end of 2001."
Not according to the Bureau of Labored Statistics, but who listens to them anymore? U9 unemployment was easily 8% by the end of 2001. ShadowStats explains:
"The popularly followed unemployment rate was 5.5% in July 2004, seasonally adjusted. That is known as U-3, one of six unemployment rates published by the BLS. The broadest U-6 measure was 9.5%, including discouraged and marginally attached workers.
"Up until the Clinton administration, a discouraged worker was one who was willing, able and ready to work but had given up looking because there were no jobs to be had. The Clinton administration dismissed to the non-reporting netherworld about five million discouraged workers who had been so categorized for more than a year. As of July 2004, the less-than-a-year discouraged workers total 504,000. Adding in the netherworld takes the unemployment rate up to about 12.5%."
Moving on to the next part of my 2001 recession prediction:
"The discount rate will be reduced to under 4% by December 2001."
There I go with my eternal optimism, again. The discount rate was 4% by April 2001 and by December stood at 1.5%.
"Evidence of a deepening recession by mid-2001 even as rates are cut will cause foreign investors to start to doubt the ability of the Fed to halt the economic contraction. At first foreign capital leaves the U.S. in search of better returns elsewhere. Later, as perception of default and currency devaluation risks rises, capital flows out of the U.S. in earnest."
Half right. Net acquisition of financial assets indeed declined, from just under $1 trillion in 2000 to about $640 billion in 2001. But the percentage of foreign acquisition of assets rose from 45% to 65% of issuance, thanks to foreign central banks that stepped into the breech to keep the US economy afloat. This same pattern repeated from 2004 to 2005, with net acquisition of financial assets declining but the percentage of foreign acquisition rising.
"The fiscal 'surplus' of the past few years will turn out to be due primarily to capital gains tax receipts. As tax payers take capital gains losses against gains in 2001, tax receipts will fall by a greater extent than expected. Tax cuts, blessed by Greenspan last week and enacted to help the economy, will create an enormous fiscal deficit for 2001. The bond market will price this in before the event, driving up interest rates in late 2001 and further stifling capital formation."
Again, half right. The fiscal "surplus" did turn out to be due to stock bubble capital gains tax receipts, and tax cuts did start the run-up of the biggest, baddest fiscal deficit in US history. But long term rates did not rise, as The Three Desperados stepped in to keep long rates down and the dollar up, and kicked off the Housing Bubble in the bargain.
"The first stage of the depression is deflationary, the second inflationary."
This is, as long time readers are no doubt tired of hearing, a reference to the Ka-Poom Theory cycle. The theory states that sooner or later, the US needs to do its own saving, and the rest of the world figures out how to grow without such heavy reliance on US consumption, US financial markets, and US dollars. We had a dress rehearsal, 2000 to 2006, but not the real deal.
From here it looks like the current inflation cycle that Allen Sinai correctly identifies extends out past the elections to the end of 2008, with the recession that the economy is trying to give us, and that Steinberg and others are predicting, put off another couple of years via a period of Mauldin-style muddle through stagflation lite. Then we get the Big Recession that global central banks have been forestalling for decades, with "Ka" disinflation from 2009 to 2011 or so, followed -- finally -- by the Event that Can Never Happen: the dollar repatriation-driven, inflationary "Poom" lasting into 2014 or so.
Keep in mind that much like my January 1999 87% tech stock bubble decline prediction and my January 2005 ten to 15 year housing correction prediction, this prediction may also be optimistic. The bid to put off the long overdue recession via mild stagflation may not last until after the elections, start in 2007 or even sooner, and the whole Ka-Poom cycle might then last only five or six years versus eight.
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Copyright © iTulip, Inc. 1998 - 2006 All Rights Reserved
All information provided "as is" for informational purposes only, not intended for trading purposes or advice. Nothing appearing on this website should be considered a recommendation to buy or to sell any security or related financial instrument. iTulip, Inc. is not liable for any informational errors, incompleteness, or delays, or for any actions taken in reliance on information contained herein. Full Disclaimer
August 22 2006 (Fortune)
At 2 p.m. on Aug. 8, the Federal Reserve declared a cease-fire in its long-running rate-hike campaign. A week later the government reported benign inflation figures for July: The producer price index rose a meager 0.1 percent, while the core consumer price index was up just 0.2 percent.
Investors and Fed watchers concluded that inflation is under control. And newly confident in the sound judgment of Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke, they began spinning happy scenarios of a soft landing.
But less noticed on Aug. 8 was the first dissent of the Bernanke era: Jeffrey M. Lacker, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, voted for a 25-basis-point increase.
He may have been reacting to a bit of news released just days before - one that may indicate we're in for a bumpy macroeconomic ride. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that in the second quarter productivity growth came to a screeching halt, falling to 1.1 percent from 4.3 percent in the first quarter.
If lower productivity and higher inflation amplify each other - as higher productivity and lower inflation did in the 1990s - we face the risk of a bizarro virtuous circle, says Achuthan: a vicious reinforcement, in which lower productivity drives inflation higher, which in turn drives productivity lower.
The most recent productivity release showed unit labor costs rose 4.2 percent in the second quarter of 2006, up from 2.5 percent in the first quarter.
"These are traditional markers of a cyclical inflation upswing," says Allen Sinai, chief global economist at Decision Economics.
AntiSpin: Takes the mystery out of comments today from Chicago Federal Reserve President Michael Moskow who's joining the Lacker choir saying that higher inflation risks outweigh concerns about slower economic growth. This begs the question, does the Fed really have a choice between the two? Not really, but Wall Street hasn't figured this out yet, and the suggestion that the Fed might have to tighten some more someday caused the usual knee-jerk reaction in the markets, it sent stocks into the red from a minor rally earlier in the day. Some day stocks will decline for the right reason, with a full comprehension of structural inflation and all that entails... but not yet.
Meanwhile, Merrill Lynch's bearish chief economist David Rosenberg, hired in the fall of 2003 after the bullish Bruce Steinberg was fired just as the economy and markets were starting to recover, continued to wax bear-colic, stating: "Practically every indicator at our disposal tells us that we are very late cycle, and the historical record also suggests that the next wave after the Fed has inverted the entire yield curve is either a hard landing or a very bumpy soft landing. Either way, the economy is going to have some sort of a ‘landing,' which is far different than a ‘takeoff.'"
In other words, a recession.
Last time I called a recession was January 29, 2001. Let's compare my Short Term Predictions from then to what actually happened:
"The U.S. economy will experience negative GDP growth for Q1 and Q2 with possibly some moderation in Q3 but no return to positive GDP growth until 2002 at the earliest."
Good call. The US experienced an eight month recession that lasted from March until November 2001.
"Unemployment doubles from 4% to 8% by the end of 2001."
Not according to the Bureau of Labored Statistics, but who listens to them anymore? U9 unemployment was easily 8% by the end of 2001. ShadowStats explains:
"The popularly followed unemployment rate was 5.5% in July 2004, seasonally adjusted. That is known as U-3, one of six unemployment rates published by the BLS. The broadest U-6 measure was 9.5%, including discouraged and marginally attached workers.
"Up until the Clinton administration, a discouraged worker was one who was willing, able and ready to work but had given up looking because there were no jobs to be had. The Clinton administration dismissed to the non-reporting netherworld about five million discouraged workers who had been so categorized for more than a year. As of July 2004, the less-than-a-year discouraged workers total 504,000. Adding in the netherworld takes the unemployment rate up to about 12.5%."
Moving on to the next part of my 2001 recession prediction:
"The discount rate will be reduced to under 4% by December 2001."
There I go with my eternal optimism, again. The discount rate was 4% by April 2001 and by December stood at 1.5%.
"Evidence of a deepening recession by mid-2001 even as rates are cut will cause foreign investors to start to doubt the ability of the Fed to halt the economic contraction. At first foreign capital leaves the U.S. in search of better returns elsewhere. Later, as perception of default and currency devaluation risks rises, capital flows out of the U.S. in earnest."
Half right. Net acquisition of financial assets indeed declined, from just under $1 trillion in 2000 to about $640 billion in 2001. But the percentage of foreign acquisition of assets rose from 45% to 65% of issuance, thanks to foreign central banks that stepped into the breech to keep the US economy afloat. This same pattern repeated from 2004 to 2005, with net acquisition of financial assets declining but the percentage of foreign acquisition rising.
"The fiscal 'surplus' of the past few years will turn out to be due primarily to capital gains tax receipts. As tax payers take capital gains losses against gains in 2001, tax receipts will fall by a greater extent than expected. Tax cuts, blessed by Greenspan last week and enacted to help the economy, will create an enormous fiscal deficit for 2001. The bond market will price this in before the event, driving up interest rates in late 2001 and further stifling capital formation."
Again, half right. The fiscal "surplus" did turn out to be due to stock bubble capital gains tax receipts, and tax cuts did start the run-up of the biggest, baddest fiscal deficit in US history. But long term rates did not rise, as The Three Desperados stepped in to keep long rates down and the dollar up, and kicked off the Housing Bubble in the bargain.
"The first stage of the depression is deflationary, the second inflationary."
This is, as long time readers are no doubt tired of hearing, a reference to the Ka-Poom Theory cycle. The theory states that sooner or later, the US needs to do its own saving, and the rest of the world figures out how to grow without such heavy reliance on US consumption, US financial markets, and US dollars. We had a dress rehearsal, 2000 to 2006, but not the real deal.
From here it looks like the current inflation cycle that Allen Sinai correctly identifies extends out past the elections to the end of 2008, with the recession that the economy is trying to give us, and that Steinberg and others are predicting, put off another couple of years via a period of Mauldin-style muddle through stagflation lite. Then we get the Big Recession that global central banks have been forestalling for decades, with "Ka" disinflation from 2009 to 2011 or so, followed -- finally -- by the Event that Can Never Happen: the dollar repatriation-driven, inflationary "Poom" lasting into 2014 or so.
Keep in mind that much like my January 1999 87% tech stock bubble decline prediction and my January 2005 ten to 15 year housing correction prediction, this prediction may also be optimistic. The bid to put off the long overdue recession via mild stagflation may not last until after the elections, start in 2007 or even sooner, and the whole Ka-Poom cycle might then last only five or six years versus eight.
Join our FREE Email Mailing List
Copyright © iTulip, Inc. 1998 - 2006 All Rights Reserved
All information provided "as is" for informational purposes only, not intended for trading purposes or advice. Nothing appearing on this website should be considered a recommendation to buy or to sell any security or related financial instrument. iTulip, Inc. is not liable for any informational errors, incompleteness, or delays, or for any actions taken in reliance on information contained herein. Full Disclaimer
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