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  • Unraveling the Mess at the CFTC

    To begin this story, it is important to know that the CFTC consists of 5 politically appointed commissioners.

    Now, we must introduce Bart Chilton and Gary Gensler.


    Gary Gensler is the chairman of the commission. He is a Wharton School grad who was appointed by President Barack Obama. A diminutive man in his mid 50s, Gary has three daughters in their teens to early 20s. He unfortunately lost his wife to breast cancer and is now a widow. His family are relatively big in the finance world. His twin brother runs an actively traded fund at T. Rowe Price. Gary worked for 18 years at Goldman Sachs and was instrumental in exempting credit default swaps from regulation. He also recently had to step aside in the MF Global investigation of Jon Corzine because of their personal relationship.


    Bart Chilton is a member of the commission. He is a Perdue grad who was appointed as a Democrat by President George W. Bush. Having been described as a "gadfly" by the Wall Street Journal, he is known for his shoulder-length blond hair, propensity for playing the guitar at the office, and ever-present cowboy boots. Having ties to the DuPonts in Delaware, Bart spent his career bouncing around the federal bureaucracy and political world, generally dealing with agricultural matters. He has been an outspoken advocate for swaps and derivatives position limits and has called for criminal investigations into the manipulation of the silver market. He also recently penned the book "Ponzimonium - How Scam Artists Are Ripping Off America."

    As one might imagine, these two men do not always get along.

    Enter Dodd-Frank.

    Dodd-Frank required by law for the CFTC to establish rules requiring position limits on swaps within six months of its passage. A year and a half later, an outline of the rules was established. But today, approximately two years later, they still have not gone into effect.

    Now there are some serious issues with the regulations. We will get into those later, but for now, suffice it to say that there are three constituencies that are upset. They are 1) the domestic financial sector, who are suing and lobbying to stop this, 2) the foreign financial sectors, who must be brought into compliance somehow, and 3) domestic energy companies who are not swaps dealers by trade, but who do have to hedge costs, and may end up being regulated twice.

    With this established, let us get into the news. I am posting this today because it flashed across my Reuters desk this morning:

    CFTC cancels meeting on international swaps rules
    WASHINGTON | Thu Jun 21, 2012 9:46am EDT


    (Reuters) - The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission called off the Thursday meeting during which it had planned to vote on how its swaps rules would apply to overseas market activity.

    The CFTC had planned to consider proposed guidance on the international reach of U.S. swaps rules and a proposal that would give overseas swaps players more time to comply with CFTC regulations.

    The agency did not immediately give a reason for cancelling the meeting.
    (Reporting By Karey Wutkowski; Editing by Gerald E. McCormick)
    Hmmm. Why is Gensler dragging his feet again? This was to be an important meeting to try to get over the hurdle with international finance. In fact, just two days ago, Gensler announced that he would seek to exempt some foreign financial companies compliance standards. I'll call this the "Save the London Whales" proposal:


    CFTC may propose Dodd-Frank exemptions for non-U.S. swap participants

    Published on June 18, 2012 by Alexandra Villarreal

    The Commodity Futures Trading Commission may consider extensions of Dodd-Frank collateral exemptions for some U.S. financial subsidiaries.


    Under the still uncertain proposal, non-U.S. affiliates with less than five percent of a bank’s aggregate notional swap business would be exempt from some clearing and collateral requirements mandated under the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, though the institutions would still be subject to reporting requirements, Bloomberg reports.


    Dodd-Frank was enacted to curb risks related to causes of the recent financial crisis, including those in the $708 trillion swaps market. CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler has advocated for increased transparency in the swaps market.


    “During a default or crisis, risk of overseas’ branches and affiliates inevitably flows back into the United States,” CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler said last week during a speech at the Institute of International Bankers conference, according to Bloomberg.


    Swaps trading serves as a major revenue generator for America’s big banks, some of which have conducted about 50 percent of all trades outside of the U.S. through affiliates or subsidiaries.


    The financial industry has advocated against the imposition of Dodd-Frank requirements on non-U.S. swaps, saying that doing so would likely damage the ability of U.S. institutions to serve the financial needs of overseas clients, Bloomberg reports.

    But just last weak, Gensler called not for exempting foreign dealers, but rather, for delaying the implementation of the rule for foreign dealers. He even cited the J.P. Morgan multi-billion dollar blunder:

    CFTC may delay some derivatives rules for foreign banks

    by Karen Bretell



    NEW YORK | Thu Jun 14, 2012 5:09pm EDT



    (Reuters) - The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission may delay by up to a year some rules including capital requirements for foreign banks that are active in the $650 trillion derivatives markets, but is likely to require the banks to comply with other rules earlier, when it issues guidance as early as next week.


    The U.S. regulation of foreign banks with big derivatives desks is among the most hotly debated pieces of the new swaps regime mandated by the 2010 Dodd Frank law, written in response to the 2007-2009 financial crisis.


    Large foreign banks that are active in United States are seeking relief from some U.S. regulations if they are subject to comparable rules overseas.


    Chairman Gary Gensler said on Thursday that the CFTC may delay introducing some so-called "entity level" requirements to allow international regulators more time to develop rules.


    These would relate to subjects including bank capital levels, risk management, record keeping and trade reporting.


    "During that time, the CFTC would be moving to complete the cross-border interpretive guidance and would work with market participants and foreign regulators on plans for substituted compliance," Gensler said at an Institute of International Bankers luncheon in New York.


    Foreign banks active in the United States or those that have any U.S.-backed operations, however, would likely need to comply with other rules earlier, including those relating to central clearing, trade margin requirements, and public real-time price reporting, Gensler said.


    "We'll get a lot of protection early on," Gensler told reporters after the luncheon.


    JPMORGAN REMINDER


    JPMorgan Chase & Co's recent losses from outsized credit derivatives trades made out of its London office are a strong reminder that risks from derivatives trades entered into overseas can quickly reverberate back to U.S. shores, Gensler said.


    "We've seen this movie before. Financial institutions set up hundreds, if not thousands of legal entities around the globe. During a default or crisis, risk of overseas' branches and affiliates inevitably flows back into the United States," he said.


    Gensler cited the examples of failed bank Lehman Brothers and insurer American International Group Inc.,which needed a government bailout, as among London-based operations that caused losses in the U.S.


    U.S. rules would likely apply to foreign banks that have large trading exposures to U.S. counterparties, in addition to any foreign entities that are guaranteed by U.S. firms, Gensler said.


    Banks that have over $8 billion in derivatives trading activity with U.S. market participants will likely need to register with the CFTC as a swap dealer and be subject to U.S. rules, he said.


    INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES


    International regulators are close to agreeing on key rules such as bank capital requirements, Gensler said, but he noted that greater disparity between nations exists relating to issues such as price transparency.


    Price transparency, both before and after trades, is also among the most contested rules.


    Large banks and some fund managers argue that revealing prices ahead of trades will reduce liquidity as it could give away investors positions before they are executed.


    Gensler and others say that transparency is vital to bringing new players to the market, which would boost volumes and help central clearinghouses manage the risks of trades that they clear.


    "Promoting transparency to the public in the swaps market is critical to both lowering the risk of the financial system, as well as to reducing costs to end users," Gensler said.


    "Starting as early as September, real-time reporting to the public and to regulators will become a reality," he said.


    A vote on guidance and the phase-in for rules relating to foreign banks are expected next Thursday at a CFTC open meeting, Gensler said.
    The delay in some rules was first reported by Reuters on Wednesday.


    (Additional reporting by Alexandra Alper; Editing by David Gregorio)



    Oddly enough, also two days ago, Chilton did the equivalent of going off the rails, and as opposed to Gensler, called for the Treasury Department to establish a panel to expedite the process and get these rules in place:

    SEC Delaying Dodd-Frank Swap Rules, Says CFTC’s Chilton





    "We have been continually reassured we are going to consider this joint rule with the SEC ‘next month’,” Chilton said. “I see no promise of movement from the SEC on this. We are two years into this new law, and position limits were supposed to be implemented after six months.”


    Chilton said the 10-member Financial Stability Oversight Council, led by Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner, should intervene to speed up the process. The council includes the heads of the CFTC, SEC, Federal Reserve and Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. among other members.


    SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro told the senate Banking Committee on May 22 that her agency and the CFTC are cooperating. “Although the timing and sequencing of the CFTC’s commission’s proposal and adoption of rules may vary, they are the subject of extensive interagency discussions,” she said.


    The speculation limits are among the most controversial requirements in Dodd-Frank and spurred more than 13,000 comments to the CFTC from supporters such as Delta Air Lines Inc. (DAL) and opponents such as Barclays Capital. CFTC commissioners voted 3-2 at an Oct. 18 meeting to approve the final regulation.


    Suits Filed

    The International Swaps and Derivatives Association Inc. and Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association filed a lawsuit in December challenging the rule. The associations’ members include JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM), Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS) and Morgan Stanley. (MS) The groups argue that the CFTC never studied whether the regulation was “necessary and appropriate” or quantified the costs tied to implementing the rule. A judgment is pending.


    The case is International Swaps and Derivatives Association v. U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 11-02146, U.S. District Court, District of Columbia (Washington).


    To contact the reporter on this story: Silla Brush in Washington at sbrush@bloomberg.net
    To contact the editor responsible for this story: Maura Reynolds atmreynolds34@bloomberg.net



    Clearly there is dissension in the ranks.

    And then there is Bernie Sanders. Earlier this month he directly called for Gensler's ouster. There has never been love-loss between the two. Bernie Sanders attempted to block Gensler's nomination, taking issue with Gensler's instrumental role in deregulating credit default swaps, which led to the AIG disaster. Then Sen. Sanders got together a group of 70 legislators to sign onto a letter demanding the CFTC obey Dodd-Frank. As of two weeks ago today, Bernie wants blood:


    Senator implores President Obama to replace CFTC Chairman Gensler



    Thursday, 07 June 2012 02:00

    A U.S. Senator implored President Barack Obama to replace the current U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) Chairman Gary Gensler on June 4. The CFTC plays an important role in U.S. derivatives regulations.


    Senator Bernie Sanders, an independent from Vermont, criticized the government official for not quickly imposing limits on the size of the bets that commodities traders can make in raw materials like copper, oil and gold, according to Reuters. The caps on the amounts for bets were set forth in the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.


    "In blatant disregard of the law, Chairman Gensler has allowed oil and gasoline prices to be dictated by Wall Street speculators instead of supply-and-demand fundamentals," Sanders wrote in the letter, the media outlet reports. "As a result, the American people continue to pay much higher prices for gasoline than they should."


    The CFTC's final rules on position limits were completed in October and are scheduled to be implemented later in 2012.


    Gensler recently stated that the derivatives regulations affecting swaps contracts will most likely be applied to the foreign branches of U.S. banks, as well as affiliates of those lending institutions.


    Meanwhile, unlike financial companies, energy companies are making cogent, reasonable arguments for regulation tweaks that probably won't require litigation:

    Energy companies moving forward with CFTC compliance despite uncertainties

    MAY 31, 2012
    By Thomas A. Utzinger (U.S.)

    NEW YORK, May 31 (Business Law Currents) – Electric utilities and natural gas companies are facing new regulatory uncertainties involving the jurisdictional reaches of two agencies overseeing futures and derivatives trading as well as wholesale energy transactions: the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Recent rulemaking efforts and litigation have raised questions as to the overlap and division of powers of these two entities over certain financial transactions and enforcement actions of interest to the energy industry.

    DODD-FRANK REFORM AND EXPANDED CFTC JURISDICTION

    The financial industry is witnessing a marathon of rulemakings required by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act). These actions include a new joint final rulemaking by the CFTC and SEC further defining and regulating “swap dealers” and similar parties under Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act (Swap Dealer Rule). The Swap Dealer Rule, recently published in the Federal Register on May 23, 2012, subjects these parties and related swap transactions to numerous registration and clearing requirements, and may have far-reaching effects on industries that make use of derivative transactions to hedge risks.

    (The Dodd-Frank Act’s treatment of over-the-counter derivative markets and entities participating in those markets is described in more detail by energy investment company Energy Transfer Equity, L.P. in its Quarterly Report. In addition, the Swap Dealer Rule’s new requirements were recently addressed by Business Law Currents in Swap dealers, major swap participants and everyone else under Dodd-Frank: who’s who and why we care.)

    Historically, the CFTC has exclusive jurisdiction over accounts, agreements, and transactions involving contracts for sale of a commodity for future delivery (futures contracts). Futures contracts can include natural gas, electricity, or other energy products traded or executed subject to a designated contract market or other market or exchange under section 2(a)(1)(A) of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA).

    In turn, FERC has exclusive jurisdiction over the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce and sales for resale of natural gas, under section 1of the Natural Gas Act (NGA). FERC also regulates the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and wholesale electric energy transactions by public utilities, under section 201 of the Federal Power Act (FPA). FERC maintains exclusive ratemaking jurisdiction over wholesale sales and interstate transmission of electricity under the FPA, as noted by Western-U.S. utility Black Hills Corporation in its Annual Report.

    Given existing regulation of electric and natural gas energy futures trading, many parties feared that the finalized Swap Dealer Rule would be so broad in scope that previously unregulated swap transactions routinely employed by energy companies would become subject to the CFTC’s jurisdiction and its new registration and exchange requirements. While the energy industry functioned with the regulation of futures markets, the routine use of swaps to hedge market volatility due to weather, unforeseen demand, and other factors would be severely disrupted if regulated by the CFTC.

    Energy companies use swaps with financial institutions and other commodity market customers to exchange floating price streams with fixed price streams. For example, as explained by Exelon Corporation in comments submitted to the CFTC during the rulemaking process, an electric utility’s annual revenue is based in part by the spot prices paid by a Regional Transmission Organization (RTO) or Independent System Operator (ISO) for the power generated. Without the swap, that annual revenue could vary widely based on demand. With a swap, however, the utility enters into an agreement whereby the variable price paid for the power generated (revenue) is transferred to another counterparty in exchange for a fixed revenue stream for the year, or vice versa depending on the specific circumstances.

    Swaps work when counterparties have opposing views of the risks involved, and therefore agree to trade revenue streams. In the case of electric power, for example, the utility may believe that revenue in 2012 will be lower than average (and therefore the fixed rate it receives from the counterparty to the swap will be greater than actual revenue), whereas the counterparty believes that 2012 revenues will be higher than average (and therefore the revenues it receives from the utility will be greater than the fixed payments made to the utility). Utilities may also enter into opposite “fixed-for-floating” swaps to hedge against power generation unit failures and other situations in which it is preferable to receive payments based on floating spot prices instead of fixed revenue streams.

    During the CFTC’s rulemaking process, energy companies were concerned that the final Swap Dealer Rule could categorize the companies making these daily swap transactions as “swap dealers,” subjecting them to mandatory capital, margin, and clearing requirements, as noted by NextEra Energy, Inc. in comments submitted to the CFTC. The other concern was that the CFTC’s exemption of smaller “de minimis” swap transactions would be set too low at $100 million, so that the total amount of a utility’s swap transactions in one year would greatly exceed that exemption amount. NextEra noted in its Annual Report that the rules could negatively affect the company’s ability to hedge commodity and interest rate risks.

    Although the final Swap Dealer Rule raises the original de minimis exemption from $100 million to a satisfactory $8 billion for “swap dealers,” falling to $3 billion within three to five years as noted by major Mid-Western electric utility PPL Corporation (PPL), energy companies remain cautious. Exelon Corporation, for example, states in its recent Quarterly Report that the company is evaluating whether its derivatives activities will be regulated in any manner.

    Similarly, many electric utility companies like NRG Energy, Inc. (NRG) and Public Service Enterprise Group Incorporated (PSEG) are taking a cautious approach and further evaluating the rulemakings. NRG states in its Quarterly Report that the company is reviewing whether the Swap Dealer Rule applies to its business, while PSEG states in its Quarterly Report that the company is carefully monitoring the new rules as they are developed, to determine whether any impact on the company’s swap and derivative transactions exist.

    Given this de minimis exemption increase, PPL notes in its Quarterly Report that the “definition of swap dealer is an amount that would not currently result in the Registrants being deemed swap dealers.” However, the company cautions that there “are numerous other provisions in the Final Rule . . . that the Registrants have not yet analyzed that could result in their being subject to the more onerous compliance requirements applicable to swap dealers.” Furthermore, legal issues and challenges could arise with respect to thede minimis levels set in the Swap Dealer Rule, as recently addressed by Business Law Currents in CFTC and SEC swap dealer rule raises legal questions along with thresholds. One such issue is that the threshold for government-owned public utilities remains at a miniscule $25 million instead of $8 billion, which would severely limit swap deals with such companies.

    In addition, electric utility Dominion Resources, Inc. proposes in its recent Quarterly Report that if the company’s derivative activities are not exempted from all the potential clearing, exchange trading, and margin requirements associated with the Dodd-Frank rulemakings, the company could become subject to higher costs. Likewise, independent power producer Calpine Corporation, in its Quarterly Report, notes that a number of features in Title VII of Dodd-Frank could impact its energy business. Natural gas companies are also concerned, as seen in the recent Prospectus Supplement ofWilliams Partners L.P., stating that the company makes extensive use of swaps and other hedging transactions to manage financial exposure.

    While the end result of the Swap Dealer Rule may not be a sea change in energy company hedging transactions, the full extent of the Dodd-Frank reforms on the energy industry remain to be seen, as many rules remain in development. This causes a level of uncertainty as energy companies and other participants in electric and natural gas transactions move forward with regulatory compliance initiatives, preferring to know whether or not traditionally unregulated practices will be subject to CFTC requirements.

    CFTC AND FERC ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY

    In an ongoing matter previously reported by Business Law Currents in Amaranth settles class action market manipulation suit, a turf war between the CFTC and FERC with respect to market manipulation enforcement involving natural gas (NG) Futures Contracts has become the subject of extensive litigation currently in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. At issue is the apparent overlap of the CFTC’s and FERC’s authority over manipulative trading of NG Futures Contracts.

    NG Futures Contracts are standardized agreements to purchase or sell a volume of natural gas at a predetermined price in the future, and are bought and sold on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX). NG Futures Contracts specify delivery of 10,000 MMBtus of natural gas at the Henry Hub in Louisiana in the month in which the contract matures. Sellers of futures contracts have a short position, benefitting if the price of natural gas drops before the delivery date. Buyers have a long position, benefitting if the price increases. Traders also enter into swaps, in which a swap buyer agrees to pay a fixed price, and the seller agrees to pay a floating price which is the final settlement price of NG Futures Contracts.

    Section 315 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 added a market-manipulation provision to the NGA. Codified at NGA section 4A, the law prohibits “any entity” from “directly or indirectly” manipulating the market “in connection with” FERC jurisdictional transactions, such as sales of natural gas in interstate commerce for resale. FERC implements NGA section 4A in Order No. 670, “Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation,” set forth at 18 C.F.R. 1c.1, the Commission’s Anti-Manipulation Rule. FERC’s civil penalty powers under the 2005 amendments to the NGA are described in further detail in the Annual Report of independent oil and natural gas company Energy Partners, Ltd., and the Amended Annual Report of exploration and production company Antero Resources LLC.

    FERC originally determined that former trader Brian Hunter intentionally manipulated NG Futures Contract settlement process by selling large amounts of contracts in the final half-hour of trading on three occasions. This manipulation was intended to benefit Hunter’s opposing swap positions (i.e., a decrease in NG Futures Contract settlement prices led to gains in the swap transactions). The close relationship between the financial and physical natural gas markets meant that Hunter’s manipulation of the futures market (under CFTC’S jurisdiction) had a direct effect on the settlement price of natural gas going to delivery and price indices (under FERC’s jurisdiction).

    Hunter and the CFTC contend that FERC’s interpretation of NGA section 4A conflicts with the CFTC’s jurisdiction under CEA section 2(a)(1)(A), which provides the CFTC with exclusive jurisdiction “with respect to accounts, agreements [of various types] and transactions involving contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery.” FERC argues, however, that its anti-manipulation authority coexists and complements the CFTC’s authority.

    FERC rejects Hunter’s argument that the CFTC has exclusive jurisdiction that precludes FERC’s jurisdiction and enforcement action. The commission states that while FERC does not directly regulate NG Futures Contracts, the settlement price of those contracts directly affects the price of natural gas sales which are under FERC’s jurisdiction. Therefore Hunter’s trading activities fell under NGA section 4A’s prohibition of natural gas market manipulation “in connection with” FERC-jurisdictional sales.

    At this time it is unclear whether both commissions may share authority when NG Futures Contracts, which are exclusively regulated by the CFTC, are manipulated in a manner affecting the larger wholesale natural gas markets regulated by FERC. This is important to many market participants, not only in the natural gas industry but also to electric power companies as well, because the two commissions maintain different priorities and objectives, and parties engaging in these transactions deserve to have certainty with respect to which entity, or both, can initiate and pursue enforcement actions.

    (This article was first published by Thomson Reuters’ Business Law Currents, a leading provider of legal analysis and news on governance, transactions and legal risk. Visit Business Law Currents online at http://currents.westlawbusiness.com)


    Moreover, the CFTC moved just yesterday to define high-frequency trading. It's a precursor to being able to regulate the activities. But that's neither here nor there.

    This is a lot of hand-wringing, position changing, and general drama for less than a month in the life of the CFTC. It seems that things are heading towards a boiling point. As always, it should be interesting to watch.

    I'd welcome any thoughts for others here who are more intimately acquainted with the topic.

  • #2
    Re: Unraveling the Mess at the CFTC

    Originally posted by dcarrigg View Post

    This is a lot of hand-wringing, position changing, and general drama for less than a month in the life of the CFTC. It seems that things are heading towards a boiling point. As always, it should be interesting to watch.

    I'd welcome any thoughts for others here who are more intimately acquainted with the topic.
    Thanks for the extensive write-up!
    I'm certainly no expert in this arena, but the timing of the burst of activity does not strike me as surprising. Obama really wants to show voters that he is serious about regulating the the financial industry. He couldn't do it too early (since he needed to ask the bankers for money first) but now that he's moved on to collecting from other constituencies, he has a few months to make a show of hammering bankers.

    I would expect continually escalating rhetoric from whatever parts of government the administration has influence over, from this point forward. Whether any good comes from it is of course another matter.

    Comment


    • #3
      Re: Unraveling the Mess at the CFTC

      he has a few months to make a show of hammering bankers.
      without a role, there is no show . . .

      Comment


      • #4
        Re: Unraveling the Mess at the CFTC

        Originally posted by don View Post
        without a role, there is no show . . .
        The saga continues...

        UPDATE 3-U.S. CFTC floats overseas treatment of swaps rules

        Sat Jun 30, 2012 6:33am IST


        By Alexandra Alper WASHINGTON, June 29 (Reuters) -

        The U.S. Commodity FuturesTrading Commission voted unanimously behind closed doors onFriday to propose two key measures outlining how U.S. swapsregulations will apply overseas. The measures had previously been slated for a public votelast Thursday, but the meeting was abruptly canceled due tolast-minute negotiations between two Democratic commissioners.

        The CFTC was tasked by the 2010 Dodd-Frank financial reformlaw with writing a raft of rules to boost transparency and limitrisk in the murky, $650 trillion, over-the-counter swaps market. One of the most hotly debated pieces of the new regime ishow broadly U.S. derivatives rules will reach into the overseasoperations of U.S. and foreign banks.

        Regulators have struggled to balance the need for broadoversight -- to prevent offshore risk from damaging the U.S.financial system -- with the aim of creating a level playingfield that gives no firm a competitive advantage. "We must not forget the lessons of the 2008 crisis andearlier," CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler said in a statement. "Swaps executed offshore by U.S. financial institutions can send riskstraight back to our shores."

        One measure proposed by the CFTC gives guidance on whichentities and transactions will be subject to U.S. "entity level"and "transaction level" rules. "Entity level" rules include how much capital is needed toback a trade, while "transaction level" requirements detail theamount of collateral a firm must put up for its transactions. The second measure would grant U.S. and foreign firms adelay in complying with certain "entity level" requirements suchas business conduct standards. Foreign firms will have 12 months to comply, while U.S.firms will have until January 2013.

        To take advantage of the delay, foreign firms would have toregister with the National Futures Association and submit acompliance plan for meeting U.S. or foreign swaps rules. It is not yet clear in practice how aggressive the overseasreach will be. The guidance will be put out for public commentfor 45 days, while the proposed compliance delay will be put for 30 days of comments.

        HOT DEBATE

        U.S. regulators are first in line to put swaps reforms inplace, which has led U.S. banks to fear their business will moveabroad to firms not subject to tough U.S. rules. But U.S. regulators point to recent history to demonstrate the need for broad regulations.

        "The recent Barclays matter, the JPMorgan loss and manyother illustrations make the case for this far better thananything else," said Bart Chilton, a Democratic commissioner at the CFTC. JPMorgan Chase & Co announced a multibillion-dollartrading loss on a complex derivatives trade, and U.S. and British authorities fined Barclays $450 million for manipulating the rate at which banks lend to each other, reigniting calls for tough banking oversight.

        Risky derivatives trading at overseas subsidiaries of firms such as insurer American International Group severelydamaged the U.S. financial system during the 2007-2009 financial crisis and led to multi billion-dollar taxpayer bailouts.

        Scott O'Malia, a Republican commissioner and frequent criticof the agency's rules, voted for the measures, but criticized the guidance as overly broad, and lacking sufficient collaboration with foreign regulators. "I would like to make it clear that if I were asked to vote on the proposed guidance as final, my vote would be no," he said in a statement. O'Malia also said he would have preferred that the agency issue a formal rule instead of guidance.

        Rules, unlike guidance, require the agency perform a cost benefit analysis, which have been fodder for industry suits against the CFTC. The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association echoed O'Malia's concern. "We are disappointed that the CFTC has issued proposed guidance in an attempt to circumvent the requirement for a cost-benefit analysis," said Tim Ryan President of SIFMA, one ofthe groups that has sued the agency over a cost benefit analysis.

        The CFTC is not required to issued guidance or a rule about the reach of its swaps rules. A swap is a financial contract in which two parties exchange cash flows on debt, currencies, or other assets, to hedge risk or make a profit. The guidance and the delay will be available for public comment for 45 days and 30 days, respectively, after which the CFTC would vote on the final versions.

        Comment


        • #5
          Re: Unraveling the Mess at the CFTC

          Interesting developments this month.

          August 5:

          Fed Should Reverse Commodity Policy, CFTC’s Chilton Says



          The Federal Reserve should reverse a decade-old ruling that lets banks trade physical commodities, Commodity Futures Trading Commission member Bart Chilton said.

          “I don’t want a bank owning an electric service, or cotton, corn or feedlots,” Chilton, a Democrat, said in remarks prepared for delivery today at a conference of U.S. cotton growers in Lake Tahoe, California. “I don’t want banks owning warehouses, whether they have aluminum, gold, silver or anything else in them.” The Fed “can and should reverse” the policy, he said.

          Banks including Citigroup Inc. (C), JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) and Morgan Stanley (MS), all based in New York, have been permitted to expand into commodities markets under a 2003 Fed decision and subsequent ones. The central bank said last month that it’s reviewing the policy amid Senate scrutiny of whether such involvement allows Wall Street firms to control prices.

          JPMorgan, the biggest U.S. bank by assets, said days after a congressional hearing on the matter last month that it’s weighing whether to sell or spin off holdings in physical commodities. The 10 largest Wall Street firms reaped about $6 billion in revenue from commodities in 2012, including dealings in physical materials as well as related financial products, analytics company Coalition Ltd. said in a Feb. 15 report.

          Falling Revenue

          Commodities revenue at the 10 largest investment banks fell 25 percent in the first half of this year, putting those units on pace for the worst annual performance in more than five years, Coalition said today. Revenue fell to about $2.7 billion in the first six months from $3.6 billion in the same period of 2012, Coalition said today in an e-mail.

          “The Federal Reserve regularly monitors the commodity activities of supervised firms and is reviewing the 2003 determination that certain commodity activities are complementary to financial activities and thus permissible for bank holding companies,” Barbara Hagenbaugh, a Fed spokeswoman, said on July 19. She declined to elaborate.

          Banks’ ownership of commodity interests already has drawn scrutiny from the CFTC and the Securities and Exchange Commission, and Senate Democrats are planning additional hearings on the issue.

          CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler, declining to comment on specific investigations, said at a Senate hearing on July 29 that his agency has legal authority to pursue manipulation of markets for metals and other commodities. The CFTC has sent letters to companies asking them not to destroy documents relating to warehouses registered by exchanges such as the London Metal Exchange or Chicago Mercantile Exchange, according to a copy of the letter obtained byBloomberg News.

          Volcker Rule

          In a letter to Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke dated Aug. 2, Chilton urged additional restrictions as part of a proposed ban on proprietary trading. The rule named for former Fed Chairman Paul Volcker, who championed it as an adviser to President Barack Obama, should have a narrow definition of banks’ hedging activities that takes account for their ownership of physical commodities.

          “Without clear prohibitory guidelines, if a bank owns physical commodities, it could contend (with a certain degree of justification) that the Volcker rule and position limits simply aren’t applicable to them, as the commodity ownership and trading pertains to ‘hedging’ their physical business risks,” Chilton said in the letter.

          Regulators have said they are seeking to complete the Volcker rule by the end of the year.



          Of course, this comes as the Administration is making noise about these things all of the sudden.

          But then, on August 23rd, the CFTC reverses its new disclosure requirements.

          And of course, this is all being considered in the wake of the recent aluminum warehousing controversy that went down in the Senate.

          Also, now, 14 months after I started this thread, it looks like the definitions and options for high frequency trading regulation are finally coming out. Or so says the Tribune, quoting unnamed sources.

          For now it's all still just talk. Gensler's still at the helm. Hasn't left yet. Chilton's still calling for stronger action.

          But I think the absurdity of Goldman driving up prices by buying Detroit warehouses and driving aluminum in a circle every day (and the fact that producers using aluminum can bring that stupid image into Congress) might have lit a tiny spark.

          Whatever it is (and maybe it's just summertime), it seems like action's back on here. More public disagreements. The whitehouse calling regulators in all of the sudden. A few public stories. And some talk of the 5-year anniversary of this great recession in the opinion pages of the NYT today.

          The bluster about the CFTC is back. Will something happen this year, unlike last year? It seems like we're about to find out. Another year of talk with no action seems too much to bear. But it would be par for the course.

          After all, the question in 2013 should not be whether or not Dodd-Frank was a good law. The question now is whether or not the Administration will ever enforce the Dodd-Frank law as enacted by Congress. Bloomberg asks, "Will Dodd-Frank Ever Be Finished?"

          When all of us are being taxed on every can we buy, every car we buy, every loaf of bread we buy, every gallon of gas we buy, even when we buy in cash, and by New York instead of Washington, it's time to ask that question.
          Last edited by dcarrigg; August 26, 2013, 03:39 AM.

          Comment


          • #6
            Re: Unraveling the Mess at the CFTC

            Originally posted by dcarrigg View Post
            When all of us are being taxed on every can, car, loaf of bread, and gallon of gas we buy, even when we buy in cash, and by New York instead of Washington.....
            Can you elaborate on the "even when we buy in cash" part?

            Comment


            • #7
              Re: Unraveling the Mess at the CFTC

              Originally posted by Thailandnotes View Post
              Can you elaborate on the "even when we buy in cash" part?
              Just that it's not interest we're paying here. They are cornering the commodities markets and driving prices up. When it gets to the point of absurdity of buying up huge aluminum storage and distribution facilities and driving it in circles to artificially depress supply and raise prices, it amounts to a tax. And now finally this month, the CFTC is issuing subpoenas over it. Meanwhile, before 2003 this wasn't even possible. In oil, it took until 2005. But there again, it looks like price fixing is gouging consumers and investigations are just now underway. Chilton at the CFTC calls part of what they do on the WTI 'spoofing,' basically pushing in bids you don't intend to execute then canceling them at the last second to drive prices up.

              And that's just the potentially illegal stuff. Then there's the raw cost of speculation. The major point is that until about a decade ago none of this was allowed. Productive industries that actually use the commodities have been begging to curb it. Dodd-Frank had multiple avenues that, if they were actually implemented, might curb it some. The Fed can just reach in and turn some of it off overnight. The CFTC and SEC could do yeoman's work too. But they don't. And we still don't have proper position limits, which were supposed to be done two years ago now. And it costs us all money, often worldwide.
              Last edited by dcarrigg; August 26, 2013, 04:32 AM.

              Comment


              • #8
                Re: Unraveling the Mess at the CFTC

                Originally posted by dcarrigg View Post
                Just that it's not interest we're paying here. They are cornering the commodities markets and driving prices up. When it gets to the point of absurdity of buying up huge aluminum storage and distribution facilities and driving it in circles to artificially depress supply and raise prices, it amounts to a tax.
                +1
                altho i'd call it more like the vig

                its also quite like what the creditcard outfits are doing (coining money, skimming their cut off the top and jacking up food prices esp, since the supermarket industry supposedly nets 'only about 2%' on their gross, then havent they added 2-3% to their prices, to cover their costs of accepting plastic?... just wondren...)

                And now finally this month, the CFTC is issuing subpoenas over it. Meanwhile, before 2003 this wasn't even possible. In oil, it took until 2005. But there again, it looks like price fixing is gouging consumers and investigations are just now underway.
                but that certainly wouldnt be considered 'inflationary' - now, would it? (/sarc)
                whats even more interesting (refreshing) is that at least manhattan's primary news outlets (and likely some of their drinking/golfing buddies, out on the island...) are focusing on this - altho not as aggressively as some, thankfully, do....

                ... Makes $255 Million Storing 3% of Global Aluminum Production

                and they....
                ...Won't Tell Me How Much Aluminum They Hold in Detroit Warehouses


                Chilton at the CFTC calls part of what they do on the WTI 'spoofing,' basically pushing in bids you don't intend to execute then canceling them at the last second to drive prices up.

                And that's just the potentially illegal stuff. Then there's the raw cost of speculation.
                potentially?
                and never mind the fact - well.. observation anyway - that this same speculation is what drove us over the cliff in 2008???

                esp considering Mr J's well documented/supported theory that predated this obs...

                just speculating...
                altho its kinda funny how the above (your) ref'd/linked publishers dont seem to focus their editorial depts on this kind of.. uhhh...
                trivia, eh dc?

                course ole rupert's dont seem to either, but eye may have missed their... ummm... contributions on this particular topic.

                The major point is that until about a decade ago none of this was allowed.
                not sure if this has anything to do with it, but the timing is interesting - its inception only shortly before the events leading up to 1993 ???



                Productive industries that actually use the commodities have been begging to curb it. Dodd-Frank had multiple avenues that, if they were actually implemented, might curb it some. The Fed can just reach in and turn some of it off overnight. The CFTC and SEC could do yeoman's work too. But they don't. And we still don't have proper position limits, which were supposed to be done two years ago now. And it costs us all money, often worldwide.
                methinks it all comes down/gets back to this

                its also interesting to note the tools being used to... uhhh... 'repair the image' - esp considering how/where the..... ummmm
                the tentacles are showing up -

                but then... guess its not all that surprising - considering the armtwisting that quite likely occurred for various.... ummm
                developments - esp consdering the developer - altho there must've been some connection... somehow?

                ".....WHOOOPS, there it is...." and WHOOPS, there it is again....

                oh yeah, simply HILARIOUS that the lamestream media flatly refuses to even TRY to connect the dots....and then, will make every attempt to disparage/discredit any of their compatriots who tries??
                ....Two years earlier, Rolling Stone magazine printed a lengthy polemic by journalist Matt Taibbi, who called "the world's most powerful investment bank" a "great vampire squid" that had brought about every major market gyration since the Great Depression of the 1930s.
                just trying to help prove your point here, dc - as you know how much i appreciate (and agree with) your POV in these matters.
                right big guy?

                i gotta git tho - if i dont have my other half's punchlist done today, i'm toast....

                ;0)

                Comment


                • #9
                  Re: Unraveling the Mess at the CFTC

                  This thread's a couple of years old now. But the wheels of justice turn slowly. And the banks always find a way to crank them up. Time to drop an update:

                  So, since our last installment, Gensler has been trotted out as an enemy of the big banks - even though he spent the bulk of his career and made the bulk of his money at Goldman. But now that's over. Gensler's bye-bye.

                  But after 7 years, Chilton went with him. He says he's coming out with a book called "Theft" now about a Wall Street / .gov nexus.

                  Anyways, if this video link works, here's his take on the new Chairman and what's going on over there - and some practical comments about keeping finance out of the productive economy on the commodity side:

                  http://www.bloomberg.com/video/embed...RVqJKlExGdZXQQ

                  Meanwhile, Massad's in charge now. He's a securities lawyer and a career bureaucrat. He goes out of his way on his profile to drop Liz Warren's name. And in the couple months since he has been there, there, he's moved on some things. The banks stopped the position limits with court actions last time, but he has refiled rules.

                  ...And then the truly good news came last week...

                  After 2 years of banks' courtroom delays, judge gives the CFTC greenlight to move forward with swaps rules - still waiting on position limits, though:

                  Originally posted by Reuters
                  UPDATE 2-U.S. court rules against banks in swap rules lawsuit

                  (Reuters) - A U.S. court on Tuesday largely rejected an attempt by banking groups to limit the U.S. swaps regulator's ability to apply its rules overseas, a hotly debated issue as the agency reins in the $710 trillion global market.

                  Most of the claims by the three banking groups failed because the law gave the Commodity Futures Trading Commission clear powers to apply a host of new rules to govern the formerly unregulated swaps market overseas, the ruling by a Washington, D.C., federal court said.

                  While Judge Paul Friedman sent back some of the rules to the CFTC, telling the agency to do a better job in weighing the costs and benefits, he did not invalidate them.
                  The banks' challenges "merely seek to delay the inevitable," Friedman said in his opinion, adding that "Congress has clearly indicated that the swaps provisions (in the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act) apply extraterritorially."

                  ...snip...


                  "This decision is a very big win for financial reform and for transparent derivatives markets," said Dennis Kelleher, who heads Better Markets, a group urging Wall Street reform.

                  Banks had succeeded in getting a court to throw out another CFTC rule to cap speculation in commodity markets, using the same argument of a lack of cost-benefit analysis, a requirement of the Administrative Procedures Act. The CFTC has since reproposed those rules for so-called position limits.

                  The Securities and Exchange Commission - which oversees a tiny corner of the swaps market - is working on its own proposal for cross-border rules.

                  Swaps were originally designed to protect companies against risks with interest rates or currencies, but they can also be packaged into the types of complex financial transactions that became a problem during the financial crisis.
                  At long last. 2 years later. Nothing's implemented yet. But we're lurching along.

                  Oh. Wait. How could I forget? Remember when JP Morgan decided to drop out of the commodities business all together? I wonder if the other big banks will think about following suit...

                  Originally posted by NYT

                  JPMorgan Commodities Unit to Be Sold for $3.5 Billion


                  Wall Street banks, facing tighter scrutiny from regulators, are moving to get out of the business of physical commodities trading.

                  On Wednesday, JPMorgan Chase took a big step in that direction, announcing that it had agreed to sell its physical commodities trading unit to the Mercuria Energy Group, a rapidly growing Swiss trading firm, for $3.5 billion in cash.

                  The Volcker Rule, part of the sweeping Dodd-Frank financial regulatory overhaul, restricts the ability of banks to trade for their own accounts. That extends to limits on some commodities trading.

                  The Federal Reserve is also considering limiting banks’ commodities activities to try to reduce their exposure to a potential source of instability.

                  And the Commodity Futures Trading Commission has subpoenaed Goldman Sachs and other owners of metals warehouses as part of an investigation into potential irregularities in the aluminum market.

                  They're finally making a little headway into the OTC derivative market that created this mess after they screwed up and passed the CFMA of 2000.

                  If they ever get the position limits done this year, I have a feeling you'll see it in the markets before the news drops...
                  Last edited by dcarrigg; September 26, 2014, 11:49 PM.

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    Re: Unraveling the Mess at the CFTC

                    US Senate Permanent Committee on Investigations Report on banks and physical commodities is in. You can download it here.

                    Couple excerpts:

                    The case studies show how financial holding companies have taken control of numerous commercial businesses that have never before been run by a bank or bank holding company. Morgan Stanley’s effort to construct a compressed natural gas facility, for example, isunprecedented for a bank or bank holding company, and in direct competition with a similar project by a private company. Morgan Stanley’s jet fuel supply services also compete directly with oil and refining companies providing the same services. Goldman’s coal operations are in direct competition with those of an American company that is the second largest coal producer in Colombia. In running its power plants, JPMorgan competes with utilities and other energy companies that specialize in that business. Until recently, banks and their holding companies focused on financing private sector businesses, rather than acquiring and using subsidiaries to compete against them.


                    One key concern when financial holding companies compete against non-bank companies is that their borrowing costs will nearly always undercut those of their non-bank competitors. Another advantage is their relatively low capital requirements. The Federal Reserve Commodities Team determined that, in 2012, corporations engaged in oil and gas businesses typically had a capital ratio of 42% to cover potential losses, while bank holding company subsidiaries had a capital ratio of, on average, 8% to 10%, making it much easier for them to invest corporate funds in their business operations.

                    In addition to those fundamental economic advantages over non-bank companies, a financial holding company could, in theory, help its rise in a particular business simply by not providing financing to its rivals. Some experts have identified less expensive financing, lower capital, and control over credit decisions as key factors that give financial holding companies an unfair advantage over non-bank competitors and represent some of the concerns motivating the traditional U.S. ban on mixing banking with commerce. Avoiding the catastrophic risks described above is another.

                    Still another set of concerns involves the transitory nature of a financial holding company’s involvement in any particular physical commodity operation. In most cases, financial holding companies are looking for short-term financial returns rather than making long-term commitments to run a business like a power plant or natural gas facility. In addition, financial holding companies that make so-called merchant banking investments in a commercial company are constrained by law to sell those investments generally within ten years. Those relatively short-term investment horizons mean that financial holding companies are not or may not be willing to develop or dedicate the resources, time, and expertise needed to make complex infrastructure investments and meet regulatory requirements. For example, in the case studies, Goldman chose not to upgrade its port in Colombia with new coal loading equipment, while JPMorgan stalled upgrades to two power plants in California to support grid
                    reliability, making decisions contrary to the companies participating in those business sectors for the long haul. Without those investments, however, a financial holding company may place itself at greater risk of violating regulations or experiencing a catastrophic event. A related concern is whether decisions by financial holding companies to delay or avoid infrastructure investments disadvantage competitors who do make those investments and may, in fact, pressure those competitors to delay or skimp on needed infrastructure as well.

                    Many physical commodity businesses today rely on a small cadre of experienced corporations with long term investment horizons to transport oil and gas, mine coal, process uranium, or generate electricity. Those corporations make expensive infrastructure investments. The prospect of financial holding companies changing those markets by buying particular companies, capturing profits, and then pulling out, is a troubling scenario.


                    ...snip...

                    Findings of Fact


                    (1) Engaging in Risky Activities. Since 2008, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase,
                    and Morgan Stanley have engaged in many billions of dollars of risky physical
                    commodity activities, owning or controlling, not only vast inventories of physical
                    commodities like crude oil, jet fuel, heating oil, natural gas, copper, aluminum, and
                    uranium, but also related businesses, including power plants, coal mines, natural gas
                    facilities, and oil and gas pipelines.


                    (2) Mixing Banking and Commerce. From 2008 to 2014, Goldman, JPMorgan,
                    and Morgan Stanley engaged in physical commodity activities that mixed banking
                    and commerce, benefiting from lower borrowing costs and lower capital to debt
                    ratios compared to nonbank companies.


                    (3) Affecting Prices. At times, some of the financial holding companies used or
                    contemplated using physical commodity activities, such as electricity bidding
                    strategies, merry-go-round trades, or a proposed exchange traded fund backed
                    by physical copper, that had the effect or potential effect of manipulating or
                    influencing commodity prices.


                    (4) Gaining Trading Advantages. Exercising control over vast physical
                    commodity activities gave Goldman, JPMorgan, and Morgan Stanley access to
                    commercially valuable, non-public information that could have provided
                    advantages in their trading activities.


                    (5) Incurring New Bank Risks. Due to their physical commodity activities,
                    Goldman, JPMorgan, and Morgan Stanley incurred multiple risks normally absent
                    from banking, including operational, environmental, and catastrophic event risks,
                    made worse by the transitory nature of their investments.


                    (6) Incurring New Systemic Risks. Due to their physical commodity activities,
                    Goldman, JPMorgan, and Morgan Stanley incurred increased financial, operational,
                    and catastrophic event risks, faced accusations of unfair trading advantages,
                    conflicts of interest, and market manipulation, and intensified problems with being
                    too big to manage or regulate, introducing new systemic risks into the U.S. financial
                    system.


                    (7) Using Ineffective Size Limits. Prudential safeguards limiting the size of
                    physical commodity activities are riddled with exclusions and applied in an
                    uncoordinated, incoherent, and ineffective fashion, allowing JPMorgan, for
                    example, to hold physical commodities with a market value of $17.4 billion –
                    nearly 12% of its Tier 1 capital – while at the same time calculating the market
                    value of its physical commodity holdings for purposes of complying with the
                    Federal Reserve limit at just $6.6 billion.


                    (8) Lacking Key Information. Federal regulators and the public currently lack key
                    information about financial holding companies’ physical commodities activities to
                    form an accurate understanding of the nature and extent of those activities and to
                    protect the markets.

                    Recommendations


                    (1) Reaffirm Separation of Banking and Commerce as it Relates to Physical
                    Commodity Activities. Federal bank regulators should reaffirm the separation of
                    banking from commerce, and reconsider all of the rules and practices related to
                    physical commodity activities in light of that principle.


                    (2) Clarify Size Limits. The Federal Reserve should issue a clear limit on a financial
                    holding company’s physical commodity activities; clarify how to calculate the
                    market value of physical commodity holdings; eliminate major exclusions; and
                    limit all physical commodity activities to no more than 5% of the financial holding
                    company’s Tier 1 capital. The OCC should revise its 5% limit to protect banks
                    from speculative or other risky positions, including by calculating it based on asset
                    values on a commodity-by-commodity basis.


                    (3) Strengthen Disclosures. The Federal Reserve should strengthen financial
                    holding company disclosure requirements for physical commodities and related
                    businesses in internal and public filings to support effective regulatory oversight,
                    public disclosure, and investor protections, including with respect to commodityrelated
                    merchant banking and grandfathered activities.


                    (4) Narrow Scope of Complementary Activity. The Federal Reserve should
                    narrow the scope of “complementary” activities by requiring financial holding
                    companies to demonstrate how a proposed physical commodity activity would be
                    directly linked to and support the settlement of other financial transactions
                    conducted by the company.


                    (5) Clarify Scope of Grandfathering Clause. The Federal Reserve should clarify
                    the scope of the “grandfather” clause as originally intended, which was only to
                    prevent disinvestment of physical commodity activities that were underway in
                    September 1997, and continued to be underway at the time of a company’s
                    conversion to a financial holding company.


                    (6) Narrow Scope of Merchant Banking Authority. The Federal Reserve should
                    tighten controls over merchant banking activities involving physical commodities
                    by shortening and equalizing the 10-year and 15-year investment time periods,
                    clarifying the actions that qualify as “routine operation and management” of a
                    business, and including those activities under an overall physical commodities size
                    limit.


                    (7) Establish Capital and Insurance Minimums. The Federal Reserve should
                    establish capital and insurance minimums based on market-prevailing standards to
                    protect against potential losses from catastrophic events in physical commodity
                    activities, and specify the catastrophic event models used by financial holding
                    companies.


                    (8) Prevent Unfair Trading. Financial regulators should ensure that large traders,
                    including financial holding companies, are legally precluded from using material
                    non-public information gained from physical commodities activities to benefit their
                    trading activities in the financial markets.


                    (9) Utilize Section 620 Study. Federal regulators should use the ongoing Section
                    620 study requiring regulators to identify permissible bank activities to restrict
                    banks and their holding companies from owning or controlling physical
                    commodities in excess of 5% of their Tier 1 capital and consider other appropriate
                    modifications to current practice involving physical commodities.

                    (10) Reclassify Commodity-Backed ETFs. The Commodity Futures Trading
                    Commission (CFTC) and Securities Exchange Commission should treat exchange
                    traded funds (ETFs) backed by physical commodities as hybrid security-commodity
                    instruments subject to regulation by both agencies. The CFTC should apply
                    position limits to ETF organizers and promoters, and consider banning such
                    instruments due to their potential use in commodity market corners or squeezes.


                    (11) Study Misuse of Physical Commodities to Manipulate Prices. The Office
                    of Financial Research should study and produce recommendations on the broader
                    issue of how to detect, prevent, and take enforcement action against all entities that
                    use physical commodities or related businesses to manipulate commodity prices in
                    the physical and financial markets.


                    Comment


                    • #11
                      Re: Unraveling the Mess at the CFTC

                      The report I link to above lays out the process by which investment banks can play with prices pretty clearly.

                      Let me drop some pictures on you to give you an overview:

                      Here's how Morgan Stanley controls supply lines:







                      Wrap the whole mess up, and this is what it looks like, complete with Cayman investment arms and carried interest:





                      And who controls & tolls your power plant? Why, that'd be JP Morgan, of course:




                      And let's not forget who has the copper:



                      And who has your uranium? Oh, that's right, our friend, Goldman.



                      Anyways, let's add it all together.



                      Okay, so now that we know they've got the supply lines and they've got the physical inventory, how is it that they make the big bucks? Oh - wait:

                      Comment


                      • #12
                        Re: Unraveling the Mess at the CFTC

                        Thanks for the link, dcarrigg, and your excerpting of the most salient material.

                        Now that it's all been so clearly documented, I suppose the only thing left to do is see which pols and regulators take which actions in response.

                        Most will of course dodge their responsibility. The only ones worth following/supporting will be those that don't.

                        Comment


                        • #13
                          Re: Unraveling the Mess at the CFTC

                          Can there be any doubt that after plowing through all this brain-damage inducing information overload that it all boils down to one simple incontrovertible data point; BIG IS BAD! And even the attempt to regulate this massively interconnected gang of schemers and scammers can result in more harm than good to legitimate enterprises because of the intentionally complicated corporate structures and financial connections. Instead of more mostly useless and counterproductive rules and guidance, just CUT the Gordian Knot by strictly limiting the size of corporations and the levels of corporate structure allowed. Outlaw individual ownership of or governance of more than a handful of corporations. That MSIP chart is an abomination. It's obvious purpose for existence is to obscure criminal activity and prevent transparency. Big powerful structures will always damage society. Society cannot allow individual freedom to be sacrificed so that a relative handful can satisfy their megalomania and greed. To paraphrase, we must bind down corporate rulers from mischief by the chains of anti-monopoly laws. Chop up the squids starting with their tentacles.
                          "I love a dog, he does nothing for political reasons." --Will Rogers

                          Comment


                          • #14
                            Re: Unraveling the Mess at the CFTC

                            Well said.
                            Recall they let all the investment banks convert to deposit bank status to access FDIC et cet at the height of the AFC, which prevented them from being wound down and restuctured.
                            Pure policy decision by Fed; well intentioned actions indeed ... toward a select few.

                            Comment


                            • #15
                              Re: Unraveling the Mess at the CFTC

                              Every Asset Price Influencing Monetary Policy Transmission Is Now Manipulated


                              Keynesian economists are annoying enough when they are pitching inflated financial assets on Wall Street or the supposed curative powers of fiscal deficits on Capitol Hill. But they become positively dangerous when they populate the Eccles Building and usurp control of the nation’s capital and money markets lock, stock and barrel in the name of “monetary accommodation”.

                              Needless to say, the Fed is presently over-run with Keynesian money printers led by Janet Yellen and Stanley Fischer. Both of these famous PhDs are actually proponents of a primitive macroeconomic doctrine that should be called “bathtub economics”. In their wisdom, these doctors of economics have simply postulated that the nation’s economic output “should” be at aggregate levels which far exceed current production, and that the resulting shortfall from “potential” output, incomes and jobs is due to insufficient “aggregate demand”.

                              This purported “output gap” is conveniently self-serving. It has been interpreted to mean that the Fed has a plenary mission to fill-up the nation’s economic bathtub by generating sufficient incremental aggregate demand to off-set the shortfall. This demand plugging function, in turn, is to be accomplished by the constant intervention of the Fed’s open market desk into money and capital markets. So doing, it is empowered to manipulate, massage, twist, bend and pump any financial variable that in its wisdom is deemed to influence the transmission of its monetary policy (i.e.”aggregate demand” stimulus) into the real economy.

                              Except this is all a fiction. There is no such economic ether called “aggregate demand”; it is an utterly artificial construct of Keynesian economic models. What actually exists out in the real main street economy is nothing more than the total spending by households and businesses; and the latter does not pre-exist as an independent variable. Instead, it is derived from either current income or from incremental borrowing—that is, extending the pre-existing leverage ratio of business and household balance sheets to steadily higher levels.

                              But here’s the thing. The Fed can do only do two concrete things to influence these income and credit sources of spending—–both of which are unsustainable, dangerous and an assault on free market capitalism’s capacity to generate growth and wealth. It can induce households to consume a higher fraction of current income by radically suppressing interest rates on liquid savings. And it can inject reserves into the financial system to induce higher levels of credit creation.

                              But the passage of time soon catches up with both of these parlor tricks. When household savings decline to the vanishing point, as has occurred since the turn of the century, there is no more incremental spending to be extracted from current income.



                              Likewise, when balance sheets become totally exhausted with leverage—as is also the case at present—there are no more one-time increments to spending available from the simple expedient of ratcheting-up household and business leverage ratios. That condition amounts to “peak debt” and it characterizes upwards of 90% of US households today.


                              Household Leverage Ratio –

                              The fact is, the Fed’s modern regime of inducing lower savings and higher leverage was not only an unsustainable, one-time proposition that prevailed roughly from 1971 to 2007, but also was only good on the margins of Keynesian GDP accounting. It was the booster shot which stimulated a simulacrum of prosperity and out performance on the measured macro variables.

                              Still, none of the Greenspan/Bernanke/Yellen era financial market interventions and manipulations by the Fed could impact the foundation of spending—-that is, current period organic income. The latter comes from production, invested capital, entrepreneurial activities and labor hours and productivity.

                              Stated differently, income is the fruit of the economy’s supply side operations. But the central banking branch of the state has no tools to grow the supply side. The latter is the unplanned result of workers, entrepreneurs, savers, investors and inventors interacting on the main street market.

                              Take the case of labor hours. The crucial variable here is not some academic concoction called “full employment” or an arbitrarily chosen unemployment rate of say 5.2% measured against an artificially designated proxy for the work force collected by the BLS.

                              Instead, what matters is the price of labor; the quantity supplied everywhere and always follows the price. Accordingly, if at current production and income levels, the price of labor on the margin is too high, there will be elevated levels of unemployment. But the Fed can do nothing about millions of wage arrangements in the main street economy—-except to make over-pricing of labor worse by inducing households to live beyond their means on cheap credit.

                              To be sure, the Keynesian money printers claim they are boosting labor inputs by enlarging demand for the services of unemployed workers. But this just another case of the economist who tumbled into a 30-foot hole, but quickly assured his colleague of an escape plan: Assume we have a ladder, he airily intoned.

                              In a similar manner, the Keynesian economists who run the Fed have no ability to create the fictional ether called “aggregate demand”, yet they have seized control of the entire capital and money market pretending to do just that. However, not withstanding the fact that the Fed has pumped $4 trillion of new reserves into the financial system since the year 2000, there has not been a single hour of gain in private non-farm labor inputs supplied to the US economy during the past 14 years. Self-evidently, all their “assumptions” to the contrary, the Keynesian economists at the Fed do not have a magic ladder called “aggregate demand” that can pull idle labor hours into production.




                              Yet here is where the Wall Street connection enters the picture. While the modern Fed’s incessant manipulation of money market rates, the yield curve and the price of risk assets generally can have no lasting effect on household and business spending, it does cause massive financial bubbles. The latter, in turn, can be harvested by adroit speculators during the 5-7 year intervals between the inevitable busts which result from central bank financial repression and artificial inflation of risk asset values.

                              That essentially is the reason for the present universe of some $3 trillion of hedge funds, and the trillions more of mutual funds and institutional investors which surf on their momentum driving waves. Their assigned function in the scheme is to be the first-in and first-out as these central bank financial bubbles inflate and bust.

                              Naturally, it was only a matter of time before Wall Street sought to institutionalize these beneficent policies by developing a financial market overlay on the bathtub economics of the academic Keynesians. This new element originated during the Greenspan era with the expansion of staff to include Wall Street economists and traders. But the arrival seven years ago of William Dudley straight from the top economics job at Goldman Sachs took the matter to a whole new level.

                              In effect, under Dudley’s supervision the New York Fed has been transformed from a dabbler in the money markets to the plenary master of the entire financial system. Thus, during the early Greenspan days the nearly exclusive tool of Fed policy intervention was the Federal funds rate, but that was a crude and imprecise lever for managing the flow of incremental demand into the nation’s economic bathtub.

                              Accordingly, the doctrine of “monetary accommodation” was evolved by the Wall Street contingent at the Fed led by Dudley. By the lights of this new dispensation, any financial variable that might conceivably encourage more mortgage borrowing or corporate stock buybacks or “wealth effects” driven household consumption (albeit by mainly the top 10%) was fair game. Such variables were declared to influence “the transmission of monetary policy to the real economy”.

                              Thus, when Ben Bernanke averred a few years ago that the Fed’s success in stimulating the economy was evident in the soaring levels of the Russell 2000, he was merely noting a particular instance of this new monetary accommodation doctrine at work.

                              Yet the monetary accommodation doctrine surely does amount to an economic coup d’état by the unelected bureaucrats and academics who run the nation’s central bank. To be sure, they rationalize it in the name of their statutory mandate to achieve maximum employment and price stability, as contained in the Humphrey-Hawkins Act.

                              But read the act and the legislative history. Not even Hubert Humprhey himself ever envisioned a Fed which would target the Russell 2000 or deliberately punish main stream savers in order to inflate financial assets and encourage wealth effects driven levitation of the GDP and jobs count. The Fed’s plenary manipulation of prices across the warp and woof of the financial system thus amounts to the greatest instance of “mission creep” ever undertaken by an agency of the state.

                              Now in a recent forked-tongue effort to deny the existence of a Fed “put” under the stock market, Goldman’s plenipotentiary at the Fed, perhaps better referred to as B-Dud, has told us exactly that. If the monetary politburo deems that the nation’s economic bathtub is not full to the brim and therefore requires “extremely accommodative” policy, the central bank will indeed deliberately pump-up the S&P 500 to achieve its misguided ends.

                              A few weeks ago, the Fed’s hapless school marm and chair person lamented publicly about the severe shift of income and wealth to the top 1% during recent decades. Perhaps it is time for B-Dud to explain to her that its all about filling James Tobin’s economic bathtub with the requisite “aggregate demand”.

                              It goes without saying that Keynesian economists have always been a threat to free market capitalism. But now that they have hooked up with Wall Street agents like B-Dud they have become a clear and present danger.

                              ….. we focus on how financial market conditions influence the transmission of monetary policy to the real economy. At times, a large decline in equity prices will not be problematic for achieving our goals….. (if) it does not conflict with our objectives. In contrast, when we want financial market conditions to be extremely accommodative—as has been the case in recent years when we have been far away from our employment and inflation objectives—then we will take into consideration a broad set of developments with respect to interest rates, the stock market and other measures of financial conditions in choosing the appropriate stance for monetary policy.


                              David Stockman

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