(A highly-compressed version of the letter below was published in the Jan 29, 2007 Barron's "Mailbag" section. Here's my original letter, along with some bookend commentary for iTulip readers).
The following is a letter I sent to Barron's in response to two columns by Thomas Donlan, written in the weeks prior to January 15, 2007, in which he defended extreme executive compensation and argued against more shareholder control (both regarding compensation, and generally).
I don't think I unfairly characterize Donlan's essays when I say his logic basically went like this: "Steve Jobs is God (and Nardelli is at least a demigod); therefore there's no problem with their pay; therefore there is no problem with executive pay in general; therefore shareholders should shut up and sit back for the ride."
I was disappointed in Donlan's uncharacteristically breezy and apologetic argument. Here was my response:
I'll also add that I personally find Donlan's suggestion (which is explicit, mind you) that shareholders are akin to "passive riders on a cruise" offensive. There is no such thing as financing with no strings attached. And why should there be? The financier expects to make a reasonable return -- taking on some risk, of course -- but both the risk and the venture should be well-defined beforehand. Equity is simply a kind of financing where the financier exchanges a predictable return for at least some modicum of control over management. Donlan, on the other hand, seems to view equity as a birthright of corporate chieftans.
Further, his suggestion that shareholders can simply "leave the arrangement any time" is rather specious: if a stock has already crashed due to mismanagement or some sort of scandal, bailing is tantamount to selling low. It's at least as reasonable to want to stick around and right the ship. If Donlan had his way, the board room would have unlimited agency (special rights, dare I say) over shareholders to continue looting their companies into oblivion.
As has been written about extensively here on iTulip, it is quite clear we have entered a new era of "Robber Barrons" -- rhetorical contortions to the contrary notwithstanding. I hope we as a society can accept this fact and constructively search for a solution, rather than embracing the denial.
The following is a letter I sent to Barron's in response to two columns by Thomas Donlan, written in the weeks prior to January 15, 2007, in which he defended extreme executive compensation and argued against more shareholder control (both regarding compensation, and generally).
I don't think I unfairly characterize Donlan's essays when I say his logic basically went like this: "Steve Jobs is God (and Nardelli is at least a demigod); therefore there's no problem with their pay; therefore there is no problem with executive pay in general; therefore shareholders should shut up and sit back for the ride."
I was disappointed in Donlan's uncharacteristically breezy and apologetic argument. Here was my response:
Donlan seems to be conflating a number of key issues in his arguments.
Rewarding good executive performance and doing so ethically are two such separate issues. In his two most recent essays, Thomas Donlan uses two specific examples (Jobs and Nardelli) to argue that performance has justified compensation, while ignoring the ethical questions about the manner in which this was done. This is simply a distraction.
A second pair of confused issues are then thrown into the mix: the right of shareholders to exert agency over companies regarding compensation, and more broadly, the boundaries of shareholder rights in general. I shouldn't have to argue that shareholders should be empowered to control ethical lapses of the companies they part-own -- doubly-so since these lapses might constitute a transfer of wealth away from themselves to a privileged cabal of company executives.
As for their rights in general, that would seem to be a matter for the market to decide: company principals need to come to their own power-sharing understandings with the shareholders they have relied upon for financing. If they cannot, companies are free to put their money where their mouth is and buy back shares or sell out to private equity, minimizing external influence.
As for Jobs and Nardelli, they only make good examples for Donlan's case if one squints very hard. Jobs didn't let his backdated options lie fallow: he had them converted to stock at the questionable valuations. So to argue he didn't "exercise" the options is to dodge the ethical question with a technicality. And Jobs was no passive observer: if he has been so single-handedly responsible for Apple's fortunes (as Donlan argues), then he certainly knew about the compensation rules and practices taking place on his watch -- especially those that pertained to him personally.
Nardelli is a far more egregious case: as Donlan admits (but then discards), Nardelli only improved shareholder returns if one arbitrarily chooses to benchmark from the stock's multi-year low rather than the beginning of his tenure. Ironically, this analysis is very reminiscent of the odious back-dating practices that are now being scrutinized and which Donlan would like us to ignore.
I would suggest that in Nardelli's case, shareholders are concerned not just with share price but with his autocratic take on investor relations and wholesale binding of the company's fortunes to the housing market (to the detriment of customer service). The latter might not play out so well without a home building boom, making Home Depot a far more cyclical company than it used to be. In my opinion, Nardelli deliberately avoided broaching this topic with shareholders.
Regarding executive compensation in general, shareholders are right to be up in arms. Formal studies (e.g., DolmatConnell & Partners, 2006) have gone far beyond Donlan's sample set of two and found that executive compensation is now negatively correlated with performance. It is easy to see why this might be the case: obscene levels of compensation are more likely to indicate managerial dysfunction than rewards well-earned.
So it's no wonder shareholders want more control over compensation practives. I suggest Donlan rethink his apologetic, pro-insider stance. After all, if shareholders and management do not find an equitable balance on these matters, congress just might do it for them. And neither Donlan nor myself would like that very much.
Rewarding good executive performance and doing so ethically are two such separate issues. In his two most recent essays, Thomas Donlan uses two specific examples (Jobs and Nardelli) to argue that performance has justified compensation, while ignoring the ethical questions about the manner in which this was done. This is simply a distraction.
A second pair of confused issues are then thrown into the mix: the right of shareholders to exert agency over companies regarding compensation, and more broadly, the boundaries of shareholder rights in general. I shouldn't have to argue that shareholders should be empowered to control ethical lapses of the companies they part-own -- doubly-so since these lapses might constitute a transfer of wealth away from themselves to a privileged cabal of company executives.
As for their rights in general, that would seem to be a matter for the market to decide: company principals need to come to their own power-sharing understandings with the shareholders they have relied upon for financing. If they cannot, companies are free to put their money where their mouth is and buy back shares or sell out to private equity, minimizing external influence.
As for Jobs and Nardelli, they only make good examples for Donlan's case if one squints very hard. Jobs didn't let his backdated options lie fallow: he had them converted to stock at the questionable valuations. So to argue he didn't "exercise" the options is to dodge the ethical question with a technicality. And Jobs was no passive observer: if he has been so single-handedly responsible for Apple's fortunes (as Donlan argues), then he certainly knew about the compensation rules and practices taking place on his watch -- especially those that pertained to him personally.
Nardelli is a far more egregious case: as Donlan admits (but then discards), Nardelli only improved shareholder returns if one arbitrarily chooses to benchmark from the stock's multi-year low rather than the beginning of his tenure. Ironically, this analysis is very reminiscent of the odious back-dating practices that are now being scrutinized and which Donlan would like us to ignore.
I would suggest that in Nardelli's case, shareholders are concerned not just with share price but with his autocratic take on investor relations and wholesale binding of the company's fortunes to the housing market (to the detriment of customer service). The latter might not play out so well without a home building boom, making Home Depot a far more cyclical company than it used to be. In my opinion, Nardelli deliberately avoided broaching this topic with shareholders.
Regarding executive compensation in general, shareholders are right to be up in arms. Formal studies (e.g., DolmatConnell & Partners, 2006) have gone far beyond Donlan's sample set of two and found that executive compensation is now negatively correlated with performance. It is easy to see why this might be the case: obscene levels of compensation are more likely to indicate managerial dysfunction than rewards well-earned.
So it's no wonder shareholders want more control over compensation practives. I suggest Donlan rethink his apologetic, pro-insider stance. After all, if shareholders and management do not find an equitable balance on these matters, congress just might do it for them. And neither Donlan nor myself would like that very much.
Further, his suggestion that shareholders can simply "leave the arrangement any time" is rather specious: if a stock has already crashed due to mismanagement or some sort of scandal, bailing is tantamount to selling low. It's at least as reasonable to want to stick around and right the ship. If Donlan had his way, the board room would have unlimited agency (special rights, dare I say) over shareholders to continue looting their companies into oblivion.
As has been written about extensively here on iTulip, it is quite clear we have entered a new era of "Robber Barrons" -- rhetorical contortions to the contrary notwithstanding. I hope we as a society can accept this fact and constructively search for a solution, rather than embracing the denial.
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