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Derivatives the new 'ticking bomb' Buffett and Gross warn: $516 trillion bubble is a disaster waiting to happen.
"The $300 Trillion Time Bomb: If Buffett can't figure out derivatives, can anybody?"
As I said here
The only way you can adequately insure a risky position is by taking leveraged positions -- and the assumption that those positions are small enough relative to the size of the market, and that those positions do not materially affect the market. But this assumption has not held good -- the LTCM debacle was evidence enough. Further, too many people adopting the same strategy can lead to disaster -- and everybody uses the same models - with minor variations -- and everybody assumes that they are the only ones. This can lead to a classic positive feedback loops.
"We try to be alert to any sort of mega-catastrophe risk, and that posture may make us unduly appreciative about the burgeoning quantities of long-term derivatives contracts and the massive amount of uncollateralized receivables that are growing alongside. In our view, however, derivatives are financial weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers that, while now latent, are potentially lethal."
That warning was in Buffett's 2002 letter to Berkshire shareholders. He saw a future that many others chose to ignore. The Iraq war build-up was at a fever-pitch. The imagery of WMDs and a mushroom cloud fresh in his mind.
Also fresh on Buffett's mind: His acquisition of General Re four years earlier, about the time the Long-Term Capital Management hedge fund almost killed the global monetary system. How? This is crucial: LTCM nearly killed the system with a relatively small $5 billion trading loss. Peanuts compared with the hundreds of billions of dollars of subprime - credit write-offs now making Wall Street's big shots look like amateurs.
Buffett tried to sell off Gen Re's derivatives group. No buyers. Unwinding it was costly, but led to his warning that derivatives are a "financial weapon of mass destruction." That was 2002.
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Derivatives bubble explodes five times bigger in five years
Wall Street didn't listen to Buffett. Derivatives grew into a massive bubble, from about $100 trillion to $516 trillion by 2007. The new derivatives bubble was fueled by five key economic and political trends:
Data on the five-fold growth of derivatives to $516 trillion in five years comes from the most recent survey by the Bank of International Settlements, the world's clearinghouse for central banks in Basel, Switzerland. The BIS is like the cashier's window at a racetrack or casino, where you'd place a bet or cash in chips, except on a massive scale: BIS is where the U.S. settles trade imbalances with Saudi Arabia for all that oil we guzzle and gives China IOUs for the tainted drugs and lead-based toys we buy.
To grasp how significant this five-fold bubble increase is, let's put that $516 trillion in the context of some other domestic and international monetary data:
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However, while that may be true as far as the parties to an individual deal, there are broader risks to the world's economies. Remember back in 1998 when LTCM's little $5 billion loss nearly brought down the world's banking system. That "domino effect" is now repeating many times over, straining the world's monetary, economic and political system as the subprime housing mess metastasizes, taking the U.S. stock market and the world economy down with it.
This cascading "domino effect" was brilliantly described in "The $300 Trillion Time Bomb: If Buffett can't figure out derivatives, can anybody?"
That warning was in Buffett's 2002 letter to Berkshire shareholders. He saw a future that many others chose to ignore. The Iraq war build-up was at a fever-pitch. The imagery of WMDs and a mushroom cloud fresh in his mind.
Also fresh on Buffett's mind: His acquisition of General Re four years earlier, about the time the Long-Term Capital Management hedge fund almost killed the global monetary system. How? This is crucial: LTCM nearly killed the system with a relatively small $5 billion trading loss. Peanuts compared with the hundreds of billions of dollars of subprime - credit write-offs now making Wall Street's big shots look like amateurs.
Buffett tried to sell off Gen Re's derivatives group. No buyers. Unwinding it was costly, but led to his warning that derivatives are a "financial weapon of mass destruction." That was 2002.
.
.
.
Derivatives bubble explodes five times bigger in five years
Wall Street didn't listen to Buffett. Derivatives grew into a massive bubble, from about $100 trillion to $516 trillion by 2007. The new derivatives bubble was fueled by five key economic and political trends:
- Sarbanes-Oxley increased corporate disclosures and government oversight
- Federal Reserve's cheap money policies created the subprime-housing boom
- War budgets burdened the U.S. Treasury and future entitlements programs
- Trade deficits with China and others destroyed the value of the U.S. dollar
- Oil and commodity rich nations demanding equity payments rather than debt
Data on the five-fold growth of derivatives to $516 trillion in five years comes from the most recent survey by the Bank of International Settlements, the world's clearinghouse for central banks in Basel, Switzerland. The BIS is like the cashier's window at a racetrack or casino, where you'd place a bet or cash in chips, except on a massive scale: BIS is where the U.S. settles trade imbalances with Saudi Arabia for all that oil we guzzle and gives China IOUs for the tainted drugs and lead-based toys we buy.
To grasp how significant this five-fold bubble increase is, let's put that $516 trillion in the context of some other domestic and international monetary data:
- U.S. annual gross domestic product is about $15 trillion
- U.S. money supply is also about $15 trillion
- Current proposed U.S. federal budget is $3 trillion
- U.S. government's maximum legal debt is $9 trillion
- U.S. mutual fund companies manage about $12 trillion
- World's GDPs for all nations is approximately $50 trillion
- Unfunded Social Security and Medicare benefits $50 trillion to $65 trillion
- Total value of the world's real estate is estimated at about $75 trillion
- Total value of world's stock and bond markets is more than $100 trillion
- BIS valuation of world's derivatives back in 2002 was about $100 trillion
- BIS 2007 valuation of the world's derivatives is now a whopping $516 trillion
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However, while that may be true as far as the parties to an individual deal, there are broader risks to the world's economies. Remember back in 1998 when LTCM's little $5 billion loss nearly brought down the world's banking system. That "domino effect" is now repeating many times over, straining the world's monetary, economic and political system as the subprime housing mess metastasizes, taking the U.S. stock market and the world economy down with it.
This cascading "domino effect" was brilliantly described in "The $300 Trillion Time Bomb: If Buffett can't figure out derivatives, can anybody?"
In their most benign form, derivatives are probably the greatest financial innovation of the past 25 years. They have helped smooth currency and interest-rate fluctuations by allowing investors to protect themselves. But when it comes to the really big stuff—such as global market collapses — derivatives could turn from vaccine to contagion. Investors use them as a form of insurance, which may give a false sense of security
Everybody talks of the assets and the valuation of assets -- but nobody points a finger at the degree of leveraging involved -- higher the leverage, more the damage and the pain.
All the models of leveraged investing that I have seen are micro models -- that are only good in small scale investing -- and nobody has ever assessed the impact of the widespread use of leveraged instruments on the economy - particularly if the payment chains hiccup.
All the models of leveraged investing that I have seen are micro models -- that are only good in small scale investing -- and nobody has ever assessed the impact of the widespread use of leveraged instruments on the economy - particularly if the payment chains hiccup.
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