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Nomi Prins frames JP Morgan's antics

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  • Nomi Prins frames JP Morgan's antics

    JPM Chase Chairman, Jamie Dimon, the Whale Man, and Glass-Steagall

    Friday, May 11, 2012 at 5:01PM

    It was fitting that while President Obama and his Hollywood apostles broke fundraising records at a sumptuous $40,000 per plate dinner at George Clooney’s place, word of JPM Chase’s ‘mistake’ rippled through the news. Not long ago, Dimon’s name was batted about to become Treasury Secretary. But as lines are drawn and pundits take sides in the Jamie Dimon ego deflation saga – or, as I see it - why big banks should be made smaller and then, broken up into commercial vs. speculative components ala Glass Steagall – it’s important to look beyond the size of the $2 billion dollar (and counting) beached whale of a trading loss.

    Yes, $2 billion in the scheme of JPM Chase’s book and quarterly earnings is tiny, a ‘trading blip’ as it’s been called by some business press. But that’s not a mitigating factor in what it represents. In this era dominated by a few consolidated and complex banks, the very fact that it’s a relatively small loss IS the red flag.

    First - because the loss could (and will) grow. Second, because even if it doesn’t, it’s a blatant example of a big bank incurring un-due risk within a barely regulated, highly correlated financial markets. It only takes another Paulson hedge fund, or a trading desk at Goldman Sachs, to short the hell out of the corporates that JPM Chase is synthetically long, or take whatever the other side really is, to create a liquidity crisis that will further screw those least able to access credit – individuals, small businesses, and productive capital users.

    We know this. We’ve seen this. We're in this. There’s no such thing as an isolated trading loss anymore. And yet Jamie Dimon, seated atop the most powerful bank in the world, has smugly led the charge to adamantly oppose any moves to alter the banking framework that allows him, or any bank, to call a bet - a hedge or client position or market-making maneuver - with central bank, government official, and regulatory impunity.

    Flashback to the unimaginable in 1933

    It’s 1933 and the country has undergone several years of painful Depression following the 1920s speculation that crashed in the fall of 1929. Investigations into the bank related causes began under Republican President, Herbert Hoover and continued under Democratic President, FDR.

    Okay, that’s pretty common knowledge. But, here’s something that isn’t: of all the giant banks operating their trusts schemes and taking advantage of off-book deals, and international bets in the late 1920s, it was an incoming head of Chase (replacing Al Wiggins who shorted Chase stock in a network of fraud) that advocated for Glass-Steagall. Indeed, despite all pedigree to the opposite (his father was Senator Nelson Aldrich architect of the Federal Reserve and brother-in-law, John D. Rockefeller), Chase Chair, Winthrop Aldrich, took to the front pages of the New York Times in March, 1933 to pitch decisive separation of commercial and speculative activity arguments. Fellow bankers hated him.

    His motives weren’t totally altruistic to be sure, but somewhere in his calculation that Chase would survive a separation of activities and emerge stronger than rival, Morgan Bank, was an awareness that something more – permanent – had to be put in place if only to save the banking industry from future confidence breaches and loss. It turned out he was right. And wrong. (much more on that in my next book, research still ongoing.)

    Financial history has a sense of irony. JPM Chase was the post-Glass-Steagall repeal marriage, 66 years in the making, of Morgan Bank and Chase. Today, it is the largest bank in America, possessing greater control of the nation’s cash than any other bank.It also has the largest derivatives exposure ($70 trillion) including nearly $6 trillion worth of credit derivatives.

    It is the size of a bank holding company’s deposits that dictates the extent of the risk it takes, risk ‘models’ not withstanding: the more deposits, the more risk, the more potential loss. JPM Chase is not alone in using its position as deposit taker to increase speculation, but it has more to play with.

    And the more access to other people’s money, the greater the gambling incentive. The largest banks hold deposits (our deposits) hostage in the global game of financial warfare. Related access to capital and bailouts are enabling weaponry in the fight for worldwide insitutional supremacy.

    The Alleged Hedge


    Now, consider JPM Chase’s alleged ‘hedge’ itself; a trading position taken in the London department, the chief investment office, set up to allegedly protect the bank’s overall book and ‘invest’ its excess capital. Any investment is a bet. A hedge is supposed to mitigate loss if the bet fails. An investment is not a hedge.

    Let’s pretend for a moment that banks were about simple conventional - banking – taking deposits and making loans. In that context, it would be nonsensical to hedge loan risk by pouring on more loan risk, or put out a fire by pouring fuel on its flames.

    In other words, if a bank lends money to, say Boeing, it accepts a rate, in return, more or less related to its assessment of the risk involved in getting its money back, which translates into an interest payment. To hedge that payment, a bank could purchase ‘insurance’ or ‘protection’ from a counterparty solvent enough to make good on any shortfall in Boeing’s ability to pay its interest, or in the event of an Boeing default. What is not a hedge for the loan, is further exposure to the risk that Boeing could default. Yet, in a more complex manner, that’s exactly what happened here.

    By engaging in a trade that tied up 15% of its assets, or $350 billion, no matter what label that trade received, the Whale man and his managers (leading up to Jamie Dimon), went long credit risk by shorting an index of synthetic credits, thereby placing the bank in the position of paying out, or losing money, if those credits deteriorate. In effect, and super-simplistically, it doubled down. In its more complex form, the firm took a short position in an index of credit default swaps representing 125 North American investment grade corporations (including Boeing), called the CDX.NA.IG.9. The index has been diving in price, hence the loss - and mounting loss to JPM.

    Deception and Delusion


    Going long the corporate credit market while still immersed in the fallout of having been long the European sovereign and US real estate market, demonstrates the same cluelessness about the economy and financial system prevalent in the media and in Washington every time the words ‘slow recovery’ rather than something to the effect of ‘prolonged, continued, enduring depression’ are uttered.

    In such a charade, why wouldn’t JPM Chase, a bank existing on an array of federal largesse, and Jamie Dimon who was re-voted to Class A NY Fed Director, the position he held during the 2008 crisis, in early 2010 – rubber stamp a bet that corporate economic health is a foregone conclusion.

    It was under that same misplaced, other people’s money optimism and hubris that MF Global stole (or for the apologists, ‘mistakenly took’) $1.6 billion of its segregated customers' money to stay in a bad bet. Former MF Global CEO, the ‘honorable’ Jon Corzine’s bet was that certain European sovereign credits would improve. Only they didn’t. Not in time for his margins to hold out.

    It’s more than ironic, that JPM Chase, the bank still entangled with MF Global customer money, took the same bet, albeit with different credits and is trying to pawn it off as an ‘egregious’ mistake, a blip on the radar of an otherwise pristinely risk-managed bank.

    It’s also supremely annoying that Dimon is right about something, that the Volcker Rule wouldn’t necessarily apply to this ‘hedge.’ There’s nothing particularly wrong with the Volcker Rule; it will mitigate some fraction of risk, though given the SEC and Fed’s inability to understand what risk is, it’s unlikely they’ll take the mental leap to segment trades as mitigating it, or not. Yet, the Volcker Rule will not change one fundamental pillar of global systemic risk – as long as banks are not segregated ala Glass Steagall along deposit-taking / loan-making vs. speculation lines, they will have access to capital to burn. And burn it they will.

    http://www.nomiprins.com/thoughts/20...ass-steag.html

  • #2
    Re: Nomi Prins frames JP Morgan's antics

    Don't like the Banksters raping America?
    Then, do somthing!

    JPM Chase is a business . . . boycott them. Starve the beast!

    If large numbers of folks pulled their deposits out of Big Banks and transferred their business to small, local banks, the Big Banks would go under. Let's pick off JP Morgan first . . . .

    Or maybe the American people are too uneducated, unmotivated or whatever to take action. They don't mind being reamed out by Big Banks. I guess we'll see how they like being Debt Serfs.

    Note: As to the effects of depositors pulling out of a bank, consider this . . . .
    "Sept. 26, 2008 (Bloomberg) -- JPMorgan Chase & Co. became the biggest U.S. bank by deposits, acquiring Washington Mutual Inc.'s branch network for $1.9 billion after the thrift was seized in the largest U.S. bank failure in history.
    Customers of WaMu withdrew $16.7 billion from accounts since Sept. 16, leaving the Seattle-based bank ``unsound,'' the Office of Thrift Supervision said late yesterday. WaMu's branches will open today and depositors will have full access to all their accounts, Sheila Bair, chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., said on a conference call. "
    raja
    Boycott Big Banks • Vote Out Incumbents

    Comment


    • #3
      Re: Nomi Prins frames JP Morgan's antics

      Originally posted by nomi
      JPM Chase Chairman, Jamie Dimon, the Whale Man, and Glass-Steagall
      .....

      In such a charade, why wouldn’t JPM Chase, a bank existing on an array of federal largesse, and Jamie Dimon who was re-voted to Class A NY Fed Director, the position he held during the 2008 crisis, in early 2010 – rubber stamp a bet that corporate economic health is a foregone conclusion.

      ....
      yeah - why wouldnt he...


      Comment


      • #4
        Re: Nomi Prins frames JP Morgan's antics

        Originally posted by raja View Post
        Don't like the Banksters raping America?
        Then, do somthing!

        JPM Chase is a business . . . boycott them. Starve the beast!

        If large numbers of folks pulled their deposits out of Big Banks and transferred their business to small, local banks, the Big Banks would go under. Let's pick off JP Morgan first . . . .

        Or maybe the American people are too uneducated, unmotivated or whatever to take action. They don't mind being reamed out by Big Banks. I guess we'll see how they like being Debt Serfs.

        Note: As to the effects of depositors pulling out of a bank, consider this . . . .
        "Sept. 26, 2008 (Bloomberg) -- JPMorgan Chase & Co. became the biggest U.S. bank by deposits, acquiring Washington Mutual Inc.'s branch network for $1.9 billion after the thrift was seized in the largest U.S. bank failure in history.
        Customers of WaMu withdrew $16.7 billion from accounts since Sept. 16, leaving the Seattle-based bank ``unsound,'' the Office of Thrift Supervision said late yesterday. WaMu's branches will open today and depositors will have full access to all their accounts, Sheila Bair, chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., said on a conference call. "
        Many here rant and rave, But they do help feed the beast. Making life more difficult and more costly is a price to pay. There is always a price to pay.

        Comment


        • #5
          Re: Nomi Prins frames JP Morgan's antics

          Black weighs in . . .





          Why JPMorgan gets away with bad bets - CNN.com
          By William K. Black , Special to CNN


          updated 5:39 AM EDT, Tue May 15, 2012
          Editor's note: William K. Black is an associate professor of economics and law at the University of Missouri-Kansas City. A former senior financial regulator and a white-collar criminologist, he is the author of "The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to Own One."

          (CNN) -- JPMorgan Chase can be considered a systemically dangerous institution, which means that it is "too big to fail" because the government fears that its collapse would cause a global financial crisis.


          It is simply irrational to allow such an institution to exist, especially when it can easily incur a $2 billion trading loss.
          Banks are more efficient when shrunk to the point that they can no longer endanger the world economy. But because JPMorgan and similar banks are the leading contributors to Democrats and Republicans, neither political party has the courage to order them to reform.


          The Volcker Rule, which aims to prevent insured banks from engaging in speculative bets, was passed as part of the Dodd-Frank Act over the objections of Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner and almost the entire Republican congressional delegation.


          Back in 2008 when the financial crisis hit us hard, a host of large institutions were destroyed. AIG, Merrill Lynch, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Washington Mutual and Wachovia all suffered massive losses on their toxic derivatives, particularly collateralized debt obligations (CDO) and credit default swaps (CDS), better known as "green slime." One would think everyone has learned a lesson. Jamie Dimon, JPMorgan's CEO, now agrees that banks should not invest in derivatives. But government subsidies have a way of encouraging fraud and speculation.


          JPMorgan, the nation's largest bank, receives an explicit federal subsidy (deposit insurance) and a much larger implicit federal subsidy. It's improper for the megabank to use these subsidies to speculate in derivatives. And yet it can do so with hardly any serious regulatory consequences.



          Financial institutions such as JPMorgan love to buy derivatives because they are opaque, create fictional income that leads to real bonuses and when (not if) they suffer losses so large that they would cause the bank to fail, they will be bailed out.
          The Dodd-Frank Act's Volcker Rule was designed to solve the problem.


          However, JPMorgan led the effort to gut the Volcker Rule and the provision that requires transparency. JPMorgan is the world's largest proprietary purchaser of financial derivatives -- precisely what the Volcker Rule sought to end. The bank claims that it does not engage in proprietary trading and that it purchases derivatives solely to hedge. That claim is an example of what Stephen Colbert meant when he invented the term: "truthiness."


          A hedge is an investment that offsets losses in another investment. JPMorgan's supposed hedges aren't hedges under accounting rules because they haven't been shown to perform as hedges.


          JPMorgan bought tens of billions of dollars of derivatives that increased its losses rather than reduced them. It calls these anti-hedges "hedges" -- in other words, it practiced "hedginess." The bank's approach to hedging is that it would like to purchase a derivative if it deems that derivative to be a hedge to something else and voila, it's a hedge.


          The draft regulations of the Volcker Rule allow such faux hedges because JPMorgan lobbied to render the rule useless. JPMorgan asserts that these inherently unsafe and unsound anti-hedges are "hedges" as that term is defined in the draft regulations implementing the Volcker Rule. But if hedginess is permissible, the Volcker rule is unenforceable.


          It is a travesty for JPMorgan to be able to create an additional $2 billion in losses through investments that are supposed to be allowed only if they reduce losses. The government must revise the regulations and reject JPMorgan's absurd treatment of anti-hedges as hedges.


          Faux hedges are a common, dangerous abuse and a lethal form of speculation. From 2003 to 2006, the Securities and Exchange Commission caught mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac violating hedge accounting to maximize their executives' compensation. Fannie's faux hedges, like JPMorgan's faux hedges, increased losses. The Justice Department failed to prosecute, and the senior executives walked away wealthy. Their successors blew up Fannie and cost taxpayers hundreds of billions of dollars.


          When a bank CEO is honest but incompetent, faux hedges simultaneously increase risk and create a false complacency that the hedge has offset the risk. This can cause catastrophic losses.


          Dishonest bank CEOs use faux hedges to loot the bank by creating fictional income and hiding real losses. The fake income makes the CEO wealthy by maximizing his compensation.


          The current JPMorgan speculation in derivatives weakens but will not kill the bank. If it and other systemically dangerous institutions continue to engage in hedginess, it is only a matter of time before we'll get a replay of the financial crisis. And who'll lose out? Taxpayers like you and me, of course.


          The opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of William K. Black.



          © 2012 Cable News Network. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

          Comment


          • #6
            Re: Nomi Prins frames JP Morgan's antics

            Saw her with Keiser (about 12 mins in)

            Comment


            • #7
              Re: Nomi Prins frames JP Morgan's antics

              In a remarkably short piece for Henry, Liu weighs in . . .

              JPMorgan not so dumb
              By Henry C K Liu

              The revelation by JPMorgan Chase last week that it lost US$2 billion in its hedging operations was duly followed by an apology of sorts by chief executive Jamie Dimon. "This should never have happened. I can't justify it. Unfortunately, these mistakes are self-inflicted," he told the bank's annual meeting. His subsequent claim to reporters that "the buck always stops with me" was followed by resignation of Ina Drew, chief investment officer and in charge of the unit responsible for the losses.

              According to a New York Times "overly simplistic primer" on "how JPMorgan got in this mess in the first place", The company's chief investment office originally made a series of trades intended to protect the firm from a possible global slowdown. JPMorgan owns billions of dollars in corporate bonds, so if a slowdown were to occur and corporations couldn't pay back their debt, those bonds would have lost value.

              To mitigate that possibility, JPMorgan bought insurance - credit-default swaps - that would go up in value if the bonds fell in value.

              But sometime last year, with the economy doing better than expected, the bank decided it had bought too much insurance. Rather than simply selling the insurance, the bank set up a second "hedge" to bet that the economy would continue to improve - and this time, traders overshot, by a lot. [1]I wrote in May 2009 on how hedge funds could squeeze a bank:

              There were two dimensions to the cause of the current credit crisis. The first was that unit risk was not eliminated, merely transferred to a larger pool to make it invisible statistically. The second, and more ominous, was that regulatory risks were defined by credit ratings, and the two fed on each other inversely. As credit rating rose, risk exposure fell to create an under-pricing of risk. But as risk exposure rose, credit rating fell to exacerbate further rise of risk exposure in a chain reaction that detonated a debt explosion of atomic dimension.

              The [US] Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve jointly allowed banks with credit default swaps (CDS) insurance to keep super-senior risk assets on their books without adding capital because the risk was insured. Normally, if the banks held the super-senior risk on their books, they would need to post capital at 8% of the liability.

              But capital could be reduced to one-fifth the normal amount (20% of 8%, meaning $160 for every $10,000 of risk on the books) if banks could prove to the regulators that the risk of default on the super-senior portion of the deals was truly negligible, and if the securities being issued via a collateral debt obligation (CDO) structure carried a Triple-A credit rating from a "nationally recognized credit rating agency", such as Standard & Poor's rating on AIG.

              With CDS insurance, banks then could cut the normal $800 million capital for every $10 billion of corporate loans on their books to just $160 million, meaning banks with CDS insurance can loan up to five times more on the same capital. The CDS-insured CDO deals could then bypass international banking rules on capital. To correct this bypass is a key reason why the government wanted to conduct stress tests on banks in 2009 to see if banks need to raise new capital in a Downward Loss Given Default.

              CDS contracts are generally subject to mark-to-market accounting that introduces regular periodic income statements to show balance sheet volatility that would not be present in a regulated insurance contract. Further, the buyer of a CDS does not even need to own the underlying security or other form of credit exposure. In fact, the buyer does not even have to suffer an actual loss from the default event, only a virtual loss would suffice for collection of the insured notional amount.

              So, at 0.02 cents to a dollar (1 to 10,000 odd), speculators could place bets to collect astronomical payouts in billions with affordable losses. A $10,000 bet on a CDS default could stand to win $100,000,000 within a year. That was exactly what many hedge funds did because they could recoup all their lost bets even if they only won once in 10,000 years. As it turns out, many only had to wait a couple of years before winning a huge windfall. But until AIG was bailed out by the Fed, these hedge funds were not sure they could collect their winnings. [2]



              That is how hedge funds squeezed JPMorgan for a $2 billion loss. JPMorgan paid up because even with the $2 billion loss, it still makes $4 billion in the same quarter, much of it from CDS-insured CDO deals that could then bypass international banking rules on capital. With all the noise about the Volker Rule restricting bank proprietary trading, JPMorgan still has the last laugh.

              My friend Dar Maanavi, former head of corporate derivatives at Merrill Lynch, thinks the reason JPMorgan has not come completely clean on this is that from a regulatory perspective, if it is so simple to coordinate risk taking between the bank and the trading businesses, then it must be just also possible to take speculative positions for the trading businesses on the banking side.

              Maanavi thinks that in such an environment, JP chose to make the loss look as if there was some unauthorized dumb trading going on versus admitting that the bank and proprietary trading are highly integrated activities, in the face of Volcker rule debates on restricting such integration.

              Notes
              1. The 'Perfect Hedge' Remains Elusive at JPMorgan, New York Times, May 14, 2012.
              2. Mark-to-Market vs Mark-to-Model, Henryckliu.com, May 25, 2009.

              Henry C K Liu is chairman of a New York-based private investment group. His website is at www.henryckliu.com

              Comment


              • #8
                Re: Nomi Prins frames JP Morgan's antics

                That is how hedge funds squeezed JPMorgan for a $2 billion loss. JPMorgan paid up because even with the $2 billion loss, it still makes $4 billion in the same quarter, much of it from CDS-insured CDO deals that could then bypass international banking rules on capital. With all the noise about the Volker Rule restricting bank proprietary trading, JPMorgan still has the last laugh.
                Wowwww, and I was worried that they were in trouble. Who pockets that $4 billion because I am sure they don't live in my neighborhood.

                Comment


                • #9
                  Re: Nomi Prins frames JP Morgan's antics

                  Are these guys playing Monopoly ???

                  JPMorgan's Trading Loss Is Said to Rise at Least 50%
                  http://finance.yahoo.com/news/jpmorg...100803486.html

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